From 9276ecc42a8a0bd21bbf90368bab321d332450cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eli Friedman Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 23:03:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] [docs] Fix a couple spelling errors. git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@352439 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8 --- docs/LangRef.rst | 2 +- docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/LangRef.rst b/docs/LangRef.rst index 16cc068ce4f..27f5e0cbec7 100644 --- a/docs/LangRef.rst +++ b/docs/LangRef.rst @@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ operations relative to non-volatile operations. This is not Java's A volatile load or store may have additional target-specific semantics. Any volatile operation can have side effects, and any volatile operation can read and/or modify state which is not accessible via a regular load -or store in this module. Volatile operations may use adresses which do +or store in this module. Volatile operations may use addresses which do not point to memory (like MMIO registers). This means the compiler may not use a volatile operation to prove a non-volatile access to that address has defined behavior. diff --git a/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.md b/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.md index 0911b7c6ae2..de6dc015c57 100644 --- a/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.md +++ b/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.md @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ if (untrusted_size_from_caller < sizeof(local_buffer)) { memcpy(local_buffer, untrusted_data_from_caller, untrusted_size_from_caller); // The stack has now been smashed, writing an attacker-controlled - // address over the return adress. + // address over the return address. minor_processing(local_buffer); return; // Control will speculate to the attacker-written address.