Re-commit r319490 "XOR the frame pointer with the stack cookie when protecting the stack"

The patch originally broke Chromium (crbug.com/791714) due to its failing to
specify that the new pseudo instructions clobber EFLAGS. This commit fixes
that.

> Summary: This strengthens the guard and matches MSVC.
>
> Reviewers: hans, etienneb
>
> Subscribers: hiraditya, JDevlieghere, vlad.tsyrklevich, llvm-commits
>
> Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40622

git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@319824 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This commit is contained in:
Hans Wennborg
2017-12-05 20:22:20 +00:00
parent aa1ccb63b4
commit e33d953bea
9 changed files with 206 additions and 22 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -385,8 +385,12 @@ static bool CreatePrologue(Function *F, Module *M, ReturnInst *RI,
/// - The epilogue checks the value stored in the prologue against the original
/// value. It calls __stack_chk_fail if they differ.
bool StackProtector::InsertStackProtectors() {
// If the target wants to XOR the frame pointer into the guard value, it's
// impossible to emit the check in IR, so the target *must* support stack
// protection in SDAG.
bool SupportsSelectionDAGSP =
EnableSelectionDAGSP && !TM->Options.EnableFastISel;
TLI->useStackGuardXorFP() ||
(EnableSelectionDAGSP && !TM->Options.EnableFastISel);
AllocaInst *AI = nullptr; // Place on stack that stores the stack guard.
for (Function::iterator I = F->begin(), E = F->end(); I != E;) {