* chore: rebrand user-facing gitlawb references to Twigpine
Rename the product name in docs, README, CLI help/output, MCP tool
descriptions, macOS app strings, installers, npm metadata and license
headers from gitlawb/Gitlawb to Twigpine. Point GitHub links at the
renamed Twigpine org (and fix the release workflow's repository guard,
which still matched Gitlawb/node), and switch the public node hosts and
website/install URLs to twigpine.com.
Protocol and operator identifiers are intentionally unchanged
(did:gitlawb, gitlawb://, signing domains, GITLAWB_* env vars, crate
and binary names, X-Gitlawb-* headers, icaptcha and peer-network URLs);
they need a follow-up migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* docs: point image pulls at ghcr.io/twigpine/node and fix macOS DMG name
The release workflow publishes the container image to
ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}, which is ghcr.io/twigpine/node since the
org rename; the old ghcr.io/gitlawb/node path no longer resolves for
anonymous pulls. Point the RUN-A-NODE docker run example, the OSS
readiness audit's claim about it, and the macOS app's generated compose
file at the published path.
The README listed the macOS DMG as "Twigpine Node.dmg", but
build-macos-app.sh writes GitlawbNode-macOS.dmg (kept on purpose), so
document the real file name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* fix(infra): keep the AWS security group description to avoid replacement
`description` on aws_security_group is ForceNew, so renaming it forced a
replace of the in-use group on the next apply of an existing deployment.
Restore the original text and note why it must stay until a separate
infra migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* fix(macos): regenerate the app's compose file instead of treating it as a repo's
Config.repoPath fell back to the data directory when no repo clone was
found, and DockerCompose then picked up the compose file it had generated
there as if it belonged to a repo. The generator therefore only ran on
first launch, so upgraded installs kept their original compose, including
the old ghcr.io/gitlawb/node image, which no longer serves anonymous pulls.
repoPath now returns nil when there is no clone, and the app regenerates
its compose file whenever no repo compose is in use. Project directory and
named volumes are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* fix(infra): default the AWS node image to ghcr.io/twigpine/node
release.yml publishes to ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}, which is now
ghcr.io/twigpine/node; ghcr.io/gitlawb/node denies anonymous pulls, so the
default made new deployments fail to start and the upgrade command fail
on existing ones. On an existing deployment `terraform apply` only updates
the upgrade SSM document in place (user_data drift is ignored); the new
image is pulled on the next upgrade_command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* fix(macos): keep operator edits to the generated compose, migrate only the image
e04efe4 regenerated the app's compose file on every access, overwriting
edits operators make to pass settings the generated environment block
omits (e.g. GITLAWB_OPERATOR_STRICT_MODE). Generate the file only when it
is missing; when it exists, keep it and rewrite only references to the
retired ghcr.io/gitlawb/node image, keeping tags and digests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* fix(macos): only migrate complete ghcr.io/gitlawb/node references
Without a left boundary the migration also rewrote the retired path when
it appeared inside a longer reference, such as a registry mirror
(registry.example.com/ghcr.io/gitlawb/node), pointing it at a path the
mirror may not have.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Every item below was verified against the code before changing it; two of them
were confirmed by running the probe the reviewer described.
A test the fixture sweep missed, and that could not fail
--------------------------------------------------------
`f1_write_cap_is_inert_without_a_resolvable_source_key` seeded `z6f1none` and
pushed as `z6MkF1NoKeyPusher…`, so the owner gate rejected it before it reached
the per-caller cap the test exists to measure. Its assertion was
`!matches!(r, Err(Overloaded(_)))`, which a `Forbidden` satisfies, so it reported
ok while measuring nothing — and it is not `#[cfg(unix)]`, so it did that inside
every green run. Confirmed by inverting the assertion to expect `Forbidden`: it
passed, proving the request stopped at the gate.
The pusher is now the owner, and the assertion is positive: reaching git on the
missing on-disk repo (`Err(Git(_))`) is proof the request cleared both the gate
and the cap. The sibling `f1_write_cap_key_is_per_source_not_per_repo` carried
the same weak negative in its second assertion and is tightened the same way.
The default was barely tested, and what tested it read the environment
---------------------------------------------------------------------
`Config::parse_from` consults the process environment, so on a host exporting
`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` the old `enforce_owner_push_defaults_to_true`
reported the operator's setting rather than what this crate declares — it failed
outright, which would also break any contributor who sets the variable. It is
replaced by two tests that are env-independent and behavioural:
* `enforce_owner_push_is_declared_true_independent_of_the_environment` reads
the declared default off `Config::command()`.
* `default_config_refuses_a_non_owner_push` drives the handler on an untouched
`test_state` config and asserts 403 — authenticated by a real RFC 9421
signature, so 403 rather than 401 is what makes it a statement about
authorization.
Both were checked by reverting `default_value_t` to `false`: the handler test
reports 500 where it wants 403, and the declared test reports `["false"]`.
The cross-tenant test lost its second tenant
--------------------------------------------
The sweep collapsed `u1_parked_push_does_not_shed_another_pusher_behind_the_same
_ip` onto one identity, leaving the test named for cross-tenant behaviour with a
single tenant and two docstrings describing a scenario it no longer ran. `n2` is
now owned by `z6u1nat2` and its push signs as that owner, so two distinct tenants
share one edge IP again — which is the property under test, since the per-source
key is the resolved peer address and never the DID.
Four comments outlived their premise
-------------------------------------
`repos.rs` (3 sites) and `.env.example` still said owner enforcement defaults
off. The IP-keying rationale they support is unchanged and still correct — a DID
farm defeats a DID key — so only the dead premise is rewritten: the cap is
load-bearing because the rate limiter bounds arrival rate rather than occupancy,
because the gate can be turned off for a rolling upgrade, and because one owner
can open many concurrent pushes to their own repo.
Operators on the container path got none of this
-------------------------------------------------
`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` is now forwarded in `docker-compose.yml`, the macOS
app's bundled compose, and `infra/aws/compose.yaml.tftpl`, defaulting to `true`
to match the node. Without it the rolling-upgrade opt-out this PR documents in
three places was unreachable for anyone running compose.
A cutover this project never promised
--------------------------------------
The README paragraph announcing a 15 September 2026 flip of
`GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` is removed. That flag is not changed here,
the date appears nowhere on main, and a PR about a different flag is not where
that commitment would be made. The table row for `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`
carries the part that belongs.
A docstring that credited the wrong thing
------------------------------------------
The field and test docs claimed the value-taking action is what makes
`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` resolve to `false`. It is not: the env form
resolved under the presence-only declaration too. What the change buys is
`--enforce-owner-push false` parsing at all, rather than erroring as an
unexpected argument. Both docstrings now say so.
* fix(docker): reap orphan processes via tini + init, cap pids
The node runs as PID 1 in the container and never reaps reparented
orphans, so git grandchildren (e.g. pack-objects left behind when a
served clone disconnects) accumulate as zombies until fork() fails with
EAGAIN. Run under tini and set compose init: true so reparented orphans
are reaped, and add pids_limit as a blast-radius cap.
Refs #53
* fix(node): reap leaked git child processes (#53)
Serving git over smart-HTTP could leak zombie processes that, over weeks,
exhaust the PID table until fork() fails with EAGAIN and all git
operations break until restart.
The serve path (run_git_service) now runs git in its own process group and
SIGKILLs that group when the request future is dropped (client disconnect)
or returns early, so git and its pack-objects child are torn down together
instead of orphaning the grandchild to PID 1 as a zombie. A drop guard,
disarmed once the request completes cleanly, owns this teardown.
create_issue and build_filtered_pack spawned a std Child and dropped it
unwaited if the stdin write failed (and build_filtered_pack could panic on
a missing stdin handle). Both now always wait the child before surfacing
any error, so the failure path cannot leak.
Adds libc for the group-kill syscall and three regression tests covering
direct-child kill, grandchild reaping via the group, and the disarmed
no-kill path.
Refs #53
* fix(review): reap-then-disarm on serve-path errors; tini/comment nits
Address code-review findings on the #53 fix:
- run_git_service no longer early-returns on a stdin-write error. It captures
the write result, always reaps the child, then disarms the group guard
before surfacing the error. Previously a write/wait error path could drop
the still-armed guard after the child was already reaped, so the group
SIGKILL could in theory land on a reused pgid. (correctness, reliability,
adversarial all flagged this region.)
- Drop tini's -g flag: the node manages its own children and graceful
shutdown, so group-wide signalling would only disturb in-flight git helpers
on shutdown.
- Correct the SAFETY comment (kill(2) is not relevant to async-signal-safety
here) and the alive() test-helper comment (EPERM does not read as alive).
* fix(node): SIGTERM (not SIGKILL) the served-git group on disconnect
SIGKILL gave git no chance to run its signal cleanup, so an aborted
receive-pack could leave a stale .git/*.lock that blocks the next push.
SIGTERM lets git remove its lock files before exiting. Signalling the
whole process group still reaches pack-objects directly, so the grandchild
is terminated rather than orphaned, and a single immediate signal avoids
any delayed-kill pid-reuse window.
Refs #53
* docs(node): correct stale SIGKILL comments to SIGTERM in served-git teardown
- Menu bar icon with colored status dot (green/yellow/red)
- Start/Stop node via Docker Compose
- Settings UI: ports, public URL, postgres password, auto-sync, operator config
- View Logs window with live docker compose logs
- Auto-start on launch and login (SMAppService)
- Docker detection with install prompt
- Repo root detection via compile-time path for local builds
- Port variables wired through docker-compose.yml for custom port support
- GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC passthrough for peer replication toggle
- Build script: scripts/build-macos-app.sh (codesign + DMG)
Co-authored-by: Rimas Mocevicius <[email protected]>
Touch alone wasn't enough — cargo can still reuse cached fingerprint
state from the dependency-cache layer. Explicitly remove the dummy
binaries and their fingerprint dirs so the second build reproduces
real artifacts unconditionally.
Also drop the obsolete `version: '3.9'` from docker-compose.yml.
Co-Authored-By: OpenClaude <[email protected]>
