fix(core): zeroize the derived X25519 secret (#65) (#66)

x25519_secret_from_seed derived the X25519 private scalar from the Ed25519
seed and returned it as a bare [u8; 32]. Because [u8; 32] is Copy with no
Drop (and sha2's digest output likewise has no zeroize), the scalar, the
SHA-512 digest, and the returned temporary were released without being
scrubbed, leaving secret-derived material in freed memory. This is the same
Copy-no-Drop class fixed for the raw seed in #41, on the derived secret.

Return Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, build the scalar directly into a zeroizing
buffer so no bare secret local persists, and explicitly wipe the SHA-512
digest before it drops. Callers deref the result into crypto_box::SecretKey,
which already scrubs its own copy. No behavior change: the derived scalar and
all decryption output are byte-identical, covered by the existing
ed25519_to_x25519_keypair_agrees and seal_open_round_trip_for_recipients tests.

Stacked on #41 (#64).

crates/gitlawb-core/src/encrypt.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 use crate::identity::Keypair;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 
 /// X25519 public key (Montgomery u) for an Ed25519 verifying key.
 fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
@@ -18,14 +19,18 @@ fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
 }
 
 /// X25519 secret scalar for an Ed25519 seed (SHA-512 of seed, lower 32, clamped).
-fn x25519_secret_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
+/// Returns the scalar wrapped in `Zeroizing`, and scrubs the intermediate
+/// SHA-512 digest, so no copy of this secret material lingers in freed memory.
+fn x25519_secret_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
     use sha2::{Digest, Sha512};
-    let h = Sha512::digest(seed);
+    use zeroize::Zeroize;
-    let mut s = [0u8; 32];
+    let mut h = Sha512::digest(seed);
+    let mut s = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
     s.copy_from_slice(&h[..32]);
     s[0] &= 248;
     s[31] &= 127;
     s[31] |= 64;
+    h.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
     s
 }
 
@@ -123,7 +128,7 @@ pub fn open_blob(envelope: &[u8], keypair: &Keypair) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
             .context("decode header")?;
     let body = &envelope[p + hlen..];
 
-    let my_x = XSecret::from(x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.seed_bytes()));
+    let my_x = XSecret::from(*x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.to_seed()));
 
     // Identities are blinded: no entry says which recipient it belongs to, so
     // try each one. The ChaChaBox AEAD tag authenticates, so exactly the
@@ -185,10 +190,10 @@ mod tests {
         // The X25519 public derived from the Ed25519 public must equal the
         // X25519 public of the X25519 secret derived from the same seed.
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let seed = kp.seed_bytes();
+        let seed = kp.to_seed();
         let xpub_from_public = x25519_public(&kp.verifying_key()).unwrap();
         let xsec = x25519_secret_from_seed(&seed);
-        let xpub_from_secret = crypto_box::SecretKey::from(xsec).public_key().to_bytes();
+        let xpub_from_secret = crypto_box::SecretKey::from(*xsec).public_key().to_bytes();
         assert_eq!(xpub_from_public, xpub_from_secret);
     }
 

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity.rs

@@ -52,13 +52,9 @@ impl Keypair {
         URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig.to_bytes())
     }
 
-    /// The raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed. Used to derive the X25519 secret for
+    /// The raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed, wrapped in `Zeroizing` so the copy is
-    /// envelope decryption (see `crate::encrypt`).
+    /// scrubbed on drop. This is the only seed accessor; it is used to derive
-    pub fn seed_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+    /// the X25519 secret for envelope decryption (see `crate::encrypt`).
-        self.signing_key.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    /// Export the signing key as raw 32-byte seed (wrapped in Zeroizing).
     pub fn to_seed(&self) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
         Zeroizing::new(self.signing_key.to_bytes())
     }
@@ -172,6 +168,20 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(kp.verifying_key(), kp2.verifying_key());
     }
 
+    // `to_seed()` is the only seed accessor on `Keypair` (the raw, unzeroized
+    // `seed_bytes()` was removed in #41). Pin its return type so a bare-array
+    // accessor can't slip back in, and confirm it is deterministic. The
+    // from_seed -> verifying_key round-trip is already covered by
+    // `from_seed_round_trip`.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_seed_returns_zeroizing_and_is_deterministic() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        // The type annotation is the regression guard: the seed must be handed
+        // out wrapped in `Zeroizing`, never as a bare `[u8; 32]`.
+        let seed: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> = kp.to_seed();
+        assert_eq!(*kp.to_seed(), *seed); // stable across calls
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn sign_b64_decodes_to_valid_signature() {
         use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs

@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
         let irys_url = state.config.irys_url.clone();
         let http_client = std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.http_client);
         let node_did_str = state.node_did.to_string();
-        let node_seed = state.node_keypair.seed_bytes();
+        let node_seed = state.node_keypair.to_seed();
         let repo_name = record.name.clone();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
             let pinned = crate::ipfs_pin::pin_new_objects(