27 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
KRATOS	e018ee27e0	Remove superseded and dead utility functions ... Behavior-preserving cleanup of functions unreachable even from tests: - tools.CoreWriteTools / CoreShellTools — superseded by the …Scoped variants. - workspaceindex.MaxFileDepth — unused helper. - tui.indentText — unused string util. - tuiTheme.onPanel2 + the now-orphaned colorPanel2 const — unused style helper. deadcode -test=false: 114 -> 109; truly-dead: 23 -> 18. Scoped to genuine cruft only — the remaining dead funcs are dormant/intended-but-unwired features (owner wire-vs-delete), not blind deletes.	2026-06-14 12:22:32 +05:30
KRATOS	474f494b93	Deep-audit remediation + sandbox hardening (batches 1–35) (#189) ... * audit batch 1: redact nested secrets fully; count image tokens in compaction estimate - secrets.Redact: replace longest matches first so a containing PRIVATE KEY block is redacted before a nested shorter match corrupts its exact string (audit medium internal/secrets/scanner.go:81) + regression test. - agent compaction estimateTokens: add a flat per-image token cost so an image-heavy context trends toward compaction instead of reading as ~0 (audit medium internal/agent/compaction.go:58) + test. - ledger: re-verify against current main; mark scanner.go:35 and redaction.go:362 already-fixed-on-main, record this batch's fixes. * audit batch 2: worktrees defaultRunGit separates stdout/stderr Capture git stdout and stderr into separate buffers instead of CombinedOutput, so parsed rev-parse output is not polluted by git warnings and CommandResult.Stderr carries the real error text (audit medium internal/worktrees/worktrees.go:247) + test. * audit: re-verify all 87 pending findings against current main Independent agent per file re-checked each open/partial finding against the actual current code (the 06-11 ledger was verified on a since-diverged branch), with an adversarial second pass on every already_fixed verdict. Authoritative result: 78 genuinely pending (66 still_open + 12 partial); 9 rows were already fixed on main and are reclassified. Full table in 2026-06-13-reverification.md. * audit batch 3 (agent): cancellation identity, always-allow w/o sandbox, compaction usage, dedup - loop.go: check ctx.Err() before collected.Error so a cancelled run returns context.Canceled (errors.Is holds) instead of a plain stringified error. - loop.go: 'Always allow' with no sandbox engine now allows THIS call instead of denying it (persistence is skipped when there's nowhere to persist). - loop.go: remove a duplicate schema["items"] assignment in propertyToRuntimeMap. - compaction.go: forward OnUsage (token accounting) through the summarizer while still omitting OnText, so compaction's token cost is counted in usage/budgets. - tests for all three behavioral fixes (each fails pre-fix). * audit batch 4 (cli): list-tools -o json, interrupted -o json terminal, surface session-record failures - exec --list-tools -o json now emits a JSON tool listing instead of falling through to the human-readable text (audit medium exec.go:182) + test. - interrupted run with -o json now emits a terminal error+done on stdout instead of only printing to stderr, so a JSON consumer sees a clean end (medium exec.go:500) + test. - execSessionRecorder: surface a latched session-append failure to stderr once at run end (deferred) instead of silently dropping it (medium exec_sessions.go:114/115) + test. - left app.go trailing-arg ignore as-is: documented-intentional, TUI has no argv prompt. * audit batch 5 (zerogit): status -z porcelain (renames + non-ASCII paths); document env-drop on plain Runner - parseStatus: switch `git status` to `--porcelain -z` and parse the NUL-delimited form (audit medium zerogit.go:212). Previously the default --short output was split on newlines, so a rename `R old -> new` was kept as one bogus path and a non-ASCII/whitespace filename arrived C-quoted+escaped (e.g. `"caf\303\251.txt"`). The -z form never quotes paths and emits a rename/copy as `XY <dest>\0<src>`, so we now record the destination verbatim and consume the source field. + TestParseStatusZHandlesRenamesAndSpecialPaths. - resolveRunners: document that the plain-Runner EnvRunner adapter intentionally drops env (audit low zerogit.go:417). The branch is reached only when a caller supplies a custom Runner without a RunGitEnv — in practice fake-Runner tests. Production leaves both nil and gets defaultRunGit/defaultRunGitEnv, which honor GIT_INDEX_FILE, so snapshot-diff isolation holds. Routing env calls to real git instead would break the fake-Runner test pattern and fix nothing in production. - update Inspect/Commit mock tests to the -z status format and the new command. * audit batch 6 (config): reject negative maxTurns; drop dead contract-gap helpers - FileConfig.UnmarshalJSON now rejects a negative maxTurns instead of letting the `MaxTurns > 0` merge gates silently drop it and fall back to the default, hiding the misconfiguration (audit medium resolver.go:136). 0 is left as the "unset" sentinel (omitempty) and still falls back to the default; the CLI --max-turns flag continues to reject 0 too since there it is distinguishable from absent. + TestResolveRejectsNegativeMaxTurns / ...ZeroFallsBackToDefault. - remove dead config/contracts.go (ContractGap, DefaultContractGaps, FindContractGapsByMilestone, ContractOwnerRuntime) and its test — referenced only by that test, never by production (audit low contracts.go:12). - NOT changed: ResolveMCP intentionally does not run the provider command (TestResolveMCPDoesNotRunProviderCommand guards this), so the "ZERO_PROVIDER_COMMAND MCP servers dropped" row is by-design, not a defect. * audit batch 7 (mcp): bound captured MCP server stderr connectStdio attached a plain bytes.Buffer as cmd.Stderr that is only ever read on initialize failure, yet it kept growing for the entire process lifetime as a long-lived server logged to stderr (audit medium client.go:98). Replace it with a concurrency-safe boundedBuffer capped at 64 KiB that keeps the head (enough for init-error diagnostics) and discards the rest, reporting full write lengths so os/exec never sees a short write. + TestBoundedBufferCapsRetainedBytes. Left as-is (not defects worth the risk in the MCP client): - client.go writer.write under client.mu: already designed to release the lock before the unbounded response wait; the residual concern is a server that stops draining stdin, an involved async rewrite for a theoretical deadlock. - readLoop not answering server-initiated requests (ping): responding safely needs re-locking around the shared writer; no configured server relies on it. * audit batch 8 (tools/providers): read_file truncation marker; drop dead provider branch - read_file: when a max_lines cut occurs, append an explicit "[truncated: N more line(s)... set start_line=X to continue]" marker to the output. Previously only the Result.Truncated flag was set, which is invisible in the rendered text, so the model could not distinguish a cut read from a complete one (audit low read_file.go:89). + TestReadFileToolMarksTruncation. - providers/factory: simplify `if !explicitProvider || isImplicitOpenAI(...)` to `if !explicitProvider` and delete the now-unused isImplicitOpenAI. The clause was dead: explicitProvider==true implies ProviderKind or Provider is set, but isImplicitOpenAI required both empty, so it could never contribute a case (audit low factory.go:118). Behavior-preserving; providers tests still green. * audit batch 9 (sessions): Tree builds from a single List() snapshot (no N+1 disk scans) Store.Tree recursed via ListChildren per node, and each ListChildren ran a full store.List() that re-read every metadata.json from disk — O(nodes * total-sessions) reads for one tree (audit medium lineage.go:140). Snapshot all sessions once, index children by parent in memory, and recurse over that. Child ordering is factored into sortChildSessions so ListChildren and Tree stay identical; path-scoped cycle detection (delete(seen,...)) is preserved. Existing tree/lineage tests still pass. Left as-is: store.go timestamp() second precision (RFC3339) — switching to RFC3339Nano would break lexical UpdatedAt ordering against existing second-precision records ("...00.5Z" sorts before "...00Z"), so it is not a safe one-line change. * audit batch 10 (specialist): serialize accounting dedup-then-append recordSpecialistStop and appendSpecialistUsageRollup checked for an existing event (specialistEventExists → ReadEvents) and then appended under SEPARATE store locks, so two concurrent finishers — a foreground onExit racing a TaskOutput poll, or a background reaper — could both pass the dedup check and write duplicate stop/usage events (audit medium accounting.go:72). Guard each check-then-append pair with a package-level accountingMu (Executor is used by value, so a struct field would not be shared). + TestRecordSpecialistStopDedupesUnderConcurrency (passes under -race). * audit batch 11 (zeroruntime/gemini): O(1) text accumulation; gemini cached-token counts - zeroruntime CollectStreamWithOptions accumulated assistant text with `collected.Text += event.Content`, reallocating the whole string on every chunk (O(n^2) over a long streamed response). Accumulate in a strings.Builder on the collector and materialize it once in flush, the single finalization point hit before every return (audit low helpers.go:104). Existing collect tests still pass. - gemini decoded usageMetadata without cachedContentTokenCount, so a cached-prompt response reported zero cached input tokens while the other providers report them (audit medium gemini/types.go:88). Decode the field and thread it through streamState into NormalizeUsage as CachedInputTokens. + extended TestStreamCompletionEmitsTextUsageAndReasoningTokens. * audit batch 12 (specialist): parse child stream without a line-length cap; drop dead helper - ParseStream used a bufio.Scanner capped at 1 MiB, so one large stream-json line from a child (a big tool result or final answer) hit bufio.ErrTooLong and aborted the entire specialist run (audit medium streamer.go:43). Switch to a bufio.Reader with ReadString, which has no per-line limit; the child is our own trusted subprocess, so its output length is the legitimate bound. Line numbering and blank-line/EOF handling are preserved. + TestParseStreamHandlesLineLargerThan1MiB. - remove dead formatTaskOutput (output_tool.go:244): zero callers and zero tests; it only forwarded to formatTaskOutputSummary, which is the one actually used. * audit batch 13 (background/specialist): kill background tasks as a process group Background children were launched in the parent's process group and terminated by signalling only the single PID, so any process the task forked was orphaned and outlived a cancel; the signal also risked hitting a recycled PID after the child was reaped (audit medium process_posix.go:38/50). - ConfigureChildProcessGroup (Setpgid on POSIX, no-op on Windows where taskkill /T already tree-kills) is applied at launch so the child leads its own group. - terminateProcess now SIGTERM/SIGKILLs the negative PID (the whole group), with a pid>1 guard so a bogus 0/1 can never expand to "our own group" or "everything", and treats ESRCH as already-gone. Liveness polls the group. Targeting a group (rarely recycled vs. a bare PID) also shrinks the reaped-then-recycled window. - specialist launchBackgroundProcess opts every child into its own group; on a SetPID failure it now kills the child + group, marks the task errored, and records the stop (deduped) instead of leaking an untracked orphan. - tests launch as group leaders; new TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren proves a forked grandchild dies with the group. * audit batch 14 (sandbox): quote-aware shell segment splitting splitShellSegments used a quote-unaware strings.Replacer, so a shell operator inside quotes was treated as a separator: `git commit -m "use top | less"` split into a `less` segment and `echo "a; vim b"` into a `vim` segment, both falsely flagged as interactive (audit medium safe_command.go:138). Replace it with a quote-aware scanner that mirrors the shell: single quotes make everything literal; double quotes keep $(...)/`...` substitution active but treat |, ;, && as literal; unquoted text splits on the same operator set as before (;, |, ||, &&) plus substitution boundaries. Real unquoted operators still split, so an interactive program behind a separator — or inside a live `"$(...)"` substitution — is still caught (no new false negatives, the security-relevant direction). + TestDetectInteractiveQuoteAwareSeparators covering both directions. * audit batch 15 (cron): collapse DST fall-back repeated hour to one fire On a fall-back day the clock repeats an hour (e.g. 01:30 EDT then 01:30 EST), so Next("30 1 * * *", <01:30 EDT>) returned the same-day 01:30 EST — firing a daily job twice (audit medium schedule.go:171, which previously guarded only the spring-forward gap). Next now skips a match whose local wall-clock minute equals `after`'s but whose absolute time is later (the repeated-hour duplicate) and keeps searching. Normal forward search always advances the wall-clock, so this only triggers on the fall-back repeat; when the scheduler passes the last fire time as `after`, the repeated hour collapses to a single fire. + TestNextDSTFallBackDoesNotRepeatHour (spring-forward termination test still passes). Note: Next is stateless, so it dedupes relative to `after`; a caller that passes an arbitrary mid-hour "now" instead of the last fire time is out of scope here. * audit batch 16 (mcp): skip SSE notifications before the response; larger SSE buffer - decodeSSERPCMessage returned the first non-empty `message` event unconditionally, so a server-initiated notification/request arriving before the response made the caller see an id mismatch and fail (audit medium network_client.go:621). It now skips any message carrying a method (notifications/requests have one; a response does not) and returns the first real response; the caller's rpcIDMatches still validates the id. + TestDecodeSSERPCMessageSkipsNotifications. - raise the per-event SSE scanner cap from 1 MiB to a bounded 8 MiB so a large but legitimate MCP message no longer hits bufio.ErrTooLong and fails the request (audit medium network_client.go:637); still bounded against an unbounded server. Out of scope (kept): full reconnect of a persistent SSE stream after a fatal read error — a larger change than this remediation. * audit batch 17 (sessions): fsync session metadata before the atomic rename writeMetadata wrote the temp file with os.WriteFile (no sync) and renamed it into place, so a crash right after the rename could expose a metadata file whose bytes were never flushed — a torn or empty file that corrupts the whole session (audit medium store.go:632). Write+fsync the temp via a new writeFileSync helper before renaming, closing that window. + TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips. Deliberately scoped: - Event-log appends (appendEventLocked) are NOT fsynced per append: that would add a disk flush to every event (every tool call), and a hard-crash loss of the log's unsynced tail is acceptable, whereas torn METADATA is not. Metadata is the integrity-critical part and is what this syncs. - Directory fsync is omitted for cross-platform simplicity (it errors on Windows); the file fsync already prevents the torn-contents failure, the serious case. Left for follow-up (in this bucket but not safe/clear wins here): - hooks append sequence still re-reads the file per append; the in-memory cache is cross-process-unsafe and the safe last-line read is fiddly for a low-volume log. - Fork event re-append/de-dup is nuanced usage-accounting and needs its own change. * audit batch 18 (agent): count tool-defs in compaction estimate; don't deny an always-allow on persist failure - maybeCompact's estimate omitted the tool definitions, which ride on every request, so the real input could exceed the model limit while the message-only estimate stayed under threshold and compaction never fired (audit medium compaction.go:58). partitionTools is now computed before maybeCompact (it does not depend on the messages) and the exposed tools' estimated tokens are added to both the threshold check and the post-compaction shrink check. + estimateToolDefTokens and TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions. - PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow denied the call when persistPermissionGrant failed, overriding what the user explicitly allowed (audit medium loop.go:468). Persisting is now best-effort: a failure (or no sandbox engine) just means the grant is not remembered and the user is re-prompted next time, not denied now. This also drops the dead requestEvent.GrantMatched/Grant writes (audit low loop.go:473) — the emitted event derives them from the sandbox decision via buildPermissionEvent. Left intentional (documented, not defects): the reactive-retry path omits OnText to avoid duplicating mid-stream text (loop.go:183); OnContext/MeasureContext is a complete, tested context-breakdown scaffold awaiting a consumer (types.go:183). * audit batch 19 (usage): price escalated usage from the event's own model exec persists payload["model"] on --allow-escalation runs (the model can change mid-run), but BuildReport priced every event from the session's Metadata.ModelID and never read the payload, so usage from an escalated model was mis-priced at the base model (audit medium report.go:17). usageEventPayload now carries Model and BuildReport prefers it, falling back to the session model when absent (older events stay byte-identical and behave as before). + TestBuildReportPricesFromEventModelWhenPresent. * audit batch 20 (sessions): don't copy usage events into a fork (no double-count) Fork re-appended every parent event, including provider_usage, into the child, so a usage report aggregating the parent and the fork double-counted the parent's usage (audit medium store.go:387). Skip EventUsage when copying — it already counted against the parent and is not part of the conversation history a fork replays — and record the actual copied count in the fork marker. + TestStoreForkSkipsUsageEvents. * audit batch 21 (cli/skills): warn on duplicate skill names instead of silently dropping skills.Load deduplicates same-named skills (first directory wins) and records the dropped collisions via skills.Duplicates, but nothing surfaced them, so a shadowed skill just vanished with no signal — and Duplicates had no production caller (audit low skills.go:91). `skills list` now reports each collision to stderr (keeping stdout/--json clean), using Duplicates. + TestRunSkillsListWarnsOnDuplicateNames. Note: skills.Get is kept — it is a by-name accessor used throughout the package's tests, not dead code. * audit batch 22 (cli/cron): capture the run error from stream-json stdout Cron jobs run exec with --output-format stream-json, so a failure is reported as an `error` event on STDOUT, but the run record's Error was set only from stderr — so a failed job often recorded an empty/uninformative error while the real message sat unread in outBuf (audit low cron_run.go:150). On a non-zero exit, scan the stdout stream-json for the error event's message and prefer it, falling back to stderr. + extractStreamJSONError and TestExtractStreamJSONError. * audit batch 23 (sandbox): richer macOS seatbelt profile (signal + mach-lookup) The generated sandbox-exec profile was default-deny with only process/sysctl/file allowances, so two real gaps remained on macOS (sandbox quality report H1): - A sandboxed script could not signal the children it spawned — `kill` returned "Operation not permitted" under seatbelt, breaking common `cmd & ... kill`, test-runner, and timeout patterns. Add `(allow signal (target self) (target pgrp))`, which stays scoped to the command's own process group. - XPC to system daemons was denied, so keychain (securityd/trustd), user/group lookup (opendirectoryd), preferences (cfprefsd), network config (SystemConfiguration), launch services, and the pasteboard all failed. Add a curated `(allow mach-lookup ...)` allowlist (`sandboxMachServices`). Neither touches the file-write or network rules, so the workspace boundary is unchanged — verified on a real macOS host: `security`/`scutil`/`pbpaste`/self-kill now succeed while writes to $HOME and /etc are still denied. iokit-open was tried and dropped as unnecessary. + unit assertions (TestSandboxExecProfileGrantsSignalAndMachLookup) and extended the darwin integration test with a self-kill case and an outside-workspace deny check. * audit batch 24 (sandbox/tools): remove dead OnSandboxDecision hook RunOptions.OnSandboxDecision had no setter anywhere, yet registry.RunWithOptions spawned a goroutine (with panic recovery) for it on every sandboxed tool call — pure per-call overhead for an unreachable callback (sandbox report M1). The sandbox decision is already surfaced to observers via the permission event (buildPermissionEvent reads the decision), so this hook is redundant; delete the field and its call site. * audit batch 25 (sandbox/cli): exact-path grants — create and revoke by path The engine already matched ScopeFile grants and DeriveScope already produced them from path/file tool args, but the CLI could neither create one explicitly nor revoke a single one (sandbox report L3 / prompt 7). Add: - GrantStore.RevokePath(tool, path): revokes only the grant whose scope matches the given file/dir, leaving tool-wide and other-path grants intact (path canonicalized to absolute like stored scopes). + TestGrantStoreRevokePathRemovesOnlyMatchingScope. - `zero sandbox grants allow <tool> --path <p>`: persists an exact-file (ScopeFile) grant, path resolved to absolute so it matches lookups and revokes. - `zero sandbox grants revoke <tool> --path <p>`: revokes just that grant (default still revokes all grants for the tool). + TestRunSandboxGrantsCreateAndRevokeByPath. The TUI permission-card "Allow always (exact path)" option is intentionally left for the TUI feature branches (it overlaps #187/#188); the engine + CLI now cover the full create/match/revoke round-trip for file-scoped grants. * audit batch 26 (sandbox): Engine.Precheck — report violations before execution Add Engine.Precheck(ctx, request) []Violation, which reports the sandbox violations that would block a tool request before it runs (sandbox report / prompt 6). It reuses Evaluate so policy is not duplicated: an allowed or merely-prompted request yields no violations; a denied request yields its violation (via the shared violationsFromDecision helper, with a ViolationPolicyDenied fallback for a deny that carries no structured violation). A nil engine yields nothing. + TestEnginePrecheckReportsViolationsBeforeExecution. Wiring Precheck into the batch-confirmation prompt is intentionally left to the TUI branch: it touches prompt rendering, and short-circuiting the agent loop's deny path would skip the before/after-tool hooks that currently fire around a policy-denied call. The engine API is in place for that consumer. * audit batch 27 (sandbox): scoped-egress domain prompt with timeout + caching The scoped-egress proxy failed closed on any host outside the allowlist. Add an opt-in DomainPrompt callback (prompt 8): an UNKNOWN host (neither allowed nor explicitly denied) is authorized at request time via the callback instead of being refused outright. An explicitly denied host is still refused without prompting; the callback is bounded by PromptTimeout (default 60s, timeout/error => deny); decisions are cached for the proxy's lifetime so a host is prompted at most once. With no callback set the strict fail-closed behavior is unchanged. Wired through both the CONNECT and HTTP handlers via authorizeTarget. + TestEgressProxyAuthorizeDomainPrompt / ...TimeoutDenies / ...NilPromptFailsClosed. The user-facing prompt that supplies the callback is left to the permission UI (TUI) branch; the egress mechanism (callback + timeout + cache) is in place and tested. * audit batch 28 (sandbox): AST-based shell analysis (AnalyzeCommand) Add AnalyzeCommand(script) AnalysisResult, a static shell analyzer built on the mvdan.cc/sh/v3 parser (prompt 12). Walking the parsed command tree makes it a more precise second opinion than the regex detector: a program name only counts when it is an actual command, so `echo "vim ..."`, `printf 'open with vim'`, and `git commit -m "rm -rf /"` are clean, while real commands are flagged — interactive (editors/pagers + REPLs, with the same -e/script suppression as nonInteractiveREPLFlags), destructive (rm -rf/-fr, dd, mkfs, shred, ...), and network (curl/wget/ssh/nc/...). An unparseable script yields TooComplex so callers can treat it as higher-risk. + TestAnalyzeCommand (16 cases) / ...EmptyIsClean. Dependency: mvdan.cc/sh/v3 pinned to v3.11.0 — compatible with the existing go 1.24 directive (the latest v3.13.1 would have bumped the module to go 1.25). It is kept as a standalone analyzer for callers to consult; feeding it into Engine.Evaluate is deliberately not done here, since that would change allow/deny classification. * audit batch 29 (sandbox): unify proxy-env generation (ProxyEnv) Export ProxyEnv as the single source of truth for proxy-env injection (prompt 9 req 1), replacing the unexported scopedProxyEnv used by the sandboxed-shell path. + TestProxyEnv. Investigation that bounds the rest of prompt 9 (documented in the ProxyEnv doc): - web_fetch already honors HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY — its transport clones http.DefaultTransport, whose Proxy is http.ProxyFromEnvironment. - MCP children already inherit the parent env (mergeProcessEnv appends os.Environ), so they pick up any proxy vars the agent has. So the only missing link to scope FetchUrl/MCP is a SESSION-level egress proxy whose address reaches the agent process. That is deliberately NOT wired here: doing it safely requires allowlisting the active LLM provider's own domain first, or the agent's provider calls would route through the scoped proxy and be denied — a correctness pitfall that also can't be verified end-to-end on this host. Flagged rather than shipped blind. * audit batch 30 (sandbox): Linux seccomp Unix-socket block — UNVERIFIED, needs Linux CI Adds a pure-Go (no cgo, no vendored binary) seccomp BPF filter that denies socket(AF_UNIX) with EPERM on x86-64/arm64, closing the Unix-socket gap bubblewrap's filesystem/network isolation leaves open (prompt 11): - internal/sandbox/seccomp.go: the classic-BPF program as a platform-neutral []sockFilter, built and UNIT-TESTED (structure + every jump offset in range — the classic way a hand-written BPF filter goes silently wrong). - seccomp_linux.go: ApplyUnixSocketBlock installs it via prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) + prctl(SET_SECCOMP, MODE_FILTER). seccomp_other.go is a no-op everywhere else. - cmd/zero-seccomp: a tiny linux-only exec wrapper that applies the filter then execs the real command (the standard way to install seccomp in a child with os/exec); degrades gracefully (warns + runs) if the kernel lacks seccomp. ⚠️ HONEST CAVEAT: I developed this on macOS and CANNOT run the actual AF_UNIX block here. darwin build, `GOOS=linux` cross-compile, vet, and the structure test all pass, but the unit test verifies the program's SHAPE, not that the kernel actually blocks AF_UNIX — that MUST be verified on Linux CI (create a Unix socket under the wrapper and assert EPERM). Safe to ship as-is: it is linux-only, no-op on every other platform, and not wired into the bwrap command yet (opt-in prefixing the sandboxed command with zero-seccomp is the remaining integration), so it cannot regress any current path. * audit batch 31 (sandbox): macOS denial log monitor (opt-in, default off) Re-adds the macOS seatbelt-denial monitor as an opt-in feature (prompt 10). When Policy.MonitorDenials is set, the sandbox-exec profile tags its default-deny with a marker and bash tails `log stream` for that tag during the command, appending any captured denials as a <sandbox_violations> block to the command's stderr so the model can see what was blocked. - DenialMonitor (darwin) tails/parses tagged denials with a capped, deduped ring buffer and noise filtering; no-op stub on other platforms. parseSandboxDenyLine is unit-tested. + profile-tag test + appendSandboxViolations test. - Default OFF: with MonitorTag empty, StartDenialMonitor is a no-op and the command path is byte-for-byte unchanged, so there is no regression or per-command overhead unless enabled. CAVEAT: on at least one macOS host (verified live) seatbelt denials are NOT delivered to the `log stream`-queryable unified log, so the monitor captures nothing there. It is the standard mechanism and works on macOS versions that do log denials; shipping it default-off means it never affects whether a command runs. * audit batch 32 (sandbox): wire seccomp Unix-socket block into bubblewrap (opt-in) Completes prompt 11: the zero-seccomp helper (which installs the AF_UNIX seccomp filter) is now actually invoked by the sandbox instead of only existing as a standalone binary. - bubblewrapCommandPlan, when Policy.BlockUnixSockets is set, ro-binds the discovered zero-seccomp helper into the sandbox at its host path and prefixes the command with it so the filter is installed before the real argv runs. - findSeccompHelper discovers the helper next to the running executable first, then on PATH; it returns "" when absent, so the sandbox degrades gracefully (runs without the extra filter — bubblewrap's fs/net isolation still applies) rather than failing the command. Exposed as a package var so the wiring is unit-tested on any OS. - Reachable from config: SandboxConfig.BlockUnixSockets and .MonitorDenials now map onto the policy in applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy (opt-in only — config can turn a hardening flag on, never off). Both default OFF. - Tests: helper-prefix present when enabled / absent by default; config flags apply independently and stay off when omitted. Default OFF and Linux-only effect; the runtime seccomp enforcement still needs a Linux host/CI to exercise end-to-end (the wiring and BPF program are unit-tested). * audit batch 33 (sandbox): enforce scoped/deny network policy in web_fetch & web_search Completes prompt 9: the built-in network tools now honor the SAME allow/deny/scoped policy the sandboxed shell egress proxy enforces, instead of bypassing it. Before this, web_fetch/web_search would reach any public host even when the policy was NetworkDeny or NetworkScoped — the egress proxy only constrained shell commands. - New shared gate Engine.NetworkHostAllowed(host) reuses the egress domain matcher (domainAllowed/normalizeDomains/effectiveNetwork) as the single source of truth: allow → all hosts; deny → none; scoped → only AllowedDomains minus DeniedDomains (empty allowlist collapses to deny). Disabled policy / nil engine impose nothing. - web_fetch is now sandbox-aware: the host is checked before the request AND on every redirect, so a denied/unlisted host fails closed before any dial. Plumbed via a networkPolicyGate so the no-sandbox path is byte-for-byte unchanged. - web_search is sandbox-aware: the configured backend's endpoint host is checked before the query leaves the machine; blocked under deny, and under scoped unless the backend host is allowlisted. - The registry already routes sandbox-aware tools through RunWithSandbox when an engine is present, so this activates automatically wherever the sandbox is wired. - Tests: engine gate matrix (deny/allow/scoped/denylist/empty/disabled/nil + host:port); web_fetch & web_search block denied/unlisted hosts without dialing and allow listed ones; endpoint-host parsing. * audit batch 34 (sandbox): prove network-policy wiring end-to-end + document opt-in flags Verification follow-up to batches 31-33; no behaviour change. - Adds a registry-level test that exercises the FULL chain for the scoped-network enforcement: registry.RunWithOptions -> engine.Evaluate (passes a scoped, egress-capable sandbox-exec backend) -> routes web_fetch through RunWithSandbox -> per-host allowlist blocks an unlisted host before any dial. This proves the Tool-interface value actually satisfies sandboxAwareTool at the registry boundary, not just in a direct method call. - Documents the two opt-in hardening flags (sandbox.blockUnixSockets, sandbox.monitorDenials) and the scoped web_fetch/web_search behaviour in the README so the config keys are discoverable. Both remain off by default. Confirmed wiring: agent loop forwards options.Sandbox to the registry; the registry routes sandbox-aware tools (web_fetch, web_search) through RunWithSandbox when an engine is present; MonitorTag is set only on the macOS sandbox-exec plan; the seccomp helper prefix is added only on the bubblewrap plan when BlockUnixSockets is set; both config flags map onto the policy via applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy. * audit batch 35 (sessions): fix Windows CI failure in TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips The exact-permission assertion (perm == 0o600) added in batch 17 fails on windows-latest because Windows does not honor Unix permission bits: Go reports 0o666 for a writable file regardless of the mode passed to OpenFile. This was the sole cause of the failing Smoke (windows-latest) CI job; macOS and Ubuntu passed. Guard the perm check with runtime.GOOS != "windows" so it still verifies the mode on the platforms that enforce it, while the round-trip (write + read-back) is still asserted on every platform. * audit batch 36: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings) - background/process_posix: after SIGKILL, poll until the process group is actually gone (SIGKILL is async) and return an error if it survives past a second deadline, instead of returning nil while descendants still race. - sandbox/safe_command: only treat ')' as a substitution boundary when it closes an active $(...). A literal ')' (e.g. echo "a) less") no longer splits into a fake `less` segment and is no longer misflagged as interactive. Depth-tracked so nested $(...) still isolate their inner command. Direct splitShellSegments test (fails pre-fix: yields ["echo \"a", "less\""]). - cron/schedule: the DST fall-back collapse now only applies when `after` sits exactly on the minute boundary (its "last fire time" form). With sub-minute precision (e.g. 01:30:30 EDT) the first 01:30 fire already passed, so the repeated 01:30 EST is the legitimate next fire and is returned — restoring strictly-after semantics. New test fails pre-fix (skipped to next day). - config/types: maxTurns error message now reads "must be >= 0" to match the check (0 is accepted; only < 0 is rejected). Negative-maxTurns test asserts the message. - docs/audit: header date/branch metadata now matches the body (2026-06-13, fix/audit-batch) instead of the stale 2026-06-11/fix/audit-critical-high snapshot. Verified: gofmt clean; go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites green. Each behavioural fix ships with a test confirmed to fail without the change. * audit batch 37: address CodeRabbit re-review (12 findings) Findings on the audit code from batches 21-36; each behavioural fix ships with a regression test (several confirmed to fail without the change). sandbox/analyzer (AnalyzeCommand): - Unwrap launcher prefixes (sudo/env/nice/bash -c/...) and recurse into `sh -c` payloads so `sudo rm -rf`, `env curl …`, `bash -c 'vim x'` classify on the real command, not the launcher. Mirrors DetectInteractiveCommand. - Honor rm's `--` end-of-options marker so `rm -- -rf` (delete a file named -rf) is not flagged destructive. sandbox/engine: NetworkHostAllowed now shares one backend-aware effective-mode helper with Evaluate, so scoped collapses to deny when the backend can't enforce scoped egress — the per-tool gate can no longer permit traffic the engine-level decision would fail closed. sandbox/egress: cache domain-prompt decisions by host:port, not host, so one "allow" can't authorize other ports on the same host. sandbox/safe_command: the segment splitter is now escape-aware (\| , \" ) so an escaped operator/quote can't manufacture a fake interactive segment. sandbox/log_monitor (darwin): Wait() the `log stream` child after draining stdout so the cancelled process isn't leaked as a zombie. tools/web_search: confine the search backend to same-host redirects (with a limit) so a redirect chain can't egress to a host the scoped/deny policy never authorized. cli/sandbox: an explicit empty --path (`--path=` / `--path ""`) now fails closed instead of silently widening an allow to tool-wide or a revoke to all-grants. cli/skills: warn on stderr when duplicate-skill detection fails instead of swallowing the error. specialist/exec: don't mask a failed orphan-kill — join the TerminateProcess error with the SetPID error so a surviving process is visible. background/process_posix: resolve the PGID and only group-signal when pid leads its own group; otherwise signal the individual PID. Avoids both a false-success on a non-leader ESRCH and the hazard of signalling an unrelated (possibly our own) group. Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./... green. * audit batch 38: address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 (3 findings) Follow-ups to batch 37, each with a regression test: - safe_command (splitter): a ')' is now only a substitution boundary when it closes an active, UNQUOTED $(...). A quote-state stack saved at each '$(' lets a substitution run in a fresh quoting context and restores the outer quoting on its matching ')'. Fixes `echo $(printf "a) less")` splitting into a fake `less` segment, while still isolating the inner command of `echo "$(vim x)"`. - egress: deduplicate in-flight domain prompts per host:port. Concurrent requests for the same unknown target now wait on the first prompt and reuse its cached decision instead of each firing a prompt (a prompt storm) and racing to write the final decision. Race-tested with 25 concurrent authorizers → one prompt. - analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption is now wrapper-specific (wrapperValueOptionsByProg) instead of a global option set. A valueless flag like `sudo -n` no longer swallows the real payload, so `sudo -n rm -rf` / `sudo -n curl …` are correctly classified destructive/network; `sudo -u root vim` still consumes its value. Shared by the AST analyzer and the regex detector so they can't diverge. Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and -race on sandbox/background all green. * audit batch 39: address CodeRabbit re-review round 3 (12 findings) All verified against current code; each behavioural fix has a regression test. Security / correctness: - tools/web_search: redirect policy now also refuses a scheme change, blocking a same-host https→http downgrade that would send the query + bearer token over plaintext. - sandbox/safe_command: a ')' is only a substitution boundary when it closes an active UNQUOTED $(...), and backticks now get the same quote-state save/restore as $( — so `echo "`a | less`"` and `echo "$(true | less)"` no longer hide the inner pager from interactive detection. - sandbox/analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption stays wrapper-specific, and unwrapping no longer aborts on a dynamic ($x) wrapper arg once a wrapper is active, so `env "$opts" curl` / `sudo "$x" rm -rf` are still classified. - sandbox/egress: in-flight prompts deduped per host:port (carried from batch 38); the prompt callback is now cancellable (context cancelled on timeout) so a stuck prompt can abort instead of leaking; signature threaded through. - sandbox/runner: per-plan unique denial tag (pid+counter) so concurrent monitored sandbox-exec runs can't ingest each other's denials; helper selection now requires an executable regular file so a non-exec sibling degrades gracefully. - mcp/network_client: aggregate SSE event-size cap (not just per-line) so a server can't grow memory with many unterminated data: lines. - specialist/accounting: a previously-recorded stop/usage with an empty runId is a catch-all and now suppresses a later runId-bearing duplicate. - sessions/lineage: Tree fetches the root via Get() first so a corrupt root surfaces its real error instead of degrading to "not found". Docs/tests: - background/terminate: docstring now states the leader-only group-kill (PID-only fallback for non-leaders); test child-liveness probe uses ESRCH specifically. - cli/sandbox: grant usage strings include --path. Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and -race on sandbox/background all green. * audit batch 40: address CodeRabbit re-review round 4 (8 fixed, 1 skipped) Verified each against current code. Fixed: - sessions/lineage: PANIC FIX — store.Get returns (nil, nil) for a missing session, so the batch-39 root prefetch could nil-deref. Guard root == nil and return a not-found error. Regression test added (was a panic). - agent/compaction: the reactive recover() now records lowWaterMark in the SAME combined (messages + tool-defs) token domain maybeCompact uses, so the proactive shrink-guard compares like with like. recover() takes tools; callers pass request.Tools. - mcp/network_client: SSE aggregate counter no longer counts a joining newline for the first data line (only when prior content exists), avoiding premature rejects. - sessions/store: fsync the parent directory after the metadata rename so the rename is durable across a crash (no-op on Windows, which can't fsync a dir). - sandbox/egress: parse the target port with strconv.Atoi instead of net.LookupPort (no context-unaware resolver use). - sandbox/runner: escape the per-plan denial tag through sandboxProfileString when embedding it in the seatbelt profile. - sandbox/seccomp_linux: guard against an empty filter program before taking &kernelFilters[0] (defensive; the program is fixed non-empty today). - cli/cron_run_test: assert last-error-wins with two error events. - background/terminate, cli/sandbox usage, process_posix_test ESRCH (carried). Skipped (with reason): - zerogit worktree-rename (Y='R') test: git porcelain v1 -z only emits the rename-source field when the INDEX column is R/C; the worktree column never carries 'R' with a source field in v1, so the fixture would test output git doesn't produce, and making parseStatus consume on code[1]=='R' would risk mis-consuming the following entry for a plain ` R` status. Left as-is. Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and -race on sandbox/background all green. * audit batch 41: address CodeRabbit re-review round 5 (4 findings) All verified against current code; code fixes have regression tests. - agent/compaction: summarizeWithFallback's reduce pass no longer swallows ALL errors. A context-limit error still falls back to the joined partial summaries (documented "extreme" case), but a non-context failure (auth/network/provider) now surfaces unchanged, per the function's contract. Two tests (propagate vs. joined-fallback); the propagate test fails without the fix. - sandbox/safe_command + analyzer: wrapper value-consuming options now include the long spellings (sudo --user root, env --unset NAME, timeout --signal …), so a long flag's value is no longer mis-read as the program (interactive/destructive/ network detection bypass). A `--flag=value` token carries its own value and never consumes the next token. Tests for space and = forms in both the AST analyzer and the regex detector. - docs/audit: the status-ledger summary table's open/partial cells (64/14) were the lone outlier — the ledger's own narrative and 2026-06-13-reverification.md both state 66/12. Corrected to 66/12 (66+12+97 = 175); derivation: body 69 open + 18 partial minus the 9 already-fixed-on-main (3 open + 6 partial) = 66/12 = 78 pending, fixed 88+9 = 97. Added a comment documenting the summary-vs-body relationship. The reverification doc already states 66/12, so both now agree. Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./... green. * audit batch 42: address CodeRabbit re-review round 6 (1 fixed, 1 kept w/ proof) CodeRabbit re-surfaced two "duplicate" refinements; CI was already green (its 6th pass was a COMMENT with no new findings). - cli/sandbox_test (TestRunSandboxGrantsRejectsEmptyPath): now seeds a tool-wide grant and asserts grant-store immutability after EACH rejected empty-`--path` call (reflect.DeepEqual before/after), so a mutation in one call can't be masked by a later one — and a buggy "revoke all" is actually observable (it's a no-op on an empty store). Stronger than the suggested patch. - zerogit.parseStatus: KEPT consuming the rename source on the index column only (code[0]), with an explanatory comment. Verified empirically that git porcelain v1 -z reports a rename/copy (and emits the extra source field) only in the index column: `git mv` → "R new\0old\0"; a worktree-only rename → " D old\0?? new\0" (delete + untracked, never "R" in code[1]). Consuming on code[1]=='R'/'C' would match no real git output and would only risk mis-consuming the next entry on malformed input, so the suggestion is declined as incorrect for v1. Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites green.	2026-06-13 21:32:48 +05:30
KRATOS	5e68c78824	wedge stage 10: distribution (skill/plugin install, tools make) (#184) ... * stage 10: distribution (skill/plugin install, tools make) Add a file-backed distribution surface so skills and plugins can be installed from a git URL or local path, and new plugin-tools can be scaffolded. No central registry: a source is just a git URL or path. - internal/skills/install.go: Install/Remove/Info + skills.lock. Validates SKILL.md frontmatter via the existing parser, copies it into the skills dir, and records a sha256 content hash. Reinstall surfaces the hash change; a clash with a different source is refused without --force. - internal/plugins/install.go: same flow validated against the plugin manifest schema, copying the whole plugin tree (minus .git) so the plugin is activatable. plugins.lock records source + hash. - internal/tools/scaffold.go: generate a prompt-gated plugin-tool skeleton (manifest + runnable shell/node/python entry stub) in the toolbox dir. - CLI: zero skill {add,info,remove}, zero plugin {add,remove}, and a new zero tools {make,list}; wired in app.go/extensions.go/skills.go. Safety: fetch honors the process environment (proxy/egress) and disables git credential prompts; install never executes fetched content (skills are markdown; plugin install scripts are never run) and installed plugins still go through normal activation with permission gating. * stage 10: make no-usable-name install test cross-platform The test used a whitespace-only source dir name to force the no-usable-name rejection, which is not creatable on Windows (Smoke failure). Switched to a dir base that validSkillName rejects on every platform (contains "..") while staying creatable on Windows; the blank frontmatter still falls back to the unusable dir base, exercising the same rejection. * stage 10: address review (tree hash, tools-list diagnostics, --json guards) * stage 10: make canonical-source tests cross-platform (Windows) Two Windows Smoke failures from the canonical-source review fix: - TestInstallSameLocalSourceDifferentSpellingIsNotAClash (skills + plugins) used filepath.Rel(cwd, tempdir), which errors on Windows when the temp dir (C:) and repo (D:) are on different drives. Switched to a same-directory alternate spelling (redundant /./), which still exercises canonicalSource without a cross-drive relative path. - TestRunSkillAddInfoRemove asserted the raw source path, but canonicalSource resolves symlinks/8.3-short-paths, so the stored+displayed source differs on Windows. Normalize the source via EvalSymlinks up front so the assertion matches on every platform. * stage 10: address CodeRabbit nitpicks (variadic append, header comment)	2026-06-13 10:43:31 +05:30
KRATOS	59c332638d	wedge M2: MCP server resources/prompts + sandbox scoped egress + MCP OAuth (#179) ... * wedge stage 06: MCP server resources + prompts Advertise resources and prompts capabilities in the initialize response and handle resources/list, resources/read, prompts/list, and prompts/get alongside the existing tools methods. Resources enumerate in-scope workspace files via the shared workspace scanner (reusing its gitignore-style exclusions) and read them read-only with strict scope enforcement: traversal and out-of-scope absolute paths are rejected with a JSON-RPC error and no contents, and binary files come back as base64 blobs. Prompts expose a curated set of templates with simple {{arg}} substitution; unknown prompt names return an error. * wedge stage 07: sandbox scoped egress + auto-allow-bash Add a middle-ground network mode between full allow and full deny: - types.go: NetworkScoped network mode; Policy.AllowedDomains / Policy.DeniedDomains; Policy.AutoAllowBashWhenSandboxed plus its ZERO_SANDBOX_AUTO_ALLOW_BASH env surface (off by default). - egress.go: in-process loopback (127.0.0.1:0) filtering proxy handling HTTP CONNECT (HTTPS tunnel) and plain HTTP. Allows only AllowedDomains minus DeniedDomains via exact-or-subdomain matching (github.com matches api.github.com but not notgithub.com or github.com.evil.com); deny wins. Denied targets get 403 / refused CONNECT. Decisions are logged through the repo redaction so query tokens never hit the audit trail. Fails closed: empty allowlist is rejected at construction. - runner.go: NetworkScoped starts the proxy and routes the sandboxed process through it (HTTP(S)_PROXY/ALL_PROXY + NO_PROXY into the sandbox env; Linux keeps --unshare-net; macOS profile denies general network but permits localhost:proxyPort). Empty-allowlist scoped collapses to deny (effectiveNetwork). Any proxy-start error denies the build rather than falling back to open network. NetworkAllow/NetworkDeny unchanged. - engine.go / registry.go / bash.go: honor AutoAllowBashWhenSandboxed - auto-allow bash without a prompt only when a wrapping sandbox is active for the command; ignore the flag when the sandbox is inactive. Preflight network gate now uses effectiveNetwork so a misconfigured scoped policy still fails closed. Bash defers plan.Cleanup() to shut the proxy down. Default behaviour is unchanged for existing NetworkAllow / NetworkDeny users and for the off-by-default auto-allow flag. * wedge stage 08: MCP OAuth client Add an OAuth 2.0 + PKCE authorization-code flow so ZERO can connect to remote MCP servers that require OAuth. - internal/mcp/oauth.go: authorization-server metadata discovery with config fallback/override, S256 PKCE, loopback redirect listener, state (CSRF) validation, code+verifier token exchange, refresh, and optional dynamic client registration. Tokens are never logged. - internal/mcp/oauth_store.go: per-server token persistence in a 0600 JSON file under the config dir, with a redaction-safe status summary that omits the token material. - internal/mcp/network_client.go: OAuth-configured servers get a round tripper that attaches the bearer token and, on 401, refreshes once and retries; refresh failure surfaces an actionable re-login message. - internal/mcp/config.go + internal/config: an MCP server entry may declare auth: "oauth" with optional client registration / explicit endpoints. Non-OAuth servers are unaffected. - zero mcp oauth {login,logout,status} wired into the CLI surface; status reports presence/expiry, never the token. * wedge M2: address review — 2 security fixes, portability, robustness (#179) Security (Critical): - resources: resolve symlinks BEFORE the scope check (and resolve roots) so an in-workspace symlink to an out-of-scope file (e.g. link -> /etc/passwd) is no longer readable via resources/read. resources/read echoes the requested URI (not the resolved path) so list/read stay consistent. - sandbox egress: authorize the dialed URL host, not the client Host header, so 'GET http://denied/ ... Host: allowed' can't bypass the allowlist. Robustness/correctness: - prompts: reject prompts/get that omits a required argument; tokenized substitution so {{...}} inside supplied values is preserved (not stripped). - resources: percent-encode/decode file URIs via net/url (spaces, #, %). - oauth: one timeout-scoped context bounds discovery + registration + callback + exchange; joinWellKnown preserves issuer path segments (RFC 8414). - cli: 'mcp oauth login' rejects --json instead of silently ignoring it; the login test is bounded so a missed callback fails fast instead of hanging. Portability: XDG token-store path test uses t.TempDir() so it passes on Windows (fixes the Windows Smoke failure). Adds regression tests for the symlink escape, Host-header bypass, required-arg rejection, and placeholder preservation. Full go test ./... + -race green. * wedge M2: fail closed on unenforceable scoped egress (review #179) Addresses the two P1 scoped-egress enforcement gaps from review: 1. Policy-only fallback ran NetworkScoped with unrestricted networking. On Windows / any host without a native backend, 'network: scoped' with allowedDomains silently got open host networking because Evaluate permitted network-risk tools (expecting a proxy) while BuildCommandPlan ran a direct plan with no proxy. Evaluate now collapses scoped to deny when the active backend cannot enforce egress, so network-risk tools fail closed. 2. Bubblewrap 'scoped egress' could not reach the proxy. --unshare-net isolates the netns and there is no bridge to the host-loopback proxy (the comments claimed one; no code added it), so allowlisted egress never worked. Bubblewrap no longer starts an unreachable proxy: scoped collapses to deny (--unshare-net, no proxy env), matching Evaluate. Comments corrected; a real relay (e.g. slirp4netns) is left as future work. Mechanism: new Backend.ScopedEgress capability (true only for sandbox-exec, which shares the host net under a seatbelt profile restricting outbound to the proxy port) + Backend.EnforcesScopedEgress(). sandbox-exec scoped egress is unchanged. Regression tests cover enforcing vs non-enforcing backends in Evaluate and the bubblewrap fail-closed plan.	2026-06-12 20:41:59 +05:30
KRATOS	ae4ce8aae2	wedge build: web_search + LSP client/diagnostics (stages 01-03) (#175) ... * stage 01: web_search tool Adds a web_search tool alongside web_fetch: discovers URLs via a pluggable searchBackend (env-configured generic JSON backend; swappable for Exa/You/ Tavily/Brave) and formats ranked results as a numbered list. Registered in CoreNetworkTools(). Deviation from the stage spec: the spec said readOnlySafety, but the repo enforces (TestCoreNetworkToolsExposePromptMetadata) that every core network tool is prompt-gated network egress — so web_search matches web_fetch's posture instead of being auto-allowed. Necessary fallout from adding the tool: knownToolNames (+web_search), the network-tools metadata test (now covers both), and a stale 'unknown tool' fixture that had used web_search. * stage 02: LSP client foundation New internal/lsp package: a direct (self-spawned, stdio) Language Server Protocol client so unattended runs see real compiler diagnostics without an open editor. - client.go: JSON-RPC 2.0 with LSP Content-Length framing; concurrent Call/Notify, id-matched responses, server->client request auto-reply, notification handler, context cancellation, read-loop teardown. - server.go: process lifecycle (spawn via os/exec, initialize/initialized handshake, graceful shutdown+exit with kill fallback). Handshake factored out (performInitialize) for pipe-based testing. - registry.go: extension -> server command (.go/.ts/.tsx/.js/.jsx/.py/.rs), languageId map, PATH availability via exec.LookPath. - types.go: minimal LSP types + PathToURI/URIToPath (Windows-drive aware). Stdlib-only; tested over in-memory pipes with a stub server (no real gopls), including -race for the concurrent id router. * stage 03: LSP document sync + diagnostics Makes the LSP client produce actionable signal so ZERO can ask 'did my edit compile?' headlessly. - documents.go: per-server session with document lifecycle (didOpen/didChange full-sync/didClose), a URI->diagnostics store fed by publishDiagnostics, and WaitForDiagnostics with a publish-baseline + 300ms quiet debounce (servers never signal 'analysis complete'). - diagnostics.go: FormatDiagnostics (path:line:col: severity: message, 1-based), HasErrors, FilterBySeverity, severity labels. - manager.go: Manager — one lazily-started, reused server per language (keyed by binary), routes a file to the right server, Check(ctx,path,text) -> settled diagnostics, graceful Shutdown; unknown extension -> (nil,nil), not an error. Concurrency-safe; tested under -race over in-memory pipes with a stub server (no real gopls). FormatDiagnostics takes the path explicitly since a Diagnostic carries only a range, not its document. * wedge: address review on #175 (LSP robustness + web_search provider) - lsp/client.go: Close() now disables the client — Call/Notify reject after close instead of leaking a pending entry / writing to a dead conn. - lsp/documents.go: serialize same-document syncs through the Notify write via a per-URI lock and commit version/open only on success; drop delayed publishDiagnostics for a superseded (older positive) version; WaitForDiagnostics now reports whether a fresh publish arrived. - lsp/manager.go: Check returns (nil,nil) when no publish newer than baseline arrives (don't return a stale prior result for new text); Shutdown joins and returns per-server shutdown errors instead of always reporting success. - lsp/diagnostics.go: FormatDiagnostics collapses embedded whitespace so each diagnostic stays one physical line. - tools/web_search.go: forward ZERO_WEBSEARCH_PROVIDER in the request so the config knob isn't inert. Adds tests: close-disables-client, stale-version drop, multi-line message collapse, Shutdown error propagation, httptest backend (provider+parse). * wedge: degrade gracefully when an LSP server binary is missing (#175 review) Manager.Check translated a missing-binary start error (exec.ErrNotFound) into (nil,nil) so a configured extension on a machine without gopls/ pyright/rust-analyzer degrades exactly like an unsupported extension — LSP diagnostics are an opportunistic layer, not a hard dependency. Other start failures still surface. Adds a test injecting an exec.ErrNotFound starter. * wedge stage 04: self-correct loop (#176) * stage 04: self-correct loop After a successful mutating tool call, verify the changed files (LSP diagnostics + project tests) and feed failures back to the model to fix — bounded and autonomy-gated, so an unattended run fixes its own mistakes without looping forever. - internal/agent/selfcorrect.go: SelfCorrector with injectable diagnosticsChecker (lsp.Manager adapter) and projectVerifier (verify.DetectPlan+Run); AfterEdit produces a redacted, model-facing corrective message; per-run attempt ceiling; low autonomy reports without auto-attempting; medium/high auto-correct. - internal/agent/loop.go: invoke AfterEdit after a successful mutating tool call (ChangedFiles non-empty), appending feedback to messages. nil SelfCorrect (the default) is a no-op — read-only tools never trigger it. - internal/agent/types.go: add Options.SelfCorrect *SelfCorrector (the explicit options-struct change). Single-pass verify per call (the agent loop + model edits provide the multi- attempt cycle, not selfverify's same-command re-runs). Tested with fakes (no gopls/shell): fail-then-pass, max-attempts abort, read-only skip, low-autonomy report-only, LSP-only failure, secret redaction; -race clean. CLI activation (a --self-correct flag building the SelfCorrector in exec.go) is intentionally left out to honor this stage's file scope — the engine is exported and ready to wire. * wedge: propagate file-read error in self-correct LSP checker (#176 review) CodeRabbit/golangci-lint (nilerr) flagged lspDiagnosticsChecker.Check returning (nil, nil) after os.ReadFile fails. Propagate the error instead; the sole caller (inspect) already skips files whose Check errors, so a deleted/unreadable file still degrades quietly while future callers can decide. Adds a regression test. * wedge: surface non-degradable verify errors in self-correct (#175 review) SelfCorrector.inspect silently continued on every checker.Check error and ignored verifier errors, so a real LSP startup/sync failure, an unreadable changed file, or a failed plan detection produced report.Failed=false -> OutcomePassed with no signal. Manager.Check already degrades missing servers to (nil,nil) and DetectPlan returns an empty plan (not an error) when nothing is detected, so a non-nil error from either is a genuine failure. Record such errors in CorrectionReport.InspectErrors, fail the pass, and surface them in the model feedback. Adds regression tests for both paths. * wedge: drop third-party search-provider names from web_search comments Keep code/comments provider-neutral: describe the backend interface as 'any hosted search API' rather than naming specific services. * wedge: defer self-correct feedback until after the tool-call batch (#175 review) Self-correct feedback was appended as a user message inside the per-tool-call loop, so a multi-tool-call turn whose first (mutating) call failed verification produced: assistant tool_use batch -> tool_result 1 -> user feedback -> tool_result 2. A user message interleaved between tool_results breaks strict provider replay and later session replay/compaction. Accumulate feedback during the batch and append it once after the loop (same after-batch pattern already used for mid-run model escalation), so every advertised tool call keeps its tool_result contiguous. Adds a two-tool-call regression test asserting the feedback lands after both tool_results. * wedge: batch self-correct AfterEdit once per turn over union of changes (#175 review) Deferring only the feedback emission still ran SelfCorrect.AfterEdit once per mutating tool call, which (a) consumes the per-run attempt budget multiple times in a single turn and (b) verifies an intermediate edit that a later call in the same batch already superseded — AfterEdit is documented as one per-run instance holding attempt state, so this is a correctness issue, not just transcript shape. Aggregate every mutating tool's ChangedFiles during the batch and call AfterEdit once afterward over the deduped union, appending its feedback once (still after all tool_results, preserving contiguity). Adds dedupeStrings and a regression test asserting two writes in one turn consume exactly one attempt and emit one feedback message.	2026-06-12 15:13:05 +05:30
KRATOS	06ea4f004b	Edit safety: file read/write tracking, external-modification detection, post-apply hooks (#172) ... * Edit safety: file version tracking, conflict detection, hook wiring Phase 1 — FileTracker (internal/tools/file_tracker.go): per-session map[absPath]{sha256, size, mtime}; CheckConflict flags drift only against a known baseline, so first-touch writes are unaffected. nil = no-op. Phase 2 — external-modification detection: read_file records the whole-file baseline; edit_file and write_file --overwrite refuse to clobber a file whose on-disk content drifted from it and tell the model to re-read first, then re-baseline to what they wrote. apply_patch forgets the files it rewrote (git apply has its own context guard). Threaded via RunOptions/agent.Options FileTracker, built once per session in the exec, spec, and TUI paths. Phase 3 — post-apply validation via hooks: the dormant hooks.Dispatcher is wired into executeToolCall. beforeTool hooks can veto a call (DenialHookBlocked); afterTool hook output is scrubbed and surfaced to the model. DispatchOutcome now collects hook stdout/stderr. Per-session dispatcher built from merged user+project hooks.json; fails open and runs nothing until a hook is configured. * edit-safety: address review — fail closed on read, redact hook reason - write_file overwrite: if a tracked file cannot be re-read to verify it, fail CLOSED (refuse the overwrite) instead of silently proceeding — the read error previously skipped the conflict check and could clobber an externally modified or replaced file. - blockedByHookResult: scrub outcome.Reason through redaction before placing it in model-visible ToolResult.Output; this intercepted path bypassed the registry's normal output-redaction boundary. - TestHashContentIsStableAndDistinguishing: compare separately stored hashes so the stability check is not a same-expression comparison (SA4000). * edit-safety: flag ToolResult.Redacted when hook output is scrubbed appendHookFeedback now reports whether scrubbing changed the afterTool feedback, and blockedByHookResult reports whether it scrubbed the reason; both set ToolResult.Redacted so the hook-intercepted paths match the registry's redaction contract. Adds tests asserting a secret-bearing hook reason/feedback is scrubbed and flips Redacted.	2026-06-11 20:34:35 +05:30
KRATOSandClaude Fable 5	e381d8eab1	Additional write roots: --add-dir flag, global config key, /add-dir TUI command (#162) ... * docs: spec for additional write roots (--add-dir / /add-dir) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * docs: implementation plan for additional write roots Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: add Scope type for multi-root write access Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * docs: write roots honored from global config only, union merge semantics Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: fix multi-root violation reporting and pin prefix-alias behavior - validate: prefer ViolationSymlinkTraversal over ViolationOutsideWorkspace when all roots deny; return original requestedPath in violation; append --add-dir hint only on outside_workspace results; extend doc comment to state that a symlink resolving inside any root is allowed. - normalizePrefixForRoot: dedupe insideRoot check via pathWithinRoot (Fix 3); widen EvalSymlinks comment to cover jump-over case; add POSIX-only note. - WorkspaceRoot: add doc comment noting immutability/lock safety (Fix 4). - Tests: pin multi-root traversal-preferred behavior, deterministic alias test (TestValidateResolvesAliasedPathPrefixes), Add symlink normalization test, and tilde-expansion error path test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: make engine path validation and risk scope-aware Thread *Scope through EngineOptions/Engine so Evaluate and Classify use multi-root scope validation instead of single-root validateWorkspacePaths, letting extra write roots (--add-dir / /add-dir) be honoured by the policy gate and risk classifier. Remove now-dead validateWorkspacePaths helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: pin override-root scope isolation, tidy Evaluate scope handling Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: widen seatbelt/bubblewrap profiles and command cwd to scope roots Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: pin extra-root chdir behavior and document bind invariants Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * tools: resolve paths against the shared write scope Add PathScope interface and scoped resolver helpers to workspace.go, then thread a scope field through all 8 file tools (read_file, list_directory, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file, apply_patch, bash). Each existing constructor delegates to a new NewScoped* variant; nil scope is byte-identical to the original behavior. Registry gains CoreReadOnlyToolsScoped, CoreWriteToolsScoped, CoreShellToolsScoped, and CoreToolsScoped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * tools: restore fail-closed write-target symlink checks, share prefix normalization * tools: report absolute paths for extra-root changes, pin scoped traversal denial - resolveScopedPath and resolveScopedTargetPath now return the absolute path as the second value when the matched root is an extra (non-workspace) root, eliminating ambiguity in ChangedFiles, cwd meta, and display summaries downstream - Add TestScopedWriteRefusesSameRootSymlinkTraversal to pin that same-root symlink traversal within an extra root is denied (pre-existing behavior) - Add TestScopedWriteReportsAbsolutePathForExtraRoot to enforce the new absolute-path contract for ChangedFiles on extra-root writes - Extend doc comments on PathScope, ChangedFiles, changedFilesFromPatch, and both scoped resolvers to capture the workspace-vs-absolute invariant Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * config: add sandbox.additionalWriteRoots (global config only, union merge) * cli: add repeatable --add-dir flag wiring scope into registry and engine Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * cli: forward --add-dir across dispatch paths, pin scope wiring with tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * cli: pin --add-dir dispatch forwarding end-to-end, close guard gaps Review fixes for the --add-dir dispatch commit: - Add TestRunAddDirDispatchForwardsGrantIntoExecScope: drives runWithDeps through both the "exec" and "-p" dispatch shapes with a provider that calls write_file inside the extra root, asserting the grant reaches the exec sandbox scope (and a negative control without --add-dir is denied fail-closed). Mutation-verified: dropping addDirFlagArgs forwarding from either case fails the test. - Remove help/version from the --add-dir allowlist so any non-TUI/ non-exec leading --add-dir hard-errors, matching the stated requirement; extend the rejection test with those cases. - Fail loud when --add-dir is hidden behind a stray non-flag arg on the --skip-permissions-unsafe path instead of silently dropping the grant. - Reject flag-like values in the inline --add-dir= spelling to match the space form (a directory named -foo stays reachable as ./-foo). - Move TestExecScopeReRegistrationSwapsCoreToolsByName out of the parse test file into the new exec_scope_test.go alongside the e2e test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * tui: add /add-dir command for session write-root grants Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: surface write roots in zero sandbox status and plan snapshots Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * cli: surface write-roots error in --effective --json, normalize fallback root Review fixes for the Task8 observability range: - runSandboxPolicyEffective JSON payload gains writeRootsError (omitempty) so --json consumers see the same fail-soft signal as the text write_roots_error line instead of a misleading workspace-only writeRoots list. - The fail-soft fallback now derives its write roots from a workspace-only Scope (which cannot fail) so the error path renders the same symlink-resolved root as the success path. - TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveWriteRootsFailSoft gains a --json leg asserting writeRootsError names the stale root with a workspace-only fallback; the configured-roots test asserts the key is absent for valid roots. - SandboxPlanSnapshot doc comment reworded to match the converter: no current builder populates WriteRoots. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: seatbelt integration test for extra write roots Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * docs: document --add-dir and /add-dir write-root grants Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: pass volume-qualified paths through prefix normalization verbatim NormalizePrefixForRoot's POSIX component walk mangled Windows drive paths (C:\Users -> C:Users), which downstream single-root checks treated as relative and joined under the workspace — failing the policy gate OPEN on Windows. Volume-qualified paths now bypass the walk entirely (the macOS /var alias problem it solves has no Windows equivalent) and windows-gated tests pin both the verbatim pass-through and the engine denial. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: make prefix normalization volume-aware for Windows alias resolution The previous commit disabled NormalizePrefixForRoot on Windows, which broke it the other direction: a workspace created under an 8.3 short path (C:\Users\RUNNER~1\...) resolves via EvalSymlinks to its long form (runneradmin), so raw short-form requests escaped the long-form root and legitimate extra-root writes were denied. This is the same alias problem as macOS /var -> /private/var, which the helper already solves. Start the component walk from the volume root (C:\ or //host/share/) instead of "/" so it resolves the prefix on Windows too; POSIX VolumeName is empty so the walk reduces to the original "/"-rooted behavior byte-for-byte. Windows test now pins allow-inside-root + deny-outside both directions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * sandbox: address PR review findings for additional write roots Resolve the CHANGES_REQUESTED review on PR #162: - engine: derive workspaceRoot from scope.Roots()[0] when NewEngine is given a Scope without an explicit WorkspaceRoot, so Evaluate's EnforceWorkspace/classification guards no longer silently skip (+ regression test). - tools/workspace: scopedRoots now fails closed (returns an error) when a non-nil PathScope exposes empty Roots(), instead of returning success with an empty path; threaded through the scoped resolve/recheck helpers and resolveGrepRoot. - tools/glob: emit absolute matches when cwd resolves into an extra root so results can't be fed back and resolve to a same-named workspace file (+ regression test). - tools/bash,grep,apply_patch: schema descriptions mention granted extra roots (relative -> workspace, absolute -> granted root). - docs/plan: fix markdownlint heading increment, malformed rule+heading, and bare code fence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * tools/grep, tui: address PR review for additional write roots - grep now emits absolute, symlink-resolved paths for matches in a granted extra (non-workspace) root, mirroring the glob fix. A bare workspace-relative name like "report.go" otherwise resolves back under the workspace when fed to read_file/edit_file and hits the wrong file when the name exists in both roots. Covers content and files_with_matches output. - tui: only reset chatScrollOffset for a real submission, not an empty Enter (a no-op), so the viewport is no longer yanked to the bottom when nothing was submitted. Real submissions still snap back. - glob: schema description now mentions granted extra roots, matching the bash/grep/apply_patch wording so the --add-dir/-add-dir flow is discoverable. Regression tests: TestScopedGrepReturnsAbsoluteMatchesForExtraRoot, TestEmptySubmitKeepsChatScrollOffset. * docs: add /add-dir to the TUI commands quick-reference table The command was documented further down but missing from the scannable commands table, so users browsing the table wouldn't discover the additional-write-roots flow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-06-11 15:17:20 +05:30
gnanam1990	0c37093974	audit: address PR review findings (security, correctness, tests) ... Fixes from the code review on the critical/high audit branch: - tools/apply_patch: parseHunkCounts now reads only the range section between the opening and closing "@@". A crafted section heading like "@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@ +1,999999" could otherwise overwrite the line count, wedge the parser in hunk mode, and swallow later file headers so they escaped validatePatchPaths / recheckPatchWriteTargets — a workspace-confinement bypass. - providerhealth: the SSRF-hardened dial now tries every validated address in order instead of pinning addrs[0], so a dual-stack/multi-record provider isn't failed by a single dead record. Extracted dialValidatedAddrs for coverage. - hooks/dispatch: a beforeTool hook killed by its deadline now fails CLOSED (vetoes the tool) instead of fail-open. A launch failure (missing binary) still fails open so a misconfigured hook can't wedge every tool call. - cron: Store.Get returns a distinct ErrJobNotFound sentinel; cron_run only treats that as "removed during run" and still records/persists on a transient read error instead of silently dropping the run. - providers/anthropic: closeOpen finalizes thinking buffers still open at stream end (SSE ended after thinking_delta/signature_delta but before content_block_stop), so they survive in the done event's ReasoningBlocks for replay. Finalized in index order. - providers/gemini: corrected the stale thinkingConfig comment (no IncludeThoughts field; thought summaries are suppressed by skipping part.Thought parts). Tests: regression coverage for each fix, plus the requested nitpicks — EOF-terminated MCP line, recipe-prompt propagation assertion, checked file.Close() in session store tests, and a shortened bash process-group timeout test via the bashWaitDelay hook. Note: declined the suggestion to replay a "signature" on redacted_thinking blocks — Anthropic's redacted_thinking carries only an opaque "data" field; the signature is for regular thinking blocks, and the stream never populates one for redacted blocks.	2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990	dbdc04db61	tools/bash: kill the shell as a process group so timeouts don't leak children ... On timeout the context cancelled only the shell, leaving backgrounded children (e.g. 'sleep 3 & wait') orphaned. Worse, those children inherited the stdout/stderr pipes, so Run() blocked until they exited — far past the timeout. Set Setpgid and a Cancel that SIGKILLs the whole process group on POSIX, plus a WaitDelay backstop so a lingering child can't hang Wait. On Windows, set WaitDelay only (no process groups).	2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990	98e0f2c764	tools: fix grep glob scope and apply_patch hunk-body misparse ... - grep matched the glob against the workspace-relative path, so "*.go" with path="subdir" found nothing while "**/*.go" matched subdir/a.go. Match the glob relative to the search directory (ripgrep semantics); a single explicit file is matched by its base name. - apply_patch parsed file paths per-line, so a hunk-body line removing content that starts with "-- " (appearing as "--- ...") was mistaken for a file header and a valid patch was rejected. Parse headers with hunk line-counting, matching how git apply delimits hunks.	2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
Vasanth T	00db8ae788	Add shared workspace index foundation (#159) ... * Add shared workspace index foundation * fix workspace index review findings * fix workspace depth on non-windows runners	2026-06-10 17:30:55 +05:30
3 people	6fb0231df8	TUI scrollback re-architecture, Lime chat surface, and deep-audit fixes (#158) ... * docs(design): add Lime TUI prototype and rebuild spec * tui: remove the zeroline skin system One design remains in the tree ahead of the Lime rebuild: the zeroline package, its TUI view/skin plumbing (Options.Skin/ThemeVariant/ThemeDark, model skin branches, theme picker), and the zeroline CLI subcommand are gone. /theme keeps its shell-only message. * tui: replace the cyan palette with the Lime token table theme.go is rebuilt around the Lime design tokens (docs/design/ zero_tui_lime.html): near-black panels, one lime accent, solid tint stand-ins for the prototype's rgba overlays. Existing render sites map onto the new role styles (ink/line/userPrompt/toolName/toolArg) without layout changes; no hex exists outside theme.go. * tui: build the Lime chat-surface components Title bar with brand badge + context window, empty state replacing the deleted splash (block-art 0, tagline, 1-3 starter suggestions), stream blocks (user prompt gutter, muted interim with cursor, final-answer accent rail, done line, bordered notes), tool cards with diff/read/ bash/grep bodies and MiniDot run spinner, borderless composer with run-state hints, and the grouped status line. Final answers are marked at append time; resolved tool calls collapse into their result cards. * tui: fix Stage 2 review findings Adversarial review of the chat-surface commit confirmed 15 issues, all fixed here: - wrapPlainText sliced wide runes by rune count: CJK/emoji prose could panic the TUI or emit lines ~2x the measure; split at width instead - a cancelled run's streamingText leaked into the next turn's interim block; cancelRun now clears it - orphaned tool-call cards (cancelled/errored turns) re-animated with the spinner on any later run; the glyph is now scoped to the call's own runID - starter-suggestion digit capture was active while the chips were off screen (/clear mid-run); the guard now mirrors the render condition - prompt submits while a deferred Ctrl+C quit is draining could start a run the quit would orphan; submission is blocked while exiting - the running placeholder advertised ctrl+c (which quits) as the interrupt key; it now says esc - read-card parser expected 'N: text' but read_file emits 'N | text', so the gutter and L-range never rendered on real output - toolCard borders were one column short of the body rows - diff tint bands now span the full row; NEW FILE renders green on addBg; preamble/no-newline lines are unnumbered meta and no longer shift hunk numbering - card bodies and system notes paint the panel surface; the head gains the separate faintest arg column (grep target + pattern) - title-bar overflow now truncates the minimal candidate instead of rendering the deleted design's 'ZERO … READY' line - untracked the stray snake-game.html (left on disk, ignored) * tui: restyle the interactive surfaces for Lime Permission prompts render as the amber permission card (PERMISSION badge, risk readout, key chips); resolved prompts collapse to one line (allowed once/always/denied · tool) and unprompted allows fold into the tool card's [auto] tag. Ask-user and spec-review prompts share the card language with line borders. Autocomplete and picker overlays move onto the panel/selection tints with the accent ❯ marker; model-picker rows gain the provider dot and ctx · KEY_ENV metadata from the registry and provider catalog. /resume renders its list as stacked session cards (id + age, title, meta). Key handling is untouched everywhere. * tui: adaptive width tiers, doc updates, final polish Width tiers re-evaluate from the live width: ≥100 renders the full spec; 80–99 drops the tool-arg column, header ctx, and the status 'interactive' group; 58–79 drops the diff/read gutters, bares the badge, and keeps provider+tokens+mode; <58 renders a single-segment header, rail-less cards, and a mode-only status line. Table-driven tests cover {58,70,80,100,120} plus a frame-wide invariant that no emitted line exceeds the terminal at any tier. Card bodies expand tabs so width math holds. Dead splash-chip machinery (startupCommandNames, startupOrder) is gone; README's TUI section now describes Lime. * tui: fix final-review findings across Stages 3-4 A second adversarial review confirmed 14 issues, all addressed: - permission collapse and tool-card pairing are now run-scoped (rcKey): providers with repeating synthetic ToolCallIDs (Gemini gemini_tool_N) could attribute a decision or result to a different run's call - rehydrated always-grants no longer mislabel as 'allowed once' (GrantMatched fallback) - the width invariant now actually holds everywhere: empty-state tagline/hint, ask-user rows, permission detail blobs, pending image chips, and the sessions trailing hint are wrapped or fitted; the invariant test renders the empty state and all of those rows at widths 24-120 - every card (permission, ask-user, spec-review, sessions, notes) drops side borders on tiny terminals, not just tool cards - /resume card fields are sanitized against separator bytes from user-controlled titles - the picker's selected row paints its gap so the selBg band is solid - dead splash helpers (normalizedStartupWidth, countLines, nonEmpty, unreachable rowWelcome branch) and stale /theme comments are gone - README no longer claims transcript scrolling keys or Tab-accept behavior that never existed; chatWidth documents its 24-col floor Tag tui-lime-s4 moves to this commit. * audit: deep-audit report, TUI scrollback re-architecture, and cross-module fixes TUI: settled-row flush frontier prints history to native terminal scrollback (tea.Println, ordered + ack-serialized); View() renders only the live tail. Full diffs (400-line flush cap) and OSC 8 file:// links land in history; streamed interim text, cancellation markers, ask_user exchanges, and composer input history are preserved; run-scoped dedup keys fix Gemini's repeating tool-call ids; /exit, Ctrl+C-after-Esc, and cross-session late flushes no longer orphan or contaminate checkpoints. Cross-module: zero search panic + offset mapping, usage report robustness, 529 retry, SSE keep-alive watchdog, registry corrections, update --check on dev builds, MCP ping + mcp list --json secret redaction, sandbox.network config knob, doctor apiKey presence, atomic config writes, C1-safe notifications, rune-safe truncation everywhere, gofmt + vet CI gates, dead glamour dependency dropped. Full audit report: docs/audit/2026-06-10-deep-audit.md (175 findings). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * tui: hide malformed ask_user tool errors * fix tui malformed tool retries * fix max-turn finalization * upgrade tui agent guardrails * fix coderabbit guardrail findings --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>	2026-06-10 17:18:30 +05:30
KRATOS	2ea36cf138	Deferred (lazy) tool loading: tool_search + auto threshold for large MCP tool sets (#148) ... * Deferred (lazy) tool loading: tool_search + auto threshold for large MCP tool sets Adds deferred tool loading so a large MCP tool set no longer sends every tool's full JSON schema each turn. When the number of visible MCP tools crosses a threshold (config tools.deferThreshold, default 10; 0 disables), their schemas are withheld and advertised compactly in a per-turn system-reminder; the model pulls a tool's full schema on demand via a new tool_search tool. Strictly additive: below the threshold behaviour is byte-identical to today. No new module dependencies. - Eligibility: MCP tools opt in via an optional Deferred() bool interface (tools.IsDeferred); built-ins stay eager. No change to the core Tool interface. - Formatting (internal/tools/deferred.go): compact one-liners wrapped in a <system-reminder> by BuildDeferredReminder; server label via MCPServerName(). - tool_search (internal/tools/tool_search.go): SideEffectNone/PermissionAllow/AdvertiseInAuto; select:Name1,Name2 (exact) or keyword (ranked); returns full schemas and signals the loop via Meta["load_tools"]. Operator-filter-aware (never lists tools hidden by --enabled-tools/--disabled-tools). - Agent loop: partitionTools is the single source of truth; eligible counts only ToolVisible deferred tools; Meta["load_tools"] lifts to ToolResult.LoadedTools and unions into a per-run loaded-set advertised next turn. Reminder appended only to the per-turn request copy (never persisted), including both reactive-compaction retry paths. tool_search stays reachable when deferral is active (exempt from the EnabledTools allowlist). - Config + wiring: tools.deferThreshold (default 10; 0 disables; negative rejected); tool_search registered and DeferThreshold threaded in exec and TUI, gated on the same visible-deferred count the loop uses. Recreated on top of current main; resolves the SideEffectNone clash with #146 (escalate_model). Supersedes #147. * deferred-tools: activate deferral only when tool_search is runnable; drop dead deferredTools() Addresses #148 review: - partitionTools gates 'active' on a registered, non-disabled, mode-advertised tool_search (mirrors the executeToolCall dispatch gate). When the loader is unavailable (explicitly disabled, missing, or not advertised e.g. spec-draft), fall back to the eager/inactive path instead of hiding deferred tools behind a loader the model can never call (the dead-end). - Flip TestDisabledToolSearch... to assert the eager fallback; register a real tool_search in the active-path tests that previously relied on activation without a usable loader. - Remove unused toolSearchTool.deferredTools(). * deferred-tools: disable deferral in exec when tool_search disabled; drop unused toolDefinitions shim Further #148 review: - exec computes one effective DeferThreshold, forced to 0 when tool_search is in --disabled-tools, and feeds it to both registerToolSearchIfEligible and agent.Options.DeferThreshold — so the registration gate and the loop partition gate agree, and a disabled loader never enables deferral. - Remove the unused toolDefinitions shim (golangci-lint unused; no callers).	2026-06-09 12:20:22 +05:30
KRATOSandGnanam	69810d5ab0	Mid-run model escalation: escalate_model tool + --allow-escalation (#146) ... * modelregistry: add UpgradeTargetID and Registry.UpgradeTarget escalation lookup * modelregistry: seed escalation chains in catalog decoration * modelregistry: verification gate for escalation upgrade map * agent: add ModelSwitcher option and ToolResult.RequestedModel field * agent: lift escalate_to_model meta into ToolResult.RequestedModel * agent: perform at-most-one mid-run model switch in the turn loop * tools: add SideEffectNone for control-only tools * tools: add escalate_model control tool (metadata + args) * cli: parse --allow-escalation exec flag * cli: document --allow-escalation in exec help * cli: register escalate_model tool under --allow-escalation * cli: wire model switcher for exec escalation * cli: guard byte-identical exec run without escalation flag * cli: attribute post-switch usage to the escalated model * tools: accept an explicit empty escalate_model reason reason is an optional, informational-only arg, but the previous arg parsing rejected an explicit reason:"" (non-empty-string check), failing the whole escalation. Switch to stringArgWithEmpty so an absent OR empty reason is accepted while a non-string value is still rejected. Add a test covering both the empty and absent forms. * agent: test (nil,nil) escalation switcher keeps original provider When a ModelSwitcher returns (nil, nil) — no error, no replacement — the loop's `else if newProvider != nil` guard already keeps the active provider, so the run continues on the original model. Add an agent-layer test that proves this (it panics if the nil guard is dropped), closing the gap the adversarial review flagged. Also note the deferred compaction limitation near the switch: the compactor's context-window budget is fixed at run start and not updated on a mid-run switch (needs a ModelSwitcher contract change to fix). * cli: gate usage model attribution on the escalation flag and harden tests FIX A (back-compat): the OnUsage closure wrote a "model" key into every persisted EventUsage payload unconditionally, diverging a non-escalation run from the byte-identical origin/main baseline. The model can only change mid-run under --allow-escalation, so include the "model" key only then. A new flag-OFF test asserts the persisted usage payload carries no "model" key (mutation-proven). Test hardening for the CLI escalation boundary: - Wire test: each newProvider build returns a DISTINCT provider with its own turn counter; assert the source provider served exactly the escalation turn and the escalated provider served exactly the post-switch answer. Fails if `provider = newProvider` is dropped. - Mixed usage attribution: emit usage pre- and post-switch and assert the first attributes to the original model, the second to the escalated target (the loop's ordering guarantee). - Switch-error path: a failed rebuild is non-fatal and post-error usage stays attributed to the original model (currentModel unchanged). - Top-tier decline end-to-end: a flag-on run that escalates while already top-tier performs no switch (newProvider built exactly once) and succeeds. * modelregistry: validate UpgradeTargetID resolves at registry construction * cli: update currentModel only when the switched provider is non-nil * sandbox: make 'none' a first-class side effect (control-only tools) --------- Co-authored-by: Gnanam <[email protected]>	2026-06-08 20:50:32 +05:30
Anandan	2dfd654107	Add spec mode foundation (#144)	2026-06-08 19:03:02 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS	df56b0dd9e	Tool quality: per-tool denial categorization + secret scanning (#137) ... * [LOCAL PR-Z] Agent: structured per-tool denial categorization Adds ToolResult.DenialReason (DenialCategory: filtered / permission_denied / sandbox_violation) so a surface can tell precisely why a call was blocked instead of parsing Output. Set in the not-enabled path and deniedPermissionResult (sandbox-violation denials categorized distinctly from approval-declined). Tested. * [LOCAL PR-Z] Secrets: scan + redact leaked secrets in bash output New internal/secrets package: a dependency-free, precision-first scanner for high-confidence secret shapes (AWS/Google keys, GitHub/Slack tokens, private-key blocks, JWTs). bash output now runs through secrets.Redact so a command that prints a secret has it replaced with a typed placeholder + a redaction notice, instead of echoing it back into the model context (additive to the configured-key scrub at the registry boundary). A built-in regex scanner fits the CLI without the heavy gitleaks dependency. Tested: detection, no-false-positives on ordinary text, redaction, and the bash wiring. * Tool quality: redact full private-key blocks + use DenialReason in retry classification CodeRabbit critical: the private_key_block pattern matched only the BEGIN header, so Redact left the PEM/OpenSSH key BODY in the output — defeating the redaction. It now matches the entire BEGIN…END block (body included) so the key material is removed. Test asserts the body is gone. CodeRabbit minor: isRetriableToolError now treats a structured ToolResult.DenialReason (filtered/permission/sandbox) as non-retriable, independent of message wording; the text checks remain a fallback for results lacking the field. --------- Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>	2026-06-08 09:08:51 +05:30
3 people	363c0312d6	Skills & plugins: skill tool, skills loader, plugin manifests (#123) ... * Skills & plugins: skill tool, skills loader, plugin manifests Module of the runtime-core split (off main, after #119 tools merged). Clean extract — internal/skills is new; internal/plugins had no drift on main. No new deps. - internal/skills: loads */SKILL.md frontmatter from the skills dir (resolves its own XDG dir); no YAML dependency. - skill tool (internal/tools/skill.go), read-only, registered in CoreReadOnlyTools (so it's in the agent core + the MCP read-only default). Path-safe: it Load()s all skills and matches by exact name — it never builds a path from the model-supplied arg, so there is no traversal surface. knownToolNames gains "skill" for the specialist cross-package invariant; CoreReadOnlyTools count test bumped 4->5. - internal/plugins: plugin manifest metadata enrichment (Author/License/Keywords/Interface). FORWARD code — the cli plugin-loading wiring lands later. MCP hardening (nested-schema + hung-server fix) is a SEPARATE follow-up PR. build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #123 review (CodeRabbit): pointer metadata, skill schema alias, dir fallback, List test - plugins: Author/Interface are now *PluginAuthor/*PluginInterface so omitempty actually omits them — a non-pointer struct is never empty to encoding/json, so the old form emitted author:{}/interface:{} and changed the serialized shape of plugins that don't set them. parseAuthor/parseInterface return nil when all fields are empty; formatAuthor takes the pointer. (Major) - skill: schema now declares the 'skill' alias alongside 'name' (and drops strict Required) so the alias survives schema validators that reject unknown keys (AdditionalProperties:false); Run still enforces exactly-one-of via aliasedStringArg. (Major) - skills.DefaultDir: return "" instead of a relative ".local/share/..." path when neither XDG_DATA_HOME nor a resolvable HOME exists, so skills can't bind to the process CWD (load("") already no-ops). (Minor) - skills_test: TestListReturnsNamesAndDescriptions now asserts List strips Content so a listing can't silently leak full skill bodies. (Minor) build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #123 review (@Vasanthdev2004): confine skill SKILL.md to the skills root skill is a permission-allow read-only core/MCP tool, so the loader must not follow a symlinked SKILL.md (or skill dir) out of the skills root and become an arbitrary-file reader. load() now resolves the skills root via EvalSymlinks and, for each entry, resolves SKILL.md through symlinks and verifies the real path stays under the root (confineSkillPath); an escaping or unreadable path is skipped rather than read. Mirrors the grep/read_file confinement. Legit skills under a symlinked root (e.g. macOS /tmp) still load because the root is resolved too. Regression: TestLoadSkipsSymlinkedSkillFileEscapingRoot (a SKILL.md symlinked to a secret outside the root is skipped, not read). build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #123 re-review (CodeRabbit): reject non-regular SKILL.md, single-trim metadata - skills: confineSkillPath now Lstats the resolved path and skips non-regular targets (directory/FIFO/device/socket). A FIFO/device named SKILL.md (or an in-root symlink to one) would otherwise make os.ReadFile block indefinitely — skill is a permission-allow tool over a user-controlled dir. Regression: TestLoadSkipsNonRegularSkillFile (unix-tagged; mkfifo SKILL.md, asserts Load skips it within a timeout rather than hanging). (Major) - plugins: coerceMetaStringSlice trims each item once into a local var instead of calling strings.TrimSpace twice. (Nitpick) build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-07 21:35:11 +05:30
Vasanth T	781bc7d3c1	Add guarded web fetch tool (#121) ... * feat: add guarded web fetch tool * fix: harden web fetch DNS validation * fix: tighten web fetch SSRF guardrails	2026-06-07 21:02:50 +05:30
3 people	75f15da82a	Tools: arg-tolerance, ask_user, secret scrubbing, structured results, hardening (#119) ... * Tools: arg-tolerance, ask_user, secret scrubbing, structured results, hardening First module of the tools->agent->tui chain that leads to the TUI shell (off main). Scope: internal/tools (+ a 1-line specialist vocabulary update). 3-way merged onto main's specialist drift (RunOptions tool-context fields, Safety.AdvertiseInAuto, optionsAwareTool dispatch, PropertySchema, base structured Result) and grafted the runtime-core additions: - Shared arg-tolerance layer (argtolerance.go: alias-aware/type-strict arg resolution + slice coercion) adopted across all tools so weak models' non-canonical arg shapes are accepted; bool/int coercion in args.go. - ask_user tool (interactive clarifying questions) wired into CoreReadOnlyTools; nested PropertySchema (Properties/Required) for its object questions + update_plan. - Secret scrubbing at the registry boundary (scrubResultSecrets via internal/redaction) applied to every tool-execution path, incl. the optionsAwareTool dispatch; structured Result (Display/Redacted/ChangedFiles). - mutation_targets (paths a mutating tool will write, for session checkpointing) + hardened grep (symlink confinement), apply_patch, bash, edit/write. EXCLUDED per the module split: the blueprint task tool (subagents — another dev's area; the merged specialist Task is separate) and the skill tool (ships with the later skills module); plus their subagent-only registry helpers (Without/isolateForChild). ask_user is now a core tool, so internal/specialist knownToolNames adds "ask_user" to keep the TestKnownToolNamesMatchCoreRegistry cross-package invariant. No new deps; build/vet/-race/windows/full-suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #119 review (CodeRabbit): scrub Display, validate apply_patch mutation paths, narrow test skips - registry.go: scrubResultSecrets now redacts Result.Display.Summary too (not just Output), so a caller preferring Display can't bypass the boundary redaction. - mutation_targets.go: apply_patch targets now run through validatePatchPaths(applyRoot, ...) before being returned, so a traversal patch (../x) can't yield an out-of-workspace checkpoint target. Regression case added to TestMutationTargetsRejectsEscapingPaths. - argtolerance_test/write_tools_test: the apply_patch tests no longer Skipf on ANY non-OK result (which masked real diff/apply regressions); they skip ONLY when the git binary is unavailable (gitApplyUnavailable helper checks exec's 'executable file not found') and otherwise Fatalf. build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #119 re-review (CodeRabbit): best-effort multiSelect + Display.Summary scrub coverage - ask_user: an uncoercible multiSelect no longer fails the whole call — it's a UI hint, so it defaults to false (best-effort, mirroring the lenient options path). Test: TestParseAskUserQuestionsLenientOptions extended. - registry_test: TestRunWithOptionsScrubsSecretsForAllCallers now also leaks a secret via Result.Display.Summary and asserts it is redacted, locking in the boundary scrub for the structured-result path (secretTool gained a display field). build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #119 review (@Vasanthdev2004): scrub ALL registry return paths + harden intArg [blocker] RunWithOptions now scrubs every return path, not just tool-execution: a named return + a single 'defer scrubResultSecrets(result)' covers the unknown-tool, sandbox-deny, sandbox-approval-required, permission-required and permission-denied early returns too. Previously a sandbox denial that echoed a secret-bearing path/arg returned it raw with Redacted=false. Regression: TestRunWithOptionsScrubsSecretsOnDenialPaths (permission-denied reason carrying a token -> scrubbed + Redacted). [non-blocking] intArg fails closed on NaN/Inf/out-of-range floats (and their string forms) via a floatToInt helper, before any implementation-defined cast. Tests added for NaN/Inf/NaN-string/non-integral. build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Address #119 review (CodeRabbit grep TOCTOU + anandh8x dependency blockers) - grep: close the confinement TOCTOU — confineGrepFile now returns the symlink-RESOLVED path and collectGrepMatches reads THAT (not the raw candidate), so a symlink swapped in between check and read can't escape the workspace. - ask_user: removed from CoreReadOnlyTools. It needs the agent loop's interactive intercept (OnAskUser), which is in the (unmerged) agent module; without it the tool only returns the non-interactive fallback. The tool still ships (NewAskUserTool); the agent module registers it in core + wires the intercept together. Reverted the specialist knownToolNames 'ask_user' entry + the ask_user-in-core test accordingly. - update_plan: reverted the plan schema to a flat array (item structure documented in the description). The structured nested-object Items schema depends on the agent's PropertySchema serializer (propertyToRuntimeMap) passing nested Properties/Required through to providers, which is in the agent module; a nested schema here would be silently dropped. PropertySchema.Properties/Required fields are kept (used by ask_user.go's own schema + the later MCP module). build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green; no new deps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> * Harden #119 from adversarial self-review: sandbox alias-gate, Meta scrub, intArg 2^63 A multi-dimension adversarial review of the tools diff surfaced 3 real issues beyond the reviewer rounds: - [major/security] write_file/edit_file path aliases file_path/filename/filepath bypassed the sandbox workspace+symlink gate: sandbox.requestPaths only inspected path/cwd/file/dir, so an aliased target skipped enforcement (same class as audit H4). Aligned requestPaths with the tools' path-alias lists (internal/sandbox/risk.go). The tools' own resolveWorkspaceTargetPath still confined, but the sandbox LAYER/audit/symlink-check was silently skipped. Regression: TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys. - [minor] scrubResultSecrets skipped Result.Meta, which is forwarded to the transcript and carries model-controlled strings (glob pattern, bash cwd). Now scrubs Meta values too. Covered in TestRunWithOptionsScrubsSecretsForAllCallers. - [minor] floatToInt used f > float64(MaxInt); that constant rounds up to 2^63 so exactly 2^63 slipped to an out-of-range cast. Changed to >=. Test added for 2^63 float+string. build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green; no new deps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-07 17:13:27 +05:30
Anandan	82314a703c	Add specialist authoring tools (#117) ... * Add specialist authoring tools * Harden specialist authoring boundaries	2026-06-07 15:21:09 +05:30
Anandan	a60154b70a	Add specialist Task runtime (#113) ... * Add specialist Task runtime * Harden specialist resume identity	2026-06-07 12:39:29 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS	34ad21a551	Add runtime permission and verification event contracts (#82) ... * feat: add runtime permission event contract * feat: stream permission events from exec * feat: add runtime command snapshots * feat: add session rewind compaction plans * feat: add verification event contracts * fix: harden runtime contract review gaps * test: assert approved exec stderr contract * fix: address CodeRabbit CHANGES_REQUESTED items for #82 - Make OnSandboxDecision callback async + panic-safe (non-blocking, recovered) in tools/registry.go per CR. - Add explicit regression test for ConfigSnapshot when ResolveRuntimeMetadata errors (no secret leak in Message/BaseURL). - (Many prior items like shapedPayloadPreview for permission/tool events, dual-target conflict test, stderr empty on approved path, Kind/Framework preservation, redactCommand empty slice, etc. were already landed on this branch.) All relevant tests now pass. * fix(agent): make sandbox decision available synchronously on Result for permission events The recent change to invoke OnSandboxDecision asynchronously (to satisfy non-blocking requirement) broke the agent's immediate capture of the decision for building PermissionEvent after registry.RunWithOptions. - Add SandboxDecision *sandbox.Decision to tools.Result (not serialized). - Populate it on all sandbox-involved return paths in registry.RunWithOptions (sync, before/while firing async callback for observers). - In agent executeToolCall, use result.SandboxDecision for buildPermissionEvent (reliable ordering) instead of side-effect capture via the callback. - The async callback is still supported for any external OnSandboxDecision consumers. This fixes the two failing agent tests that were causing the cross-platform 'Smoke' CI jobs to fail on this PR: - TestRunEmitsPermissionEventForPersistentSandboxGrant - TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode All go tests now pass. --------- Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>	2026-06-06 13:13:08 +05:30
KRATOS	623c53e324	feat: harden sandbox command execution (#79) ... * feat: add sandbox command runner * feat: route shell tools through sandbox engine * test: cover sandboxed shell execution	2026-06-06 09:20:25 +05:30
KRATOS	29aec1b190	feat: add M6 sandbox backend (#77) ... * feat: add sandbox policy backend * feat: enforce sandbox decisions in tool runtime * feat: add sandbox policy and grants CLI * fix: honor sandbox grants in registry	2026-06-05 19:25:49 +05:30
Vasanth T	af1d292de4	Add Go M0 bash tool (#49) ... * feat: add go bash tool * fix: avoid quoted helper path on windows * fix: make bash cwd test portable	2026-06-04 15:03:07 +05:30
Vasanth T	e748206c27	Add Go M0 write tools (#48) ... * feat: add go write tools * fix: address write tool review feedback * fix: recheck write target resolver	2026-06-04 14:28:37 +05:30
Vasanth T	c9d0856df4	[codex] add Go read-only core tools (#47) ... * feat: add go read-only core tools * fix: harden go read-only tools	2026-06-04 13:39:46 +05:30