Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kevin Codex d0ae9c98e3 feat: agent quality, caching, retry, and tooling upgrades
Ten self-contained improvements to the core agent engine and tools:

- edit_file: fuzzy fallback matching (7-strategy cascade with uniqueness
  protection and a disproportion guard) when old_string does not match
  byte-for-byte; exact match remains the fast path
- edit_file/write_file: inline error-severity LSP diagnostics in tool
  output so the model sees a break it introduced in the same turn
- lsp: expand server registry from 4 to 28 languages; doctor grades only
  tier-1 servers and lists the long tail informationally
- agent: consecutive read-only tool calls execute concurrently (bounded
  at 8), consumed in original order, never spanning a mutating call
- anthropic: cache_control breakpoints on the last two conversation
  messages so the transcript prefix stays a prompt-cache hit
- providerio: retry schedule raised to 6 attempts with exponential
  2s-30s backoff when the server sends no Retry-After
- tools: truncated exec/bash output spills to a redacted temp file
  referenced in the truncation notice; bash output (previously
  unbounded) now shares exec_command's token budget
- web_fetch: dependency-free HTML-to-markdown conversion (format:
  auto|raw|markdown) and larger limits (256KiB default, 2MiB max, 30s)
- modelregistry: live models.dev overlay refreshes context limits and
  base pricing from a TTL-cached fetch; opt-in at the CLI entrypoint
- tools: opt-in format-on-write (ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE=1) runs standard
  formatters across 27 extensions, ordered before the file-tracker
  re-baseline so conflict detection is preserved
2026-07-05 16:43:50 +08:00
KRATOS c0254e3266 fix(tui): context-fill gauge for custom/local Ollama models + related fixes (#356)
* fix(tui): show the context-fill gauge for custom/local Ollama models

The colored context gauge (used/window · N%) only renders when Zero knows
a model's context window. It resolves that two ways: a curated remote
catalog (how Grok/hosted models are known), or live /v1/models discovery —
but parseModelsResponse only ever extracts id/description from that
response; OpenAI-compatible model listings don't carry context-window
metadata at all. A custom/local Ollama model tag (e.g. a locally-pulled
":cloud"-tagged model) has no curated-catalog entry to borrow one from
either, so it always resolved to an unknown window and the gauge silently
fell back to a bare token count with no color grading.

Ollama does expose this, just via a different, Ollama-native endpoint
(/api/show, not /v1/models) whose model_info map reports it under an
architecture-prefixed key like "qwen2.context_length". Added
DiscoverOllamaContextWindow (providermodeldiscovery) to probe it, wired
through an async command scoped to the local "ollama" catalog ID only
(not "ollama-cloud", a different hosted service this endpoint isn't
assumed to exist on) — fired from Init() for the provider active at
launch, and from switchProviderModel for a provider switched to
mid-session (which previously warmed no discovery at all for the new
provider, a separate gap this also fixes).

New tests: DiscoverOllamaContextWindow's endpoint construction and
model_info parsing (including a mixed-type model_info and a missing
*.context_length key), the discovery command's scoping to local Ollama
only, the Update() handler populating modelContextWindow's fallback, and
switchProviderModel warming discovery for the newly active provider.

Local only — not pushed. I can't run a live Ollama daemon in this
sandbox, so the actual /api/show request/response shape (verified against
Ollama's documented API, not a live instance) needs confirming against a
real daemon before this goes out.

* fix(tui): stop showing the token count twice next to the context gauge

contextWindowSegment (the gauge) and usageStatusSegment (the plain "N tok"
figure) both read the exact same value (latestUsageTokens) — the code
already suppressed the plain figure when the sidebar shows it ("the token
figure shows on both sides"), but never extended that same dedup to the
gauge. So as soon as a model's context window becomes known (e.g. after
the previous commit's Ollama fix), the footer showed the identical number
twice: once inside the gauge, once again right next to it.

Fixed by falling back to cost-only whenever the gauge is shown, same as
the sidebar-active branch already does.

* fix: check collect()'s deadline even while output keeps draining

The wait deadline in execSession.collect() was only checked in the branch
reached when drainString() returns empty. A background process producing
output continuously enough to keep the buffer perpetually non-empty could
theoretically starve that check forever, turning the caller's requested
timeout into an unbounded block regardless of yield_time_ms.

Investigated as part of a cross-provider "stuck" report (multiple sessions
across different models/providers all hanging on the same prompt, each
with a background terminal running and no forward progress). Could not
empirically reproduce a hang via a synthetic continuous-writer test under
Go's real scheduler — the reader won the race often enough in practice
that this doesn't appear to be the actual cause of those reports. Keeping
the fix regardless since it closes a real, if hard-to-trigger, gap: the
deadline is now checked in both branches, so continuous output can never
prevent collect() from returning within its requested window.
2026-07-01 20:48:50 +05:30
KRATOS 2a8802e39c fix: cap unbounded exec_command output buffer to prevent OOM kill (#353)
* fix: cap unbounded exec_command output buffer to prevent OOM kill

execOutputBuffer.data accumulated every byte a backgrounded exec_command
session wrote, with no size cap, unlike buffer.recent which is correctly
bounded to recentExecOutputBytes for the /ps preview. drainString() only
clears data when the agent actually polls that session again — so a
long-lived background session nobody polls (e.g. a dev server left running
after the run that started it was cancelled) grows this buffer forever as
long as the process keeps writing, with no ceiling.

Traced this directly to a real crash: a session that had been running for
~5.5 hours (an earlier turn invoking swarm agents got cancelled mid-flight,
per that session's own event log) accumulated to ~42.7GB of compressed
memory, at which point macOS's memorystatus killed the process outright
("killing zero due to low-swap").

Fixed by capping data at maxExecOutputBufferBytes (2MiB), trimming from the
front like recent already does, and surfacing a one-time truncation notice
on the next drain so data loss is visible rather than silent.

* fix: pre-push review findings on the exec_command buffer-cap fix

Ran an adversarial review before opening the PR. It found the truncation
notice added alongside the buffer cap didn't actually work: prefixing
execOutputTruncatedMessage into drainString()'s text meant the notice
always sat ~2MiB before the end of the combined output, but the tool's
own downstream truncateExecOutput() keeps at most a 400KB tail (even at
the maximum allowed max_output_tokens) — so the notice was reliably
swallowed, or chopped into an unreadable fragment at smaller budgets.
Verified with direct reproductions against the real functions.

Fixed by moving the signal out of the text stream entirely:
- execOutputBuffer gains consumeTruncated() (read+reset, called once per
  collect()) and peekTruncated() (read-only, for status views) instead of
  injecting a marker into the drained bytes.
- collect() now returns (string, bool); both call sites thread the bool
  through to execToolResult, which sets meta["output_buffer_truncated"]
  and appends the notice to the response body *after* truncateExecOutput
  runs, so it can never be re-truncated or land in a discarded region.
- Also flagged: a session torn down without ever being polled again after
  truncation loses the signal entirely, since nothing drains/logs it on
  teardown. Full audit-trail logging felt like overkill for a soft
  transparency signal on top of a hard memory-safety fix, but exposed
  peekTruncated() on ExecSessionSnapshot and surfaced it in the /ps row
  (background_terminals.go) so it's visible any time a still-running
  session is checked — covers the common case (the review's own scenario:
  a long-lived dev server nobody's polling but that's still alive) even
  though a session reaped before ever being looked at is still a gap.

New tests: reworked TestExecOutputBufferCapsUndrainedData for the
consume/peek API, and TestExecToolResultSurfacesBufferTruncationOutsideByteBudget
reproducing the review's exact failure case (max_output_tokens=1) and
proving the notice now survives it.
2026-07-01 15:03:42 +05:30
Anandan d29ab98a79 Improve sandbox permission handling (#323)
Retry shell commands outside the sandbox when sandboxed output only reflects the sandbox namespace, and keep network retries sandboxed when a network grant is enough.

Show user-facing permission reasons for escalated shell commands instead of exposing internal sandbox policy text.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tui -run 'TestRunUsesEscalatedJustificationForPermissionPrompt|TestRunUsesUserFacingEscalatedFallbackForPermissionPrompt|TestPermissionPromptMapsEscalatedSandboxReason|TestRunRetriesShellUnsandboxedAfterSandboxNamespaceLimitedOutput'

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools

Tested: env HOME=/tmp/zero-test-home-clean XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/zero-test-config-clean GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-26 16:21:06 +05:30
Anandan 80ab238361 Align sandbox command approval behavior (#322)
* Align shell approval sandbox execution

Make approved shell command-prefix executions use the escalated sandbox path when denied-read policy allows it, so remembered approvals do not still hit the restrictive sandbox.

Allow auto sandbox mode to degrade to a direct command plan when native command wrapping is unavailable, while strict sandbox require continues to fail closed.

Update regression tests for degraded execution, prefix-approved shell calls, and unavailable native sandbox metadata.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryRunsWithDegradedUnavailableNativeSandbox|TestBashToolRunsWithDegradedUnavailableNativeSandbox|TestBashRequireEscalatedBypassesNativeSandboxAfterApproval|TestExecCommandRequireEscalatedBypassesNativeSandboxAfterApproval'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... -run '^$'

Tested: git diff --check

* Align sandbox command approval behavior

Evaluate reusable shell approvals across plain command segments so prefix grants can cover commands with safe read-only tails without relying on command-specific sandbox exceptions.

Keep process inspection commands sandboxed by default; unsandboxed host access continues to require explicit escalation or a narrow command-prefix approval.

Improve shell tool guidance around sandboxed additional permissions, full escalation, justifications, and narrow reusable prefixes.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/agent

Tested: env HOME=/tmp/zero-test-home-clean XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/zero-test-config-clean GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Normalize explicit sandbox backend platforms

Infer the platform from a caller-provided sandbox backend name before choosing the manager runtime platform. This keeps Linux, macOS, and Windows backend plans deterministic across host OSes when tests or callers provide a backend without an explicit Platform field.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools

Tested: env HOME=/tmp/zero-test-home-clean XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/zero-test-config-clean GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-26 13:20:07 +05:30
Anandan 6be50cd3a7 fix(sandbox): retry approved network shell commands (#301)
* fix(sandbox): retry approved network shell commands

* test(sandbox): fix portable smoke expectations

* fix(sandbox): restore Windows offline egress block
2026-06-23 17:44:46 +05:30
KRATOSandgnanam1990 f7ee189ba5 fix: resolve 15 findings from the 2026-06-20 deep audit (#281)
* docs(audit): 2026-06-20 deep adversarial audit report

Audit-only deliverable (no source changed). Fresh origin/main (bfbdbb1) deep
read across 13 subsystems with per-finding adversarial re-verification, plus
reconciliation of the 2026-06-10/2026-06-13 audits.

Result: build/vet clean; race detector finds 0 data races (67/68 pkgs; the
3 internal/tools failures are -race-only timing flakes). 35 surviving findings
(1 high, 15 medium, 17 low, 2 info); 64 prior findings fixed, 14 partial,
12 still-open.

* fix(providerhealth): strip credentials on cross-host redirect (AUDIT-M10)

The connectivity probe's CheckRedirect re-validated the redirect host against
the SSRF blocklist but never stripped auth headers. Go's stdlib only auto-strips
Authorization/Cookie/WWW-Authenticate on a host change — not x-api-key,
x-goog-api-key, or custom provider headers — so a baseURL that 3xx-redirects to
an attacker-controlled public host received the provider API key verbatim.

Thread the exact set of auth-bearing header names (kind default + profile
AuthHeader + CustomHeaders keys + well-known) into the client and Header.Del
them whenever the redirect target's host:port differs from the original.
Regression test asserts the creds are dropped cross-host and kept same-host.

* fix(sessions): fsync events.jsonl append for crash durability (AUDIT-M12)

appendEventLocked wrote the event into the page cache and returned success, then
durably wrote (fsync'd) the derived metadata. A crash after the metadata fsync
but before the events.jsonl page flushed left metadata.EventCount ahead of the
log — silently dropping the last appended event, including the checkpoint a
/rewind targets. Add file.Sync() before Close so the log is at least as durable
as the metadata derived from it.

(Note: the fsync itself has no portable unit-test seam; covered by the existing
sessions append/durability suite for no-regression.)

* fix(cron): DST fall-back double-fire + claim double-grant (AUDIT-M4, AUDIT-M5)

M4: fireJob/claimFire computed the next slot from the raw sub-second now(), so
schedule.Next's DST fall-back collapse guard (which only engages for a
minute-aligned 'after') never fired — a daily job in the repeated wall-clock hour
ran twice on the fall-back day. Feed sched.Next a minute-truncated instant at the
claim and the post-exec advance (the due-check still uses the real instant so
sub-minute NextRunAt jobs are unaffected).

M5: claimFire left NextRunAt unchanged when the schedule couldn't advance
(unparseable/exhausted spec), so two concurrent schedulers both saw the job due
and both fired it. Pause the job inside the same locked claim instead: the winner
still fires once and the post-exec keeps it paused; the loser sees a non-active
job and is refused.

Tests: claimFire double-claim on an unadvanceable job (second refused, job paused)
and a DST fall-back daily job advancing past the repeat (not re-firing it).

* fix(daemon): bound the control handshake + track bridge conns for Shutdown (AUDIT-M7, M8, I1)

The remote bridge clears the connection deadline before handing the conn to
Server.ServeConn, and the local socket set none, so handleConn's two ReadControl
handshake calls could block forever — an authenticated-but-idle remote peer
pinned a bridge connection slot (32 of them exhaust the bridge), and the local
path had the same unbounded read. Set a handshake deadline in handleConn and
clear it before the (long-lived) streaming dispatch (M7, I1).

ServeConn also bypassed trackConn, so Shutdown's conns-close sweep couldn't close
a remote conn stalled in that handshake read. Track/untrack it like the local
accept loop does (M8).

Tests: handleConn returns under a shortened handshake deadline when the peer
never sends hello; Shutdown closes a ServeConn'd conn well under the 10s deadline.

* fix(swarm): atomic rename-with-verify mailbox stale-lock break (AUDIT-M13)

The stale-break compared two consecutive reads of the SAME lock file
(string(data) == string(stale)), so the equality was always true and gave no
protection: two waiters could both observe a stale lock and both os.Remove it
while a third recreated it via O_EXCL, leaving two live writers to the same
per-agent inbox (split-brain). Replace with the proven rename-with-verify used by
the cron/hooks/oauth locks: rename the stale file aside (only one racer wins the
rename), re-check the moved file's mtime is still stale before deleting, and
rename it back if a holder rotated a fresh lock in the gap.

Tests: a genuinely stale lock is reclaimed (no .stale.* leftover); a fresh held
lock is never broken. (The double-break race itself is not deterministically
unit-testable; the fix mirrors the cron/hooks/oauth pattern.)

* fix(streamjson): anchor api_key redaction so prose isn't mangled (AUDIT-M1)

The api_key secret pattern used ["'=:\s]+ as the delimiter class, so a bare
space after the marker counted — 'the api_key: foo setting' and 'apiKey value
spans' had the following word replaced with [REDACTED] in every emitted
stream-json event (text deltas, tool output, final answer). Require a real
assignment delimiter (= or :) and a credential-length body, mirroring the
already-anchored sk-/bearer patterns. Prose survives; real api_key=... secrets
still redact.

* fix(tools): snapshot exec-session lastUsedAt under its lock to fix prune race (AUDIT-L15)

sessionToPruneLocked sorted on execSession.lastUsedAt while holding only
manager.mu, but touch() writes lastUsedAt under session.mu — a data race on a
time.Time that could torn-read and mis-select the prune victim. Snapshot each
session's lastUsedAt via a session.mu-guarded getter before sorting (lock order
stays manager.mu -> session.mu; no path takes them the other way). Adds a -race
regression test driving touch() concurrently with the prune selection.

* fix(swarm): release per-job context on MaxRuns completion (AUDIT-L13)

Scheduler.run returned on MaxRuns completion without calling job.cancel(), so the
job's derived context (and the goroutine context.WithCancel spawns to propagate
parent cancellation) leaked until the whole scheduler was cancelled at session
end. Add defer job.cancel() (idempotent with Cancel/Close) so it is released on
every exit path.

* fix(agent): route post-compaction and max-turns connects through streamWithReconnect (AUDIT-L1)

The main turn connect already retries transient disconnects via
streamWithReconnect, but the post-compaction retry connect, the reactive
mid-stream reconnect, and finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns called provider.StreamCompletion
directly — a single transient hiccup on those (e.g. the final summary after a long
autonomous/cron run, or the turn right after a context-limit compaction) failed the
whole run with no retry. All three are pre-content connects, so routing them through
the helper carries no OnText-duplication risk.

* fix(cli): reject trailing args after --skip-permissions-unsafe (AUDIT-L3)

zero --skip-permissions-unsafe "fix bug" silently discarded the prompt and
launched the interactive TUI, so a scripted one-shot unsafe invocation appeared
to hang. Reject any trailing positional arg loudly (after checking for a
misplaced --add-dir first, which keeps its specific error), pointing users at
the working form: zero exec --skip-permissions-unsafe -p "...".

* fix(provideroauth): error on present-but-wrong-shape chatgpt account-id claim (AUDIT-L11)

extractChatGPTAccountID returned ("", nil) both when the id_token had no
account-id claim AND when OpenAI's auth namespace was present but the account id
was missing/empty/non-string. The latter is a claim-shape change: the caller only
warns on a non-nil error, so it silently omitted the chatgpt-account-id header and
every Codex call 401'd with no diagnostic, indistinguishable from an expired
token. Return an error for the present-but-unusable case so the login warning
fires; a genuinely absent claim still soft-skips ("", nil).

* test(tools): widen exec-session poll windows so the suite is -race-clean (AUDIT report §2)

Three exec-session timing tests assumed a 250ms-sleep / immediate child would
finish within a fixed 1000ms yield. Under -race the child (the race-instrumented
test binary) starts slowly enough to overrun it, so the tool correctly returned a
still-running session_id instead of an exit_code and the asserts failed — the
non-green -race suite the audit flagged in §2. collect() returns as soon as the
session completes, so widening the poll window to 30s makes them deterministic
under -race without slowing the passing case. Test-only; no behavior change.

* docs(audit): mark remediation status (fixed/deferred/skipped) for the 2026-06-20 audit

* docs(audit): strip trailing whitespace from the report (fix git diff --check)

* fix(tools): drain PTY output before marking an exec session done (AUDIT-M14)

A TTY exec session's stdout was copied into the buffer by a fire-and-forget
io.Copy goroutine, but startSession's Wait goroutine called markDone (and then
removed the session) as soon as command.Wait() returned — before that goroutine
had necessarily drained the master FD. The command's final output chunk (e.g. a
test runner's last PASS/FAIL line) could be lost on exit, and since the exited
session is removed it could not be polled back. This also surfaced as the flaky
TestExecCommandTTYSessionAcceptsInputOnLinux on loaded CI.

Make the PTY cleanup (called after command.Wait, before markDone) join the copy
goroutine before closing the master: the child has exited so the master EOFs once
io.Copy finishes draining; waiting for that (bounded by bashWaitDelay) guarantees
all output is buffered before the session is marked done. Closing the master
first would truncate the unread tail, so the join precedes the Close.

Linux-only path (exec_pty_linux.go); verified via GOOS=linux build+vet (the TTY
test only runs on linux/CI).

* docs(audit): mark M14 fixed (PTY drain) in remediation status

---------

Co-authored-by: gnanam1990 <[email protected]>
2026-06-21 00:44:23 +05:30
Anandan f5038151c8 Add managed background terminals (#270)
* Add managed background terminal sessions

* Stop background terminals on TUI exit

* Cover approved local network sandbox mode

* Polish background terminal rendering

* Tighten exec session cleanup guidance

* Address background terminal review feedback

* Kill exec session trees on Windows

* Trigger CI for Windows cleanup
2026-06-20 20:30:39 +05:30
Anandan cf54e2cb0e Add persistent exec command sessions (#267)
* Add persistent exec command sessions

Introduce exec_command and write_stdin tools backed by a shared session manager so long-running shell commands can remain alive and be polled or interrupted across tool calls.

Wire exec_command through the existing shell permission, network prompt, command-prefix approval, sandbox grant scope, specialist manifest, and prompt/documentation paths.

Keep web_fetch limited to public remote HTTP(S) URLs so localhost/private URLs go through shell commands where sandbox network permission applies.

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Fix exec session lifecycle review issues
2026-06-20 14:20:32 +05:30