Commit Graph
8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
euxaristiaandeuxaristia 275e248669 fix(oauth): Split an oversized keyring token blob across entries (#1007)
* fix(oauth): split an oversized keyring token blob across entries

Store every provider and MCP token in one keyring entry and the store stops
working once the logins outgrow it. On macOS the secret rides inside a
`security -i` command line capped at 4095 bytes, which leaves 3027 bytes of
JSON for all logins combined, so a second OIDC login fails to save and every
write after it fails too.

Split a blob that does not fit across numbered entries and put a manifest in
the anchor account. Chunks live in two alternating generations: a write fills
the one that is not live, then replaces the manifest, so that single write is
the commit point and a crash partway through still reads the previous
generation. `zc1:` cannot prefix base64, so an entry written by an existing
build is still recognised and read without a migration step.

Reserve the range a write will occupy before occupying it. Without that, a
write interrupted while filling a longer generation leaves chunks above the
count the manifest records, and no later cleanup knows to delete them: a
fragment of a token blob would stay in the keychain for good.

Expose the per-entry budget from internal/keyring rather than hardcoding the
macOS figure in the oauth store, sharing one line builder with Set so the
budget and the boundary it describes cannot drift. Backends with no limit
report so and keep the single-entry layout, so Linux is untouched.

Refs #937

* fix(oauth): lock keyring reads, validate manifest digest, and harden chunk tests

* test(oauth): assert Status blocks during keyring lock regression test

* fix(oauth): sweep both chunk generations when a store regrows

A shrink writes the blob back under the anchor, which replaces the manifest
and takes the per-generation chunk counts with it. From then on nothing can
name the chunks a failed cleanup left behind, so the growth branch's sweep of
the target generation is the only one that will ever reach them — and it only
ever targets family A. A keychain that refused one delete during the shrink
therefore kept a superseded generation of access, ID and refresh tokens
indefinitely, with no way for the user to know.

Sweep the other generation alongside the target, and document that the
reclaim waits for the next growth: a store that shrinks once and never grows
again keeps the residue, which sweeping on every whole write would close at a
cost of 128 `security` invocations per save on macOS.

Also record why Load and Status take the cross-process lock, and give the
missing-chunk error the same "log in again" advice the digest failure carries.

Refs #937

* fix(oauth): serialize keyring operations under user-level lock

Derive the keyring backend lock file path from the user's home directory rather than file store configuration, ensuring processes with distinct store paths share the same lock domain for the OS keychain.

Refs #938

* Address review feedback on chunked keyring token store and recovery

Refs #938

* Refine auth reset message and chunk format notation

Refs #938

* Harden OAuth store reset lifecycle, keyring migration recovery, and completions.

Refs #938

* Validate keyring cleanup markers, propagate lock resolution errors, and test reader concurrency.

Refs #938

* Preserve live OAuth credentials when stale cleanup markers survive migration.

Refs #937

* Verify JSON output from OAuth reset to cover its recovery response.

Refs #937

* Verify that JSON OAuth reset actually removes stored logins.

Refs #937

* Require confirmation before resetting shared OAuth credentials.

Refs #937

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:33:44 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 2a062aa401 fix(auth): persist OpenRouter API key after login (#595)
* fix(auth): persist OpenRouter API key after login

zero auth openrouter minted a key but only printed it, leaving the
provider unusable unless the user manually exported it or edited
config by hand. Now the key is saved into the credential store, the
provider profile is created/activated, and stale inline/env key
fields are cleared. Auth-failure hints also now point at zero setup
and zero auth openrouter instead of the vaguer zero auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(auth): sanitize minted key and roll back orphaned credential on save failure

Addresses PR review comments: trim the OpenRouter key right after
login so both the save path and the manual fallback instructions use
the sanitized value, and delete the just-written credential-store
entry if persisting the stored-key marker in config.json fails, so a
partial failure doesn't leave an orphaned secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-08 23:04:57 +08:00
Kevin Codex 16550569c1 feat(providers): OAuth login profiles and list-first /provider manager (#560)
* feat(providers): OAuth login profiles and list-first /provider manager

Make multiple providers a first-class workflow: every OAuth login is now a
visible, switchable provider, and /provider manages the whole lifecycle.

OAuth logins become provider profiles:
- zero auth chatgpt / zero auth login <preset> and all four TUI login paths
  (wizard + first-run, browser + device-code) now upsert a catalog-backed
  profile via config.EnsureCatalogProvider after storing the token — without
  stealing the active provider. Previously the token was stored invisibly:
  the provider showed up nowhere and 'providers use' failed not-found.
- Switching to an OAuth provider no longer inlines the bearer as an API key,
  which suppressed the runtime resolver (no token refresh, no Codex
  chatgpt-account-id header → guaranteed 401s). The credential gate now
  recognizes stored OAuth logins on keyless profiles.
- providers list / current report truthful credential state: stored keys
  count as configured (APIKeySet honors apiKeyStored) and token logins show
  'oauth login'; providers check accepts an OAuth login as a credential.

List-first /provider manager (TUI):
- /provider opens the saved-provider list: Enter activates via the shared
  switch path, 'a' adds (existing wizard), 'e' opens a field-level editor
  (endpoint, model, key, description, and safe rename — the stored key,
  activeProvider, and live ZERO_PROVIDER follow the new name), 'd' deletes
  with an inline confirm and stored-key cleanup. Esc walks back one level.
- Credential states resolve asynchronously so keychain reads never block
  the render loop; 'stored key missing' surfaces broken keychain entries.
- Implemented as manager steps on providerWizardState so every existing
  overlay gate, key route, and mouse hook covers it unchanged.

CLI + config parity:
- zero providers remove <name> (deletes the stored key, hands the active
  pointer off) and zero providers rename <old> <new>.
- config.RemoveProvider / RenameProvider: read-modify-atomic-write; rename
  migrates the credential-store entry write-new-then-delete-old so an
  interruption can never lose the key.

* fix(providers): address PR #560 review findings

All six review findings validated as real; fixes with regression tests:

- Persist the apiKeyStored marker when a key is captured onto an existing
  profile: mergeProfile deliberately ignores the marker (a project config
  must not claim the user's stored keys at resolve time), so the user-config
  WRITE path (UpsertProvider) now re-applies it — previously editing a key
  onto an env/no-key profile stranded the secret in the credential store
  while every ApplyStoredAPIKey gate skipped it. [jatmn P2]
- Let active-pointer recovery select OAuth-login providers:
  firstUsableProvider now applies the same providerHasOAuthLogin check as
  setupRequired/usableSavedProviders, so a stale activeProvider plus a saved
  ChatGPT/xAI login recovers instead of forcing onboarding. [jatmn P2]
- Delete stored keys from the store BESIDE the config being edited:
  providers remove and the TUI manager delete now use ProviderKeyStoreAt
  (matching setup/rename) instead of the default-path store. [jatmn P2]
- Roll back the key migration when RenameProvider's config write fails, so
  the store and config.json can't desync (key under the new name, config
  still naming the old one). [CodeRabbit]
- Clear provider descriptions for real: new SetProviderDescription writes
  the field verbatim (the upsert merge treats empty as unchanged); the
  manager's editor routes description changes through it. [jatmn P3]
- Surface stored-key deletion failures in providers remove (stderr warning
  + keyError in the JSON payload) and the TUI delete status, instead of
  letting a lingering secret read as a clean removal. [CodeRabbit]

* fix(providers): second review round — case-only rename, logout hint, test hermeticity

- Skip the credential-store migration on case-only renames (groq -> Groq):
  the store normalizes names case-insensitively, so Set(new)+Delete(old)
  target ONE entry and the delete removed the key that was just "moved".
  The existing entry already serves the new name. [CodeRabbit]
- Point the delete flow's cleanup hint at the stored login that actually
  exists: after a rename ({name:"codex", catalogID:"chatgpt"}) the token
  lives under the catalog id, and `zero auth logout codex` would delete
  nothing. oauthLoginName resolves the same FirstStored candidate the
  runtime uses. [jatmn P3]
- Lock in APIKeyEnv semantics after a key edit: the env reference survives
  as an explicit override (a SET env var wins at resolve time; the stored
  key applies when it is absent). [CodeRabbit nitpick]
- Make main's new firstUsableProvider tests hermetic: they read the REAL
  OAuth token store, so any developer with an actual xai/chatgpt login gets
  spurious failures (found because this machine has one).

Also rebased onto main; the only conflict was comment wording in
firstUsableProvider, where the audit commit (#481) independently landed the
same OAuth-login fallback check this branch added.

* fix(tui): read stored keys from the active config's credential store

The TUI's write paths (SecureProviderProfile capture, rename migration,
manager delete) all target the store beside m.userConfigPath, but the read
paths still opened the DEFAULT-path store: profileWithCredential (feeding
the /model and manager switch gate), the model picker's discovery
credential lookup, and the manager's async credential-status probe. With a
non-default config path, a provider saved with only apiKeyStored had its
key in the config-adjacent store, so the gate rejected it as having no
usable credential and the manager showed 'stored key missing' for a
healthy profile.

All TUI stored-key reads now resolve through providerKeyStoreForPath
(config-adjacent, default-path fallback for ephemeral sessions), so the UI
reads from the same store it writes to. Regression test covers both the
credential probe and the switch path with a key seeded only beside the
config.

Also consolidates the OAuth test-store seeding on withAuthStore (now pins
ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=file so an inherited keyring backend can't bypass the
temp path) per review nitpick.

* fix(providers): resolve self-review findings — atomic edits, key normalization, threading

Findings from a multi-agent code review of this branch (8 finder angles,
independently verified); all confirmed against the code, several with
empirical repros.

Correctness:
- config.EditProvider: one atomic read-modify-write for the manager's Save
  (rename + fields + verbatim description + stored-key marker + key
  migration with write-failure rollback). Replaces the rename→upsert→
  describe sequence that (a) turned a case-only rename (groq → Groq) into a
  DUPLICATE profile via UpsertProvider's case-sensitive merge, and (b) could
  fail halfway, leaving config.json renamed while savedProviders and
  ZERO_PROVIDER still held the old name (retry then failed 'not found').
  A rename now also migrates a freshly captured replacement key (captured
  under the current name; the migration moves it).
- savedProviders is mutated surgically on manager delete/edit instead of
  being replaced with the raw user-config list — the session list is seeded
  from the RESOLVED (project-config layered) and usability-FILTERED set, so
  wholesale replacement dropped project-contributed providers and
  resurrected filtered stubs for the rest of the session.
- oauth.ProviderKey normalizes provider names to lower case at the single
  write/lookup choke point: `zero auth login xAI` stored provider:xAI while
  every candidate lookup was case-sensitive — a successful login invisible
  to the runtime. Map-based presence checks lowercase to match.
- OAuth login persistence moved onto the Update goroutine (message handlers)
  — a background tea.Cmd (device-code polls land minutes later) doing an
  unlocked config read-modify-write raced UI-thread writes (lost updates).
  The write error is now surfaced and the in-memory mirror is skipped on
  failure, so a profile that never reached disk can't show as a working
  provider that vanishes on restart.

UX / consistency:
- Esc inside a manager-launched add flow walks back to the provider list
  from EVERY step (was: first step only; deeper steps destroyed the overlay
  and the user's place). In-flight OAuth logins are invalidated on the way
  out; footers say 'Esc back'.
- switchProviderModel returns a structured outcome; the manager branches on
  it instead of strings.Contains(text, "Switched to") — UI copy is no longer
  a control-flow contract (a provider named 'Switched to prod' could close
  the manager on a refusal).
- Manager delete's keychain subprocess + OAuth lookup run in a follow-up
  tea.Cmd (the confirm keypress no longer blocks the render loop); the
  credential probe takes ONE token-store snapshot instead of 2 reads per
  row, and resolved states carry over across reloads (no 'checking…' flash).
- Credential-state reporting converges: /provider status recognizes OAuth
  logins (was 'api key: not set' + warning for a WORKING provider), doctor
  uses the shared HasConfiguredCredential definition plus OAuth awareness
  (its 'matching ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet' claim is true again), and the
  manager's classifier falls through a stale stored-key marker to env/OAuth
  the way the runtime does.

* Fix provider manager test formatting
2026-07-07 10:34:59 +08:00
Anandan 305a62c954 fix(auth): route zero auth login chatgpt to the dedicated ChatGPT flow (#443)
* fix(auth): route `zero auth login chatgpt` to the dedicated ChatGPT flow

`zero auth login chatgpt` went through the generic OAuth manager loopback
path, which builds a random-port http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback
redirect_uri with no extra authorize params. OpenAI's ChatGPT client
registration requires exactly http://localhost:1455/auth/callback plus the
id_token_add_organizations, codex_cli_simplified_flow, and originator
params, so the authorize endpoint rejected the request with an
"Authentication Error" before any browser interaction.

Route the chatgpt provider to the existing dedicated ChatGPT login
(provideroauth.ChatGPTLogin), which already binds the fixed port, uses the
localhost host, the /auth/callback path, and sends the required params.
`zero auth login chatgpt` now behaves identically to `zero auth chatgpt`.
--device is rejected with a clear message since ChatGPT has no device-code
path.

Fixes #430

* fix(auth): reject --scope on ChatGPT login instead of silently dropping it

`zero auth login chatgpt --scope <x>` reached the dedicated ChatGPT flow,
which ignores the generic manager's ExtraScopes — the scopes were silently
dropped while --device was explicitly rejected. Reject --scope up front
with a clear message, since the Codex client registration pins a fixed
scope set (incl. api.connectors.*) that custom scopes would risk dropping.

Addresses CodeRabbit review on #443.
2026-07-04 08:34:30 +08:00
KRATOS a4b2e01fe6 feat: encrypted provider credentials + provider-aware /model (#329)
Encrypted credential storage
- internal/securefile: AES-256-GCM at-rest crypter (fail-closed, atomic, locked).
- internal/credstore: provider API-key store, keyring-first with an encrypted-file
  fallback; plaintext only via an explicit ZERO_CRED_STORAGE=file opt-out.
- Provider API keys no longer live in config.json: captured straight into the store
  from the wizard/CLI setup, and any existing inline plaintext key is migrated to the
  store on launch (fail-soft; stripped only after the store write succeeds).
- buildProvider and every model/provider switch reload the credential (stored key,
  env var, or OAuth bearer), so a stored-key provider always authenticates.
- `zero auth logout <provider>` now also removes the stored API key and its marker.

/model and /provider
- /model lists every authenticated provider (filtered to those with a usable
  credential), grouped per provider under section headers.
- Each provider's models are live-discovered (its real served models) rather than a
  static catalog; local providers show only the models actually pulled.
- Selecting a model from another provider switches provider and model together.
- /provider offers keep / replace / remove when a provider already has a stored key.

Gated throughout: go build, go vet ./..., go test ./... -race, lint.
2026-06-27 23:25:08 +05:30
KRATOS a0b9876b69 OAuth / account login for providers (OpenRouter, xAI) + subscription-proxy support (#217)
* providers: authenticate model calls with an OAuth login when present

Foundation for account/subscription login: when a user is logged in via
`zero auth login <name>`, the OpenAI and Anthropic providers now authenticate
model requests with that OAuth bearer token, falling back to the API key when
there is no login. Auto-select, per the agreed design — no config needed.

  - providerio.SendWithAuthRetry: issues a request with an OAuth bearer (from a
    TokenResolver) or the API key, and retries ONCE with a force-refreshed token
    after a 401. A 401 means the server rejected the request without processing a
    completion, so replay-after-refresh is safe — the same no-duplicate-work basis
    SendWithRetry uses for 429/503. Never sends API key and bearer together.
  - openai + anthropic providers take an optional OAuthResolver and use
    SendWithAuthRetry. When OAuth is active the credential goes on Authorization
    (so Anthropic's x-api-key is correctly omitted). Gemini is unchanged.
  - providers.New threads Options.OAuthResolver to those two providers.
  - cli.oauthResolverForProfile builds the resolver from the unified oauth store:
    it attaches a resolver ONLY when a login already exists for the provider
    name, so API-key users incur no per-request store lookups. The resolver uses
    Manager.GetFresh (refresh near expiry) and Manager.Handle401 (force refresh on
    the 401 retry).
  - oauth: added ErrNoToken sentinel so "not logged in" is distinguishable from a
    real refresh failure (login removed mid-session → clean API-key fallback).

Tests (httptest): API-key fallback (nil resolver / ok=false), bearer wins +
never-both, 401→force-refresh→retry, stops after one retry, resolver error
surfaced. Local run check (real binary + mock OAuth + mock OpenAI-compatible LLM
requiring the bearer): with a login, `zero exec` sends Bearer <oauth-token> and
gets a completion; without a login it falls back to the (wrong) API key and the
mock returns 401 — proving the OAuth path.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* providers: add ChatGPT-subscription-via-proxy preset + OAuth/subscriptions docs

Follows verified research (cross-checked across ~30 sources) into using ChatGPT
and Claude subscriptions: a subscription OAuth token does NOT work as a standard
bearer on the public APIs. OpenAI's token only works against the Cloudflare-gated
ChatGPT backend (headless clients get cf-mitigated 403); Anthropic rejects
third-party subscription OAuth, requires Claude-Code identity spoofing, 400s on
tool calls (Max overage lane), and is contractually banned with active
enforcement. So zero does NOT call those backends or spoof those clients.

Instead, the supported pattern is a local proxy that holds the subscription
session and exposes a clean OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible endpoint on 127.0.0.1;
zero points at it (it already supports custom base URLs, and C1 supplies OAuth
bearer for gateways that issue standard tokens).

  - providercatalog: add `chatgpt-proxy` ("ChatGPT (local OAuth proxy)") — an
    OpenAI-compatible, local, no-API-key preset defaulting to the established
    proxy port (http://localhost:10531/v1), base URL overridable. Claude uses the
    existing `custom-anthropic-compatible` entry (no canonical Claude-proxy port
    to hardcode — not invented).
  - docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: full recipe — built-in OAuth login (C1), the
    verified reason subscriptions need a proxy, copy-paste config for ChatGPT and
    Claude via a local proxy, and the sanctioned alternatives (API key; spawning
    the real `claude` CLI for Anthropic subscription automation).

Local run check: a config using `catalogID: chatgpt-proxy` (base URL pointed at a
mock OpenAI-compatible proxy) routes `zero exec` through the proxy with no auth
header and returns a completion.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(clean)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* provideroauth: OpenRouter browser PKCE login (mints an API key) + `zero auth openrouter`

Adds the cleanest real OAuth login surfaced by the provider survey: OpenRouter's
loopback PKCE flow. It needs no client_id (public), uses S256, and the exchange
mints a normal OpenRouter API key — so no token-spoofing or vendor-backend gating
is involved (unlike ChatGPT/Claude subscriptions).

  - internal/provideroauth.OpenRouterLogin: binds a 127.0.0.1 loopback, opens/prints
    https://openrouter.ai/auth?callback_url=…&code_challenge=…&code_challenge_method=S256,
    captures the code, and POSTs it + the PKCE verifier to
    /api/v1/auth/keys → {key}. PKCE binds the code, so no separate CSRF state is
    needed. Injectable base URL / HTTP client / browser-opener for tests.
  - cli: `zero auth openrouter` runs the flow and prints the minted key with usage
    guidance. ZERO_OPENROUTER_BASE_URL overrides the endpoint (self-hosted/tests).

Tests: full flow over httptest (mint, missing-code, non-2xx exchange, empty key,
browser-error). Local run check via the real binary against a mock: the command
emits the correct PKCE authorize URL, the loopback callback is captured, and the
key is minted end-to-end.

First of the in-wizard OAuth providers; the wizard "Log in with OAuth" option
(next commit) calls this same flow and saves the key to the profile.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* oauth: built-in provider presets + xAI (Grok) preset

Adds an overridable preset layer to the env-driven OAuth registry so well-known
providers work without per-field env configuration. ResolveConfig now seeds each
field from a baked-in preset and lets the matching ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* env var
override it (env wins); flow falls back to the preset then loopback.

First preset: xAI (Grok) — standard OIDC, PUBLIC client (no secret), loopback +
device. The access token is accepted directly as a bearer on api.x.ai/v1 (an
OpenAI-compatible endpoint), so the existing C1 wiring uses it for an xai provider
profile — no header/identity spoofing. `zero auth login xai` now works out of the
box. CAVEATS (documented in code + help): the client_id is a public Grok-CLI
client not formally documented by xAI (may change; override via env), and use
requires a SuperGrok / X Premium+ subscription.

Tests: preset resolution, env-overrides-preset (per field + flow), and that a
provider with neither preset nor env still errors. Local run check: `zero auth
login xai --device` (endpoints pointed at a mock, client_id NOT overridden) logs
in and the mock confirms the preset client_id b1a00492-… was sent.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* tui: in-wizard "Log in with OAuth" option (OpenRouter) + browser opener

Adds the credential-step OAuth login the setup wizard was missing. For a provider
that supports a usable browser OAuth flow (currently OpenRouter), the credential
screen now offers "ctrl+o to log in with OAuth in the browser (no key needed)"
alongside pasting a key.

Flow: ctrl+o → the wizard marks itself oauthPending and dispatches an async
tea.Cmd that runs provideroauth.OpenRouterLogin (opens the browser via the new
internal/browser opener, captures the loopback callback, mints a key). While it
runs the step shows "Opening your browser… (or run: zero auth openrouter)";
Esc cancels. On success the minted key fills the credential and the wizard
advances to model selection; on failure the redacted error is shown and the user
can retry or paste a key.

  - internal/browser: cross-platform OpenURL (open / xdg-open / rundll32) with a
    pure, unit-tested per-OS command builder.
  - provider_wizard: oauthPending/oauthErr state, providerWizardSupportsOAuth
    (OpenRouter only — ChatGPT/Claude use the proxy preset, others paste a key),
    the async cmd + result msg, and credential-step render/keys.
  - model.Update routes the OAuth result message.

Tests: openCommand per-OS; supportsOAuth (openrouter yes / openai no); ctrl+o
starts OAuth for OpenRouter and is a no-op otherwise; apply-success advances +
applies the key; apply-error stays + surfaces the message; render shows the hint
and the pending state. The interactive browser flow itself is the same one C3
verified end-to-end against a mock.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new — the
SA1019 mouse nits are pre-existing on origin/main)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new).
No new module deps.

* docs: cover the built-in OpenRouter + xAI OAuth logins

Document the two turnkey OAuth providers added in this branch (OpenRouter browser
key-mint via `zero auth openrouter` / wizard ctrl+o; xAI via `zero auth login
xai`), alongside the existing subscription-proxy and custom-provider guidance.

* tui: method-first provider setup — a prominent "Sign in with OAuth" path

Reworks `/provider` setup to lead with a connect-method chooser, modeled on Codex
/ Claude Code / gemini-cli (verified via a UX survey), so OAuth is a first-class,
separate option instead of a key buried at the credential step.

New first step "How do you want to connect?":
  ❯ Sign in with OAuth                    (default when any OAuth provider exists)
      One-click browser login, no API key to copy (OpenRouter, xAI).
    Paste an API key / browse providers
      Any of 20+ providers, a local model, or a subscription via proxy.

  - OAuth path → a dedicated list of ONLY OAuth-capable providers
    (providercatalog.OAuthProviders()), each with a mode badge; selecting one
    runs the browser login (OpenRouter mints a key; xAI/preset providers store a
    refreshable token via the engine) and jumps straight to model selection,
    skipping the key/endpoint steps. A waiting screen shows progress + a CLI
    fallback; Esc cancels; errors are redacted and retryable.
  - Browse path → the existing full catalog → key/endpoint/model, unchanged.
  - ChatGPT/Claude are NOT offered as in-app OAuth (they can't work) — they remain
    reachable as the proxy/custom providers under "browse".

  - providercatalog: Descriptor gains OAuth/OAuthMintsKey/OAuthDeviceFlow; openrouter
    + xai are flagged; OAuthProviders() is the single source of truth.
  - wizard: new method step + OAuth provider list + per-provider OAuth dispatch
    (reuses provideroauth.OpenRouterLogin and the oauth engine login), waiting/
    render/keys/step-line/retreat all updated; mouse + keys ignored while a login
    is in flight.

Tests: catalog OAuth flags + OAuthProviders(); method chooser OAuth vs browse
paths; OAuth dispatch from the list; retreat→method; render shows the chooser +
provider list; existing wizard tests updated for the new first step. All tui tests
pass under -race.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* docs: document the /provider "Sign in with OAuth" method chooser

* tui: mirror the "Sign in with OAuth" method chooser in first-run onboarding

First-run setup (onboarding.go) was a separate flow that still showed its bare
provider list. Add the same connect-method chooser so new users get the prominent
OAuth path too, keeping /provider and first-run as one mental model.

  - New setupStageMethod (after Welcome): "How do you want to connect?" with
    "Sign in with OAuth" (default) and "Paste an API key / browse providers".
  - OAuth path filters the provider list to OAuth-capable providers, runs the same
    browser login (OpenRouter mints a key → captured as the setup credential; xAI
    stores a refreshable token and the profile is named after the provider so the
    runtime resolver attaches the bearer), shows a waiting screen, then jumps to
    model selection (skipping endpoint/name/credentials). Esc cancels; errors are
    redacted.
  - Browse path is the existing flow, unchanged. setupStages()/navigation/back/
    progress/footer/mouse all updated; OAuth result routed via model.Update.

Tests: method chooser OAuth path (OAuth-only list + retreat clears it) and
apply-OAuth-success advances to model with the minted key; existing onboarding
tests updated for the new step (pressSetupContinue transparently skips it). All
tui tests pass under -race.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* catalog+tui: show ChatGPT/Claude in the OAuth chooser as local-proxy entries

The "Sign in with OAuth" chooser listed only the real-OAuth providers (OpenRouter,
xAI), so ChatGPT and Claude looked missing. They can't do real in-app OAuth — a
subscription token is Cloudflare-gated (ChatGPT) / ToS-restricted for third-party
use (Claude) — so instead of hiding them or faking a login, list them honestly as
"subscription · needs a local proxy" entries that route into proxy setup.

  - catalog: new Descriptor.OAuthProxy flag + OAuthProxyProviders(); mark
    chatgpt-proxy and a new claude-proxy (local Anthropic-compatible, keyless)
    entry. localAnthropic() helper. Proxy entries are not OAuth (no fake login).
  - wizard + onboarding: the OAuth list now appends the proxy entries after the
    real OAuth providers (catalog order keeps real ones first). Selecting a proxy
    entry leaves OAuth mode and drops into the normal browse flow with the proxy
    provider selected and its default URL/model pre-filled, so the user just
    points Zero at the local proxy they run. No browser login is launched.
  - providerWizardNeedsEndpoint now true for proxy entries (the local port
    varies); faint badge "subscription · needs a local proxy".
  - docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: chooser now shows the four entries and explains
    the proxy routing.

Tests: catalog classification (OAuthProviders vs OAuthProxyProviders, flags);
wizard + onboarding proxy-entry routing (leaves OAuth mode, starts no login,
lands on endpoint with the URL pre-filled). Full suite green under -race;
staticcheck/govulncheck/deadcode clean. No new deps.

* oauth+tui: add xAI device-code (RFC 8628) login to the OAuth chooser

The OAuth chooser only did browser/loopback login, which can't work on a headless
or SSH box (no browser to open). Add device-code as a first-class option for
providers that support it (xAI).

  - oauth.Manager: PrepareDeviceLogin (request code) + CompleteDeviceLogin (poll +
    store), splitting the monolithic device flow so the UI can display the
    user_code + verification URI while it waits. CLI Login(Device:true) unchanged.
  - tui (shared oauth_device.go): oauthPreferDeviceFlow() picks device by default
    on SSH / headless Linux (no DISPLAY) or when ZERO_OAUTH_DEVICE is set;
    oauthDevicePrepare/Complete drive the two phases off the UI goroutine.
  - /provider wizard + first-run onboarding: device-capable providers show
    "Enter sign in · d device code" — Enter uses the browser (or device if
    headless), "d" forces device. The waiting screen shows the code + URL to
    enter elsewhere, then polls; success advances to model selection. Esc cancels;
    errors are redacted; device state is cleared on success/cancel/back.
  - docs: document the device-code path and ZERO_OAUTH_DEVICE.

Tests: manager Prepare/Complete two-phase; wizard + onboarding 'd' shortcut,
device-code display + poll dispatch, error surfacing, and success clearing device
state. Full suite green under -race; staticcheck/govulncheck/deadcode clean. No
new deps.

* tui: authenticate model discovery with the OAuth token so the live list shows

After an xAI sign-in the bearer lives in the token store, not as a pasted key, so
the post-login model step ran /models with no credential → it always fell back to
the curated list (with a discovery error). Now the user picks from the real live
model list after OAuth, like other CLIs.

  - oauthStoredToken() resolves a fresh stored token for a token-login provider.
  - wizard + onboarding discovery resolve and inject that token into the discovery
    profile inside the async goroutine (token refresh is network I/O); OpenRouter
    still uses its minted key, API-key users are unchanged. Discovery timeout
    bumped 8s→12s to cover an on-demand refresh.
  - The resolved token is added to the redaction secret set so it can never leak
    into a surfaced discovery error. If discovery still fails (offline), the
    curated per-provider fallback list is shown as before — the user always gets a
    pickable list.

Tests: oauthStoredToken reads a seeded login / returns empty when absent;
wizard discovery injects the stored token into the /models profile. Hermetic via
ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH. Full suite green under -race; staticcheck/govulncheck/
deadcode clean. No new deps.

* catalog+tui: drop ChatGPT/Claude from the OAuth chooser — OpenRouter + xAI only

Reverts the proxy-entry listing: the "Sign in with OAuth" chooser now shows only
the providers that do real OAuth (OpenRouter, xAI). ChatGPT/Claude looked
confusing there since they can't actually sign in — they remain reachable via
"Paste an API key / browse providers" + the local-proxy recipe in
docs/oauth-subscriptions.md.

  - catalog: remove the Descriptor.OAuthProxy flag, OAuthProxyProviders(), the
    oauthProxyProvider/localAnthropic helpers, and the claude-proxy entry.
    chatgpt-proxy stays as a plain browse/config entry (its pre-existing role).
  - wizard + onboarding: OAuth list = OAuthProviders() again; removed the
    proxy→browse routing, the OAuthProxy badge, and the OAuthProxy endpoint rule.
  - device-code + OAuth-token model discovery (the later features) are untouched.
  - docs + tests updated to the two-entry chooser.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck/deadcode all
clean. No new deps.

* cli: recognize a stored OAuth login as a provider credential

A provider authenticated via OAuth (e.g. `zero auth login xai`) has no inline
key or env var, so setupRequired treated it as unconfigured and forced onboarding
on every launch — and the active provider could be passed over for a different
one. setupRequired now also counts a stored OAuth login (read from the token
store) as a credential, so an OAuth-logged-in provider stays usable without
onboarding.

Tests: providerHasOAuthLogin (by name/catalog id); setupRequired returns false
for an OAuth-logged-in provider, true for a keyless one with no login.

* Address review feedback on OAuth provider login

Resolve CodeRabbit review comments on this PR:

- PrepareDeviceLogin: self-bound the network prepare (endpoint discovery +
  device-code request) with opts.Timeout (default 5m) like Login, so a caller
  passing an unbounded context still gets the timeout guarantee.
- CompleteDeviceLogin: bound the poll by the device code's own ExpiresAt so an
  unbounded caller context cannot leave an in-flight request hanging past the
  code's lifetime (PollDeviceToken already re-checks between polls).
- OAuthProviders(): return cloned descriptors, matching All()/the other
  accessors, so callers can't mutate the shared catalog backing slices.
- Onboarding applySetupOAuth / applySetupOAuthDeviceCode: ignore a stale result
  for a provider the user has since switched away from, so a late login can't
  capture a credential against the wrong provider.
- Onboarding: surface a failed OAuth login on the provider list the user lands
  on (the waiting screen that owned the error is gone once oauthPending clears),
  so the failure isn't silent and the user can retry.
- Onboarding: hide the "Sign in with OAuth" method when this setup's own
  provider list has no OAuth-capable entry, so it can't be selected into an
  empty provider list (setupMethodOptions).
- docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: label the bare example fences (text) and update
  the Anthropic policy section for the April 4 2026 third-party cutoff.

Adds tests for the descriptor-clone isolation and the method-option filtering.

* oauth: gate built-in presets behind ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS

The xAI preset baked a third-party OAuth client_id into the default
credential path, which breaks the engine's documented invariant that no
third-party OAuth client identity is used unless the operator configures
it. Rather than drop the convenience entirely, make presets opt-in:

- ResolveConfig only consults builtinOAuthPresets when ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS
  is truthy (presetsAllowed); by default every field must come from
  ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* env, so the binary's preset client_id is never used
  without an explicit opt-in.
- The "not configured" error now points the user at ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS
  when a preset exists, so the wizard/CLI failure is self-documenting.
- Refresh the package, Registry, and preset docs to describe the opt-in;
  env still overrides any preset field.
- docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: document the flag for one-click xAI sign-in.

Keeps both: invariant-clean by default, one-click xAI for opted-in users.
Tests: preset resolution now requires the opt-in; added a gate-off test
asserting xAI stays inert (and the error names the flag) without it.

* oauth: read a stored token without resolving provider config

GetFresh resolved the provider OAuth config for every read via loadForKey,
even when the stored token was still valid and no refresh would happen.
With presets gated behind ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS, that made a stored xAI
login unreadable (and stalled the proactive refresh scheduler) unless the
opt-in flag was set at read time — config that is only needed to refresh.

Split loadForKey into loadToken (token only) and resolveConfigForKey
(refresh-only). GetFresh now returns a still-valid token without touching
the config; only an actual refresh (or Handle401) resolves endpoints +
client. The scheduler's load uses loadToken too, so proactive refresh
survives a gated preset and only the refresh attempt needs the config.

Fixes the Smoke failures TestOAuthStoredTokenReadsStoredLogin and
TestProviderWizardDiscoveryUsesOAuthToken (a fresh stored token must be
readable without the preset opt-in).

* Address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 on OAuth provider login

- providerio SendWithAuthRetry: resolve the auth headers BEFORE dispatching, so
  a resolver error returns immediately instead of letting SendWithRetry send an
  unauthenticated request (leaking the path/body).
- tui handleMouse: ignore all mouse input (clicks + wheel) while a provider-wizard
  OAuth login is pending, so a stray scroll can't change the selected provider
  mid-login (mirrors the keyboard pending guard; the setup mouse handler already
  did this).
- cli runAuthOpenRouter: reject unexpected args/flags (e.g. --json) instead of
  silently running the login, matching the other auth subcommands.
- cli auth help: align the preset wording with the opt-in gate — openrouter works
  out of the box; xai needs ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1 or ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_*.
- onboarding_test: compute selectedMethod from m.setupMethodOptions() (the
  setup-filtered list) instead of providerWizardMethodOptions(), which could index
  past the end when OAuth is hidden.
- docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: sharpen the Anthropic timeline — Feb 19 2026 docs
  update, then the April 4 2026 enforcement that stopped subscription OAuth tokens
  working in third-party harnesses; current path is an API key or pay-as-you-go.

Adds tests for the no-dispatch-on-resolver-error path and openrouter arg rejection.

* Address CodeRabbit re-review round 3 on OAuth provider login

Two findings missed in the previous round:

- oauth manager resolveConfigForKey: resolve issuer metadata before refreshing.
  It returned ResolveConfig's result without calling resolveEndpoints, so a
  provider configured with only ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_ISSUER_URL (no TOKEN_URL) had
  an empty token endpoint and could not refresh on GetFresh/Handle401. Thread the
  context through and run discovery; adds a test that an issuer-only provider
  refreshes via the discovered token endpoint.
- provider_wizard_oauth_test: assert openrouter is actually present in the OAuth
  list before selecting it, so the test can't silently pass against a different
  provider if openrouter is renamed/removed.

(The re-flagged PrepareDeviceLogin timeout is already handled — it self-bounds
with opts.Timeout, same as Login.)

* Address CodeRabbit re-review round 4 (nitpicks) on OAuth provider login

- presets scopesOrPreset: return a copy of the preset scopes so a caller
  appending to cfg.Scopes can't mutate the shared global preset slice.
- provideroauth/openrouter: use bytes.NewReader(payload) instead of
  strings.NewReader(string(payload)) (avoid a needless []byte->string copy).
- onboarding setupCredentialSummary: show "OAuth token" on the Ready screen for
  an OAuth token-login provider (e.g. xAI) instead of "env var XAI_API_KEY" — it
  is authenticated by a stored token, not a key. Key-minting OAuth (OpenRouter)
  still resolves to a saved key.

(The flagged "Registry doc says no built-ins" was already corrected in the
preset opt-in commit — the doc now describes the ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS gate.)

Adds tests for the scope-slice copy and the OAuth-token credential summary.
2026-06-16 15:33:36 +05:30
KRATOS 75ecf8e385 oauth: opt-in AES-256-GCM encrypted-at-rest token storage (#213)
* oauth: opt-in AES-256-GCM encrypted-at-rest token storage

OAuth Phase 2: add an encrypted token-store backend. The default backend still
writes the 0600 plaintext JSON unchanged; setting ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=encrypted-file
encrypts the token file with AES-256-GCM under a per-user random 32-byte secret
persisted 0600 beside the token file (<tokens>.secret).

- internal/oauth/encrypt.go: aesGCMCrypter (nonce||ciphertext, GCM tamper
  detection) + load-or-create secret (atomic 0600 write). Pure stdlib, no dep.
- Store gains an optional crypter: readState decrypts before unmarshal, writeState
  encrypts after marshal. A missing secret, a short blob, or a failed auth tag all
  fail closed (no silent empty/plaintext fallback).
- CLI: newAuthManager selects the backend from ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE; `zero auth`
  help documents it.

Tests: crypter round-trip + tamper, secret create/persist/0600/wrong-size,
store-through-encrypted (ciphertext on disk, round-trip, Status/Delete, tamper +
missing-secret fail-closed). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test
-race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass. Local run
check: device login under ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=encrypted-file writes a ciphertext
file (no plaintext token), .secret is 0600, and `zero auth status` reads it back.

* Address review feedback on encrypted token storage

Resolve CodeRabbit review comments on this PR:

- newAuthManager: reject an unsupported ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE value instead of
  silently downgrading to plaintext. A mistyped non-empty value now fails fast
  ("invalid ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE ... (supported: encrypted-file)") so a user who
  believes encryption is on is never left writing plaintext.
- loadOrCreateSecret: fix the first-run TOCTOU race. os.Rename publishes by
  clobbering on POSIX, so two concurrent processes could each generate a secret
  and the loser would silently orphan every token it then encrypts. Create the
  secret exclusively (O_CREATE|O_EXCL); the loser adopts the winner's on-disk
  secret. Factored the read+size-validate into readSecretFile and dropped the
  now-unused clock plumbing from the crypter.
- encrypt_test: handle os.Stat / os.ReadFile errors before dereferencing the
  result (mode/index) so a real I/O failure surfaces instead of a panic.

Adds a test asserting an invalid ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE fails fast.

* oauth: retry the secret read when losing the first-run create race

CodeRabbit follow-up: the O_EXCL create path read the on-disk secret
immediately after EEXIST, but the winner may not have finished writing it
yet, so a loser could observe a short file and fail transiently. Retry the
read briefly (bounded) so concurrent first-run invocations converge on the
winner's secret. Adds a -race concurrency test asserting convergence.
2026-06-16 14:00:26 +05:30
KRATOS bb7de29c80 feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + zero auth CLI (#210)
* feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + `zero auth` CLI

Add internal/oauth: a transport/identity-agnostic OAuth 2.0 engine that powers
provider login alongside the MCP-server OAuth zero already has. It is additive
and provider-neutral — NO providers, endpoints, or client identities are baked
into the binary; every provider is configured entirely via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
env vars, so the engine works with any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server.

Engine (internal/oauth):
- PKCE (S256 mandatory; "plain" refused) + per-flow CSRF state.
- Authorization-code flow: BuildAuthorizationURL / ExchangeCode / Refresh, with
  an https-only token-endpoint guard (loopback exempt) and error bodies that
  carry only error/error_description (never token material).
- Loopback callback server: 127.0.0.1-only, OS-assigned port, single use, state
  verified, then closed.
- Device-authorization grant (RFC 8628): RequestDeviceCode + PollDeviceToken
  honoring authorization_pending / slow_down / interval / expiry (headless/SSH).
- RFC 8414 + OIDC discovery (issuer-driven endpoint resolution).
- Namespaced token store ("provider:<name>" / "mcp:<name>"), 0600, file-locked
  (ownership-aware), atomic writes, malformed-fails-closed; GetFresh (on-demand
  refresh) + Handle401 (forced refresh).
- Opt-in proactive RefreshScheduler.

CLI (zero auth):
- login <provider> [--device] [--scope ...], logout, status [provider],
  refresh <provider> [--watch]. Status/output never print token material.
- Registered in app.go dispatch + top-level help.

MCP OAuth (internal/mcp) is left byte-for-byte unchanged (zero regression);
sharing the engine with MCP and encrypted-at-rest/keyring storage are documented
follow-ups. Tests cover every path (PKCE, auth URL, https-guard + redaction,
exchange/refresh, loopback capture + state-mismatch + timeout, device pending/
slow_down/expired, store namespacing/0600/locking, provider env resolution,
manager login (loopback+device)/GetFresh/Handle401, scheduler). Gates: gofmt /
vet / build (host+linux+windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) /
govulncheck (0) / deadcode (no new) all pass.

* oauth: fix Windows smoke — use OS-appropriate path in store-path test

TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride hardcoded a unix "/tmp/custom/tok.json"
literal, which is not absolute on Windows (no drive), so ResolveStorePath
correctly resolves it against the current drive and the verbatim comparison
failed (D:\tmp\custom\tok.json). The production code is correct; the test now
builds the override with filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ...) so it is absolute and
clean on every OS.

* oauth: address CodeRabbit review (11 findings)

Security / correctness:
- flow: caller-supplied ExtraAuthParams/extraParams can no longer override the
  reserved OAuth/PKCE fields (state, redirect_uri, code_challenge[_method],
  response_type, client_id) — e.g. forcing method=plain.
- device: a device-authorization response without expires_in now gets a bounded
  default lifetime (fail closed), and the poll loop re-checks expiry AFTER the
  interval sleep so it never polls past the deadline (e.g. after slow_down).
- lock: handle WriteString/Close errors on the token lock file — a partial write
  no longer strands an undeletable lock.
- store: a non-nil env map is now authoritative (hermetic) — a controlled map
  never falls back to ambient ZERO_OAUTH_* / HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
- scheduler: a transient loadForKey error backs off and retries (bounded) instead
  of permanently stopping proactive refresh.
- cli auth: reject flags a subcommand does not accept (e.g. login --watch,
  status --device) and reject empty --scope values — fail fast.

Lint blockers:
- manager: restructured the discovery fallback so the non-nil-err branch no longer
  returns nil (nilerr).
- providers: dropped the ineffectual flow initializer (ineffassign).

Tests: assert Save/Load errors in the scheduler test; the slow_down device test
no longer depends on post-expiry polling. Added tests for reserved-param
stripping, hermetic env, device default-expiry, and CLI flag validation. The
store-path test was already made OS-portable in the Windows-smoke fix.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI

The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)

* oauth: address CodeRabbit re-review (4 findings)

- loopback (security): NewLoopbackListener refuses an empty CSRF state — an empty
  state would match a callback carrying no state at all, defeating the check.
- device (correctness): RequestDeviceCode now sends client_secret when set, so a
  confidential client authenticates on the device-authorization endpoint too
  (consistent with the token poll).
- cli auth: document --watch in the help Flags section.
- scheduler test: assert the seed Save error instead of ignoring it.

Also scrubbed a stray third-party reference from a loopback.go comment.
Tests added: empty-state rejection, device client_secret is sent. Gates:
gofmt/vet/build/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new)
all pass.

* mcp(oauth): delegate the OAuth engine to internal/oauth (dedup) (#212)

OAuth Phase 2: the MCP OAuth code now reuses the shared internal/oauth engine
instead of carrying its own copy of the transport/identity-agnostic primitives.
internal/mcp/oauth.go drops ~110 lines (526 -> 418): newPKCE, newState,
discoverAuthorizationServer, the authorize-URL builder, token exchange/refresh,
the token-response parser, and joinWellKnown now delegate to internal/oauth.

Behavior-preserving: MCP keeps its own OAuthConfig/StoredToken types,
LoginOptions/Login orchestration, loopback handling, registerClient (dynamic
client registration — not part of the shared engine), CLI output, and on-disk
token format (mcp-oauth-tokens.json, raw server-name keys). The existing mcp
oauth tests pass UNCHANGED. The only behavioral delta is a hardening inherited
from the shared engine: the token endpoint must be https (loopback exempt) —
a credential is no longer sent to a plaintext non-loopback endpoint.

Stacks on #210 (the internal/oauth package). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+
linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new
vs base) all pass; `zero mcp oauth status` output is identical.
2026-06-15 18:47:43 +05:30