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fix/opencode-session-header
5
Commits
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ff62f73b7f |
fix(secrets,worktrees): fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees (#855)
* fix(secrets,worktrees): fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees 1. Prevent trailing redaction leaks in github_token, aws_access_key_id, and google_api_key by adding trailing word boundaries and allowing variable lengths. Refine the openai_key pattern to cleanly distinguish legacy keys and modern prefixed keys (sk-proj-, sk-svcacct-) from ordinary kebab-case phrases. 2. Implement auto-pruning of zero-owned git worktrees older than 24 hours at the start of worktrees.Prepare to prevent indefinite disk space leaks. * fix(secrets,worktrees): close tail-leak edge case and worktree data-loss risk Drop the trailing \b anchor on the four secret patterns whose body class allows "-" (slack_token, google_api_key, the modern openai_key branch, jwt). \b requires a word/non-word transition, so a secret ending in "-" right before a delimiter has none, and the engine backtracked the greedy quantifier to drop that last character instead of failing the match, leaking it. The body character class already provides the real stopping boundary, so the anchor was unnecessary. Fix two issues in worktree Clean flagged in review: - Staleness was decided by the worktree directory's own mtime, which only changes when an entry is added/removed/renamed directly inside it, not when a long-running task edits existing files deeper in the tree. Clean now walks the tree and treats any recently modified entry as live, and also skips any worktree a caller has explicitly locked via git worktree lock. - baseDir ownership used a raw strings.HasPrefix, so a sibling like "<baseDir>-other" would false-match. Replaced with a filepath.Rel path-boundary check. * fix(worktrees): check exit codes on removal, fail closed on inspection errors defaultRunGit deliberately returns a nil error alongside a nonzero CommandResult.ExitCode for a failed git invocation, so the worktree remove call must check ExitCode itself instead of trusting a nil error to mean success. Route it through gitOutput, which already does that. worktreeIsStale treated an inspection failure (an unreadable file, a WalkDir error) the same as "keep walking," which can let an incompletely-inspected worktree be judged stale. Any inspection error now makes it ineligible for removal instead. * fix(secrets,worktrees): catch appended-suffix keys and scope pruning to owned worktrees The scanner's trailing \b anchors made a credential vanish entirely when followed by a word character outside its body class (an appended suffix like AKIA...EXTRA, or ghp_..._suffix): the fixed or unbounded-greedy quantifier had no valid word boundary to land on and the whole match failed, so the real secret reached the redaction output unredacted. Dropping the trailing anchors lets the body class itself stop the match, so the credential prefix still gets redacted even when noise follows it. Also recognize sk-admin- alongside sk-proj-/sk-svcacct- so OpenAI admin keys aren't skipped by the narrowed modern-key branch. Clean pruned any worktree under the caller-supplied BaseDir, but Prepare only ever creates worktrees under a per-repository zero-worktree-<repoKey> subtree of it. Scope pruning to that subtree so a worktree a user manages by hand elsewhere under a shared BaseDir is never force-removed. Also refuse to force-remove a worktree whose mtime looks stale but that still has uncommitted or untracked changes: a task can hold live work while waiting on a model, network, or user for longer than the staleness window without writing to the tree again. * fix(worktrees): make nested-activity test exercise the deep walk it claims to activePath/internal was created by the same MkdirAll as the nested pkg dir but never backdated, so it kept a fresh mtime and worktreeIsStale's walk reported "not stale" as soon as it hit that directory, before ever reaching the freshly-written file two levels deeper. The test passed without actually exercising recursion past the first directory. * fix(worktrees): lock zero-created worktrees and treat ignored files as dirty Prepare never called git worktree lock, so the entry.locked skip in Clean only ever protected worktrees a human locked by hand, never zero's own; a worktree that finished committing and sat idle (e.g. waiting on a slow model or network retry) for more than 24h looked clean-and-stale and got force-removed by the mtime+dirty heuristic alone. Lock every worktree Prepare creates so it gets the same protection. worktreeIsDirty also used git status --porcelain with no --ignored, so a worktree holding only .gitignore-matched task data (credentials, generated drafts, artifacts) reported as clean and got force-removed with --force, silently discarding it. Add --ignored so those files count as dirty too. * fix(worktrees): release Zero's Prepare lock so Clean can reclaim finished worktrees Prepare locks every worktree it creates so Clean's mtime+dirty staleness heuristic never force-removes one Zero is still using, but nothing ever unlocked it, making the automatic disk-space cleanup permanently inert. Add Release (git worktree unlock) and wire it in two ways: zero exec --worktree defers a release once its own run finishes, since that flow's use of the worktree is bound to its own process. zero worktrees prepare hands the path to a longer-lived external caller with no defined end-of-life, so a new zero worktrees release <path> subcommand lets that caller release it explicitly when done. * fix(worktrees): normalize release path, aggregate Clean errors, unlock deleted worktrees Address CodeRabbit's review on the lock-release fix: - zero worktrees release now resolves its path argument to absolute before calling Release, since git worktree unlock matches against the path git recorded at creation, not whatever directory the caller happens to be running from. - Clean now aggregates removal failures with errors.Join instead of overwriting lastErr, so multiple stale worktrees failing removal in the same pass are all reported, not just the last one. - Release falls back to options.Cwd as the git working directory when the worktree path itself no longer exists (e.g. a caller deleted a locked worktree by hand instead of releasing it first), so the orphaned lock can still be cleared. Added regression coverage for all three. * style(worktrees): align aggregation test comments to gofmt output * fix(worktrees,cli): restore reuse lease and scope unlock to owned locks - Prepare re-locks a reused worktree so Clean's staleness heuristic cannot force-remove it while the new caller is still using it; a lock already held by a live external caller is kept in place and reported through the new Result.LockAcquired field. - exec --worktree only releases the lock its own Prepare call acquired and surfaces a failed release on stderr with the affected path instead of discarding the error. - worktrees release wires the resolved workspace root into Options.Cwd so the deleted-path recovery works outside the worktree directory. - The relative-path release test derives its expected value via filepath.Abs, matching the resolution the CLI uses, so macOS /var vs /private/var spellings no longer break it. * fix(worktrees,cli): reject in-use leases, validate before cleanup, add release -C - Prepare rejects a worktree whose lock another run still holds, on both the reuse and the create-race paths, instead of handing a second live caller an unprotected shared checkout whose sole Git lock the first caller's exit would release. - The automatic stale-worktree pruning runs only after the request itself validates, so a rejected command (an invalid --name) has no destructive cleanup side effect; covered end to end with real git in both directions. - worktrees release accepts -C/--cwd naming the source repository, which the deleted-path recovery needs when launched outside the repo (the deleted worktree path is a one-way hash with no way back to its source). * test(worktrees): canonicalize test roots to physical spelling git records worktree paths in physical form, so the CI runners' symlinked (/var -> /private/var) and 8.3-short (RUNNER~1) temp spellings made Clean's containment check skip the test's stale entry and the pruning assertion fail on macOS and Windows. * fix(worktrees): preserve orphaned commits, verify release ownership, canonicalize base dir Four fixes from the latest review round: - Clean now creates a durable ref (refs/zero/orphaned-worktree/<sha>) for a detached worktree's HEAD before force-removing it, when that commit isn't already reachable from any other ref. Prepare always creates worktrees with `worktree add --detach`, so a commit made there had no ref pointing at it once the worktree was deleted, making it immediately eligible for git gc despite never having been merged/pushed elsewhere. - Clean resolves its configured base directory through EvalSymlinks before comparing it against git's reported worktree paths: `git worktree list --porcelain` reports each worktree's PHYSICAL location (resolving symlink components), so a symlinked --worktree-dir made every worktree created under it permanently unprunable. - Release now verifies path has a zero-worktree-<repoKey> ancestor directory component before running `git worktree unlock`, so it can't be used to clear the lock on a worktree a user or another tool manages by hand. The check doesn't need to know which --dir a given Prepare call used (nothing records that against a specific worktree, and the CLI never threads BaseDir through to Release) — the repoKey component is Prepare's actual ownership signature regardless of which directory it was created under. - Route the release command's printed path and exec's release-failure diagnostic through the existing CLI redaction helper, and split the worktrees help text into prepare-specific and release-specific flag sections (release only ever supported -C/--cwd, not the --name/--dir/ --json the shared block advertised). All four have regression tests confirmed to fail without their fix (two using real git worktrees, not just fakeRunner sequences). Build, vet, and gofmt clean on linux/windows/darwin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]> * fix(worktrees): recoverable PID leases and reclaimable released worktrees Two review findings on the cleanup lifecycle: - A lock left by an abnormal exit (SIGKILL, crash, power loss) was skipped by Clean forever, recreating the permanent disk leak this PR set out to fix. exec --worktree now records its PID in the lease reason; Clean expires a lease whose recorded owner is provably dead, unlocking only after the staleness, dirty, and HEAD-preservation guards all pass. Human locks and PID-less leases (external `worktrees prepare` owners) remain permanent until explicit release, and any ambiguity in the liveness probe counts as alive. - An explicitly released worktree holding only gitignored residue (node_modules, build output) was skipped at every age. Release is the owner's completion signal, so unlocked entries now block removal only on tracked/untracked changes; expired crashed leases keep the conservative --ignored probe since they never signaled completion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> * fix(worktrees): address review feedback on lease detection and release safety Split dead-lease PID checking into posix/windows implementations so Windows can reliably tell a dead process from a live one. Fix a path canonicalization mismatch in two release tests. Derive release ownership from git worktree list instead of the git-dir parent, which was wrong for repos with a separate git-dir. Refuse to clear a lock that was not taken by Zero in the first place. * fix(worktrees): canonicalize paths for clean/release ownership checks Compare Clean containment and Release ownership against physical path spellings so macOS /var vs /private/var and symlink TMPDIR layouts match git worktree list. Require a registered porcelain entry and a Zero lease reason before unlock; treat an already-unlocked Zero worktree as a no-op. * fix(worktrees,secrets): address jatmn review findings on #632 - Prepare and Release now agree on repoKey regardless of which worktree (main or linked) Prepare runs from, by keying off git worktree list's first entry (always the main worktree) instead of --show-toplevel. A worktree prepared from a linked checkout previously failed its own ownership check on release and its lease could never be cleared. - osProcessAlive on Windows no longer treats every OpenProcess failure as "process is dead": only ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (a live process this caller lacks rights to query) is now distinguished from a genuinely missing PID, so Clean can no longer force-remove an active worktree whose owning process it simply couldn't query. - The openai_key redaction pattern now recognizes sk-or-v1- (OpenRouter) alongside the existing sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- prefixes, so hyphenated OpenAI-compatible provider keys are redacted again without reopening the sk-<kebab-case-phrase> false-positive this pattern was narrowed to avoid. - Release/exec --worktree error text is redacted before reaching stderr, matching the already-redacted success path; ownership errors interpolate the caller-supplied path, which could carry a key-shaped segment. - canonicalizePath resolves symlinks through the nearest existing ancestor when the target itself no longer exists, so the documented `release -C` recovery path works again for a worktree deleted by hand under a symlinked --worktree-dir. - Prepare rolls back the worktree `git worktree add` just created if the subsequent lock call fails for a reason other than a concurrent racer, instead of leaking an unleased checkout until Clean's 24h staleness window reclaims it. Not addressed here: the P2 finding that worktree ownership is provable only by a directory-name convention plus a lock-reason prefix, both of which a user can reproduce by hand. A durable per-worktree ownership marker would close that gap, but internal/worktrees has been on main since #70, so a marker requirement could reject worktrees an already-installed zero created before this change existed. Needs a decision on migration before implementing. * fix(worktrees): prove Prepare ownership with a git-admin marker Address review findings that path convention plus lease-reason prefix are forgeable by hand. Prepare now writes a zero-owner marker into the worktree admin dir; Release and Clean require it before force-touching a path. Clean also keys its owned subtree off the main worktree root so linked-checkout calls still prune the same bucket Prepare uses. Tests plant the marker and list the main worktree first so fixtures match production. * fix(cli): complete worktrees release in shell completions * test(worktrees,cli): add coverage for linked-worktree Clean, forged lease rejection, and completions - TestCleanFromLinkedWorktreePrunesStaleWorktree: pins Clean deriving its owned-subtree key from the main worktree root (not the invoking linked checkout's --show-toplevel) so Prepare/Clean run from a linked worktree actually reclaim the worktrees Prepare created there. - TestReleaseRejectsForgedZeroLeaseWithoutOwnershipMarker: pins the ownership-marker requirement against the exact forgery jatmn described - a worktree under the predictable zero-worktree-<repoKey> path, manually locked with a reason that merely starts with the zero lease prefix. - Fix TestPrepareCreatesDetachedGitWorktree: its fake git runner ran out of canned results at Prepare's post-lock ownership-marker write, so writeOwnershipMarker resolved gitDir to "" and os.WriteFile wrote "zero-owner" as a relative path into the test process's real working directory instead of failing loudly. Give it autoAbsoluteGitDir like the other Prepare-exercising tests use and assert on the marker-write call. - completions_test.go: assert `worktrees`/`worktree` completions include `release` alongside `prepare`. * fix(redaction,worktrees): sort extra secret values by length descending and canonicalize worktree paths * fix(secrets,worktrees): restore Anthropic key redaction and handle legacy worktree cleanup * fix(secrets): add bash output redaction regression test for Anthropic API keys * fix(worktrees): touch worktree mtime on reuse to prevent stale pruning When Prepare reuses an existing worktree, it now touches the directory to refresh its mtime. This prevents Clean from force-removing a long-running but idle worktree (e.g. waiting on a model) that has no recent file changes but is still actively in use. Addresses the data-loss risk flagged in the PR review where mtime-only staleness + --force removal could discard live worktrees. Co-authored-by: cairn-code Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]> * fix(worktrees): properly handle os.Chtimes error on reused worktree path Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]> * fix(worktrees,secrets): unlock using porcelain entry path, set RepoRoot to primaryRoot, and add anthropic_key pattern Unlock using matched porcelain entry path, set Result.RepoRoot to primaryRoot in Prepare, add dedicated anthropic_key secret pattern, and canonicalize fake-runner test paths. Refs #632 * fix(tools): correct redaction placeholder assertion in Anthropic key test TestFormatBashOutputRedactsAnthropicKey checked for the openai_key placeholder instead of anthropic_key, a copy-paste leftover. The redaction itself was already correct; only the assertion was wrong. * test(worktrees): physicalize test paths for macOS tempdir symlink resolution * fix(secrets,worktrees): address CodeRabbit review findings Align RedactString token boundaries with secrets.Scan, strengthen the Anthropic bash redaction assertion, fix Clean fixtures so they reach the guards under test, and fail closed on ambiguous processAlive probes. * fix(secrets,worktrees): restore broad key redaction and legacy Clean safety Address human review on #855: keep sk- bodies with a digit filter instead of enumerated vendor prefixes, add a looser JWT form, restore the sk-test fixture, probe legacy ownership before dirty, treat non-INVALID Windows OpenProcess errors as alive, redact Abs/cwd release errors, and reclaim dead-owner leases on Prepare reuse. * fix(secrets,redaction): always redact known OpenAI key prefixes Alphabet-only sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- tokens are still credentials; keep the digit filter only for unknown sk- vendor forms so kebab phrases like sk-learn-… stay un-redacted. * Preserve digit-free legacy keys during redaction. Refs #855 * fix(secrets,worktrees): address CodeRabbit findings on PR #855 Redact full compact JWE tokens, pin git locale for lock parsing, write the ownership marker atomically, surface missing-dir unlock failures, and fail closed when HEAD probes are indeterminate. Align Clean fixtures and digit-free known-prefix redaction tests with the shipped behavior. Refs #855 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]> |
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KRATOS
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a4279662b9 |
redaction: catch compound secret keys + non-bearer auth schemes; stop scanner over-redaction (#249)
* redaction: catch compound secret keys + non-bearer auth schemes; stop scanner over-redaction Hardens the secret-redaction last line of defense after an audit of internal/redaction + internal/secrets. 1. Compound secret keys are now redacted. IsSensitiveKey was exact-match only, so db_password, session_secret, stripe_secret_key, auth_token, csrf_token, ssh_private_key, backup_api_key, etc. passed through in cleartext. A new keyLooksSensitive applies conservative structural heuristics (secret / password / passphrase / credential / apikey segments; a singular trailing "_token"; api_key / private_key pairs). Critically, the agent's token-COUNT fields (max_tokens, prompt_tokens, token_count) and ordinary *_key fields (primary_key, public_key, cache_key) are deliberately NOT redacted. 2. Authorization headers with non-bearer/basic schemes were leaking. The header pattern now also covers token, apikey, digest, negotiate, oauth, and aws4-hmac-sha256. 3. The secrets scanner over-redacted ordinary text: its prefixed patterns (sk-, gh*, AIza, AKIA, xox, github_pat, jwt) lacked the word boundaries that internal/redaction already uses, so kebab-case words like "task-management-and-coordination" matched as a fake key. Added \b anchors. Design note: a free-text "key: value" colon pattern was prototyped but dropped -- it mangled "file.go:line: message" output (a filename's "secret" segment looked like a sensitive key), the same over-redaction class fix #3 addresses. The structured paths (RedactValue for maps/structs, plus assign/JSON/query forms in RedactString) are covered; free-text colon-form remains out of scope. Tests: compound-key + token-count-safety matrix, auth-scheme redaction, the file:line guard, and scanner boundary positives/negatives. * redaction: redact the full auth-header value for multi-part schemes The broadened header pattern captured only the first token after the scheme, so parameterized schemes (Digest "…, response=…", AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 "…, Signature=…") left the actual secret param visible. Redact the entire value to end of line; the scheme name is kept. Adds tests with realistic Digest + AWS SigV4 headers. Addresses review feedback. |
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KRATOS
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474f494b93 |
Deep-audit remediation + sandbox hardening (batches 1–35) (#189)
* audit batch 1: redact nested secrets fully; count image tokens in compaction estimate
- secrets.Redact: replace longest matches first so a containing PRIVATE KEY
block is redacted before a nested shorter match corrupts its exact string
(audit medium internal/secrets/scanner.go:81) + regression test.
- agent compaction estimateTokens: add a flat per-image token cost so an
image-heavy context trends toward compaction instead of reading as ~0
(audit medium internal/agent/compaction.go:58) + test.
- ledger: re-verify against current main; mark scanner.go:35 and
redaction.go:362 already-fixed-on-main, record this batch's fixes.
* audit batch 2: worktrees defaultRunGit separates stdout/stderr
Capture git stdout and stderr into separate buffers instead of CombinedOutput,
so parsed rev-parse output is not polluted by git warnings and CommandResult.Stderr
carries the real error text (audit medium internal/worktrees/worktrees.go:247) + test.
* audit: re-verify all 87 pending findings against current main
Independent agent per file re-checked each open/partial finding against the
actual current code (the 06-11 ledger was verified on a since-diverged branch),
with an adversarial second pass on every already_fixed verdict. Authoritative
result: 78 genuinely pending (66 still_open + 12 partial); 9 rows were already
fixed on main and are reclassified. Full table in 2026-06-13-reverification.md.
* audit batch 3 (agent): cancellation identity, always-allow w/o sandbox, compaction usage, dedup
- loop.go: check ctx.Err() before collected.Error so a cancelled run returns
context.Canceled (errors.Is holds) instead of a plain stringified error.
- loop.go: 'Always allow' with no sandbox engine now allows THIS call instead of
denying it (persistence is skipped when there's nowhere to persist).
- loop.go: remove a duplicate schema["items"] assignment in propertyToRuntimeMap.
- compaction.go: forward OnUsage (token accounting) through the summarizer while
still omitting OnText, so compaction's token cost is counted in usage/budgets.
- tests for all three behavioral fixes (each fails pre-fix).
* audit batch 4 (cli): list-tools -o json, interrupted -o json terminal, surface session-record failures
- exec --list-tools -o json now emits a JSON tool listing instead of falling
through to the human-readable text (audit medium exec.go:182) + test.
- interrupted run with -o json now emits a terminal error+done on stdout instead
of only printing to stderr, so a JSON consumer sees a clean end (medium exec.go:500) + test.
- execSessionRecorder: surface a latched session-append failure to stderr once at
run end (deferred) instead of silently dropping it (medium exec_sessions.go:114/115) + test.
- left app.go trailing-arg ignore as-is: documented-intentional, TUI has no argv prompt.
* audit batch 5 (zerogit): status -z porcelain (renames + non-ASCII paths); document env-drop on plain Runner
- parseStatus: switch `git status` to `--porcelain -z` and parse the
NUL-delimited form (audit medium zerogit.go:212). Previously the default
--short output was split on newlines, so a rename `R old -> new` was kept as
one bogus path and a non-ASCII/whitespace filename arrived C-quoted+escaped
(e.g. `"caf\303\251.txt"`). The -z form never quotes paths and emits a
rename/copy as `XY <dest>\0<src>`, so we now record the destination verbatim
and consume the source field. + TestParseStatusZHandlesRenamesAndSpecialPaths.
- resolveRunners: document that the plain-Runner EnvRunner adapter intentionally
drops env (audit low zerogit.go:417). The branch is reached only when a caller
supplies a custom Runner without a RunGitEnv — in practice fake-Runner tests.
Production leaves both nil and gets defaultRunGit/defaultRunGitEnv, which honor
GIT_INDEX_FILE, so snapshot-diff isolation holds. Routing env calls to real git
instead would break the fake-Runner test pattern and fix nothing in production.
- update Inspect/Commit mock tests to the -z status format and the new command.
* audit batch 6 (config): reject negative maxTurns; drop dead contract-gap helpers
- FileConfig.UnmarshalJSON now rejects a negative maxTurns instead of letting the
`MaxTurns > 0` merge gates silently drop it and fall back to the default,
hiding the misconfiguration (audit medium resolver.go:136). 0 is left as the
"unset" sentinel (omitempty) and still falls back to the default; the CLI
--max-turns flag continues to reject 0 too since there it is distinguishable
from absent. + TestResolveRejectsNegativeMaxTurns / ...ZeroFallsBackToDefault.
- remove dead config/contracts.go (ContractGap, DefaultContractGaps,
FindContractGapsByMilestone, ContractOwnerRuntime) and its test — referenced
only by that test, never by production (audit low contracts.go:12).
- NOT changed: ResolveMCP intentionally does not run the provider command
(TestResolveMCPDoesNotRunProviderCommand guards this), so the "ZERO_PROVIDER_COMMAND
MCP servers dropped" row is by-design, not a defect.
* audit batch 7 (mcp): bound captured MCP server stderr
connectStdio attached a plain bytes.Buffer as cmd.Stderr that is only ever read
on initialize failure, yet it kept growing for the entire process lifetime as a
long-lived server logged to stderr (audit medium client.go:98). Replace it with
a concurrency-safe boundedBuffer capped at 64 KiB that keeps the head (enough for
init-error diagnostics) and discards the rest, reporting full write lengths so
os/exec never sees a short write. + TestBoundedBufferCapsRetainedBytes.
Left as-is (not defects worth the risk in the MCP client):
- client.go writer.write under client.mu: already designed to release the lock
before the unbounded response wait; the residual concern is a server that stops
draining stdin, an involved async rewrite for a theoretical deadlock.
- readLoop not answering server-initiated requests (ping): responding safely
needs re-locking around the shared writer; no configured server relies on it.
* audit batch 8 (tools/providers): read_file truncation marker; drop dead provider branch
- read_file: when a max_lines cut occurs, append an explicit "[truncated: N more
line(s)... set start_line=X to continue]" marker to the output. Previously only
the Result.Truncated flag was set, which is invisible in the rendered text, so
the model could not distinguish a cut read from a complete one (audit low
read_file.go:89). + TestReadFileToolMarksTruncation.
- providers/factory: simplify `if !explicitProvider || isImplicitOpenAI(...)` to
`if !explicitProvider` and delete the now-unused isImplicitOpenAI. The clause
was dead: explicitProvider==true implies ProviderKind or Provider is set, but
isImplicitOpenAI required both empty, so it could never contribute a case
(audit low factory.go:118). Behavior-preserving; providers tests still green.
* audit batch 9 (sessions): Tree builds from a single List() snapshot (no N+1 disk scans)
Store.Tree recursed via ListChildren per node, and each ListChildren ran a full
store.List() that re-read every metadata.json from disk — O(nodes * total-sessions)
reads for one tree (audit medium lineage.go:140). Snapshot all sessions once, index
children by parent in memory, and recurse over that. Child ordering is factored into
sortChildSessions so ListChildren and Tree stay identical; path-scoped cycle
detection (delete(seen,...)) is preserved. Existing tree/lineage tests still pass.
Left as-is: store.go timestamp() second precision (RFC3339) — switching to
RFC3339Nano would break lexical UpdatedAt ordering against existing second-precision
records ("...00.5Z" sorts before "...00Z"), so it is not a safe one-line change.
* audit batch 10 (specialist): serialize accounting dedup-then-append
recordSpecialistStop and appendSpecialistUsageRollup checked for an existing event
(specialistEventExists → ReadEvents) and then appended under SEPARATE store locks,
so two concurrent finishers — a foreground onExit racing a TaskOutput poll, or a
background reaper — could both pass the dedup check and write duplicate stop/usage
events (audit medium accounting.go:72). Guard each check-then-append pair with a
package-level accountingMu (Executor is used by value, so a struct field would not
be shared). + TestRecordSpecialistStopDedupesUnderConcurrency (passes under -race).
* audit batch 11 (zeroruntime/gemini): O(1) text accumulation; gemini cached-token counts
- zeroruntime CollectStreamWithOptions accumulated assistant text with
`collected.Text += event.Content`, reallocating the whole string on every chunk
(O(n^2) over a long streamed response). Accumulate in a strings.Builder on the
collector and materialize it once in flush, the single finalization point hit
before every return (audit low helpers.go:104). Existing collect tests still pass.
- gemini decoded usageMetadata without cachedContentTokenCount, so a cached-prompt
response reported zero cached input tokens while the other providers report them
(audit medium gemini/types.go:88). Decode the field and thread it through
streamState into NormalizeUsage as CachedInputTokens. + extended
TestStreamCompletionEmitsTextUsageAndReasoningTokens.
* audit batch 12 (specialist): parse child stream without a line-length cap; drop dead helper
- ParseStream used a bufio.Scanner capped at 1 MiB, so one large stream-json line
from a child (a big tool result or final answer) hit bufio.ErrTooLong and aborted
the entire specialist run (audit medium streamer.go:43). Switch to a bufio.Reader
with ReadString, which has no per-line limit; the child is our own trusted
subprocess, so its output length is the legitimate bound. Line numbering and
blank-line/EOF handling are preserved. + TestParseStreamHandlesLineLargerThan1MiB.
- remove dead formatTaskOutput (output_tool.go:244): zero callers and zero tests;
it only forwarded to formatTaskOutputSummary, which is the one actually used.
* audit batch 13 (background/specialist): kill background tasks as a process group
Background children were launched in the parent's process group and terminated by
signalling only the single PID, so any process the task forked was orphaned and
outlived a cancel; the signal also risked hitting a recycled PID after the child
was reaped (audit medium process_posix.go:38/50).
- ConfigureChildProcessGroup (Setpgid on POSIX, no-op on Windows where taskkill /T
already tree-kills) is applied at launch so the child leads its own group.
- terminateProcess now SIGTERM/SIGKILLs the negative PID (the whole group), with a
pid>1 guard so a bogus 0/1 can never expand to "our own group" or "everything",
and treats ESRCH as already-gone. Liveness polls the group. Targeting a group
(rarely recycled vs. a bare PID) also shrinks the reaped-then-recycled window.
- specialist launchBackgroundProcess opts every child into its own group; on a
SetPID failure it now kills the child + group, marks the task errored, and records
the stop (deduped) instead of leaking an untracked orphan.
- tests launch as group leaders; new TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren proves
a forked grandchild dies with the group.
* audit batch 14 (sandbox): quote-aware shell segment splitting
splitShellSegments used a quote-unaware strings.Replacer, so a shell operator
inside quotes was treated as a separator: `git commit -m "use top | less"` split
into a `less` segment and `echo "a; vim b"` into a `vim` segment, both falsely
flagged as interactive (audit medium safe_command.go:138).
Replace it with a quote-aware scanner that mirrors the shell: single quotes make
everything literal; double quotes keep $(...)/`...` substitution active but treat
|, ;, && as literal; unquoted text splits on the same operator set as before
(;, |, ||, &&) plus substitution boundaries. Real unquoted operators still split,
so an interactive program behind a separator — or inside a live `"$(...)"`
substitution — is still caught (no new false negatives, the security-relevant
direction). + TestDetectInteractiveQuoteAwareSeparators covering both directions.
* audit batch 15 (cron): collapse DST fall-back repeated hour to one fire
On a fall-back day the clock repeats an hour (e.g. 01:30 EDT then 01:30 EST), so
Next("30 1 * * *", <01:30 EDT>) returned the same-day 01:30 EST — firing a daily
job twice (audit medium schedule.go:171, which previously guarded only the
spring-forward gap).
Next now skips a match whose local wall-clock minute equals `after`'s but whose
absolute time is later (the repeated-hour duplicate) and keeps searching. Normal
forward search always advances the wall-clock, so this only triggers on the
fall-back repeat; when the scheduler passes the last fire time as `after`, the
repeated hour collapses to a single fire. + TestNextDSTFallBackDoesNotRepeatHour
(spring-forward termination test still passes).
Note: Next is stateless, so it dedupes relative to `after`; a caller that passes
an arbitrary mid-hour "now" instead of the last fire time is out of scope here.
* audit batch 16 (mcp): skip SSE notifications before the response; larger SSE buffer
- decodeSSERPCMessage returned the first non-empty `message` event unconditionally,
so a server-initiated notification/request arriving before the response made the
caller see an id mismatch and fail (audit medium network_client.go:621). It now
skips any message carrying a method (notifications/requests have one; a response
does not) and returns the first real response; the caller's rpcIDMatches still
validates the id. + TestDecodeSSERPCMessageSkipsNotifications.
- raise the per-event SSE scanner cap from 1 MiB to a bounded 8 MiB so a large but
legitimate MCP message no longer hits bufio.ErrTooLong and fails the request
(audit medium network_client.go:637); still bounded against an unbounded server.
Out of scope (kept): full reconnect of a persistent SSE stream after a fatal read
error — a larger change than this remediation.
* audit batch 17 (sessions): fsync session metadata before the atomic rename
writeMetadata wrote the temp file with os.WriteFile (no sync) and renamed it into
place, so a crash right after the rename could expose a metadata file whose bytes
were never flushed — a torn or empty file that corrupts the whole session (audit
medium store.go:632). Write+fsync the temp via a new writeFileSync helper before
renaming, closing that window. + TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips.
Deliberately scoped:
- Event-log appends (appendEventLocked) are NOT fsynced per append: that would add
a disk flush to every event (every tool call), and a hard-crash loss of the log's
unsynced tail is acceptable, whereas torn METADATA is not. Metadata is the
integrity-critical part and is what this syncs.
- Directory fsync is omitted for cross-platform simplicity (it errors on Windows);
the file fsync already prevents the torn-contents failure, the serious case.
Left for follow-up (in this bucket but not safe/clear wins here):
- hooks append sequence still re-reads the file per append; the in-memory cache is
cross-process-unsafe and the safe last-line read is fiddly for a low-volume log.
- Fork event re-append/de-dup is nuanced usage-accounting and needs its own change.
* audit batch 18 (agent): count tool-defs in compaction estimate; don't deny an always-allow on persist failure
- maybeCompact's estimate omitted the tool definitions, which ride on every
request, so the real input could exceed the model limit while the message-only
estimate stayed under threshold and compaction never fired (audit medium
compaction.go:58). partitionTools is now computed before maybeCompact (it does
not depend on the messages) and the exposed tools' estimated tokens are added to
both the threshold check and the post-compaction shrink check. + estimateToolDefTokens
and TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions.
- PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow denied the call when persistPermissionGrant failed,
overriding what the user explicitly allowed (audit medium loop.go:468). Persisting
is now best-effort: a failure (or no sandbox engine) just means the grant is not
remembered and the user is re-prompted next time, not denied now. This also drops
the dead requestEvent.GrantMatched/Grant writes (audit low loop.go:473) — the
emitted event derives them from the sandbox decision via buildPermissionEvent.
Left intentional (documented, not defects): the reactive-retry path omits OnText to
avoid duplicating mid-stream text (loop.go:183); OnContext/MeasureContext is a
complete, tested context-breakdown scaffold awaiting a consumer (types.go:183).
* audit batch 19 (usage): price escalated usage from the event's own model
exec persists payload["model"] on --allow-escalation runs (the model can change
mid-run), but BuildReport priced every event from the session's Metadata.ModelID
and never read the payload, so usage from an escalated model was mis-priced at the
base model (audit medium report.go:17). usageEventPayload now carries Model and
BuildReport prefers it, falling back to the session model when absent (older
events stay byte-identical and behave as before). + TestBuildReportPricesFromEventModelWhenPresent.
* audit batch 20 (sessions): don't copy usage events into a fork (no double-count)
Fork re-appended every parent event, including provider_usage, into the child, so
a usage report aggregating the parent and the fork double-counted the parent's
usage (audit medium store.go:387). Skip EventUsage when copying — it already
counted against the parent and is not part of the conversation history a fork
replays — and record the actual copied count in the fork marker. + TestStoreForkSkipsUsageEvents.
* audit batch 21 (cli/skills): warn on duplicate skill names instead of silently dropping
skills.Load deduplicates same-named skills (first directory wins) and records the
dropped collisions via skills.Duplicates, but nothing surfaced them, so a shadowed
skill just vanished with no signal — and Duplicates had no production caller (audit
low skills.go:91). `skills list` now reports each collision to stderr (keeping
stdout/--json clean), using Duplicates. + TestRunSkillsListWarnsOnDuplicateNames.
Note: skills.Get is kept — it is a by-name accessor used throughout the package's
tests, not dead code.
* audit batch 22 (cli/cron): capture the run error from stream-json stdout
Cron jobs run exec with --output-format stream-json, so a failure is reported as an
`error` event on STDOUT, but the run record's Error was set only from stderr — so a
failed job often recorded an empty/uninformative error while the real message sat
unread in outBuf (audit low cron_run.go:150). On a non-zero exit, scan the stdout
stream-json for the error event's message and prefer it, falling back to stderr.
+ extractStreamJSONError and TestExtractStreamJSONError.
* audit batch 23 (sandbox): richer macOS seatbelt profile (signal + mach-lookup)
The generated sandbox-exec profile was default-deny with only process/sysctl/file
allowances, so two real gaps remained on macOS (sandbox quality report H1):
- A sandboxed script could not signal the children it spawned — `kill` returned
"Operation not permitted" under seatbelt, breaking common `cmd & ... kill`,
test-runner, and timeout patterns. Add `(allow signal (target self) (target pgrp))`,
which stays scoped to the command's own process group.
- XPC to system daemons was denied, so keychain (securityd/trustd), user/group
lookup (opendirectoryd), preferences (cfprefsd), network config
(SystemConfiguration), launch services, and the pasteboard all failed. Add a
curated `(allow mach-lookup ...)` allowlist (`sandboxMachServices`).
Neither touches the file-write or network rules, so the workspace boundary is
unchanged — verified on a real macOS host: `security`/`scutil`/`pbpaste`/self-kill
now succeed while writes to $HOME and /etc are still denied. iokit-open was tried
and dropped as unnecessary. + unit assertions (TestSandboxExecProfileGrantsSignalAndMachLookup)
and extended the darwin integration test with a self-kill case and an
outside-workspace deny check.
* audit batch 24 (sandbox/tools): remove dead OnSandboxDecision hook
RunOptions.OnSandboxDecision had no setter anywhere, yet registry.RunWithOptions
spawned a goroutine (with panic recovery) for it on every sandboxed tool call —
pure per-call overhead for an unreachable callback (sandbox report M1). The sandbox
decision is already surfaced to observers via the permission event
(buildPermissionEvent reads the decision), so this hook is redundant; delete the
field and its call site.
* audit batch 25 (sandbox/cli): exact-path grants — create and revoke by path
The engine already matched ScopeFile grants and DeriveScope already produced them
from path/file tool args, but the CLI could neither create one explicitly nor
revoke a single one (sandbox report L3 / prompt 7). Add:
- GrantStore.RevokePath(tool, path): revokes only the grant whose scope matches the
given file/dir, leaving tool-wide and other-path grants intact (path canonicalized
to absolute like stored scopes). + TestGrantStoreRevokePathRemovesOnlyMatchingScope.
- `zero sandbox grants allow <tool> --path <p>`: persists an exact-file (ScopeFile)
grant, path resolved to absolute so it matches lookups and revokes.
- `zero sandbox grants revoke <tool> --path <p>`: revokes just that grant (default
still revokes all grants for the tool). + TestRunSandboxGrantsCreateAndRevokeByPath.
The TUI permission-card "Allow always (exact path)" option is intentionally left for
the TUI feature branches (it overlaps #187/#188); the engine + CLI now cover the
full create/match/revoke round-trip for file-scoped grants.
* audit batch 26 (sandbox): Engine.Precheck — report violations before execution
Add Engine.Precheck(ctx, request) []Violation, which reports the sandbox
violations that would block a tool request before it runs (sandbox report / prompt 6).
It reuses Evaluate so policy is not duplicated: an allowed or merely-prompted
request yields no violations; a denied request yields its violation (via the shared
violationsFromDecision helper, with a ViolationPolicyDenied fallback for a deny that
carries no structured violation). A nil engine yields nothing.
+ TestEnginePrecheckReportsViolationsBeforeExecution.
Wiring Precheck into the batch-confirmation prompt is intentionally left to the TUI
branch: it touches prompt rendering, and short-circuiting the agent loop's deny path
would skip the before/after-tool hooks that currently fire around a policy-denied
call. The engine API is in place for that consumer.
* audit batch 27 (sandbox): scoped-egress domain prompt with timeout + caching
The scoped-egress proxy failed closed on any host outside the allowlist. Add an
opt-in DomainPrompt callback (prompt 8): an UNKNOWN host (neither allowed nor
explicitly denied) is authorized at request time via the callback instead of being
refused outright. An explicitly denied host is still refused without prompting; the
callback is bounded by PromptTimeout (default 60s, timeout/error => deny); decisions
are cached for the proxy's lifetime so a host is prompted at most once. With no
callback set the strict fail-closed behavior is unchanged. Wired through both the
CONNECT and HTTP handlers via authorizeTarget.
+ TestEgressProxyAuthorizeDomainPrompt / ...TimeoutDenies / ...NilPromptFailsClosed.
The user-facing prompt that supplies the callback is left to the permission UI (TUI)
branch; the egress mechanism (callback + timeout + cache) is in place and tested.
* audit batch 28 (sandbox): AST-based shell analysis (AnalyzeCommand)
Add AnalyzeCommand(script) AnalysisResult, a static shell analyzer built on the
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 parser (prompt 12). Walking the parsed command tree makes it a more
precise second opinion than the regex detector: a program name only counts when it
is an actual command, so `echo "vim ..."`, `printf 'open with vim'`, and
`git commit -m "rm -rf /"` are clean, while real commands are flagged —
interactive (editors/pagers + REPLs, with the same -e/script suppression as
nonInteractiveREPLFlags), destructive (rm -rf/-fr, dd, mkfs, shred, ...), and
network (curl/wget/ssh/nc/...). An unparseable script yields TooComplex so callers
can treat it as higher-risk. + TestAnalyzeCommand (16 cases) / ...EmptyIsClean.
Dependency: mvdan.cc/sh/v3 pinned to v3.11.0 — compatible with the existing go 1.24
directive (the latest v3.13.1 would have bumped the module to go 1.25). It is kept
as a standalone analyzer for callers to consult; feeding it into Engine.Evaluate is
deliberately not done here, since that would change allow/deny classification.
* audit batch 29 (sandbox): unify proxy-env generation (ProxyEnv)
Export ProxyEnv as the single source of truth for proxy-env injection (prompt 9
req 1), replacing the unexported scopedProxyEnv used by the sandboxed-shell path.
+ TestProxyEnv.
Investigation that bounds the rest of prompt 9 (documented in the ProxyEnv doc):
- web_fetch already honors HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY — its transport clones
http.DefaultTransport, whose Proxy is http.ProxyFromEnvironment.
- MCP children already inherit the parent env (mergeProcessEnv appends os.Environ),
so they pick up any proxy vars the agent has.
So the only missing link to scope FetchUrl/MCP is a SESSION-level egress proxy whose
address reaches the agent process. That is deliberately NOT wired here: doing it
safely requires allowlisting the active LLM provider's own domain first, or the
agent's provider calls would route through the scoped proxy and be denied — a
correctness pitfall that also can't be verified end-to-end on this host. Flagged
rather than shipped blind.
* audit batch 30 (sandbox): Linux seccomp Unix-socket block — UNVERIFIED, needs Linux CI
Adds a pure-Go (no cgo, no vendored binary) seccomp BPF filter that denies
socket(AF_UNIX) with EPERM on x86-64/arm64, closing the Unix-socket gap bubblewrap's
filesystem/network isolation leaves open (prompt 11):
- internal/sandbox/seccomp.go: the classic-BPF program as a platform-neutral
[]sockFilter, built and UNIT-TESTED (structure + every jump offset in range — the
classic way a hand-written BPF filter goes silently wrong).
- seccomp_linux.go: ApplyUnixSocketBlock installs it via prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) +
prctl(SET_SECCOMP, MODE_FILTER). seccomp_other.go is a no-op everywhere else.
- cmd/zero-seccomp: a tiny linux-only exec wrapper that applies the filter then
execs the real command (the standard way to install seccomp in a child with
os/exec); degrades gracefully (warns + runs) if the kernel lacks seccomp.
⚠️ HONEST CAVEAT: I developed this on macOS and CANNOT run the actual AF_UNIX block
here. darwin build, `GOOS=linux` cross-compile, vet, and the structure test all pass,
but the unit test verifies the program's SHAPE, not that the kernel actually blocks
AF_UNIX — that MUST be verified on Linux CI (create a Unix socket under the wrapper
and assert EPERM). Safe to ship as-is: it is linux-only, no-op on every other
platform, and not wired into the bwrap command yet (opt-in prefixing the sandboxed
command with zero-seccomp is the remaining integration), so it cannot regress any
current path.
* audit batch 31 (sandbox): macOS denial log monitor (opt-in, default off)
Re-adds the macOS seatbelt-denial monitor as an opt-in feature (prompt 10). When
Policy.MonitorDenials is set, the sandbox-exec profile tags its default-deny with a
marker and bash tails `log stream` for that tag during the command, appending any
captured denials as a <sandbox_violations> block to the command's stderr so the
model can see what was blocked.
- DenialMonitor (darwin) tails/parses tagged denials with a capped, deduped ring
buffer and noise filtering; no-op stub on other platforms. parseSandboxDenyLine is
unit-tested. + profile-tag test + appendSandboxViolations test.
- Default OFF: with MonitorTag empty, StartDenialMonitor is a no-op and the command
path is byte-for-byte unchanged, so there is no regression or per-command overhead
unless enabled.
CAVEAT: on at least one macOS host (verified live) seatbelt denials are NOT delivered
to the `log stream`-queryable unified log, so the monitor captures nothing there. It
is the standard mechanism and works on macOS versions that do log denials; shipping
it default-off means it never affects whether a command runs.
* audit batch 32 (sandbox): wire seccomp Unix-socket block into bubblewrap (opt-in)
Completes prompt 11: the zero-seccomp helper (which installs the AF_UNIX seccomp
filter) is now actually invoked by the sandbox instead of only existing as a
standalone binary.
- bubblewrapCommandPlan, when Policy.BlockUnixSockets is set, ro-binds the
discovered zero-seccomp helper into the sandbox at its host path and prefixes the
command with it so the filter is installed before the real argv runs.
- findSeccompHelper discovers the helper next to the running executable first, then
on PATH; it returns "" when absent, so the sandbox degrades gracefully (runs
without the extra filter — bubblewrap's fs/net isolation still applies) rather
than failing the command. Exposed as a package var so the wiring is unit-tested
on any OS.
- Reachable from config: SandboxConfig.BlockUnixSockets and .MonitorDenials now map
onto the policy in applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy (opt-in only — config can turn a
hardening flag on, never off). Both default OFF.
- Tests: helper-prefix present when enabled / absent by default; config flags apply
independently and stay off when omitted.
Default OFF and Linux-only effect; the runtime seccomp enforcement still needs a
Linux host/CI to exercise end-to-end (the wiring and BPF program are unit-tested).
* audit batch 33 (sandbox): enforce scoped/deny network policy in web_fetch & web_search
Completes prompt 9: the built-in network tools now honor the SAME allow/deny/scoped
policy the sandboxed shell egress proxy enforces, instead of bypassing it. Before
this, web_fetch/web_search would reach any public host even when the policy was
NetworkDeny or NetworkScoped — the egress proxy only constrained shell commands.
- New shared gate Engine.NetworkHostAllowed(host) reuses the egress domain matcher
(domainAllowed/normalizeDomains/effectiveNetwork) as the single source of truth:
allow → all hosts; deny → none; scoped → only AllowedDomains minus DeniedDomains
(empty allowlist collapses to deny). Disabled policy / nil engine impose nothing.
- web_fetch is now sandbox-aware: the host is checked before the request AND on every
redirect, so a denied/unlisted host fails closed before any dial. Plumbed via a
networkPolicyGate so the no-sandbox path is byte-for-byte unchanged.
- web_search is sandbox-aware: the configured backend's endpoint host is checked
before the query leaves the machine; blocked under deny, and under scoped unless the
backend host is allowlisted.
- The registry already routes sandbox-aware tools through RunWithSandbox when an
engine is present, so this activates automatically wherever the sandbox is wired.
- Tests: engine gate matrix (deny/allow/scoped/denylist/empty/disabled/nil + host:port);
web_fetch & web_search block denied/unlisted hosts without dialing and allow listed
ones; endpoint-host parsing.
* audit batch 34 (sandbox): prove network-policy wiring end-to-end + document opt-in flags
Verification follow-up to batches 31-33; no behaviour change.
- Adds a registry-level test that exercises the FULL chain for the scoped-network
enforcement: registry.RunWithOptions -> engine.Evaluate (passes a scoped,
egress-capable sandbox-exec backend) -> routes web_fetch through RunWithSandbox ->
per-host allowlist blocks an unlisted host before any dial. This proves the
Tool-interface value actually satisfies sandboxAwareTool at the registry boundary,
not just in a direct method call.
- Documents the two opt-in hardening flags (sandbox.blockUnixSockets,
sandbox.monitorDenials) and the scoped web_fetch/web_search behaviour in the README
so the config keys are discoverable. Both remain off by default.
Confirmed wiring: agent loop forwards options.Sandbox to the registry; the registry
routes sandbox-aware tools (web_fetch, web_search) through RunWithSandbox when an
engine is present; MonitorTag is set only on the macOS sandbox-exec plan; the
seccomp helper prefix is added only on the bubblewrap plan when BlockUnixSockets is
set; both config flags map onto the policy via applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy.
* audit batch 35 (sessions): fix Windows CI failure in TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips
The exact-permission assertion (perm == 0o600) added in batch 17 fails on
windows-latest because Windows does not honor Unix permission bits: Go reports
0o666 for a writable file regardless of the mode passed to OpenFile. This was the
sole cause of the failing Smoke (windows-latest) CI job; macOS and Ubuntu passed.
Guard the perm check with runtime.GOOS != "windows" so it still verifies the mode
on the platforms that enforce it, while the round-trip (write + read-back) is still
asserted on every platform.
* audit batch 36: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings)
- background/process_posix: after SIGKILL, poll until the process group is
actually gone (SIGKILL is async) and return an error if it survives past a
second deadline, instead of returning nil while descendants still race.
- sandbox/safe_command: only treat ')' as a substitution boundary when it closes
an active $(...). A literal ')' (e.g. echo "a) less") no longer splits into a
fake `less` segment and is no longer misflagged as interactive. Depth-tracked so
nested $(...) still isolate their inner command. Direct splitShellSegments test
(fails pre-fix: yields ["echo \"a", "less\""]).
- cron/schedule: the DST fall-back collapse now only applies when `after` sits
exactly on the minute boundary (its "last fire time" form). With sub-minute
precision (e.g. 01:30:30 EDT) the first 01:30 fire already passed, so the repeated
01:30 EST is the legitimate next fire and is returned — restoring strictly-after
semantics. New test fails pre-fix (skipped to next day).
- config/types: maxTurns error message now reads "must be >= 0" to match the check
(0 is accepted; only < 0 is rejected). Negative-maxTurns test asserts the message.
- docs/audit: header date/branch metadata now matches the body (2026-06-13,
fix/audit-batch) instead of the stale 2026-06-11/fix/audit-critical-high snapshot.
Verified: gofmt clean; go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites
green. Each behavioural fix ships with a test confirmed to fail without the change.
* audit batch 37: address CodeRabbit re-review (12 findings)
Findings on the audit code from batches 21-36; each behavioural fix ships with a
regression test (several confirmed to fail without the change).
sandbox/analyzer (AnalyzeCommand):
- Unwrap launcher prefixes (sudo/env/nice/bash -c/...) and recurse into `sh -c`
payloads so `sudo rm -rf`, `env curl …`, `bash -c 'vim x'` classify on the real
command, not the launcher. Mirrors DetectInteractiveCommand.
- Honor rm's `--` end-of-options marker so `rm -- -rf` (delete a file named -rf) is
not flagged destructive.
sandbox/engine: NetworkHostAllowed now shares one backend-aware effective-mode
helper with Evaluate, so scoped collapses to deny when the backend can't enforce
scoped egress — the per-tool gate can no longer permit traffic the engine-level
decision would fail closed.
sandbox/egress: cache domain-prompt decisions by host:port, not host, so one
"allow" can't authorize other ports on the same host.
sandbox/safe_command: the segment splitter is now escape-aware (\| , \" ) so an
escaped operator/quote can't manufacture a fake interactive segment.
sandbox/log_monitor (darwin): Wait() the `log stream` child after draining stdout
so the cancelled process isn't leaked as a zombie.
tools/web_search: confine the search backend to same-host redirects (with a limit)
so a redirect chain can't egress to a host the scoped/deny policy never authorized.
cli/sandbox: an explicit empty --path (`--path=` / `--path ""`) now fails closed
instead of silently widening an allow to tool-wide or a revoke to all-grants.
cli/skills: warn on stderr when duplicate-skill detection fails instead of
swallowing the error.
specialist/exec: don't mask a failed orphan-kill — join the TerminateProcess error
with the SetPID error so a surviving process is visible.
background/process_posix: resolve the PGID and only group-signal when pid leads its
own group; otherwise signal the individual PID. Avoids both a false-success on a
non-leader ESRCH and the hazard of signalling an unrelated (possibly our own) group.
Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./...
green.
* audit batch 38: address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 (3 findings)
Follow-ups to batch 37, each with a regression test:
- safe_command (splitter): a ')' is now only a substitution boundary when it
closes an active, UNQUOTED $(...). A quote-state stack saved at each '$(' lets a
substitution run in a fresh quoting context and restores the outer quoting on
its matching ')'. Fixes `echo $(printf "a) less")` splitting into a fake `less`
segment, while still isolating the inner command of `echo "$(vim x)"`.
- egress: deduplicate in-flight domain prompts per host:port. Concurrent requests
for the same unknown target now wait on the first prompt and reuse its cached
decision instead of each firing a prompt (a prompt storm) and racing to write
the final decision. Race-tested with 25 concurrent authorizers → one prompt.
- analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption is now wrapper-specific
(wrapperValueOptionsByProg) instead of a global option set. A valueless flag like
`sudo -n` no longer swallows the real payload, so `sudo -n rm -rf` /
`sudo -n curl …` are correctly classified destructive/network; `sudo -u root vim`
still consumes its value. Shared by the AST analyzer and the regex detector so
they can't diverge.
Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.
* audit batch 39: address CodeRabbit re-review round 3 (12 findings)
All verified against current code; each behavioural fix has a regression test.
Security / correctness:
- tools/web_search: redirect policy now also refuses a scheme change, blocking a
same-host https→http downgrade that would send the query + bearer token over
plaintext.
- sandbox/safe_command: a ')' is only a substitution boundary when it closes an
active UNQUOTED $(...), and backticks now get the same quote-state save/restore
as $( — so `echo "`a | less`"` and `echo "$(true | less)"` no longer hide the
inner pager from interactive detection.
- sandbox/analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption stays
wrapper-specific, and unwrapping no longer aborts on a dynamic ($x) wrapper arg
once a wrapper is active, so `env "$opts" curl` / `sudo "$x" rm -rf` are still
classified.
- sandbox/egress: in-flight prompts deduped per host:port (carried from batch 38);
the prompt callback is now cancellable (context cancelled on timeout) so a stuck
prompt can abort instead of leaking; signature threaded through.
- sandbox/runner: per-plan unique denial tag (pid+counter) so concurrent monitored
sandbox-exec runs can't ingest each other's denials; helper selection now
requires an executable regular file so a non-exec sibling degrades gracefully.
- mcp/network_client: aggregate SSE event-size cap (not just per-line) so a server
can't grow memory with many unterminated data: lines.
- specialist/accounting: a previously-recorded stop/usage with an empty runId is a
catch-all and now suppresses a later runId-bearing duplicate.
- sessions/lineage: Tree fetches the root via Get() first so a corrupt root
surfaces its real error instead of degrading to "not found".
Docs/tests:
- background/terminate: docstring now states the leader-only group-kill (PID-only
fallback for non-leaders); test child-liveness probe uses ESRCH specifically.
- cli/sandbox: grant usage strings include --path.
Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.
* audit batch 40: address CodeRabbit re-review round 4 (8 fixed, 1 skipped)
Verified each against current code.
Fixed:
- sessions/lineage: PANIC FIX — store.Get returns (nil, nil) for a missing
session, so the batch-39 root prefetch could nil-deref. Guard root == nil and
return a not-found error. Regression test added (was a panic).
- agent/compaction: the reactive recover() now records lowWaterMark in the SAME
combined (messages + tool-defs) token domain maybeCompact uses, so the proactive
shrink-guard compares like with like. recover() takes tools; callers pass
request.Tools.
- mcp/network_client: SSE aggregate counter no longer counts a joining newline for
the first data line (only when prior content exists), avoiding premature rejects.
- sessions/store: fsync the parent directory after the metadata rename so the
rename is durable across a crash (no-op on Windows, which can't fsync a dir).
- sandbox/egress: parse the target port with strconv.Atoi instead of
net.LookupPort (no context-unaware resolver use).
- sandbox/runner: escape the per-plan denial tag through sandboxProfileString when
embedding it in the seatbelt profile.
- sandbox/seccomp_linux: guard against an empty filter program before taking
&kernelFilters[0] (defensive; the program is fixed non-empty today).
- cli/cron_run_test: assert last-error-wins with two error events.
- background/terminate, cli/sandbox usage, process_posix_test ESRCH (carried).
Skipped (with reason):
- zerogit worktree-rename (Y='R') test: git porcelain v1 -z only emits the
rename-source field when the INDEX column is R/C; the worktree column never
carries 'R' with a source field in v1, so the fixture would test output git
doesn't produce, and making parseStatus consume on code[1]=='R' would risk
mis-consuming the following entry for a plain ` R` status. Left as-is.
Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.
* audit batch 41: address CodeRabbit re-review round 5 (4 findings)
All verified against current code; code fixes have regression tests.
- agent/compaction: summarizeWithFallback's reduce pass no longer swallows ALL
errors. A context-limit error still falls back to the joined partial summaries
(documented "extreme" case), but a non-context failure (auth/network/provider)
now surfaces unchanged, per the function's contract. Two tests (propagate vs.
joined-fallback); the propagate test fails without the fix.
- sandbox/safe_command + analyzer: wrapper value-consuming options now include the
long spellings (sudo --user root, env --unset NAME, timeout --signal …), so a
long flag's value is no longer mis-read as the program (interactive/destructive/
network detection bypass). A `--flag=value` token carries its own value and never
consumes the next token. Tests for space and = forms in both the AST analyzer and
the regex detector.
- docs/audit: the status-ledger summary table's open/partial cells (64/14) were the
lone outlier — the ledger's own narrative and 2026-06-13-reverification.md both
state 66/12. Corrected to 66/12 (66+12+97 = 175); derivation: body 69 open + 18
partial minus the 9 already-fixed-on-main (3 open + 6 partial) = 66/12 = 78
pending, fixed 88+9 = 97. Added a comment documenting the summary-vs-body
relationship. The reverification doc already states 66/12, so both now agree.
Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./...
green.
* audit batch 42: address CodeRabbit re-review round 6 (1 fixed, 1 kept w/ proof)
CodeRabbit re-surfaced two "duplicate" refinements; CI was already green (its 6th
pass was a COMMENT with no new findings).
- cli/sandbox_test (TestRunSandboxGrantsRejectsEmptyPath): now seeds a tool-wide
grant and asserts grant-store immutability after EACH rejected empty-`--path`
call (reflect.DeepEqual before/after), so a mutation in one call can't be masked
by a later one — and a buggy "revoke all" is actually observable (it's a no-op on
an empty store). Stronger than the suggested patch.
- zerogit.parseStatus: KEPT consuming the rename source on the index column only
(code[0]), with an explanatory comment. Verified empirically that git porcelain
v1 -z reports a rename/copy (and emits the extra source field) only in the index
column: `git mv` → "R new\0old\0"; a worktree-only rename → " D old\0?? new\0"
(delete + untracked, never "R" in code[1]). Consuming on code[1]=='R'/'C' would
match no real git output and would only risk mis-consuming the next entry on
malformed input, so the suggestion is declined as incorrect for v1.
Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites green.
|
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KRATOS
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a6d6939bc5 |
audit: fix isolated remaining findings (redaction, secrets, rune-safety, credential status) (#174)
* audit: fix redaction sibling-DAG false cycle, hoist URL regex, widen OpenAI key pattern - redaction: seen-set now tracks only the current DFS path (delete pointer after recursing) so a shared reference reached via a sibling branch is no longer reported as CircularReference; true cycles still detected. (audit redaction.go:222) - redaction: redactURLPasswords compiles its regexp once at package scope instead of per call. (audit redaction.go:362) - secrets: openai_key body allows - and _ so sk-proj-/sk-svcacct- keys match, not just legacy sk-<alnum>. (audit scanner.go:35) * audit: rune-safe cron run-error truncation and commit-subject length - cronTruncate now cuts on a UTF-8 rune boundary (via cutRuneBoundary) so a persisted cron run-error excerpt can't end in a split rune. (audit cron_run.go:179) - zerogit ValidateMessage counts runes, not bytes, so a valid non-ASCII commit subject under 72 chars is no longer rejected. (audit zerogit.go:207) * audit: report auth-header-only profiles as having a credential ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet was true only for a non-empty APIKey, so a profile authenticated solely via AuthHeaderValue rendered as 'not set' in the command center. Treat either credential as set. (audit contracts.go:166) * audit: address review on #174 (credential-presence coverage + consistency) - Add ProviderSnapshotFromProfile test covering APIKeySet for api-key-only, auth-header-only, both, and neither (the AuthHeaderValue path CodeRabbit flagged as untested). - doctor.go: report the provider 'apiKey' diagnostic as set when EITHER APIKey or AuthHeaderValue is present, matching ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet — closing the same auth-header-only gap at the other credential-check site. - scanner_test: also assert the [REDACTED:openai_key] placeholder is present (matches the pattern used by the existing redaction test). * audit: trim credentials + surface doctor credential presence (#174 review) - ProviderSnapshot test: add whitespace-only api-key / auth-header cases so the TrimSpace behavior stays covered. - doctor.go: trim both APIKey and AuthHeaderValue before the presence check (matches ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet) AND move the indicator off the sensitive 'apiKey' detail key — check() runs RedactValue, so 'apiKey' was always scrubbed to [REDACTED], leaving the set/not-set indicator invisible. Now reported under 'credentialConfigured' so it actually surfaces; added a doctor table test. No consumer read the old detail key. * audit: honor AuthHeaderValue in model discovery + base-URL redaction (#174 review) Two credential-presence consistency gaps flagged on #174: - providermodeldiscovery: the /models probe gated on (and sent Authorization from) profile.APIKey only, so an auth-header-only profile was skipped/sent unauthenticated. Gate via discoveryHasCredential (APIKey OR AuthHeaderValue) and build the request with providerio.ApplyAuthHeaders, matching how the live providers authenticate (honors AuthHeaderValue, AuthHeader, AuthScheme, CustomHeaders). APIKey-only behavior is unchanged. - zerocommands.redactProviderBaseURL now also redacts AuthHeaderValue if it leaks into the base URL (variadic secrets, empties dropped). Adds regression tests for auth-header-only discovery, discoveryHasCredential, and auth-header redaction in the base URL. * audit: doctor credential-presence test parity with contracts_test (#174 review) Add the 'both' and 'whitespace auth header only' cases so TestProviderConfigCheckCredentialPresence matches the six cases in contracts_test.go's TestProviderSnapshotAPIKeySetCountsAuthHeaderValue. |
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KRATOSandKRATOS
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df56b0dd9e |
Tool quality: per-tool denial categorization + secret scanning (#137)
* [LOCAL PR-Z] Agent: structured per-tool denial categorization Adds ToolResult.DenialReason (DenialCategory: filtered / permission_denied / sandbox_violation) so a surface can tell precisely why a call was blocked instead of parsing Output. Set in the not-enabled path and deniedPermissionResult (sandbox-violation denials categorized distinctly from approval-declined). Tested. * [LOCAL PR-Z] Secrets: scan + redact leaked secrets in bash output New internal/secrets package: a dependency-free, precision-first scanner for high-confidence secret shapes (AWS/Google keys, GitHub/Slack tokens, private-key blocks, JWTs). bash output now runs through secrets.Redact so a command that prints a secret has it replaced with a typed placeholder + a redaction notice, instead of echoing it back into the model context (additive to the configured-key scrub at the registry boundary). A built-in regex scanner fits the CLI without the heavy gitleaks dependency. Tested: detection, no-false-positives on ordinary text, redaction, and the bash wiring. * Tool quality: redact full private-key blocks + use DenialReason in retry classification CodeRabbit critical: the private_key_block pattern matched only the BEGIN header, so Redact left the PEM/OpenSSH key BODY in the output — defeating the redaction. It now matches the entire BEGIN…END block (body included) so the key material is removed. Test asserts the body is gone. CodeRabbit minor: isRetriableToolError now treats a structured ToolResult.DenialReason (filtered/permission/sandbox) as non-retriable, independent of message wording; the text checks remain a fallback for results lacking the field. --------- Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]> |