Commit Graph
12 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Anandan 1fde941803 perf: reduce startup and turn overhead (#932)
* perf(tui): disable duplicate composer cursor blink

* perf(tui): stop composer wakeups after idle

* refactor(tools): publish immutable registry snapshots

* perf(startup): defer optional tool discovery

* perf(provider): reuse compatible response sessions

* feat(provider): add native patch tool input

* fix(provider): recognize saved chat sessions

* perf(tui): render only on screen changes

* fix(runtime): address performance review findings

* fix(usage): expose cache efficiency details

* perf(agent): reduce redundant bounded-task turns

* fix: harden runtime review edge cases

* fix: address runtime review findings

* build: restore official Bubble Tea dependency

* fix(cli): redact MCP registration errors

* fix: harden turn session regressions

* fix: keep run tools and patch roots consistent

* fix: bind freeform patch writes to scoped roots

* test: keep patch fixtures out of worktree

* fix(tools): reject mixed-root freeform patches
2026-08-26 13:22:05 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 97ef90d27a chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform (#706)
* chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform

The Security and code health job's advisory deadcode step reports 152
unreachable functions on main. Running the same check under GOOS=linux,
windows, and darwin shows 13 of those are false positives whose callers
live in windows build-tagged files, so only functions unreachable on all
three platforms are touched.

Functions with no references anywhere are deleted, including the
internal/reasoning package, which nothing imports. Functions that only
tests reference move into per-package export_test.go files so tests keep
their seams while the production binary sheds the code. Test call sites
of deleted convenience wrappers are ported to the live APIs (scoped tool
constructors, tools.DeferredSource, FinishReason checks).

Kept despite the report: cron.Store.Runs (only reader of runs.jsonl,
which production writes), and agenteval.TraceEventKeys and
MissingTraceEvents (used across packages by the trace contract test).

* docs(config): correct ValidateFile's errors.As claim

Message is a flattened string (.Error() already called on the parse
error), not a wrapped error, so callers can't recover the concrete
json error type via errors.As. Fix the comment to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* chore(trace,skills): drop obsolete Sink adapters and fix stale doc references

The dead-code pass removed the Emit methods but left Sink, NDJSONSink, and
TextSink exported with a contract nothing implements; remove the types with
their contract. Also remove the stray blank line at EOF of trace.go flagged
by gofmt, and update skills package docs and HOW_ZERO_WORKS.md to stop
directing callers to DiscoveryRoots/Duplicates, which are now test seams.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* chore: clean up remaining review nits on dead code removal

Replace a pointless fmt.Errorf(...%w...).Error() with fmt.Sprintf
using %v, since the wrapped error was discarded immediately anyway.
Remove a comment block that was duplicated verbatim.

* docs(skills): drop remaining references to test-only List/Get

Load and MergedSkills comments still named List/Get as production
entry points after they moved to export_test.go. Point callers at
Load and ListFromRoots instead.

* chore: remove now-unreferenced export_test.go seams

execSessionManager.len() and likelySandboxDenied/sandboxDenialKind had
no remaining callers after the sandbox unify-command-execution rebase;
the production code they wrapped for tests no longer exists.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:04:41 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19andAshwin f6c060631e fix(openai): handle Ollama reasoning stream deltas (#486)
* fix(openai): handle reasoning alias in stream deltas

* test(cli): assert reasoning event order

---------

Co-authored-by: Ashwin <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 17:05:54 +08:00
KRATOSandgnanam1990 f7ee189ba5 fix: resolve 15 findings from the 2026-06-20 deep audit (#281)
* docs(audit): 2026-06-20 deep adversarial audit report

Audit-only deliverable (no source changed). Fresh origin/main (bfbdbb1) deep
read across 13 subsystems with per-finding adversarial re-verification, plus
reconciliation of the 2026-06-10/2026-06-13 audits.

Result: build/vet clean; race detector finds 0 data races (67/68 pkgs; the
3 internal/tools failures are -race-only timing flakes). 35 surviving findings
(1 high, 15 medium, 17 low, 2 info); 64 prior findings fixed, 14 partial,
12 still-open.

* fix(providerhealth): strip credentials on cross-host redirect (AUDIT-M10)

The connectivity probe's CheckRedirect re-validated the redirect host against
the SSRF blocklist but never stripped auth headers. Go's stdlib only auto-strips
Authorization/Cookie/WWW-Authenticate on a host change — not x-api-key,
x-goog-api-key, or custom provider headers — so a baseURL that 3xx-redirects to
an attacker-controlled public host received the provider API key verbatim.

Thread the exact set of auth-bearing header names (kind default + profile
AuthHeader + CustomHeaders keys + well-known) into the client and Header.Del
them whenever the redirect target's host:port differs from the original.
Regression test asserts the creds are dropped cross-host and kept same-host.

* fix(sessions): fsync events.jsonl append for crash durability (AUDIT-M12)

appendEventLocked wrote the event into the page cache and returned success, then
durably wrote (fsync'd) the derived metadata. A crash after the metadata fsync
but before the events.jsonl page flushed left metadata.EventCount ahead of the
log — silently dropping the last appended event, including the checkpoint a
/rewind targets. Add file.Sync() before Close so the log is at least as durable
as the metadata derived from it.

(Note: the fsync itself has no portable unit-test seam; covered by the existing
sessions append/durability suite for no-regression.)

* fix(cron): DST fall-back double-fire + claim double-grant (AUDIT-M4, AUDIT-M5)

M4: fireJob/claimFire computed the next slot from the raw sub-second now(), so
schedule.Next's DST fall-back collapse guard (which only engages for a
minute-aligned 'after') never fired — a daily job in the repeated wall-clock hour
ran twice on the fall-back day. Feed sched.Next a minute-truncated instant at the
claim and the post-exec advance (the due-check still uses the real instant so
sub-minute NextRunAt jobs are unaffected).

M5: claimFire left NextRunAt unchanged when the schedule couldn't advance
(unparseable/exhausted spec), so two concurrent schedulers both saw the job due
and both fired it. Pause the job inside the same locked claim instead: the winner
still fires once and the post-exec keeps it paused; the loser sees a non-active
job and is refused.

Tests: claimFire double-claim on an unadvanceable job (second refused, job paused)
and a DST fall-back daily job advancing past the repeat (not re-firing it).

* fix(daemon): bound the control handshake + track bridge conns for Shutdown (AUDIT-M7, M8, I1)

The remote bridge clears the connection deadline before handing the conn to
Server.ServeConn, and the local socket set none, so handleConn's two ReadControl
handshake calls could block forever — an authenticated-but-idle remote peer
pinned a bridge connection slot (32 of them exhaust the bridge), and the local
path had the same unbounded read. Set a handshake deadline in handleConn and
clear it before the (long-lived) streaming dispatch (M7, I1).

ServeConn also bypassed trackConn, so Shutdown's conns-close sweep couldn't close
a remote conn stalled in that handshake read. Track/untrack it like the local
accept loop does (M8).

Tests: handleConn returns under a shortened handshake deadline when the peer
never sends hello; Shutdown closes a ServeConn'd conn well under the 10s deadline.

* fix(swarm): atomic rename-with-verify mailbox stale-lock break (AUDIT-M13)

The stale-break compared two consecutive reads of the SAME lock file
(string(data) == string(stale)), so the equality was always true and gave no
protection: two waiters could both observe a stale lock and both os.Remove it
while a third recreated it via O_EXCL, leaving two live writers to the same
per-agent inbox (split-brain). Replace with the proven rename-with-verify used by
the cron/hooks/oauth locks: rename the stale file aside (only one racer wins the
rename), re-check the moved file's mtime is still stale before deleting, and
rename it back if a holder rotated a fresh lock in the gap.

Tests: a genuinely stale lock is reclaimed (no .stale.* leftover); a fresh held
lock is never broken. (The double-break race itself is not deterministically
unit-testable; the fix mirrors the cron/hooks/oauth pattern.)

* fix(streamjson): anchor api_key redaction so prose isn't mangled (AUDIT-M1)

The api_key secret pattern used ["'=:\s]+ as the delimiter class, so a bare
space after the marker counted — 'the api_key: foo setting' and 'apiKey value
spans' had the following word replaced with [REDACTED] in every emitted
stream-json event (text deltas, tool output, final answer). Require a real
assignment delimiter (= or :) and a credential-length body, mirroring the
already-anchored sk-/bearer patterns. Prose survives; real api_key=... secrets
still redact.

* fix(tools): snapshot exec-session lastUsedAt under its lock to fix prune race (AUDIT-L15)

sessionToPruneLocked sorted on execSession.lastUsedAt while holding only
manager.mu, but touch() writes lastUsedAt under session.mu — a data race on a
time.Time that could torn-read and mis-select the prune victim. Snapshot each
session's lastUsedAt via a session.mu-guarded getter before sorting (lock order
stays manager.mu -> session.mu; no path takes them the other way). Adds a -race
regression test driving touch() concurrently with the prune selection.

* fix(swarm): release per-job context on MaxRuns completion (AUDIT-L13)

Scheduler.run returned on MaxRuns completion without calling job.cancel(), so the
job's derived context (and the goroutine context.WithCancel spawns to propagate
parent cancellation) leaked until the whole scheduler was cancelled at session
end. Add defer job.cancel() (idempotent with Cancel/Close) so it is released on
every exit path.

* fix(agent): route post-compaction and max-turns connects through streamWithReconnect (AUDIT-L1)

The main turn connect already retries transient disconnects via
streamWithReconnect, but the post-compaction retry connect, the reactive
mid-stream reconnect, and finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns called provider.StreamCompletion
directly — a single transient hiccup on those (e.g. the final summary after a long
autonomous/cron run, or the turn right after a context-limit compaction) failed the
whole run with no retry. All three are pre-content connects, so routing them through
the helper carries no OnText-duplication risk.

* fix(cli): reject trailing args after --skip-permissions-unsafe (AUDIT-L3)

zero --skip-permissions-unsafe "fix bug" silently discarded the prompt and
launched the interactive TUI, so a scripted one-shot unsafe invocation appeared
to hang. Reject any trailing positional arg loudly (after checking for a
misplaced --add-dir first, which keeps its specific error), pointing users at
the working form: zero exec --skip-permissions-unsafe -p "...".

* fix(provideroauth): error on present-but-wrong-shape chatgpt account-id claim (AUDIT-L11)

extractChatGPTAccountID returned ("", nil) both when the id_token had no
account-id claim AND when OpenAI's auth namespace was present but the account id
was missing/empty/non-string. The latter is a claim-shape change: the caller only
warns on a non-nil error, so it silently omitted the chatgpt-account-id header and
every Codex call 401'd with no diagnostic, indistinguishable from an expired
token. Return an error for the present-but-unusable case so the login warning
fires; a genuinely absent claim still soft-skips ("", nil).

* test(tools): widen exec-session poll windows so the suite is -race-clean (AUDIT report §2)

Three exec-session timing tests assumed a 250ms-sleep / immediate child would
finish within a fixed 1000ms yield. Under -race the child (the race-instrumented
test binary) starts slowly enough to overrun it, so the tool correctly returned a
still-running session_id instead of an exit_code and the asserts failed — the
non-green -race suite the audit flagged in §2. collect() returns as soon as the
session completes, so widening the poll window to 30s makes them deterministic
under -race without slowing the passing case. Test-only; no behavior change.

* docs(audit): mark remediation status (fixed/deferred/skipped) for the 2026-06-20 audit

* docs(audit): strip trailing whitespace from the report (fix git diff --check)

* fix(tools): drain PTY output before marking an exec session done (AUDIT-M14)

A TTY exec session's stdout was copied into the buffer by a fire-and-forget
io.Copy goroutine, but startSession's Wait goroutine called markDone (and then
removed the session) as soon as command.Wait() returned — before that goroutine
had necessarily drained the master FD. The command's final output chunk (e.g. a
test runner's last PASS/FAIL line) could be lost on exit, and since the exited
session is removed it could not be polled back. This also surfaced as the flaky
TestExecCommandTTYSessionAcceptsInputOnLinux on loaded CI.

Make the PTY cleanup (called after command.Wait, before markDone) join the copy
goroutine before closing the master: the child has exited so the master EOFs once
io.Copy finishes draining; waiting for that (bounded by bashWaitDelay) guarantees
all output is buffered before the session is marked done. Closing the master
first would truncate the unread tail, so the join precedes the Close.

Linux-only path (exec_pty_linux.go); verified via GOOS=linux build+vet (the TTY
test only runs on linux/CI).

* docs(audit): mark M14 fixed (PTY drain) in remediation status

---------

Co-authored-by: gnanam1990 <[email protected]>
2026-06-21 00:44:23 +05:30
Anandan ac6addaa83 Align sandbox permission blocks and backend states (#253)
* Prompt for shell network permissions

Route network-risk shell calls through the existing permission prompt instead of hard-denying them at sandbox preflight. Approved network prompts apply the current turn/session request-permissions overlay so the effective sandbox policy is widened only after user approval.

Move network command detection into the shell AST analyzer for package installers, gh/git network subcommands, and python http.server so quoted process patterns such as pkill -f "python3 -m http.server 8000" are not misclassified as network activity.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBash|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Auto-allow native-sandboxed shell commands

Remove the old hidden bash auto-allow environment/config path. Ordinary shell commands now use the active native sandbox as the permission boundary by default, while network, destructive, and workspace policy checks still run first.

Policy-only and disabled sandbox backends continue to require approval for shell commands, so unsandboxed execution is not silently allowed.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxedBash|TestShellSandboxActive|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBashAuto|TestBashStillPromptsWithoutActiveSandbox|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicy|TestApplyConfiguredAutonomyCeiling'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/daemon -run 'TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Prompt for destructive shell approval

Remove the separate DenyDestructiveShell policy layer from active sandbox decisions. Destructive shell classification now produces an approval prompt in ask/auto flows instead of a sandbox hard-deny, while no-approval paths remain blocked.

Drop the removed destructive-shell policy field from sandbox policy output, backend capabilities, snapshots, and Windows golden data.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicy|TestEffectiveSandboxPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/zerocommands -run 'TestSandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicyFillsEffectiveMode'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove web-tool network policy switch

Remove the old EnforceToolNetwork policy option and the NetworkHostAllowed per-tool gate so sandbox network policy only controls sandboxed shell egress.

Keep web_search and web_fetch on their own tool permission and URL safety paths, with tests proving deny/scoped shell network policy no longer blocks in-process web tools.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy|TestEngineAllowsNetworkSideEffectWhenShellPolicyBlocksNetwork|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestScopedNetworkGateInEvaluate'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestWebSearchRunWithSandbox|TestWebFetchRunWithSandbox|TestRegistryRoutesWebFetchThroughSandboxPath'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Prompt for outside-workspace file access

Convert recoverable outside-workspace file path violations into permission prompts instead of hard-denying in ask/auto modes.

Approved prompts now grant the requested filesystem scope through the existing request_permissions overlay for the current turn or session, so the follow-up sandbox evaluation and scoped file tools use the same policy path.

Keep unsafe mode, apply_patch escapes, symlink traversal, and non-recoverable path cases hard-denied.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDeniesOutOfWorkspacePaths|TestGrantRequestPermissionsReadDoesNotGrantWrite|TestGrantRequestPermissionsSessionPersists'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsAndAllowsOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunSessionAllowsLaterOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryAppliesSandboxBeforeToolExecution|TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys|TestRegistryAllowsPromptToolWithPersistentSandboxGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxCheckJSONDeniesOutOfWorkspaceWrite'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix Windows network prompt test fixture

Use a Windows curl.cmd shim and cmd.exe PATH syntax for TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant while keeping the POSIX fake curl fixture for Linux and macOS.

This keeps the test focused on network prompt approval and turn network grants instead of relying on a POSIX shell script being executable on Windows.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestClassifyASTCatchesNetworkProgramsRegexMisses|TestClassifyFlagsPipedInstallerVariants'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Remove sandbox autonomy ceilings

Sandbox permission decisions now match grants by tool and scope only, without MaxAutonomy or request autonomy checks. Persistent/session grants, permission approvals, workspace-write auto-allow, and native-sandbox shell auto-allow no longer route through an autonomy ceiling.

Remove the sandbox.maxAutonomy config and CLI surfaces, including grant --auto, policy output, sandbox check autonomy input, and sandbox grant snapshots.

MCP permission autonomy is intentionally unchanged because it is a separate MCP permission model.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/config ./internal/cli ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Fail closed without native sandbox

Remove AllowPolicyOnlyRunner from sandbox policy and snapshots. A restricted/managed command plan now errors when native sandbox support is unavailable instead of running through a policy-only direct runner.

Policy-only backend data remains as diagnostics for capability/reporting paths, but it no longer authorizes command execution when a platform sandbox is required.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/cli ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove scoped shell network policy

Drop the domain-scoped shell network mode and the local scoped-egress proxy path from the active sandbox model.

Shell network policy now serializes and evaluates only deny or allow. Request-permissions network grants widen to allow without domain lists, and platform profiles consume the binary mode directly.

The Linux helper no longer accepts proxy-route flags, Windows network hashes only the binary mode, and web tool tests assert they remain separate from shell network policy.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/notify

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Align permission grant ordering and prompt text

Move persistent and session grant matching ahead of recoverable sandbox prompts while keeping explicit denies and non-recoverable path violations fail-closed.

Clean TUI permission transcript/card text so normal prompts show action, reason, scope, and readable block details instead of raw permission/risk/violation key-value metadata.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove policy-only sandbox terminology

Replace the unavailable native-backend diagnostic path with explicit unavailable support/backend states, and stop presenting missing native isolation as a policy-only fallback.

Rename structured sandbox denial metadata from violation to block across permission events, stream-json, snapshots, TUI rendering, and sandbox-check output so user-facing flow matches blocked action language.

Update README, work split docs, smoke test selectors, and Windows sandbox policy golden output for the new backend/support names and block payloads.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/tui ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/streamjson

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix sandbox review follow-ups

Fail closed for unknown network modes, keep network prompts ahead of bash allow grants, preserve v1 grant-file reads, and classify unparseable commands with obvious network programs as network-risk.

Bump stream-json schema to v2 and document the block metadata field after the violation-to-block rename.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/streamjson ./internal/specialist ./internal/cli -run 'TestExec.*Stream|TestStreamJSON|TestExecProtocol|TestExecReadsStreamJSONImages|TestExecAcceptsImageOnlyStreamJSONMessage|TestExecInputFormatStreamJSON'

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tests: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tests: git diff --check
2026-06-19 19:50:12 +05:30
gnanam1990 a3f62f093b streamjson: stop over-redacting prose in secret scrubbing
The sk- and bearer patterns were unanchored, so "sk-" inside "task-list" and
the word after a bare "bearer" were replaced with [REDACTED], corrupting
legitimate output. Anchor sk- on a word boundary and require a credential-length
body for both sk- and bearer tokens; real keys/tokens are still redacted.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
68facda077 Image (multimodal) input: exec --image, stream-json images, TUI /image across all 3 providers (#143)
* zeroruntime: add ImageBlock type and NormalizeImageMediaType

* zeroruntime: add optional Images field to Message

* zeroruntime: add SeedMessagesWithImages, delegate SeedMessages with nil

* Emit Anthropic image source blocks for user image turns

* Add inlineData part type to Gemini request schema

* Serialize user image attachments as Gemini inlineData parts

* test(openai): pin text-only chat request serialization before content refactor

* feat(openai): allow structured multimodal content parts in chat request

* feat(openai): map image attachments to image_url content parts

* test(openai): assert image content parts serialize over the request body

* modelregistry: add SupportsVision capability gate

* Add shared image-file loader package

* cli: parse repeatable exec --image flag into imagePaths

* cli: resolve exec image attachments via shared loader with sniff and size cap

* agent: thread image attachments through Options into the seeded user turn

* cli: resolve and vision-gate exec image attachments into the agent run

* cli: document exec --image flag in help output

* streamjson: add InputImage type and InputEvent.Images field

* streamjson: whitelist images field on message events only

* streamjson: allow empty content on message events that carry images

* streamjson: add ResolveImages to decode, normalize and cap input images

* streamjson: cover image parse-and-resolve round-trip and text-only invariance

* Add /image command definition to TUI

* Add synchronous vision check for TUI model

* Implement /image attach, clear, and non-vision refusal in TUI

* Render pending image chips above the input in both skins

* Thread pending images into the agent turn and clear on submit

* Wire stream-json images through to the agent run

Stream-json message images were parsed and validated but never reached
agent.Options.Images: streamjson.ResolveImages had no production caller,
so images sent over stream-json input were silently dropped.

resolveExecPrompt now also returns the resolved stream-json images
(nil for text input and for image-free stream-json input). The exec
runner merges them with --image attachments before the vision gate, so
both input sources flow through the same drop+warn and the same
agent.Options.Images wiring.

Adds an exec-level end-to-end test that feeds a base64 image on a
stream-json message event via stdin on a vision model and asserts the
image reaches the agent run (the provider request's user turn).

* Re-check TUI vision support at submit, not only at /image attach

A user could attach an image on a vision model and then switch to a
non-vision model via /model before submitting; the images were threaded
unconditionally into the agent turn, reaching a model that rejects them.

The commandPrompt submit path now re-runs the vision check against the
current effective model. When the active model can't accept images, the
pending images are dropped (not threaded) and an inline notice mirroring
the headless drop+warn wording is appended. Pending image state is still
cleared after submit either way.

Adds a test that attaches on a vision model, switches the model id to a
non-vision one, submits, and asserts the run received no images, an
inline notice was appended, and pending state was cleared.

* Bound memory with an os.Stat size pre-check in imageinput.LoadFile

LoadFile read the whole file into memory before checking the size cap,
so a multi-gigabyte file allocated a huge buffer only to be discarded.

Add an os.Stat size pre-check before os.ReadFile: a file whose size
exceeds MaxImageBytes is rejected with the same 10 MiB-limit error
before any read; a missing file surfaces the same not-found error. The
existing post-read len(data) check is kept as a TOCTOU backstop in case
the file grows between Stat and ReadFile.

* OpenAI: only the user role emits image content-parts

The Anthropic and Gemini providers only attach images in their user
branches, but OpenAI funnels every role through a single mapMessage,
which would emit image content-parts for any role carrying Images.

Guard the content-parts path to the user role: a non-user message that
happens to carry Images keeps the plain string/nil content path. Pins
the invariant with TestMapMessageNonUserRolesNeverCarryImages, asserting
assistant/tool/system messages with Images set still serialize plain
content (no content-parts array).

* Deep-copy image buffers so attachments are never aliased

Add a shared CloneImageBlocks helper in zeroruntime that deep-copies a
slice of ImageBlock including each Data byte slice (returning nil for
nil/empty input). Use it in SeedMessagesWithImages so a seeded user turn
owns an independent copy of the caller's image bytes, and in the agent
loop's copyMessages so image bytes are deep-copied alongside ToolCalls
instead of staying aliased across history/request/result copies.

Tests assert that mutating the caller's original Data bytes after seeding
leaves the seeded message unchanged, and that copyMessages produces
independent image bytes.

* Accept image-only stream-json turns and bound base64 image size

Resolve stream-json images before the prompt in the exec input path and
tolerate an empty prompt when images are present, so an image-only
message event (empty content + one image) proceeds with prompt="" and the
image reaches the agent run instead of being rejected. A turn carrying
neither text nor images still errors.

In ResolveImages, reject an oversized payload from its ENCODED length
(DecodedLen) BEFORE the base64 decode so a huge blob never allocates a
decode buffer just to be capped afterward; the post-decode length check
stays as a backstop.

Tests cover the image-only exec turn reaching the agent and the
pre-decode oversize rejection (asserting the size gate fires before any
decode).

* Bound the image read in imageinput.LoadFile with a LimitReader

Replace os.ReadFile with os.Open + io.ReadAll over an
io.LimitReader(f, MaxImageBytes+1). The os.Stat pre-check is only a
fast-path hint (a non-regular file reports a misleading size and the file
can grow between stat and read); the LimitReader is the real bound, so at
most one byte past the cap is ever buffered and an oversized or unbounded
source can never allocate a multi-gigabyte buffer. The file is closed via
defer and the existing size message is reused.

* Fix RenderChat frame-height off-by-one with image chips

cmdRegion emits TWO rows when ImageChips is set (a chip row above the
input line), but the body/overlay height accounting assumed a one-row
command region, overflowing the fixed frame by one line. Compute the
fixed-row count from the actual command-region height (1 or 2 rows) so
the composed frame stays exactly Height rows in both cases.

A RenderChat test asserts the rendered frame line-count equals the
requested height both with and without ImageChips set.

* Reject an empty inline --image= value

Route the inline --image= form through requiredInlineFlagValue, the same
empty-rejection the other inline flags use, so --image= errors with
"--image requires a value" instead of appending an empty image path. A
parse test covers the empty inline value.

* imageinput: reject non-regular files (FIFO/dir) before opening

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Gnanam <[email protected]>
2026-06-08 18:49:09 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 07d8ffc524 CLI wiring: skills/zeroline commands, --mode presets, exec checkpoints, sandbox --effective, sessions rewind (#128)
* CLI wiring: skills/zeroline commands, --mode presets, exec checkpoints, sandbox --effective, sessions rewind

Final module of the runtime-core split. Wires the new runtime features into the cli, PRESERVING main's merged specialist cli (the source branch predates specialist and drops it; this keeps it via a 3-way merge from the common base, adding the reskin features as ours/theirs-only changes).

- skills command (internal/cli/skills.go) listing internal/skills; zeroline-skin TUI launcher (internal/cli/zeroline.go) via runInteractiveTUIWithSkin.

- exec: --mode presets (smart/deep/fast/large/precise) via applyExecMode; model-registry alias resolution + deprecation/effort notices; ContextWindow sizing (modelContextWindow); before-mutation checkpoint recording in OnToolCall; enhanced tool-result output (ChangedFiles/Redacted/Display); permission-mode validation fix.

- sandbox policy --effective (resolved guards); sessions rewind (executes the rewind plan); interactive TUI defaults to Ask mode (advertises write/edit/bash + gates via prompts).

- internal/streamjson: EventCheckpoint/EventRestore + CheckpointInfo for structured checkpoint output.

Specialist cli preserved (specialist.go + flags + runtime + tests all intact). build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green; no new deps.

* Address #128 review: make sessions rewind reachable + honor --exclude-target, mode/notice/redaction fixes

- sessions: add "rewind" to the parser whitelist (isSessionsCommand) — it was wired in dispatch + help but parseSessionsArgs rejected it as 'unknown sessions command', so it was unreachable. Regression test TestRunSessionsRewindIsReachableAndHonorsExcludeTarget.

- sessions rewind: honor --exclude-target — ApplyRewind keeps THROUGH a sequence, so when KeepTarget is false apply through TargetSequence-1, matching rewind-plan (previously rewind always applied TO the target, disagreeing with the plan). The test asserts --exclude-target keeps fewer events than the default.

- sessions rewind: redact the session id in the success + not-found messages (consistent with every other human-readable path).

- exec_parse: reject empty inline --mode= via requiredInlineFlagValue (was a silent no-op running defaults).

- exec: notice writes (model-deprecation + reasoning-effort advisories) now treat write failures as exitCrash, consistent with the rest of the command.

build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-06-07 23:42:10 +05:30
Vasanth T 52fbb6d9e7 feat: add runtime permission decisions (#95) 2026-06-06 15:26:33 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 34ad21a551 Add runtime permission and verification event contracts (#82)
* feat: add runtime permission event contract

* feat: stream permission events from exec

* feat: add runtime command snapshots

* feat: add session rewind compaction plans

* feat: add verification event contracts

* fix: harden runtime contract review gaps

* test: assert approved exec stderr contract

* fix: address CodeRabbit CHANGES_REQUESTED items for #82

- Make OnSandboxDecision callback async + panic-safe (non-blocking, recovered) in tools/registry.go per CR.
- Add explicit regression test for ConfigSnapshot when ResolveRuntimeMetadata errors (no secret leak in Message/BaseURL).
- (Many prior items like shapedPayloadPreview for permission/tool events, dual-target conflict test, stderr empty on approved path, Kind/Framework preservation, redactCommand empty slice, etc. were already landed on this branch.)

All relevant tests now pass.

* fix(agent): make sandbox decision available synchronously on Result for permission events

The recent change to invoke OnSandboxDecision asynchronously (to satisfy non-blocking requirement) broke the agent's immediate capture of the decision for building PermissionEvent after registry.RunWithOptions.

- Add SandboxDecision *sandbox.Decision to tools.Result (not serialized).
- Populate it on all sandbox-involved return paths in registry.RunWithOptions (sync, before/while firing async callback for observers).
- In agent executeToolCall, use result.SandboxDecision for buildPermissionEvent (reliable ordering) instead of side-effect capture via the callback.
- The async callback is still supported for any external OnSandboxDecision consumers.

This fixes the two failing agent tests that were causing the cross-platform 'Smoke' CI jobs to fail on this PR:
- TestRunEmitsPermissionEventForPersistentSandboxGrant
- TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode

All go tests now pass.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-06-06 13:13:08 +05:30
KRATOS 623c53e324 feat: harden sandbox command execution (#79)
* feat: add sandbox command runner

* feat: route shell tools through sandbox engine

* test: cover sandboxed shell execution
2026-06-06 09:20:25 +05:30
Vasanth T a710b0e5f5 feat: add Go headless protocol sessions (#60)
* feat: add Go headless protocol sessions

* test: harden stream-json tool list filtering

* fix: resolve stream-json review followups

* chore: enable coderabbit review verdicts
2026-06-05 10:41:38 +05:30