9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
zzucs 63962081cf fix(sessions): capture freeform apply_patch checkpoints (#1183)
* fix(sessions): capture freeform apply_patch checkpoints

Freeform apply_patch arguments are raw patch text, but both checkpoint
paths passed them to json.Unmarshal and dropped the error, so they found
no mutation targets and recorded no checkpoint. The tool still executed,
leaving rewind unable to restore the edit.

Resolve targets through a shared agent.CheckpointTargets helper that
prepares freeform input on the registered built-in apply_patch, exactly
as executeToolCall does. This keeps absolute patch headers
workspace-relative (rewriting them and setting cwd) instead of handing
absolute paths to the checkpoint layer. Non-freeform calls now use the
same tolerant decoder as execution, so the two cannot disagree.

Covers the CLI, spec-draft, and TUI capture paths.

Fixes #1162

* test(sessions): canonicalize freeform absolute-header fixtures

t.TempDir returns the symlinked /var spelling on macOS and short names on
Windows, while the apply_patch tool resolves the physical root. The
absolute-header cases must build the header from the resolved root, as the
repo's cross-platform test guidance requires.
2026-11-02 14:23:58 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5.5 13e2596b2e chore: move repository references to Twigpine/zero (#1105)
Update the Go module path, imports, install scripts, docs, workflows,
packaging and action defaults from Gitlawb/zero to Twigpine/zero. The npm
scope (already @twigpine/zero on main, with its @gitlawb/zero migration
notes), LICENSE, action author, the OpenGateway provider and historical
CHANGELOG links are unchanged.

The X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo header keeps Gitlawb/zero: it is what
AIMLAPI sees for attribution, so changing it needs a maintainer's yes.
docs/INSTALL.md keeps `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/...`, because
every tagged release so far declares that module path. The Homebrew
formula comment names the Twigpine/homebrew-tap tap.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-17 07:13:21 +08:00
Anandan 2e267bdbee feat(tui): add isolated /btw conversations (#748)
* feat(tui): add isolated btw conversations

Add /btw with inline-question support, isolated non-resumable session forks, background main-run routing, and safe return behavior.

Refs #637

* test(tui): cover btw return controls

Preserve drafts when Ctrl+C is pressed during an active BTW run and cover returning to the parent through the documented /btw toggle.

* Address BTW isolation review feedback

* Reject explicit resumes of side sessions

* Harden BTW isolation lifecycle
2026-07-19 20:37:38 +05:30
KRATOS 474f494b93 Deep-audit remediation + sandbox hardening (batches 1–35) (#189)
* audit batch 1: redact nested secrets fully; count image tokens in compaction estimate

- secrets.Redact: replace longest matches first so a containing PRIVATE KEY
  block is redacted before a nested shorter match corrupts its exact string
  (audit medium internal/secrets/scanner.go:81) + regression test.
- agent compaction estimateTokens: add a flat per-image token cost so an
  image-heavy context trends toward compaction instead of reading as ~0
  (audit medium internal/agent/compaction.go:58) + test.
- ledger: re-verify against current main; mark scanner.go:35 and
  redaction.go:362 already-fixed-on-main, record this batch's fixes.

* audit batch 2: worktrees defaultRunGit separates stdout/stderr

Capture git stdout and stderr into separate buffers instead of CombinedOutput,
so parsed rev-parse output is not polluted by git warnings and CommandResult.Stderr
carries the real error text (audit medium internal/worktrees/worktrees.go:247) + test.

* audit: re-verify all 87 pending findings against current main

Independent agent per file re-checked each open/partial finding against the
actual current code (the 06-11 ledger was verified on a since-diverged branch),
with an adversarial second pass on every already_fixed verdict. Authoritative
result: 78 genuinely pending (66 still_open + 12 partial); 9 rows were already
fixed on main and are reclassified. Full table in 2026-06-13-reverification.md.

* audit batch 3 (agent): cancellation identity, always-allow w/o sandbox, compaction usage, dedup

- loop.go: check ctx.Err() before collected.Error so a cancelled run returns
  context.Canceled (errors.Is holds) instead of a plain stringified error.
- loop.go: 'Always allow' with no sandbox engine now allows THIS call instead of
  denying it (persistence is skipped when there's nowhere to persist).
- loop.go: remove a duplicate schema["items"] assignment in propertyToRuntimeMap.
- compaction.go: forward OnUsage (token accounting) through the summarizer while
  still omitting OnText, so compaction's token cost is counted in usage/budgets.
- tests for all three behavioral fixes (each fails pre-fix).

* audit batch 4 (cli): list-tools -o json, interrupted -o json terminal, surface session-record failures

- exec --list-tools -o json now emits a JSON tool listing instead of falling
  through to the human-readable text (audit medium exec.go:182) + test.
- interrupted run with -o json now emits a terminal error+done on stdout instead
  of only printing to stderr, so a JSON consumer sees a clean end (medium exec.go:500) + test.
- execSessionRecorder: surface a latched session-append failure to stderr once at
  run end (deferred) instead of silently dropping it (medium exec_sessions.go:114/115) + test.
- left app.go trailing-arg ignore as-is: documented-intentional, TUI has no argv prompt.

* audit batch 5 (zerogit): status -z porcelain (renames + non-ASCII paths); document env-drop on plain Runner

- parseStatus: switch `git status` to `--porcelain -z` and parse the
  NUL-delimited form (audit medium zerogit.go:212). Previously the default
  --short output was split on newlines, so a rename `R old -> new` was kept as
  one bogus path and a non-ASCII/whitespace filename arrived C-quoted+escaped
  (e.g. `"caf\303\251.txt"`). The -z form never quotes paths and emits a
  rename/copy as `XY <dest>\0<src>`, so we now record the destination verbatim
  and consume the source field. + TestParseStatusZHandlesRenamesAndSpecialPaths.

- resolveRunners: document that the plain-Runner EnvRunner adapter intentionally
  drops env (audit low zerogit.go:417). The branch is reached only when a caller
  supplies a custom Runner without a RunGitEnv — in practice fake-Runner tests.
  Production leaves both nil and gets defaultRunGit/defaultRunGitEnv, which honor
  GIT_INDEX_FILE, so snapshot-diff isolation holds. Routing env calls to real git
  instead would break the fake-Runner test pattern and fix nothing in production.

- update Inspect/Commit mock tests to the -z status format and the new command.

* audit batch 6 (config): reject negative maxTurns; drop dead contract-gap helpers

- FileConfig.UnmarshalJSON now rejects a negative maxTurns instead of letting the
  `MaxTurns > 0` merge gates silently drop it and fall back to the default,
  hiding the misconfiguration (audit medium resolver.go:136). 0 is left as the
  "unset" sentinel (omitempty) and still falls back to the default; the CLI
  --max-turns flag continues to reject 0 too since there it is distinguishable
  from absent. + TestResolveRejectsNegativeMaxTurns / ...ZeroFallsBackToDefault.

- remove dead config/contracts.go (ContractGap, DefaultContractGaps,
  FindContractGapsByMilestone, ContractOwnerRuntime) and its test — referenced
  only by that test, never by production (audit low contracts.go:12).

- NOT changed: ResolveMCP intentionally does not run the provider command
  (TestResolveMCPDoesNotRunProviderCommand guards this), so the "ZERO_PROVIDER_COMMAND
  MCP servers dropped" row is by-design, not a defect.

* audit batch 7 (mcp): bound captured MCP server stderr

connectStdio attached a plain bytes.Buffer as cmd.Stderr that is only ever read
on initialize failure, yet it kept growing for the entire process lifetime as a
long-lived server logged to stderr (audit medium client.go:98). Replace it with
a concurrency-safe boundedBuffer capped at 64 KiB that keeps the head (enough for
init-error diagnostics) and discards the rest, reporting full write lengths so
os/exec never sees a short write. + TestBoundedBufferCapsRetainedBytes.

Left as-is (not defects worth the risk in the MCP client):
- client.go writer.write under client.mu: already designed to release the lock
  before the unbounded response wait; the residual concern is a server that stops
  draining stdin, an involved async rewrite for a theoretical deadlock.
- readLoop not answering server-initiated requests (ping): responding safely
  needs re-locking around the shared writer; no configured server relies on it.

* audit batch 8 (tools/providers): read_file truncation marker; drop dead provider branch

- read_file: when a max_lines cut occurs, append an explicit "[truncated: N more
  line(s)... set start_line=X to continue]" marker to the output. Previously only
  the Result.Truncated flag was set, which is invisible in the rendered text, so
  the model could not distinguish a cut read from a complete one (audit low
  read_file.go:89). + TestReadFileToolMarksTruncation.

- providers/factory: simplify `if !explicitProvider || isImplicitOpenAI(...)` to
  `if !explicitProvider` and delete the now-unused isImplicitOpenAI. The clause
  was dead: explicitProvider==true implies ProviderKind or Provider is set, but
  isImplicitOpenAI required both empty, so it could never contribute a case
  (audit low factory.go:118). Behavior-preserving; providers tests still green.

* audit batch 9 (sessions): Tree builds from a single List() snapshot (no N+1 disk scans)

Store.Tree recursed via ListChildren per node, and each ListChildren ran a full
store.List() that re-read every metadata.json from disk — O(nodes * total-sessions)
reads for one tree (audit medium lineage.go:140). Snapshot all sessions once, index
children by parent in memory, and recurse over that. Child ordering is factored into
sortChildSessions so ListChildren and Tree stay identical; path-scoped cycle
detection (delete(seen,...)) is preserved. Existing tree/lineage tests still pass.

Left as-is: store.go timestamp() second precision (RFC3339) — switching to
RFC3339Nano would break lexical UpdatedAt ordering against existing second-precision
records ("...00.5Z" sorts before "...00Z"), so it is not a safe one-line change.

* audit batch 10 (specialist): serialize accounting dedup-then-append

recordSpecialistStop and appendSpecialistUsageRollup checked for an existing event
(specialistEventExists → ReadEvents) and then appended under SEPARATE store locks,
so two concurrent finishers — a foreground onExit racing a TaskOutput poll, or a
background reaper — could both pass the dedup check and write duplicate stop/usage
events (audit medium accounting.go:72). Guard each check-then-append pair with a
package-level accountingMu (Executor is used by value, so a struct field would not
be shared). + TestRecordSpecialistStopDedupesUnderConcurrency (passes under -race).

* audit batch 11 (zeroruntime/gemini): O(1) text accumulation; gemini cached-token counts

- zeroruntime CollectStreamWithOptions accumulated assistant text with
  `collected.Text += event.Content`, reallocating the whole string on every chunk
  (O(n^2) over a long streamed response). Accumulate in a strings.Builder on the
  collector and materialize it once in flush, the single finalization point hit
  before every return (audit low helpers.go:104). Existing collect tests still pass.

- gemini decoded usageMetadata without cachedContentTokenCount, so a cached-prompt
  response reported zero cached input tokens while the other providers report them
  (audit medium gemini/types.go:88). Decode the field and thread it through
  streamState into NormalizeUsage as CachedInputTokens. + extended
  TestStreamCompletionEmitsTextUsageAndReasoningTokens.

* audit batch 12 (specialist): parse child stream without a line-length cap; drop dead helper

- ParseStream used a bufio.Scanner capped at 1 MiB, so one large stream-json line
  from a child (a big tool result or final answer) hit bufio.ErrTooLong and aborted
  the entire specialist run (audit medium streamer.go:43). Switch to a bufio.Reader
  with ReadString, which has no per-line limit; the child is our own trusted
  subprocess, so its output length is the legitimate bound. Line numbering and
  blank-line/EOF handling are preserved. + TestParseStreamHandlesLineLargerThan1MiB.

- remove dead formatTaskOutput (output_tool.go:244): zero callers and zero tests;
  it only forwarded to formatTaskOutputSummary, which is the one actually used.

* audit batch 13 (background/specialist): kill background tasks as a process group

Background children were launched in the parent's process group and terminated by
signalling only the single PID, so any process the task forked was orphaned and
outlived a cancel; the signal also risked hitting a recycled PID after the child
was reaped (audit medium process_posix.go:38/50).

- ConfigureChildProcessGroup (Setpgid on POSIX, no-op on Windows where taskkill /T
  already tree-kills) is applied at launch so the child leads its own group.
- terminateProcess now SIGTERM/SIGKILLs the negative PID (the whole group), with a
  pid>1 guard so a bogus 0/1 can never expand to "our own group" or "everything",
  and treats ESRCH as already-gone. Liveness polls the group. Targeting a group
  (rarely recycled vs. a bare PID) also shrinks the reaped-then-recycled window.
- specialist launchBackgroundProcess opts every child into its own group; on a
  SetPID failure it now kills the child + group, marks the task errored, and records
  the stop (deduped) instead of leaking an untracked orphan.
- tests launch as group leaders; new TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren proves
  a forked grandchild dies with the group.

* audit batch 14 (sandbox): quote-aware shell segment splitting

splitShellSegments used a quote-unaware strings.Replacer, so a shell operator
inside quotes was treated as a separator: `git commit -m "use top | less"` split
into a `less` segment and `echo "a; vim b"` into a `vim` segment, both falsely
flagged as interactive (audit medium safe_command.go:138).

Replace it with a quote-aware scanner that mirrors the shell: single quotes make
everything literal; double quotes keep $(...)/`...` substitution active but treat
|, ;, && as literal; unquoted text splits on the same operator set as before
(;, |, ||, &&) plus substitution boundaries. Real unquoted operators still split,
so an interactive program behind a separator — or inside a live `"$(...)"`
substitution — is still caught (no new false negatives, the security-relevant
direction). + TestDetectInteractiveQuoteAwareSeparators covering both directions.

* audit batch 15 (cron): collapse DST fall-back repeated hour to one fire

On a fall-back day the clock repeats an hour (e.g. 01:30 EDT then 01:30 EST), so
Next("30 1 * * *", <01:30 EDT>) returned the same-day 01:30 EST — firing a daily
job twice (audit medium schedule.go:171, which previously guarded only the
spring-forward gap).

Next now skips a match whose local wall-clock minute equals `after`'s but whose
absolute time is later (the repeated-hour duplicate) and keeps searching. Normal
forward search always advances the wall-clock, so this only triggers on the
fall-back repeat; when the scheduler passes the last fire time as `after`, the
repeated hour collapses to a single fire. + TestNextDSTFallBackDoesNotRepeatHour
(spring-forward termination test still passes).

Note: Next is stateless, so it dedupes relative to `after`; a caller that passes
an arbitrary mid-hour "now" instead of the last fire time is out of scope here.

* audit batch 16 (mcp): skip SSE notifications before the response; larger SSE buffer

- decodeSSERPCMessage returned the first non-empty `message` event unconditionally,
  so a server-initiated notification/request arriving before the response made the
  caller see an id mismatch and fail (audit medium network_client.go:621). It now
  skips any message carrying a method (notifications/requests have one; a response
  does not) and returns the first real response; the caller's rpcIDMatches still
  validates the id. + TestDecodeSSERPCMessageSkipsNotifications.

- raise the per-event SSE scanner cap from 1 MiB to a bounded 8 MiB so a large but
  legitimate MCP message no longer hits bufio.ErrTooLong and fails the request
  (audit medium network_client.go:637); still bounded against an unbounded server.

Out of scope (kept): full reconnect of a persistent SSE stream after a fatal read
error — a larger change than this remediation.

* audit batch 17 (sessions): fsync session metadata before the atomic rename

writeMetadata wrote the temp file with os.WriteFile (no sync) and renamed it into
place, so a crash right after the rename could expose a metadata file whose bytes
were never flushed — a torn or empty file that corrupts the whole session (audit
medium store.go:632). Write+fsync the temp via a new writeFileSync helper before
renaming, closing that window. + TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips.

Deliberately scoped:
- Event-log appends (appendEventLocked) are NOT fsynced per append: that would add
  a disk flush to every event (every tool call), and a hard-crash loss of the log's
  unsynced tail is acceptable, whereas torn METADATA is not. Metadata is the
  integrity-critical part and is what this syncs.
- Directory fsync is omitted for cross-platform simplicity (it errors on Windows);
  the file fsync already prevents the torn-contents failure, the serious case.

Left for follow-up (in this bucket but not safe/clear wins here):
- hooks append sequence still re-reads the file per append; the in-memory cache is
  cross-process-unsafe and the safe last-line read is fiddly for a low-volume log.
- Fork event re-append/de-dup is nuanced usage-accounting and needs its own change.

* audit batch 18 (agent): count tool-defs in compaction estimate; don't deny an always-allow on persist failure

- maybeCompact's estimate omitted the tool definitions, which ride on every
  request, so the real input could exceed the model limit while the message-only
  estimate stayed under threshold and compaction never fired (audit medium
  compaction.go:58). partitionTools is now computed before maybeCompact (it does
  not depend on the messages) and the exposed tools' estimated tokens are added to
  both the threshold check and the post-compaction shrink check. + estimateToolDefTokens
  and TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions.

- PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow denied the call when persistPermissionGrant failed,
  overriding what the user explicitly allowed (audit medium loop.go:468). Persisting
  is now best-effort: a failure (or no sandbox engine) just means the grant is not
  remembered and the user is re-prompted next time, not denied now. This also drops
  the dead requestEvent.GrantMatched/Grant writes (audit low loop.go:473) — the
  emitted event derives them from the sandbox decision via buildPermissionEvent.

Left intentional (documented, not defects): the reactive-retry path omits OnText to
avoid duplicating mid-stream text (loop.go:183); OnContext/MeasureContext is a
complete, tested context-breakdown scaffold awaiting a consumer (types.go:183).

* audit batch 19 (usage): price escalated usage from the event's own model

exec persists payload["model"] on --allow-escalation runs (the model can change
mid-run), but BuildReport priced every event from the session's Metadata.ModelID
and never read the payload, so usage from an escalated model was mis-priced at the
base model (audit medium report.go:17). usageEventPayload now carries Model and
BuildReport prefers it, falling back to the session model when absent (older
events stay byte-identical and behave as before). + TestBuildReportPricesFromEventModelWhenPresent.

* audit batch 20 (sessions): don't copy usage events into a fork (no double-count)

Fork re-appended every parent event, including provider_usage, into the child, so
a usage report aggregating the parent and the fork double-counted the parent's
usage (audit medium store.go:387). Skip EventUsage when copying — it already
counted against the parent and is not part of the conversation history a fork
replays — and record the actual copied count in the fork marker. + TestStoreForkSkipsUsageEvents.

* audit batch 21 (cli/skills): warn on duplicate skill names instead of silently dropping

skills.Load deduplicates same-named skills (first directory wins) and records the
dropped collisions via skills.Duplicates, but nothing surfaced them, so a shadowed
skill just vanished with no signal — and Duplicates had no production caller (audit
low skills.go:91). `skills list` now reports each collision to stderr (keeping
stdout/--json clean), using Duplicates. + TestRunSkillsListWarnsOnDuplicateNames.

Note: skills.Get is kept — it is a by-name accessor used throughout the package's
tests, not dead code.

* audit batch 22 (cli/cron): capture the run error from stream-json stdout

Cron jobs run exec with --output-format stream-json, so a failure is reported as an
`error` event on STDOUT, but the run record's Error was set only from stderr — so a
failed job often recorded an empty/uninformative error while the real message sat
unread in outBuf (audit low cron_run.go:150). On a non-zero exit, scan the stdout
stream-json for the error event's message and prefer it, falling back to stderr.
+ extractStreamJSONError and TestExtractStreamJSONError.

* audit batch 23 (sandbox): richer macOS seatbelt profile (signal + mach-lookup)

The generated sandbox-exec profile was default-deny with only process/sysctl/file
allowances, so two real gaps remained on macOS (sandbox quality report H1):

- A sandboxed script could not signal the children it spawned — `kill` returned
  "Operation not permitted" under seatbelt, breaking common `cmd & ... kill`,
  test-runner, and timeout patterns. Add `(allow signal (target self) (target pgrp))`,
  which stays scoped to the command's own process group.
- XPC to system daemons was denied, so keychain (securityd/trustd), user/group
  lookup (opendirectoryd), preferences (cfprefsd), network config
  (SystemConfiguration), launch services, and the pasteboard all failed. Add a
  curated `(allow mach-lookup ...)` allowlist (`sandboxMachServices`).

Neither touches the file-write or network rules, so the workspace boundary is
unchanged — verified on a real macOS host: `security`/`scutil`/`pbpaste`/self-kill
now succeed while writes to $HOME and /etc are still denied. iokit-open was tried
and dropped as unnecessary. + unit assertions (TestSandboxExecProfileGrantsSignalAndMachLookup)
and extended the darwin integration test with a self-kill case and an
outside-workspace deny check.

* audit batch 24 (sandbox/tools): remove dead OnSandboxDecision hook

RunOptions.OnSandboxDecision had no setter anywhere, yet registry.RunWithOptions
spawned a goroutine (with panic recovery) for it on every sandboxed tool call —
pure per-call overhead for an unreachable callback (sandbox report M1). The sandbox
decision is already surfaced to observers via the permission event
(buildPermissionEvent reads the decision), so this hook is redundant; delete the
field and its call site.

* audit batch 25 (sandbox/cli): exact-path grants — create and revoke by path

The engine already matched ScopeFile grants and DeriveScope already produced them
from path/file tool args, but the CLI could neither create one explicitly nor
revoke a single one (sandbox report L3 / prompt 7). Add:

- GrantStore.RevokePath(tool, path): revokes only the grant whose scope matches the
  given file/dir, leaving tool-wide and other-path grants intact (path canonicalized
  to absolute like stored scopes). + TestGrantStoreRevokePathRemovesOnlyMatchingScope.
- `zero sandbox grants allow <tool> --path <p>`: persists an exact-file (ScopeFile)
  grant, path resolved to absolute so it matches lookups and revokes.
- `zero sandbox grants revoke <tool> --path <p>`: revokes just that grant (default
  still revokes all grants for the tool). + TestRunSandboxGrantsCreateAndRevokeByPath.

The TUI permission-card "Allow always (exact path)" option is intentionally left for
the TUI feature branches (it overlaps #187/#188); the engine + CLI now cover the
full create/match/revoke round-trip for file-scoped grants.

* audit batch 26 (sandbox): Engine.Precheck — report violations before execution

Add Engine.Precheck(ctx, request) []Violation, which reports the sandbox
violations that would block a tool request before it runs (sandbox report / prompt 6).
It reuses Evaluate so policy is not duplicated: an allowed or merely-prompted
request yields no violations; a denied request yields its violation (via the shared
violationsFromDecision helper, with a ViolationPolicyDenied fallback for a deny that
carries no structured violation). A nil engine yields nothing.
+ TestEnginePrecheckReportsViolationsBeforeExecution.

Wiring Precheck into the batch-confirmation prompt is intentionally left to the TUI
branch: it touches prompt rendering, and short-circuiting the agent loop's deny path
would skip the before/after-tool hooks that currently fire around a policy-denied
call. The engine API is in place for that consumer.

* audit batch 27 (sandbox): scoped-egress domain prompt with timeout + caching

The scoped-egress proxy failed closed on any host outside the allowlist. Add an
opt-in DomainPrompt callback (prompt 8): an UNKNOWN host (neither allowed nor
explicitly denied) is authorized at request time via the callback instead of being
refused outright. An explicitly denied host is still refused without prompting; the
callback is bounded by PromptTimeout (default 60s, timeout/error => deny); decisions
are cached for the proxy's lifetime so a host is prompted at most once. With no
callback set the strict fail-closed behavior is unchanged. Wired through both the
CONNECT and HTTP handlers via authorizeTarget.
+ TestEgressProxyAuthorizeDomainPrompt / ...TimeoutDenies / ...NilPromptFailsClosed.

The user-facing prompt that supplies the callback is left to the permission UI (TUI)
branch; the egress mechanism (callback + timeout + cache) is in place and tested.

* audit batch 28 (sandbox): AST-based shell analysis (AnalyzeCommand)

Add AnalyzeCommand(script) AnalysisResult, a static shell analyzer built on the
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 parser (prompt 12). Walking the parsed command tree makes it a more
precise second opinion than the regex detector: a program name only counts when it
is an actual command, so `echo "vim ..."`, `printf 'open with vim'`, and
`git commit -m "rm -rf /"` are clean, while real commands are flagged —
interactive (editors/pagers + REPLs, with the same -e/script suppression as
nonInteractiveREPLFlags), destructive (rm -rf/-fr, dd, mkfs, shred, ...), and
network (curl/wget/ssh/nc/...). An unparseable script yields TooComplex so callers
can treat it as higher-risk. + TestAnalyzeCommand (16 cases) / ...EmptyIsClean.

Dependency: mvdan.cc/sh/v3 pinned to v3.11.0 — compatible with the existing go 1.24
directive (the latest v3.13.1 would have bumped the module to go 1.25). It is kept
as a standalone analyzer for callers to consult; feeding it into Engine.Evaluate is
deliberately not done here, since that would change allow/deny classification.

* audit batch 29 (sandbox): unify proxy-env generation (ProxyEnv)

Export ProxyEnv as the single source of truth for proxy-env injection (prompt 9
req 1), replacing the unexported scopedProxyEnv used by the sandboxed-shell path.
+ TestProxyEnv.

Investigation that bounds the rest of prompt 9 (documented in the ProxyEnv doc):
- web_fetch already honors HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY — its transport clones
  http.DefaultTransport, whose Proxy is http.ProxyFromEnvironment.
- MCP children already inherit the parent env (mergeProcessEnv appends os.Environ),
  so they pick up any proxy vars the agent has.
So the only missing link to scope FetchUrl/MCP is a SESSION-level egress proxy whose
address reaches the agent process. That is deliberately NOT wired here: doing it
safely requires allowlisting the active LLM provider's own domain first, or the
agent's provider calls would route through the scoped proxy and be denied — a
correctness pitfall that also can't be verified end-to-end on this host. Flagged
rather than shipped blind.

* audit batch 30 (sandbox): Linux seccomp Unix-socket block — UNVERIFIED, needs Linux CI

Adds a pure-Go (no cgo, no vendored binary) seccomp BPF filter that denies
socket(AF_UNIX) with EPERM on x86-64/arm64, closing the Unix-socket gap bubblewrap's
filesystem/network isolation leaves open (prompt 11):

- internal/sandbox/seccomp.go: the classic-BPF program as a platform-neutral
  []sockFilter, built and UNIT-TESTED (structure + every jump offset in range — the
  classic way a hand-written BPF filter goes silently wrong).
- seccomp_linux.go: ApplyUnixSocketBlock installs it via prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) +
  prctl(SET_SECCOMP, MODE_FILTER). seccomp_other.go is a no-op everywhere else.
- cmd/zero-seccomp: a tiny linux-only exec wrapper that applies the filter then
  execs the real command (the standard way to install seccomp in a child with
  os/exec); degrades gracefully (warns + runs) if the kernel lacks seccomp.

⚠️ HONEST CAVEAT: I developed this on macOS and CANNOT run the actual AF_UNIX block
here. darwin build, `GOOS=linux` cross-compile, vet, and the structure test all pass,
but the unit test verifies the program's SHAPE, not that the kernel actually blocks
AF_UNIX — that MUST be verified on Linux CI (create a Unix socket under the wrapper
and assert EPERM). Safe to ship as-is: it is linux-only, no-op on every other
platform, and not wired into the bwrap command yet (opt-in prefixing the sandboxed
command with zero-seccomp is the remaining integration), so it cannot regress any
current path.

* audit batch 31 (sandbox): macOS denial log monitor (opt-in, default off)

Re-adds the macOS seatbelt-denial monitor as an opt-in feature (prompt 10). When
Policy.MonitorDenials is set, the sandbox-exec profile tags its default-deny with a
marker and bash tails `log stream` for that tag during the command, appending any
captured denials as a <sandbox_violations> block to the command's stderr so the
model can see what was blocked.

- DenialMonitor (darwin) tails/parses tagged denials with a capped, deduped ring
  buffer and noise filtering; no-op stub on other platforms. parseSandboxDenyLine is
  unit-tested. + profile-tag test + appendSandboxViolations test.
- Default OFF: with MonitorTag empty, StartDenialMonitor is a no-op and the command
  path is byte-for-byte unchanged, so there is no regression or per-command overhead
  unless enabled.

CAVEAT: on at least one macOS host (verified live) seatbelt denials are NOT delivered
to the `log stream`-queryable unified log, so the monitor captures nothing there. It
is the standard mechanism and works on macOS versions that do log denials; shipping
it default-off means it never affects whether a command runs.

* audit batch 32 (sandbox): wire seccomp Unix-socket block into bubblewrap (opt-in)

Completes prompt 11: the zero-seccomp helper (which installs the AF_UNIX seccomp
filter) is now actually invoked by the sandbox instead of only existing as a
standalone binary.

- bubblewrapCommandPlan, when Policy.BlockUnixSockets is set, ro-binds the
  discovered zero-seccomp helper into the sandbox at its host path and prefixes the
  command with it so the filter is installed before the real argv runs.
- findSeccompHelper discovers the helper next to the running executable first, then
  on PATH; it returns "" when absent, so the sandbox degrades gracefully (runs
  without the extra filter — bubblewrap's fs/net isolation still applies) rather
  than failing the command. Exposed as a package var so the wiring is unit-tested
  on any OS.
- Reachable from config: SandboxConfig.BlockUnixSockets and .MonitorDenials now map
  onto the policy in applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy (opt-in only — config can turn a
  hardening flag on, never off). Both default OFF.
- Tests: helper-prefix present when enabled / absent by default; config flags apply
  independently and stay off when omitted.

Default OFF and Linux-only effect; the runtime seccomp enforcement still needs a
Linux host/CI to exercise end-to-end (the wiring and BPF program are unit-tested).

* audit batch 33 (sandbox): enforce scoped/deny network policy in web_fetch & web_search

Completes prompt 9: the built-in network tools now honor the SAME allow/deny/scoped
policy the sandboxed shell egress proxy enforces, instead of bypassing it. Before
this, web_fetch/web_search would reach any public host even when the policy was
NetworkDeny or NetworkScoped — the egress proxy only constrained shell commands.

- New shared gate Engine.NetworkHostAllowed(host) reuses the egress domain matcher
  (domainAllowed/normalizeDomains/effectiveNetwork) as the single source of truth:
  allow → all hosts; deny → none; scoped → only AllowedDomains minus DeniedDomains
  (empty allowlist collapses to deny). Disabled policy / nil engine impose nothing.
- web_fetch is now sandbox-aware: the host is checked before the request AND on every
  redirect, so a denied/unlisted host fails closed before any dial. Plumbed via a
  networkPolicyGate so the no-sandbox path is byte-for-byte unchanged.
- web_search is sandbox-aware: the configured backend's endpoint host is checked
  before the query leaves the machine; blocked under deny, and under scoped unless the
  backend host is allowlisted.
- The registry already routes sandbox-aware tools through RunWithSandbox when an
  engine is present, so this activates automatically wherever the sandbox is wired.
- Tests: engine gate matrix (deny/allow/scoped/denylist/empty/disabled/nil + host:port);
  web_fetch & web_search block denied/unlisted hosts without dialing and allow listed
  ones; endpoint-host parsing.

* audit batch 34 (sandbox): prove network-policy wiring end-to-end + document opt-in flags

Verification follow-up to batches 31-33; no behaviour change.

- Adds a registry-level test that exercises the FULL chain for the scoped-network
  enforcement: registry.RunWithOptions -> engine.Evaluate (passes a scoped,
  egress-capable sandbox-exec backend) -> routes web_fetch through RunWithSandbox ->
  per-host allowlist blocks an unlisted host before any dial. This proves the
  Tool-interface value actually satisfies sandboxAwareTool at the registry boundary,
  not just in a direct method call.
- Documents the two opt-in hardening flags (sandbox.blockUnixSockets,
  sandbox.monitorDenials) and the scoped web_fetch/web_search behaviour in the README
  so the config keys are discoverable. Both remain off by default.

Confirmed wiring: agent loop forwards options.Sandbox to the registry; the registry
routes sandbox-aware tools (web_fetch, web_search) through RunWithSandbox when an
engine is present; MonitorTag is set only on the macOS sandbox-exec plan; the
seccomp helper prefix is added only on the bubblewrap plan when BlockUnixSockets is
set; both config flags map onto the policy via applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy.

* audit batch 35 (sessions): fix Windows CI failure in TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips

The exact-permission assertion (perm == 0o600) added in batch 17 fails on
windows-latest because Windows does not honor Unix permission bits: Go reports
0o666 for a writable file regardless of the mode passed to OpenFile. This was the
sole cause of the failing Smoke (windows-latest) CI job; macOS and Ubuntu passed.

Guard the perm check with runtime.GOOS != "windows" so it still verifies the mode
on the platforms that enforce it, while the round-trip (write + read-back) is still
asserted on every platform.

* audit batch 36: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings)

- background/process_posix: after SIGKILL, poll until the process group is
  actually gone (SIGKILL is async) and return an error if it survives past a
  second deadline, instead of returning nil while descendants still race.
- sandbox/safe_command: only treat ')' as a substitution boundary when it closes
  an active $(...). A literal ')' (e.g. echo "a) less") no longer splits into a
  fake `less` segment and is no longer misflagged as interactive. Depth-tracked so
  nested $(...) still isolate their inner command. Direct splitShellSegments test
  (fails pre-fix: yields ["echo \"a", "less\""]).
- cron/schedule: the DST fall-back collapse now only applies when `after` sits
  exactly on the minute boundary (its "last fire time" form). With sub-minute
  precision (e.g. 01:30:30 EDT) the first 01:30 fire already passed, so the repeated
  01:30 EST is the legitimate next fire and is returned — restoring strictly-after
  semantics. New test fails pre-fix (skipped to next day).
- config/types: maxTurns error message now reads "must be >= 0" to match the check
  (0 is accepted; only < 0 is rejected). Negative-maxTurns test asserts the message.
- docs/audit: header date/branch metadata now matches the body (2026-06-13,
  fix/audit-batch) instead of the stale 2026-06-11/fix/audit-critical-high snapshot.

Verified: gofmt clean; go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites
green. Each behavioural fix ships with a test confirmed to fail without the change.

* audit batch 37: address CodeRabbit re-review (12 findings)

Findings on the audit code from batches 21-36; each behavioural fix ships with a
regression test (several confirmed to fail without the change).

sandbox/analyzer (AnalyzeCommand):
- Unwrap launcher prefixes (sudo/env/nice/bash -c/...) and recurse into `sh -c`
  payloads so `sudo rm -rf`, `env curl …`, `bash -c 'vim x'` classify on the real
  command, not the launcher. Mirrors DetectInteractiveCommand.
- Honor rm's `--` end-of-options marker so `rm -- -rf` (delete a file named -rf) is
  not flagged destructive.

sandbox/engine: NetworkHostAllowed now shares one backend-aware effective-mode
helper with Evaluate, so scoped collapses to deny when the backend can't enforce
scoped egress — the per-tool gate can no longer permit traffic the engine-level
decision would fail closed.

sandbox/egress: cache domain-prompt decisions by host:port, not host, so one
"allow" can't authorize other ports on the same host.

sandbox/safe_command: the segment splitter is now escape-aware (\| , \" ) so an
escaped operator/quote can't manufacture a fake interactive segment.

sandbox/log_monitor (darwin): Wait() the `log stream` child after draining stdout
so the cancelled process isn't leaked as a zombie.

tools/web_search: confine the search backend to same-host redirects (with a limit)
so a redirect chain can't egress to a host the scoped/deny policy never authorized.

cli/sandbox: an explicit empty --path (`--path=` / `--path ""`) now fails closed
instead of silently widening an allow to tool-wide or a revoke to all-grants.

cli/skills: warn on stderr when duplicate-skill detection fails instead of
swallowing the error.

specialist/exec: don't mask a failed orphan-kill — join the TerminateProcess error
with the SetPID error so a surviving process is visible.

background/process_posix: resolve the PGID and only group-signal when pid leads its
own group; otherwise signal the individual PID. Avoids both a false-success on a
non-leader ESRCH and the hazard of signalling an unrelated (possibly our own) group.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./...
green.

* audit batch 38: address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 (3 findings)

Follow-ups to batch 37, each with a regression test:

- safe_command (splitter): a ')' is now only a substitution boundary when it
  closes an active, UNQUOTED $(...). A quote-state stack saved at each '$(' lets a
  substitution run in a fresh quoting context and restores the outer quoting on
  its matching ')'. Fixes `echo $(printf "a) less")` splitting into a fake `less`
  segment, while still isolating the inner command of `echo "$(vim x)"`.

- egress: deduplicate in-flight domain prompts per host:port. Concurrent requests
  for the same unknown target now wait on the first prompt and reuse its cached
  decision instead of each firing a prompt (a prompt storm) and racing to write
  the final decision. Race-tested with 25 concurrent authorizers → one prompt.

- analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption is now wrapper-specific
  (wrapperValueOptionsByProg) instead of a global option set. A valueless flag like
  `sudo -n` no longer swallows the real payload, so `sudo -n rm -rf` /
  `sudo -n curl …` are correctly classified destructive/network; `sudo -u root vim`
  still consumes its value. Shared by the AST analyzer and the regex detector so
  they can't diverge.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.

* audit batch 39: address CodeRabbit re-review round 3 (12 findings)

All verified against current code; each behavioural fix has a regression test.

Security / correctness:
- tools/web_search: redirect policy now also refuses a scheme change, blocking a
  same-host https→http downgrade that would send the query + bearer token over
  plaintext.
- sandbox/safe_command: a ')' is only a substitution boundary when it closes an
  active UNQUOTED $(...), and backticks now get the same quote-state save/restore
  as $( — so `echo "`a | less`"` and `echo "$(true | less)"` no longer hide the
  inner pager from interactive detection.
- sandbox/analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption stays
  wrapper-specific, and unwrapping no longer aborts on a dynamic ($x) wrapper arg
  once a wrapper is active, so `env "$opts" curl` / `sudo "$x" rm -rf` are still
  classified.
- sandbox/egress: in-flight prompts deduped per host:port (carried from batch 38);
  the prompt callback is now cancellable (context cancelled on timeout) so a stuck
  prompt can abort instead of leaking; signature threaded through.
- sandbox/runner: per-plan unique denial tag (pid+counter) so concurrent monitored
  sandbox-exec runs can't ingest each other's denials; helper selection now
  requires an executable regular file so a non-exec sibling degrades gracefully.
- mcp/network_client: aggregate SSE event-size cap (not just per-line) so a server
  can't grow memory with many unterminated data: lines.
- specialist/accounting: a previously-recorded stop/usage with an empty runId is a
  catch-all and now suppresses a later runId-bearing duplicate.
- sessions/lineage: Tree fetches the root via Get() first so a corrupt root
  surfaces its real error instead of degrading to "not found".

Docs/tests:
- background/terminate: docstring now states the leader-only group-kill (PID-only
  fallback for non-leaders); test child-liveness probe uses ESRCH specifically.
- cli/sandbox: grant usage strings include --path.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.

* audit batch 40: address CodeRabbit re-review round 4 (8 fixed, 1 skipped)

Verified each against current code.

Fixed:
- sessions/lineage: PANIC FIX — store.Get returns (nil, nil) for a missing
  session, so the batch-39 root prefetch could nil-deref. Guard root == nil and
  return a not-found error. Regression test added (was a panic).
- agent/compaction: the reactive recover() now records lowWaterMark in the SAME
  combined (messages + tool-defs) token domain maybeCompact uses, so the proactive
  shrink-guard compares like with like. recover() takes tools; callers pass
  request.Tools.
- mcp/network_client: SSE aggregate counter no longer counts a joining newline for
  the first data line (only when prior content exists), avoiding premature rejects.
- sessions/store: fsync the parent directory after the metadata rename so the
  rename is durable across a crash (no-op on Windows, which can't fsync a dir).
- sandbox/egress: parse the target port with strconv.Atoi instead of
  net.LookupPort (no context-unaware resolver use).
- sandbox/runner: escape the per-plan denial tag through sandboxProfileString when
  embedding it in the seatbelt profile.
- sandbox/seccomp_linux: guard against an empty filter program before taking
  &kernelFilters[0] (defensive; the program is fixed non-empty today).
- cli/cron_run_test: assert last-error-wins with two error events.
- background/terminate, cli/sandbox usage, process_posix_test ESRCH (carried).

Skipped (with reason):
- zerogit worktree-rename (Y='R') test: git porcelain v1 -z only emits the
  rename-source field when the INDEX column is R/C; the worktree column never
  carries 'R' with a source field in v1, so the fixture would test output git
  doesn't produce, and making parseStatus consume on code[1]=='R' would risk
  mis-consuming the following entry for a plain ` R` status. Left as-is.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.

* audit batch 41: address CodeRabbit re-review round 5 (4 findings)

All verified against current code; code fixes have regression tests.

- agent/compaction: summarizeWithFallback's reduce pass no longer swallows ALL
  errors. A context-limit error still falls back to the joined partial summaries
  (documented "extreme" case), but a non-context failure (auth/network/provider)
  now surfaces unchanged, per the function's contract. Two tests (propagate vs.
  joined-fallback); the propagate test fails without the fix.
- sandbox/safe_command + analyzer: wrapper value-consuming options now include the
  long spellings (sudo --user root, env --unset NAME, timeout --signal …), so a
  long flag's value is no longer mis-read as the program (interactive/destructive/
  network detection bypass). A `--flag=value` token carries its own value and never
  consumes the next token. Tests for space and = forms in both the AST analyzer and
  the regex detector.
- docs/audit: the status-ledger summary table's open/partial cells (64/14) were the
  lone outlier — the ledger's own narrative and 2026-06-13-reverification.md both
  state 66/12. Corrected to 66/12 (66+12+97 = 175); derivation: body 69 open + 18
  partial minus the 9 already-fixed-on-main (3 open + 6 partial) = 66/12 = 78
  pending, fixed 88+9 = 97. Added a comment documenting the summary-vs-body
  relationship. The reverification doc already states 66/12, so both now agree.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./...
green.

* audit batch 42: address CodeRabbit re-review round 6 (1 fixed, 1 kept w/ proof)

CodeRabbit re-surfaced two "duplicate" refinements; CI was already green (its 6th
pass was a COMMENT with no new findings).

- cli/sandbox_test (TestRunSandboxGrantsRejectsEmptyPath): now seeds a tool-wide
  grant and asserts grant-store immutability after EACH rejected empty-`--path`
  call (reflect.DeepEqual before/after), so a mutation in one call can't be masked
  by a later one — and a buggy "revoke all" is actually observable (it's a no-op on
  an empty store). Stronger than the suggested patch.

- zerogit.parseStatus: KEPT consuming the rename source on the index column only
  (code[0]), with an explanatory comment. Verified empirically that git porcelain
  v1 -z reports a rename/copy (and emits the extra source field) only in the index
  column: `git mv` → "R  new\0old\0"; a worktree-only rename → " D old\0?? new\0"
  (delete + untracked, never "R" in code[1]). Consuming on code[1]=='R'/'C' would
  match no real git output and would only risk mis-consuming the next entry on
  malformed input, so the suggestion is declined as incorrect for v1.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites green.
2026-06-13 21:32:48 +05:30
6fb0231df8 TUI scrollback re-architecture, Lime chat surface, and deep-audit fixes (#158)
* docs(design): add Lime TUI prototype and rebuild spec

* tui: remove the zeroline skin system

One design remains in the tree ahead of the Lime rebuild: the zeroline
package, its TUI view/skin plumbing (Options.Skin/ThemeVariant/ThemeDark,
model skin branches, theme picker), and the zeroline CLI subcommand are
gone. /theme keeps its shell-only message.

* tui: replace the cyan palette with the Lime token table

theme.go is rebuilt around the Lime design tokens (docs/design/
zero_tui_lime.html): near-black panels, one lime accent, solid tint
stand-ins for the prototype's rgba overlays. Existing render sites map
onto the new role styles (ink/line/userPrompt/toolName/toolArg) without
layout changes; no hex exists outside theme.go.

* tui: build the Lime chat-surface components

Title bar with brand badge + context window, empty state replacing the
deleted splash (block-art 0, tagline, 1-3 starter suggestions), stream
blocks (user prompt gutter, muted interim with cursor, final-answer
accent rail, done line, bordered notes), tool cards with diff/read/
bash/grep bodies and MiniDot run spinner, borderless composer with
run-state hints, and the grouped status line. Final answers are marked
at append time; resolved tool calls collapse into their result cards.

* tui: fix Stage 2 review findings

Adversarial review of the chat-surface commit confirmed 15 issues, all
fixed here:
- wrapPlainText sliced wide runes by rune count: CJK/emoji prose could
  panic the TUI or emit lines ~2x the measure; split at width instead
- a cancelled run's streamingText leaked into the next turn's interim
  block; cancelRun now clears it
- orphaned tool-call cards (cancelled/errored turns) re-animated with
  the spinner on any later run; the glyph is now scoped to the call's
  own runID
- starter-suggestion digit capture was active while the chips were off
  screen (/clear mid-run); the guard now mirrors the render condition
- prompt submits while a deferred Ctrl+C quit is draining could start a
  run the quit would orphan; submission is blocked while exiting
- the running placeholder advertised ctrl+c (which quits) as the
  interrupt key; it now says esc
- read-card parser expected 'N: text' but read_file emits 'N | text',
  so the gutter and L-range never rendered on real output
- toolCard borders were one column short of the body rows
- diff tint bands now span the full row; NEW FILE renders green on
  addBg; preamble/no-newline lines are unnumbered meta and no longer
  shift hunk numbering
- card bodies and system notes paint the panel surface; the head gains
  the separate faintest arg column (grep target + pattern)
- title-bar overflow now truncates the minimal candidate instead of
  rendering the deleted design's 'ZERO … READY' line
- untracked the stray snake-game.html (left on disk, ignored)

* tui: restyle the interactive surfaces for Lime

Permission prompts render as the amber permission card (PERMISSION
badge, risk readout, key chips); resolved prompts collapse to one line
(allowed once/always/denied · tool) and unprompted allows fold into the
tool card's [auto] tag. Ask-user and spec-review prompts share the card
language with line borders. Autocomplete and picker overlays move onto
the panel/selection tints with the accent ❯ marker; model-picker rows
gain the provider dot and ctx · KEY_ENV metadata from the registry and
provider catalog. /resume renders its list as stacked session cards
(id + age, title, meta). Key handling is untouched everywhere.

* tui: adaptive width tiers, doc updates, final polish

Width tiers re-evaluate from the live width: ≥100 renders the full
spec; 80–99 drops the tool-arg column, header ctx, and the status
'interactive' group; 58–79 drops the diff/read gutters, bares the
badge, and keeps provider+tokens+mode; <58 renders a single-segment
header, rail-less cards, and a mode-only status line. Table-driven
tests cover {58,70,80,100,120} plus a frame-wide invariant that no
emitted line exceeds the terminal at any tier. Card bodies expand tabs
so width math holds. Dead splash-chip machinery (startupCommandNames,
startupOrder) is gone; README's TUI section now describes Lime.

* tui: fix final-review findings across Stages 3-4

A second adversarial review confirmed 14 issues, all addressed:
- permission collapse and tool-card pairing are now run-scoped (rcKey):
  providers with repeating synthetic ToolCallIDs (Gemini gemini_tool_N)
  could attribute a decision or result to a different run's call
- rehydrated always-grants no longer mislabel as 'allowed once'
  (GrantMatched fallback)
- the width invariant now actually holds everywhere: empty-state
  tagline/hint, ask-user rows, permission detail blobs, pending image
  chips, and the sessions trailing hint are wrapped or fitted; the
  invariant test renders the empty state and all of those rows at
  widths 24-120
- every card (permission, ask-user, spec-review, sessions, notes)
  drops side borders on tiny terminals, not just tool cards
- /resume card fields are sanitized against separator bytes from
  user-controlled titles
- the picker's selected row paints its gap so the selBg band is solid
- dead splash helpers (normalizedStartupWidth, countLines, nonEmpty,
  unreachable rowWelcome branch) and stale /theme comments are gone
- README no longer claims transcript scrolling keys or Tab-accept
  behavior that never existed; chatWidth documents its 24-col floor

Tag tui-lime-s4 moves to this commit.

* audit: deep-audit report, TUI scrollback re-architecture, and cross-module fixes

TUI: settled-row flush frontier prints history to native terminal
scrollback (tea.Println, ordered + ack-serialized); View() renders only
the live tail. Full diffs (400-line flush cap) and OSC 8 file:// links
land in history; streamed interim text, cancellation markers, ask_user
exchanges, and composer input history are preserved; run-scoped dedup
keys fix Gemini's repeating tool-call ids; /exit, Ctrl+C-after-Esc, and
cross-session late flushes no longer orphan or contaminate checkpoints.

Cross-module: zero search panic + offset mapping, usage report
robustness, 529 retry, SSE keep-alive watchdog, registry corrections,
update --check on dev builds, MCP ping + mcp list --json secret
redaction, sandbox.network config knob, doctor apiKey presence, atomic
config writes, C1-safe notifications, rune-safe truncation everywhere,
gofmt + vet CI gates, dead glamour dependency dropped.

Full audit report: docs/audit/2026-06-10-deep-audit.md (175 findings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* tui: hide malformed ask_user tool errors

* fix tui malformed tool retries

* fix max-turn finalization

* upgrade tui agent guardrails

* fix coderabbit guardrail findings

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 17:18:30 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 07d8ffc524 CLI wiring: skills/zeroline commands, --mode presets, exec checkpoints, sandbox --effective, sessions rewind (#128)
* CLI wiring: skills/zeroline commands, --mode presets, exec checkpoints, sandbox --effective, sessions rewind

Final module of the runtime-core split. Wires the new runtime features into the cli, PRESERVING main's merged specialist cli (the source branch predates specialist and drops it; this keeps it via a 3-way merge from the common base, adding the reskin features as ours/theirs-only changes).

- skills command (internal/cli/skills.go) listing internal/skills; zeroline-skin TUI launcher (internal/cli/zeroline.go) via runInteractiveTUIWithSkin.

- exec: --mode presets (smart/deep/fast/large/precise) via applyExecMode; model-registry alias resolution + deprecation/effort notices; ContextWindow sizing (modelContextWindow); before-mutation checkpoint recording in OnToolCall; enhanced tool-result output (ChangedFiles/Redacted/Display); permission-mode validation fix.

- sandbox policy --effective (resolved guards); sessions rewind (executes the rewind plan); interactive TUI defaults to Ask mode (advertises write/edit/bash + gates via prompts).

- internal/streamjson: EventCheckpoint/EventRestore + CheckpointInfo for structured checkpoint output.

Specialist cli preserved (specialist.go + flags + runtime + tests all intact). build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green; no new deps.

* Address #128 review: make sessions rewind reachable + honor --exclude-target, mode/notice/redaction fixes

- sessions: add "rewind" to the parser whitelist (isSessionsCommand) — it was wired in dispatch + help but parseSessionsArgs rejected it as 'unknown sessions command', so it was unreachable. Regression test TestRunSessionsRewindIsReachableAndHonorsExcludeTarget.

- sessions rewind: honor --exclude-target — ApplyRewind keeps THROUGH a sequence, so when KeepTarget is false apply through TargetSequence-1, matching rewind-plan (previously rewind always applied TO the target, disagreeing with the plan). The test asserts --exclude-target keeps fewer events than the default.

- sessions rewind: redact the session id in the success + not-found messages (consistent with every other human-readable path).

- exec_parse: reject empty inline --mode= via requiredInlineFlagValue (was a silent no-op running defaults).

- exec: notice writes (model-deprecation + reasoning-effort advisories) now treat write failures as exitCrash, consistent with the rest of the command.

build/vet/-race/full-suite + GOOS=windows build green.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-06-07 23:42:10 +05:30
Anandan a60154b70a Add specialist Task runtime (#113)
* Add specialist Task runtime

* Harden specialist resume identity
2026-06-07 12:39:29 +05:30
Anandan ae6c9595db feat(specialist): add exec metadata flags (#104)
* Add specialist exec metadata flags

* Address exec metadata review
2026-06-07 10:40:16 +05:30
Vasanth T a710b0e5f5 feat: add Go headless protocol sessions (#60)
* feat: add Go headless protocol sessions

* test: harden stream-json tool list filtering

* fix: resolve stream-json review followups

* chore: enable coderabbit review verdicts
2026-06-05 10:41:38 +05:30