Files
zero/internal/acp/agent.go
KRATOS 5b348056a4 feat(acp): Agent Client Protocol surface — drive ZERO as an editor backend (#288)
* feat(acp): JSON-RPC 2.0 ndjson transport for the ACP surface

Bidirectional JSON-RPC 2.0 peer over stdio (newline-delimited JSON): serves
inbound requests/notifications via registered handlers and issues outbound
requests/notifications. Handlers run on their own goroutines so a long-running
request (session/prompt) never blocks delivery of session/cancel or a permission
response. Stdlib-only, no new dependencies.

Derived solely from the public JSON-RPC 2.0 + ACP specs.

* feat(acp): ACP wire types derived from the public spec

Protocol message types for initialize, session/{new,load,prompt,cancel,update,
set_mode,set_config_option}, request_permission, content blocks, tool-call
updates, plan entries, permission options, and session modes — method names and
field shapes taken from the public ACP spec (agentclientprotocol.com schema/v1).
Model selection is exposed both via the spec's session/set_config_option and a
vendor _zero/set_model alias for clients that prefer it.

* feat(acp): translate ZERO agent events to ACP session/update payloads

Pure mappers (unit-tested) from ZERO's agent callbacks to ACP updates: text->
agent_message_chunk, reasoning->agent_thought_chunk, tool call->tool_call(in_progress),
tool result->tool_call_update(completed/failed) with content + changed-file
locations, and plan items->plan entries. A notifier wires the mappers to a live
connection per session.

* feat(acp): map ZERO permission prompts to ACP session/request_permission

Translate ZERO's permission decisions into ACP PermissionOptions (optionId carries
the ZERO action verbatim for a lossless round trip) and map the client's outcome
back to a ZERO PermissionDecision: cancelled->cancel, selected->the chosen action,
anything unrecognized fails closed to deny. Builds the embedded toolCall too.

* feat(acp): ACP Agent server driving ZERO's core

Implements the ACP methods over the JSON-RPC peer: initialize (capability +
version negotiation), session/new, session/load (with history replay for resume),
session/prompt (drives the real agent.Run with streaming callbacks -> session/update,
and an OnPermissionRequest that round-trips through session/request_permission),
session/cancel, session/set_mode (permission/autonomy mode), and model selection
via session/set_config_option plus the vendor _zero/set_model alias. Dependencies
are injected so the editor only hosts the thread while ZERO keeps auth/model/keys
(BYOK). Includes an end-to-end test (initialize+new+prompt over stdio pipes through
agent.Run with a fake provider) asserting the streamed updates.

* feat(acp): wire the 'zero acp' subcommand

Add 'zero acp', which serves ACP over stdio so editors (Zed, JetBrains, Neovim,
...) can drive ZERO as a backend. Reuses ZERO's real deps — config resolution,
provider construction, the core tool registry, and the session store — so
provider/model/keys stay owned by ZERO (BYOK). Registered in the command
dispatch and the help listing.

* fix(acp): drain in-flight handlers on stream close

On stdin EOF the read loop returned before the dispatch goroutines flushed their
responses, so piped/finite ndjson input (and editors that close the stream right
after a request) dropped the reply. Serve now cancels in-flight handlers (so any
blocked outbound Call unblocks via ctx) and waits for them before returning.

* fix(acp): address review — sandbox confinement, mode/cwd/transport hardening

Blockers:
- Confine shell/file tools: runTurn now builds a SCOPED registry + sandbox engine
  per session (BuildWorkspace mirrors exec's buildExecSandboxEngine + NewScope) and
  passes Options.Sandbox — ACP no longer runs bash/exec_command unconfined.
- Reject PermissionModeUnsafe over ACP (set_mode + advertised modes are auto/ask
  only); Unsafe stays gated to the operator, so a client can't self-grant no-prompt
  host access.
- Fix data race on acpSession.history: registerSession sets history before
  publishing the session and reuses an already-live session instead of overwriting.
- deliver() now deletes the pending entry and sends non-blocking, so a duplicate/
  late response frame can't wedge the read loop.

Should-fix:
- Serialize prompt turns per session (turnMu) so concurrent prompts can't interleave
  history or clobber the cancel slot.
- Validate client cwd (ResolveWorkspaceRoot mirrors exec; rejects filesystem root +
  home) before it becomes the file-tool confinement root.
- Malformed JSON no longer tears down the connection: framing is per-line; a bad
  line replies -32700 (id null) and the loop continues. Also validate jsonrpc:"2.0".
- Permission outcome binds to the offered set only (dropped the isKnownDecision
  fallback) — a client can't return a broader grant than was presented; fail closed.
- Drop the non-conformant SessionCapabilities advertisement (no resume handler) and
  the non-conformant SessionConfigOption model selector; model switching stays
  available via the vendor _zero/set_model.

Adds regression tests: sandbox+scoped-registry wiring, invalid-cwd rejection,
Unsafe-mode rejection, and malformed-line resilience. Full go test ./... -race green.
2026-06-21 17:55:44 +05:30

562 lines
17 KiB
Go

package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Deps are the ZERO capabilities the ACP Agent drives. The CLI fills these with
// real implementations; tests inject fakes (e.g. a canned provider) to drive the
// full ACP flow without a live model. Keeping auth/model/keys behind these deps
// means the editor only hosts the thread — ZERO owns BYOK and telemetry-free
// operation.
type Deps struct {
ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
NewProvider func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
RunAgent func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
// BuildWorkspace builds the SCOPED tool registry and the sandbox engine for a
// validated workspace root, so ACP shell tools (bash/exec_command) are confined
// exactly like the exec surface — never run unconfined on the host.
BuildWorkspace func(workspaceRoot string, resolved config.ResolvedConfig) (*tools.Registry, *sandbox.Engine, error)
// ResolveWorkspaceRoot validates + normalizes a client-supplied cwd (must be an
// existing directory; never the bare root). It is the file-tool confinement root.
ResolveWorkspaceRoot func(cwd string) (string, error)
Store *sessions.Store
AgentInfo Implementation
}
// Agent is the ACP agent server bound to one JSON-RPC connection (one editor).
type Agent struct {
conn *Conn
deps Deps
mu sync.Mutex
clientCaps ClientCapabilities
initialized bool
sessions map[string]*acpSession
}
type turnRecord struct {
user string
assistant string
}
type acpSession struct {
id string
cwd string
// turnMu serializes prompt turns for one session: concurrent session/prompt
// calls run one at a time so they can't interleave history or clobber the
// single cancel slot.
turnMu sync.Mutex
mu sync.Mutex
mode agent.PermissionMode
model string // override; "" => config default
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
}
// NewAgent builds the ACP server and registers its method handlers on conn.
func NewAgent(conn *Conn, deps Deps) *Agent {
a := &Agent{conn: conn, deps: deps, sessions: make(map[string]*acpSession)}
conn.Handle(MethodInitialize, a.handleInitialize)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionNew, a.handleSessionNew)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionLoad, a.handleSessionLoad)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionPrompt, a.handleSessionPrompt)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionSetMode, a.handleSetMode)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionSetConfigOption, a.handleSetConfigOption)
conn.Handle(MethodZeroSetModel, a.handleZeroSetModel)
conn.HandleNotify(MethodSessionCancel, a.handleCancel)
return a
}
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
// ---- initialize ----
func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p InitializeParams
if len(params) > 0 {
_ = json.Unmarshal(params, &p)
}
negotiated := ProtocolVersion
if p.ProtocolVersion > 0 && p.ProtocolVersion < ProtocolVersion {
negotiated = p.ProtocolVersion
}
a.mu.Lock()
a.clientCaps = p.ClientCapabilities
a.initialized = true
a.mu.Unlock()
info := a.deps.AgentInfo
return InitializeResult{
ProtocolVersion: negotiated,
AgentCapabilities: AgentCapabilities{
// Only advertise what ZERO actually implements: session/load (loadSession)
// and image prompts. session/resume + the session-capability sub-object
// are intentionally omitted since there is no resume handler yet.
LoadSession: true,
PromptCapabilities: PromptCapabilities{Image: true},
},
AgentInfo: &info,
// ZERO owns credentials (BYOK) and does not delegate auth to the editor.
AuthMethods: []AuthMethod{},
}, nil
}
// ---- session lifecycle ----
func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p NewSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/new params")
}
root, err := a.deps.ResolveWorkspaceRoot(p.Cwd)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root})
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "create session: "+err.Error())
}
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil)
return NewSessionResult{
SessionID: sess.id,
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p LoadSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/load params")
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Get(p.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "session not found: "+p.SessionID)
}
cwdInput := p.Cwd
if strings.TrimSpace(cwdInput) == "" {
cwdInput = meta.Cwd
}
root, err := a.deps.ResolveWorkspaceRoot(cwdInput)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
}
// Load history BEFORE publishing the session so no concurrent prompt observes
// a half-initialized session (registerSession sets history under the lock and
// reuses an already-live session rather than orphaning its in-flight turn).
history := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID)
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history)
return LoadSessionResult{
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
// ---- prompt turn ----
func (a *Agent) handleSessionPrompt(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p PromptParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/prompt params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
// Serialize turns for this session so two prompts can't interleave history or
// fight over the single cancel slot. session/cancel still works concurrently
// (it doesn't take turnMu).
sess.turnMu.Lock()
defer sess.turnMu.Unlock()
userText := promptText(p.Prompt)
images := promptImages(p.Prompt)
turnCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
sess.setCancel(cancel)
defer func() {
cancel()
sess.setCancel(nil)
}()
reason, err := a.runTurn(turnCtx, sess, userText, images)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return PromptResult{StopReason: reason}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) runTurn(ctx context.Context, sess *acpSession, userText string, images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock) (string, error) {
overrides := config.Overrides{}
if model := sess.currentModel(); model != "" {
overrides.Provider.Model = model
}
resolved, err := a.deps.ResolveConfig(sess.cwd, overrides)
if err != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
}
provider, err := a.deps.NewProvider(resolved.Provider)
if err != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, "provider: "+err.Error())
}
// Build the SCOPED registry + sandbox engine for this session's workspace so
// shell/file tools are confined to the workspace exactly like the exec surface.
registry, sandboxEngine, err := a.deps.BuildWorkspace(sess.cwd, resolved)
if err != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, "workspace: "+err.Error())
}
note := &notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}
opts := agent.Options{
Cwd: sess.cwd,
SessionID: sess.id,
ProviderName: resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
Registry: registry,
Sandbox: sandboxEngine,
PermissionMode: sess.currentMode(),
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
Images: images,
OnText: note.text,
OnReasoning: note.thought,
OnToolCall: note.toolCall,
OnToolResult: func(result agent.ToolResult) {
note.toolResult(result)
if result.Name == "update_plan" {
a.emitPlan(registry, note)
}
},
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, req agent.PermissionRequest) (agent.PermissionDecision, error) {
return a.requestPermission(ctx, sess.id, req)
},
}
agentPrompt := buildPrompt(sess.snapshotHistory(), userText)
result, runErr := a.deps.RunAgent(ctx, agentPrompt, provider, opts)
reason, stopErr := stopReasonFor(result, runErr)
if stopErr != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, stopErr.Error())
}
a.persistTurn(sess, userText, result.FinalAnswer)
return reason, nil
}
func stopReasonFor(result agent.Result, err error) (string, error) {
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return StopCancelled, nil
}
return "", err
}
if result.FinishReason == "length" {
return StopMaxTokens, nil
}
if result.FinishReason == "content_filter" {
return StopRefusal, nil
}
return StopEndTurn, nil
}
// requestPermission forwards a ZERO permission prompt to the client as an ACP
// session/request_permission request and maps the outcome back. Failure to reach
// the client fails closed to deny.
func (a *Agent) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, req agent.PermissionRequest) (agent.PermissionDecision, error) {
params := RequestPermissionParams{
SessionID: sessionID,
ToolCall: permissionToolCall(req),
Options: buildPermissionOptions(req),
}
var result RequestPermissionResult
if err := a.conn.Call(ctx, MethodSessionRequestPerm, params, &result); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "cancelled"}, nil
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission request failed: " + err.Error()}, nil
}
return decisionFromOutcome(result.Outcome, req.AvailableDecisions), nil
}
func (a *Agent) emitPlan(registry *tools.Registry, note *notifier) {
t, ok := registry.Get("update_plan")
if !ok {
return
}
planner, ok := t.(interface{ CurrentPlan() []tools.PlanItem })
if !ok {
return
}
note.plan(planner.CurrentPlan())
}
// ---- mode + model selection ----
func (a *Agent) handleSetMode(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p SetSessionModeParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid set_mode params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.ModeID)
switch mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
sess.setMode(mode)
(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
return SetSessionModeResult{}, nil
case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
// Unsafe = run every tool with no prompt. The TUI gates this behind an
// explicit --skip-permissions-unsafe operator flag; an editor client must
// not be able to grant itself unconfined, no-prompt access over the wire.
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "mode not permitted over ACP: "+p.ModeID)
default:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown mode: "+p.ModeID)
}
}
func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p SetSessionConfigOptionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid set_config_option params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
if p.ConfigID != configIDModel {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown config option: "+p.ConfigID)
}
sess.setModel(p.Value)
return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p ZeroSetModelParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid _zero/set_model params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
sess.setModel(p.Model)
return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: p.Model}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var p CancelParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return
}
if sess := a.session(p.SessionID); sess != nil {
sess.invokeCancel()
}
}
// ---- advertising helpers ----
func (a *Agent) modeState(s *acpSession) *SessionModeState {
// Only auto/ask are offered over ACP; Unsafe is gated to the operator (see
// handleSetMode) so a client can't grant itself no-prompt host access.
return &SessionModeState{
CurrentModeID: string(s.currentMode()),
AvailableModes: []SessionMode{
{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
},
}
}
// ---- persistence + continuity ----
func (a *Agent) persistTurn(sess *acpSession, user, assistant string) {
if a.deps.Store != nil {
_, _ = a.deps.Store.AppendEvent(sess.id, sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventMessage,
Payload: map[string]any{"role": "user", "content": user},
})
if assistant != "" {
_, _ = a.deps.Store.AppendEvent(sess.id, sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventMessage,
Payload: map[string]any{"role": "assistant", "content": assistant},
})
}
}
sess.appendHistory(turnRecord{user: user, assistant: assistant})
}
func (a *Agent) loadHistory(sessionID string) []turnRecord {
if a.deps.Store == nil {
return nil
}
events, err := a.deps.Store.ReadEvents(sessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
var records []turnRecord
var pendingUser string
havePending := false
for _, e := range events {
if e.Type != sessions.EventMessage {
continue
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(e.Payload)
if err != nil {
continue
}
var msg struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg) != nil {
continue
}
switch msg.Role {
case "user":
if havePending {
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser})
}
pendingUser = msg.Content
havePending = true
case "assistant":
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser, assistant: msg.Content})
pendingUser = ""
havePending = false
}
}
if havePending {
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser})
}
return records
}
// buildPrompt prepends prior conversation as context, since agent.Run drives a
// single seeded turn. Mirrors how headless resume folds history into the prompt.
func buildPrompt(history []turnRecord, userText string) string {
if len(history) == 0 {
return userText
}
var b strings.Builder
b.WriteString("Conversation so far:\n")
for _, t := range history {
b.WriteString("User: ")
b.WriteString(t.user)
b.WriteString("\n")
if t.assistant != "" {
b.WriteString("Assistant: ")
b.WriteString(t.assistant)
b.WriteString("\n")
}
}
b.WriteString("\n---\nContinue with this request:\n")
b.WriteString(userText)
return b.String()
}
func promptImages(blocks []ContentBlock) []zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
var images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
for _, blk := range blocks {
if blk.Type != "image" || blk.Data == "" {
continue
}
data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(blk.Data)
if err != nil {
continue
}
images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: blk.MimeType, Data: data})
}
return images
}
// ---- session registry + accessors ----
// registerSession publishes a session under the agent's lock. If one is already
// registered for id (e.g. a re-load of an in-flight session) the existing live
// session is returned unchanged rather than orphaning its turn or resetting its
// mode/model. history is set BEFORE publishing so no concurrent prompt can read a
// half-initialized session.
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord) *acpSession {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if existing := a.sessions[id]; existing != nil {
return existing
}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, history: history}
a.sessions[id] = sess
return sess
}
func (a *Agent) session(id string) *acpSession {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
return a.sessions[id]
}
func (s *acpSession) setCancel(cancel context.CancelFunc) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.cancel = cancel
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) invokeCancel() {
s.mu.Lock()
cancel := s.cancel
s.mu.Unlock()
if cancel != nil {
cancel()
}
}
func (s *acpSession) setMode(mode agent.PermissionMode) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.mode = mode
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) currentMode() agent.PermissionMode {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.mode
}
func (s *acpSession) setModel(model string) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.model = model
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) currentModel() string {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.model
}
func (s *acpSession) appendHistory(rec turnRecord) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.history = append(s.history, rec)
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) snapshotHistory() []turnRecord {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return append([]turnRecord(nil), s.history...)
}