Files
zero/internal/oauth/discovery.go
KRATOS bb7de29c80 feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + zero auth CLI (#210)
* feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + `zero auth` CLI

Add internal/oauth: a transport/identity-agnostic OAuth 2.0 engine that powers
provider login alongside the MCP-server OAuth zero already has. It is additive
and provider-neutral — NO providers, endpoints, or client identities are baked
into the binary; every provider is configured entirely via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
env vars, so the engine works with any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server.

Engine (internal/oauth):
- PKCE (S256 mandatory; "plain" refused) + per-flow CSRF state.
- Authorization-code flow: BuildAuthorizationURL / ExchangeCode / Refresh, with
  an https-only token-endpoint guard (loopback exempt) and error bodies that
  carry only error/error_description (never token material).
- Loopback callback server: 127.0.0.1-only, OS-assigned port, single use, state
  verified, then closed.
- Device-authorization grant (RFC 8628): RequestDeviceCode + PollDeviceToken
  honoring authorization_pending / slow_down / interval / expiry (headless/SSH).
- RFC 8414 + OIDC discovery (issuer-driven endpoint resolution).
- Namespaced token store ("provider:<name>" / "mcp:<name>"), 0600, file-locked
  (ownership-aware), atomic writes, malformed-fails-closed; GetFresh (on-demand
  refresh) + Handle401 (forced refresh).
- Opt-in proactive RefreshScheduler.

CLI (zero auth):
- login <provider> [--device] [--scope ...], logout, status [provider],
  refresh <provider> [--watch]. Status/output never print token material.
- Registered in app.go dispatch + top-level help.

MCP OAuth (internal/mcp) is left byte-for-byte unchanged (zero regression);
sharing the engine with MCP and encrypted-at-rest/keyring storage are documented
follow-ups. Tests cover every path (PKCE, auth URL, https-guard + redaction,
exchange/refresh, loopback capture + state-mismatch + timeout, device pending/
slow_down/expired, store namespacing/0600/locking, provider env resolution,
manager login (loopback+device)/GetFresh/Handle401, scheduler). Gates: gofmt /
vet / build (host+linux+windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) /
govulncheck (0) / deadcode (no new) all pass.

* oauth: fix Windows smoke — use OS-appropriate path in store-path test

TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride hardcoded a unix "/tmp/custom/tok.json"
literal, which is not absolute on Windows (no drive), so ResolveStorePath
correctly resolves it against the current drive and the verbatim comparison
failed (D:\tmp\custom\tok.json). The production code is correct; the test now
builds the override with filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ...) so it is absolute and
clean on every OS.

* oauth: address CodeRabbit review (11 findings)

Security / correctness:
- flow: caller-supplied ExtraAuthParams/extraParams can no longer override the
  reserved OAuth/PKCE fields (state, redirect_uri, code_challenge[_method],
  response_type, client_id) — e.g. forcing method=plain.
- device: a device-authorization response without expires_in now gets a bounded
  default lifetime (fail closed), and the poll loop re-checks expiry AFTER the
  interval sleep so it never polls past the deadline (e.g. after slow_down).
- lock: handle WriteString/Close errors on the token lock file — a partial write
  no longer strands an undeletable lock.
- store: a non-nil env map is now authoritative (hermetic) — a controlled map
  never falls back to ambient ZERO_OAUTH_* / HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
- scheduler: a transient loadForKey error backs off and retries (bounded) instead
  of permanently stopping proactive refresh.
- cli auth: reject flags a subcommand does not accept (e.g. login --watch,
  status --device) and reject empty --scope values — fail fast.

Lint blockers:
- manager: restructured the discovery fallback so the non-nil-err branch no longer
  returns nil (nilerr).
- providers: dropped the ineffectual flow initializer (ineffassign).

Tests: assert Save/Load errors in the scheduler test; the slow_down device test
no longer depends on post-expiry polling. Added tests for reserved-param
stripping, hermetic env, device default-expiry, and CLI flag validation. The
store-path test was already made OS-portable in the Windows-smoke fix.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI

The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)

* oauth: address CodeRabbit re-review (4 findings)

- loopback (security): NewLoopbackListener refuses an empty CSRF state — an empty
  state would match a callback carrying no state at all, defeating the check.
- device (correctness): RequestDeviceCode now sends client_secret when set, so a
  confidential client authenticates on the device-authorization endpoint too
  (consistent with the token poll).
- cli auth: document --watch in the help Flags section.
- scheduler test: assert the seed Save error instead of ignoring it.

Also scrubbed a stray third-party reference from a loopback.go comment.
Tests added: empty-state rejection, device client_secret is sent. Gates:
gofmt/vet/build/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new)
all pass.

* mcp(oauth): delegate the OAuth engine to internal/oauth (dedup) (#212)

OAuth Phase 2: the MCP OAuth code now reuses the shared internal/oauth engine
instead of carrying its own copy of the transport/identity-agnostic primitives.
internal/mcp/oauth.go drops ~110 lines (526 -> 418): newPKCE, newState,
discoverAuthorizationServer, the authorize-URL builder, token exchange/refresh,
the token-response parser, and joinWellKnown now delegate to internal/oauth.

Behavior-preserving: MCP keeps its own OAuthConfig/StoredToken types,
LoginOptions/Login orchestration, loopback handling, registerClient (dynamic
client registration — not part of the shared engine), CLI output, and on-disk
token format (mcp-oauth-tokens.json, raw server-name keys). The existing mcp
oauth tests pass UNCHANGED. The only behavioral delta is a hardening inherited
from the shared engine: the token endpoint must be https (loopback exempt) —
a credential is no longer sent to a plaintext non-loopback endpoint.

Stacks on #210 (the internal/oauth package). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+
linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new
vs base) all pass; `zero mcp oauth status` output is identical.
2026-06-15 18:47:43 +05:30

80 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

package oauth
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
const wellKnownAuthServerPath = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"
// ServerMetadata is the subset of an RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata
// document the engine consumes.
type ServerMetadata struct {
Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
AuthorizationEndpoint string `json:"authorization_endpoint"`
TokenEndpoint string `json:"token_endpoint"`
DeviceAuthorizationEndpoint string `json:"device_authorization_endpoint"`
RegistrationEndpoint string `json:"registration_endpoint"`
ScopesSupported []string `json:"scopes_supported"`
}
// DiscoverAuthorizationServer fetches the RFC 8414 metadata document at the
// well-known path under baseURL.
func DiscoverAuthorizationServer(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, baseURL string) (ServerMetadata, error) {
metadataURL, err := joinWellKnown(baseURL)
if err != nil {
return ServerMetadata{}, err
}
return fetchMetadata(ctx, client, metadataURL)
}
// fetchMetadata GETs and decodes an authorization-server metadata document at an
// already-resolved URL (no well-known recomputation), so callers can also use it
// for the OIDC openid-configuration path.
func fetchMetadata(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, metadataURL string) (ServerMetadata, error) {
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, metadataURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return ServerMetadata{}, err
}
request.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
response, err := client.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return ServerMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("oauth: fetch authorization server metadata: %w", err)
}
defer response.Body.Close()
if response.StatusCode < http.StatusOK || response.StatusCode >= http.StatusMultipleChoices {
return ServerMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("oauth: authorization server metadata returned HTTP %d", response.StatusCode)
}
var metadata ServerMetadata
if err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(response.Body, tokenResponseLimit)).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {
return ServerMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("oauth: decode authorization server metadata: %w", err)
}
return metadata, nil
}
// joinWellKnown builds the RFC 8414 metadata URL, inserting the well-known
// segment between host and any issuer path component (so a path-based issuer is
// probed tenant-scoped, not at the host root).
func joinWellKnown(baseURL string) (string, error) {
parsed, err := url.Parse(trimmed(baseURL))
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("oauth: invalid base URL for metadata discovery: %q", baseURL)
}
issuerPath := strings.Trim(parsed.Path, "/")
parsed.Path = wellKnownAuthServerPath
if issuerPath != "" {
parsed.Path = strings.TrimRight(wellKnownAuthServerPath, "/") + "/" + issuerPath
}
parsed.RawQuery = ""
parsed.Fragment = ""
return parsed.String(), nil
}