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* feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + `zero auth` CLI
Add internal/oauth: a transport/identity-agnostic OAuth 2.0 engine that powers
provider login alongside the MCP-server OAuth zero already has. It is additive
and provider-neutral — NO providers, endpoints, or client identities are baked
into the binary; every provider is configured entirely via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
env vars, so the engine works with any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server.
Engine (internal/oauth):
- PKCE (S256 mandatory; "plain" refused) + per-flow CSRF state.
- Authorization-code flow: BuildAuthorizationURL / ExchangeCode / Refresh, with
an https-only token-endpoint guard (loopback exempt) and error bodies that
carry only error/error_description (never token material).
- Loopback callback server: 127.0.0.1-only, OS-assigned port, single use, state
verified, then closed.
- Device-authorization grant (RFC 8628): RequestDeviceCode + PollDeviceToken
honoring authorization_pending / slow_down / interval / expiry (headless/SSH).
- RFC 8414 + OIDC discovery (issuer-driven endpoint resolution).
- Namespaced token store ("provider:<name>" / "mcp:<name>"), 0600, file-locked
(ownership-aware), atomic writes, malformed-fails-closed; GetFresh (on-demand
refresh) + Handle401 (forced refresh).
- Opt-in proactive RefreshScheduler.
CLI (zero auth):
- login <provider> [--device] [--scope ...], logout, status [provider],
refresh <provider> [--watch]. Status/output never print token material.
- Registered in app.go dispatch + top-level help.
MCP OAuth (internal/mcp) is left byte-for-byte unchanged (zero regression);
sharing the engine with MCP and encrypted-at-rest/keyring storage are documented
follow-ups. Tests cover every path (PKCE, auth URL, https-guard + redaction,
exchange/refresh, loopback capture + state-mismatch + timeout, device pending/
slow_down/expired, store namespacing/0600/locking, provider env resolution,
manager login (loopback+device)/GetFresh/Handle401, scheduler). Gates: gofmt /
vet / build (host+linux+windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) /
govulncheck (0) / deadcode (no new) all pass.
* oauth: fix Windows smoke — use OS-appropriate path in store-path test
TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride hardcoded a unix "/tmp/custom/tok.json"
literal, which is not absolute on Windows (no drive), so ResolveStorePath
correctly resolves it against the current drive and the verbatim comparison
failed (D:\tmp\custom\tok.json). The production code is correct; the test now
builds the override with filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ...) so it is absolute and
clean on every OS.
* oauth: address CodeRabbit review (11 findings)
Security / correctness:
- flow: caller-supplied ExtraAuthParams/extraParams can no longer override the
reserved OAuth/PKCE fields (state, redirect_uri, code_challenge[_method],
response_type, client_id) — e.g. forcing method=plain.
- device: a device-authorization response without expires_in now gets a bounded
default lifetime (fail closed), and the poll loop re-checks expiry AFTER the
interval sleep so it never polls past the deadline (e.g. after slow_down).
- lock: handle WriteString/Close errors on the token lock file — a partial write
no longer strands an undeletable lock.
- store: a non-nil env map is now authoritative (hermetic) — a controlled map
never falls back to ambient ZERO_OAUTH_* / HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
- scheduler: a transient loadForKey error backs off and retries (bounded) instead
of permanently stopping proactive refresh.
- cli auth: reject flags a subcommand does not accept (e.g. login --watch,
status --device) and reject empty --scope values — fail fast.
Lint blockers:
- manager: restructured the discovery fallback so the non-nil-err branch no longer
returns nil (nilerr).
- providers: dropped the ineffectual flow initializer (ineffassign).
Tests: assert Save/Load errors in the scheduler test; the slow_down device test
no longer depends on post-expiry polling. Added tests for reserved-param
stripping, hermetic env, device default-expiry, and CLI flag validation. The
store-path test was already made OS-portable in the Windows-smoke fix.
Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.
* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI
The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)
* oauth: address CodeRabbit re-review (4 findings)
- loopback (security): NewLoopbackListener refuses an empty CSRF state — an empty
state would match a callback carrying no state at all, defeating the check.
- device (correctness): RequestDeviceCode now sends client_secret when set, so a
confidential client authenticates on the device-authorization endpoint too
(consistent with the token poll).
- cli auth: document --watch in the help Flags section.
- scheduler test: assert the seed Save error instead of ignoring it.
Also scrubbed a stray third-party reference from a loopback.go comment.
Tests added: empty-state rejection, device client_secret is sent. Gates:
gofmt/vet/build/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new)
all pass.
* mcp(oauth): delegate the OAuth engine to internal/oauth (dedup) (#212)
OAuth Phase 2: the MCP OAuth code now reuses the shared internal/oauth engine
instead of carrying its own copy of the transport/identity-agnostic primitives.
internal/mcp/oauth.go drops ~110 lines (526 -> 418): newPKCE, newState,
discoverAuthorizationServer, the authorize-URL builder, token exchange/refresh,
the token-response parser, and joinWellKnown now delegate to internal/oauth.
Behavior-preserving: MCP keeps its own OAuthConfig/StoredToken types,
LoginOptions/Login orchestration, loopback handling, registerClient (dynamic
client registration — not part of the shared engine), CLI output, and on-disk
token format (mcp-oauth-tokens.json, raw server-name keys). The existing mcp
oauth tests pass UNCHANGED. The only behavioral delta is a hardening inherited
from the shared engine: the token endpoint must be https (loopback exempt) —
a credential is no longer sent to a plaintext non-loopback endpoint.
Stacks on #210 (the internal/oauth package). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+
linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new
vs base) all pass; `zero mcp oauth status` output is identical.
129 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
129 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package oauth
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import (
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func newTestStore(t *testing.T) (*Store, string) {
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t.Helper()
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path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "oauth-tokens.json")
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s, err := NewStore(StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
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}
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return s, path
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}
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func TestStoreSaveLoadDelete(t *testing.T) {
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s, _ := newTestStore(t)
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tok := Token{AccessToken: "at", RefreshToken: "rt", Account: "me@x"}
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if err := s.Save(ProviderKey("demo"), tok); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err)
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}
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if err := s.Save(KeyPrefixMCP+"server1", Token{AccessToken: "mcp-at"}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Save mcp: %v", err)
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}
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got, ok, err := s.Load(ProviderKey("demo"))
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if err != nil || !ok || got.AccessToken != "at" || got.Account != "me@x" {
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t.Fatalf("Load = %+v ok=%v err=%v", got, ok, err)
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}
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removed, err := s.Delete(ProviderKey("demo"))
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if err != nil || !removed {
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t.Fatalf("Delete = %v %v", removed, err)
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}
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if _, ok, _ := s.Load(ProviderKey("demo")); ok {
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t.Fatal("token should be gone after delete")
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}
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// The mcp-namespaced token is untouched.
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if _, ok, _ := s.Load(KeyPrefixMCP + "server1"); !ok {
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t.Fatal("mcp token should survive provider delete")
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}
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}
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func TestStoreRejectsInvalidKeys(t *testing.T) {
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s, _ := newTestStore(t)
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for _, bad := range []string{"demo", "provider:", "provider:../escape", "mcp:bad/key", "other:x", ""} {
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if err := s.Save(bad, Token{AccessToken: "x"}); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("Save(%q) should be rejected", bad)
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}
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}
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for _, ok := range []string{"provider:demo", "mcp:server-1", "provider:two-svc"} {
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if err := ValidateKey(ok); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("ValidateKey(%q) = %v, want nil", ok, err)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestStoreStatusFiltersByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
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s, _ := newTestStore(t)
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_ = s.Save(ProviderKey("demo"), Token{AccessToken: "a", RefreshToken: "r", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)})
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_ = s.Save(KeyPrefixMCP+"srv", Token{AccessToken: "m"})
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statuses, err := s.Status(KeyPrefixProvider)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Status: %v", err)
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}
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if len(statuses) != 1 || statuses[0].Key != ProviderKey("demo") {
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t.Fatalf("provider status = %+v", statuses)
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}
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if !statuses[0].HasRefreshToken {
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t.Fatal("status should report a refresh token")
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}
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}
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func TestStoreFileMode0600(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("unix file modes")
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}
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s, path := newTestStore(t)
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if err := s.Save(ProviderKey("x"), Token{AccessToken: "a"}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err)
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}
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info, err := os.Stat(path)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("stat: %v", err)
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}
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if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0o600 {
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t.Fatalf("token file mode = %o, want 600", perm)
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}
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}
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func TestStoreMalformedFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
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s, path := newTestStore(t)
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("{not json"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("corrupt: %v", err)
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}
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if _, _, err := s.Load(ProviderKey("x")); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("malformed store must fail closed")
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}
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}
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func TestEnvValueHermetic(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_DEMO_CLIENT_ID", "ambient")
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// A non-nil map omitting the key must NOT leak the ambient process value.
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if got := envValue(map[string]string{}, "ZERO_OAUTH_DEMO_CLIENT_ID"); got != "" {
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t.Fatalf("non-nil env map must be hermetic, got %q", got)
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}
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// A nil map reads the process environment.
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if got := envValue(nil, "ZERO_OAUTH_DEMO_CLIENT_ID"); got != "ambient" {
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t.Fatalf("nil env map should read os env, got %q", got)
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}
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}
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func TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride(t *testing.T) {
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// Use an OS-appropriate absolute path: a unix-style "/tmp/..." literal is not
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// absolute on Windows (no drive), so it would be resolved against the current
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// drive and a verbatim comparison would fail there.
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override := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "custom", "tok.json")
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path, err := ResolveStorePath(map[string]string{"ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH": override})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ResolveStorePath: %v", err)
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}
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if path != override {
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t.Fatalf("path = %q, want %q", path, override)
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}
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}
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