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Vasanth T
a78c6c357e
* fix(acp): four defects a desktop ACP client hits Found by driving `zero acp` from ZeroApp and comparing both sides of the wire. None of them fail loudly — they produce a blank transcript, a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons nobody can tell apart. session/load restored the conversation into the agent's own memory and sent nothing. The turns were read from the store and used to build every later prompt, but not one notification went out, so a client that resumed opened an empty transcript against a model that remembered everything. Ask a follow-up and ZERO answers correctly, about a question no longer on screen. It now replays the loaded turns as user/agent message chunks before returning, so a client rendering on the reply already has them. Whole messages rather than per-token deltas: this is a transcript, not a stream. A permission option we offered could not be accepted. The fallback list for a request with no AvailableDecisions lived inside buildPermissionOptions, while requestPermission validated the client's answer against the raw field — so whenever ZERO did not enumerate, the client was sent Allow and Reject and its reply was checked against an empty slice. Every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny with "permission option was not offered". The user clicked Allow and ZERO recorded a denial, and nothing surfaced it, because a denial is a legitimate answer. One resolver now feeds both, so they agree by construction. The narrowing this validation exists for is unchanged: an unoffered broader grant is still refused. Cancelling a permission prompt came back as an internal error. Only context.Canceled was recognised, so errPermissionApprovalCanceled fell through to -32603 carrying the sentinel text, and clients render that as a failed turn — declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. For apply_patch, dismissing the dialog is the only refusal a client is offered. It maps to StopCancelled now. The sentinel is exported so the surfaces can recognise it; a genuine failure is still an error. request_permissions labelled two different decisions "Allow". The label is the only thing an ACP client shows, and plain allow and strict-review allow are offered together, so the panel had two identical buttons where one silently enabled strict auto-review of what was granted. The distinction cannot live in the option id, which is opaque to the client, so it is in the name. Eleven tests, each confirmed to fail without its fix. * refactor(acp): drop the session/load replay, superseded by #914 gnanam's #914 lands the same fix and does more with it: the replayed messages carry stable ids derived from the store's event ids, session/load replays while session/resume deliberately does not, and both are capability-gated. Keeping a second, weaker replay here would have meant a conflict in handleSessionLoad and translate.go for no gain. translate.go is back to its state on main. What remains are the three defects #914 does not touch: the permission option that could not be accepted, the cancel that arrived as an internal error, and the two options labelled the same. * fix(acp): validate a permission reply against the options that were sent CodeRabbit caught a hole on the same seam this PR already fixes, in the other direction. buildPermissionOptions drops PermissionDecisionCancel, because ACP expresses cancellation through the outcome rather than an option. But ZERO enumerates cancel in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch — the two commonest prompts — so validating against the decisions accepted {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an identifier no client was ever shown, aborting the whole turn. Rather than reject cancel by name, decisionFromOutcome now takes the []PermissionOption that were actually sent, and requestPermission builds that list once and uses it for both halves. "What we offered" and "what we accept" become the same slice instead of two things kept in step, so anything optionKindFor declines to render is excluded structurally — the next such action is covered the day it is added. The regression test is written over every option-less decision rather than over cancel specifically, for the same reason. Cancelling through the outcome still works, which is asserted separately: closing the selected-id route must not close the real one. Also adds the cancellation coverage CodeRabbit asked for on the two sandbox-retry paths. Both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is reached by a different denial, and the ACP mapping in this PR depends on them producing something recognisable. They also assert the escalated retry does not run: a cancelled prompt that still ran it would run the command the user had just declined.