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* Prompt for shell network permissions Route network-risk shell calls through the existing permission prompt instead of hard-denying them at sandbox preflight. Approved network prompts apply the current turn/session request-permissions overlay so the effective sandbox policy is widened only after user approval. Move network command detection into the shell AST analyzer for package installers, gh/git network subcommands, and python http.server so quoted process patterns such as pkill -f "python3 -m http.server 8000" are not misclassified as network activity. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBash|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Auto-allow native-sandboxed shell commands Remove the old hidden bash auto-allow environment/config path. Ordinary shell commands now use the active native sandbox as the permission boundary by default, while network, destructive, and workspace policy checks still run first. Policy-only and disabled sandbox backends continue to require approval for shell commands, so unsandboxed execution is not silently allowed. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxedBash|TestShellSandboxActive|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBashAuto|TestBashStillPromptsWithoutActiveSandbox|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicy|TestApplyConfiguredAutonomyCeiling' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/daemon -run 'TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Prompt for destructive shell approval Remove the separate DenyDestructiveShell policy layer from active sandbox decisions. Destructive shell classification now produces an approval prompt in ask/auto flows instead of a sandbox hard-deny, while no-approval paths remain blocked. Drop the removed destructive-shell policy field from sandbox policy output, backend capabilities, snapshots, and Windows golden data. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicy|TestEffectiveSandboxPolicy' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/zerocommands -run 'TestSandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicyFillsEffectiveMode' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove web-tool network policy switch Remove the old EnforceToolNetwork policy option and the NetworkHostAllowed per-tool gate so sandbox network policy only controls sandboxed shell egress. Keep web_search and web_fetch on their own tool permission and URL safety paths, with tests proving deny/scoped shell network policy no longer blocks in-process web tools. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy|TestEngineAllowsNetworkSideEffectWhenShellPolicyBlocksNetwork|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestScopedNetworkGateInEvaluate' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestWebSearchRunWithSandbox|TestWebFetchRunWithSandbox|TestRegistryRoutesWebFetchThroughSandboxPath' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Prompt for outside-workspace file access Convert recoverable outside-workspace file path violations into permission prompts instead of hard-denying in ask/auto modes. Approved prompts now grant the requested filesystem scope through the existing request_permissions overlay for the current turn or session, so the follow-up sandbox evaluation and scoped file tools use the same policy path. Keep unsafe mode, apply_patch escapes, symlink traversal, and non-recoverable path cases hard-denied. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDeniesOutOfWorkspacePaths|TestGrantRequestPermissionsReadDoesNotGrantWrite|TestGrantRequestPermissionsSessionPersists' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsAndAllowsOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunSessionAllowsLaterOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryAppliesSandboxBeforeToolExecution|TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys|TestRegistryAllowsPromptToolWithPersistentSandboxGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxCheckJSONDeniesOutOfWorkspaceWrite' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Fix Windows network prompt test fixture Use a Windows curl.cmd shim and cmd.exe PATH syntax for TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant while keeping the POSIX fake curl fixture for Linux and macOS. This keeps the test focused on network prompt approval and turn network grants instead of relying on a POSIX shell script being executable on Windows. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestClassifyASTCatchesNetworkProgramsRegexMisses|TestClassifyFlagsPipedInstallerVariants' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Remove sandbox autonomy ceilings Sandbox permission decisions now match grants by tool and scope only, without MaxAutonomy or request autonomy checks. Persistent/session grants, permission approvals, workspace-write auto-allow, and native-sandbox shell auto-allow no longer route through an autonomy ceiling. Remove the sandbox.maxAutonomy config and CLI surfaces, including grant --auto, policy output, sandbox check autonomy input, and sandbox grant snapshots. MCP permission autonomy is intentionally unchanged because it is a separate MCP permission model. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/config ./internal/cli ./internal/tui Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Fail closed without native sandbox Remove AllowPolicyOnlyRunner from sandbox policy and snapshots. A restricted/managed command plan now errors when native sandbox support is unavailable instead of running through a policy-only direct runner. Policy-only backend data remains as diagnostics for capability/reporting paths, but it no longer authorizes command execution when a platform sandbox is required. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/cli ./internal/tui Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove scoped shell network policy Drop the domain-scoped shell network mode and the local scoped-egress proxy path from the active sandbox model. Shell network policy now serializes and evaluates only deny or allow. Request-permissions network grants widen to allow without domain lists, and platform profiles consume the binary mode directly. The Linux helper no longer accepts proxy-route flags, Windows network hashes only the binary mode, and web tool tests assert they remain separate from shell network policy. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/notify Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Align permission grant ordering and prompt text Move persistent and session grant matching ahead of recoverable sandbox prompts while keeping explicit denies and non-recoverable path violations fail-closed. Clean TUI permission transcript/card text so normal prompts show action, reason, scope, and readable block details instead of raw permission/risk/violation key-value metadata. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/tools Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove policy-only sandbox terminology Replace the unavailable native-backend diagnostic path with explicit unavailable support/backend states, and stop presenting missing native isolation as a policy-only fallback. Rename structured sandbox denial metadata from violation to block across permission events, stream-json, snapshots, TUI rendering, and sandbox-check output so user-facing flow matches blocked action language. Update README, work split docs, smoke test selectors, and Windows sandbox policy golden output for the new backend/support names and block payloads. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/tui ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/streamjson Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh Tested: git diff --check * Fix sandbox review follow-ups Fail closed for unknown network modes, keep network prompts ahead of bash allow grants, preserve v1 grant-file reads, and classify unparseable commands with obvious network programs as network-risk. Bump stream-json schema to v2 and document the block metadata field after the violation-to-block rename. Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/streamjson ./internal/specialist ./internal/cli -run 'TestExec.*Stream|TestStreamJSON|TestExecProtocol|TestExecReadsStreamJSONImages|TestExecAcceptsImageOnlyStreamJSONMessage|TestExecInputFormatStreamJSON' Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tests: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh Tests: git diff --check
103 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
103 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
package daemon
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import (
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"context"
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"runtime"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
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)
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func TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers(t *testing.T) {
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in := []string{
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"PATH=/bin",
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sandbox.EnvSandboxed + "=1",
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"ZERO_USER_SETTING=1",
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sandbox.EnvSandboxBackend + "=bubblewrap",
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"HOME=/home/u",
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}
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out := scrubWorkerEnv(in)
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for _, kv := range out {
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if strings.HasPrefix(kv, sandbox.EnvSandboxed+"=") || strings.HasPrefix(kv, sandbox.EnvSandboxBackend+"=") {
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t.Fatalf("re-entrancy marker not scrubbed: %q", kv)
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}
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}
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want := map[string]bool{"PATH=/bin": true, "ZERO_USER_SETTING=1": true, "HOME=/home/u": true}
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got := map[string]bool{}
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for _, kv := range out {
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got[kv] = true
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}
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for w := range want {
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if !got[w] {
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t.Fatalf("scrub dropped a non-marker var: %q", w)
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}
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}
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if len(out) != len(want) {
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t.Fatalf("scrub result = %v, want exactly %d preserved vars", out, len(want))
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}
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if len(in) != 5 {
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t.Fatal("scrubWorkerEnv must not mutate the caller's slice")
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}
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}
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// TestExecLauncherScrubsEnvEndToEnd proves the spawned WORKER PROCESS actually
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// receives an environment without the re-entrancy markers — the security
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// invariant. It uses /bin/sh to dump the worker env, so it is POSIX-only.
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func TestExecLauncherScrubsEnvEndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("uses the POSIX env dumper /bin/sh -c env")
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}
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launcher, err := NewExecLauncher(ExecLauncherConfig{
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Executable: "/bin/sh",
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BaseArgs: []string{"-c", "env"},
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Env: append([]string{"KEEP=yes"},
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sandbox.EnvSandboxed+"=1",
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sandbox.EnvSandboxBackend+"=bubblewrap"),
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewExecLauncher: %v", err)
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}
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h, err := launcher(context.Background(), WorkerSpec{})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("launch: %v", err)
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}
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lines := h.Stdout()
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var got []string
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for {
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line, ok, lerr := lines.Next()
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if lerr != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read worker stdout: %v", lerr)
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}
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if !ok {
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break
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}
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got = append(got, line)
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}
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if _, err := h.Wait(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("worker wait: %v", err)
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}
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keepSeen := false
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for _, l := range got {
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if strings.HasPrefix(l, sandbox.EnvSandboxed+"=") || strings.HasPrefix(l, sandbox.EnvSandboxBackend+"=") {
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t.Fatalf("worker process still has a re-entrancy marker in its env: %q", l)
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}
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if l == "KEEP=yes" {
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keepSeen = true
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}
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}
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if !keepSeen {
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t.Fatalf("worker env lost a non-marker var (KEEP=yes); got %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestNewExecLauncherDefaults(t *testing.T) {
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// With no Executable it resolves the test binary's own path (os.Executable),
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// and constructs without error.
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if _, err := NewExecLauncher(ExecLauncherConfig{}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewExecLauncher with defaults: %v", err)
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}
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}
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