* Prompt for shell network permissions Route network-risk shell calls through the existing permission prompt instead of hard-denying them at sandbox preflight. Approved network prompts apply the current turn/session request-permissions overlay so the effective sandbox policy is widened only after user approval. Move network command detection into the shell AST analyzer for package installers, gh/git network subcommands, and python http.server so quoted process patterns such as pkill -f "python3 -m http.server 8000" are not misclassified as network activity. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBash|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Auto-allow native-sandboxed shell commands Remove the old hidden bash auto-allow environment/config path. Ordinary shell commands now use the active native sandbox as the permission boundary by default, while network, destructive, and workspace policy checks still run first. Policy-only and disabled sandbox backends continue to require approval for shell commands, so unsandboxed execution is not silently allowed. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxedBash|TestShellSandboxActive|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBashAuto|TestBashStillPromptsWithoutActiveSandbox|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicy|TestApplyConfiguredAutonomyCeiling' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/daemon -run 'TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Prompt for destructive shell approval Remove the separate DenyDestructiveShell policy layer from active sandbox decisions. Destructive shell classification now produces an approval prompt in ask/auto flows instead of a sandbox hard-deny, while no-approval paths remain blocked. Drop the removed destructive-shell policy field from sandbox policy output, backend capabilities, snapshots, and Windows golden data. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicy|TestEffectiveSandboxPolicy' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/zerocommands -run 'TestSandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicyFillsEffectiveMode' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove web-tool network policy switch Remove the old EnforceToolNetwork policy option and the NetworkHostAllowed per-tool gate so sandbox network policy only controls sandboxed shell egress. Keep web_search and web_fetch on their own tool permission and URL safety paths, with tests proving deny/scoped shell network policy no longer blocks in-process web tools. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy|TestEngineAllowsNetworkSideEffectWhenShellPolicyBlocksNetwork|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestScopedNetworkGateInEvaluate' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestWebSearchRunWithSandbox|TestWebFetchRunWithSandbox|TestRegistryRoutesWebFetchThroughSandboxPath' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Prompt for outside-workspace file access Convert recoverable outside-workspace file path violations into permission prompts instead of hard-denying in ask/auto modes. Approved prompts now grant the requested filesystem scope through the existing request_permissions overlay for the current turn or session, so the follow-up sandbox evaluation and scoped file tools use the same policy path. Keep unsafe mode, apply_patch escapes, symlink traversal, and non-recoverable path cases hard-denied. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDeniesOutOfWorkspacePaths|TestGrantRequestPermissionsReadDoesNotGrantWrite|TestGrantRequestPermissionsSessionPersists' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsAndAllowsOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunSessionAllowsLaterOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryAppliesSandboxBeforeToolExecution|TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys|TestRegistryAllowsPromptToolWithPersistentSandboxGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxCheckJSONDeniesOutOfWorkspaceWrite' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Fix Windows network prompt test fixture Use a Windows curl.cmd shim and cmd.exe PATH syntax for TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant while keeping the POSIX fake curl fixture for Linux and macOS. This keeps the test focused on network prompt approval and turn network grants instead of relying on a POSIX shell script being executable on Windows. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestClassifyASTCatchesNetworkProgramsRegexMisses|TestClassifyFlagsPipedInstallerVariants' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Remove sandbox autonomy ceilings Sandbox permission decisions now match grants by tool and scope only, without MaxAutonomy or request autonomy checks. Persistent/session grants, permission approvals, workspace-write auto-allow, and native-sandbox shell auto-allow no longer route through an autonomy ceiling. Remove the sandbox.maxAutonomy config and CLI surfaces, including grant --auto, policy output, sandbox check autonomy input, and sandbox grant snapshots. MCP permission autonomy is intentionally unchanged because it is a separate MCP permission model. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/config ./internal/cli ./internal/tui Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Fail closed without native sandbox Remove AllowPolicyOnlyRunner from sandbox policy and snapshots. A restricted/managed command plan now errors when native sandbox support is unavailable instead of running through a policy-only direct runner. Policy-only backend data remains as diagnostics for capability/reporting paths, but it no longer authorizes command execution when a platform sandbox is required. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/cli ./internal/tui Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove scoped shell network policy Drop the domain-scoped shell network mode and the local scoped-egress proxy path from the active sandbox model. Shell network policy now serializes and evaluates only deny or allow. Request-permissions network grants widen to allow without domain lists, and platform profiles consume the binary mode directly. The Linux helper no longer accepts proxy-route flags, Windows network hashes only the binary mode, and web tool tests assert they remain separate from shell network policy. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/notify Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Align permission grant ordering and prompt text Move persistent and session grant matching ahead of recoverable sandbox prompts while keeping explicit denies and non-recoverable path violations fail-closed. Clean TUI permission transcript/card text so normal prompts show action, reason, scope, and readable block details instead of raw permission/risk/violation key-value metadata. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/tools Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove policy-only sandbox terminology Replace the unavailable native-backend diagnostic path with explicit unavailable support/backend states, and stop presenting missing native isolation as a policy-only fallback. Rename structured sandbox denial metadata from violation to block across permission events, stream-json, snapshots, TUI rendering, and sandbox-check output so user-facing flow matches blocked action language. Update README, work split docs, smoke test selectors, and Windows sandbox policy golden output for the new backend/support names and block payloads. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/tui ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/streamjson Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh Tested: git diff --check * Fix sandbox review follow-ups Fail closed for unknown network modes, keep network prompts ahead of bash allow grants, preserve v1 grant-file reads, and classify unparseable commands with obvious network programs as network-risk. Bump stream-json schema to v2 and document the block metadata field after the violation-to-block rename. Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/streamjson ./internal/specialist ./internal/cli -run 'TestExec.*Stream|TestStreamJSON|TestExecProtocol|TestExecReadsStreamJSONImages|TestExecAcceptsImageOnlyStreamJSONMessage|TestExecInputFormatStreamJSON' Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tests: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh Tests: git diff --check
7.9 KiB
ZERO GitHub Action
Run ZERO headlessly inside a GitHub workflow. The action is a thin wrapper around
zero exec: it installs a pinned ZERO release, runs your prompt in the checked-out
repository, surfaces ZERO's exit code as the step status, captures the output as a
file, and can optionally post a summary to the triggering pull request or to Slack.
ZERO is model- and provider-agnostic, and so is this action: you choose the provider and supply the API key. Nothing is hardcoded to any single provider.
Quick start
# .github/workflows/zero.yml
name: ZERO
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
task:
description: What should ZERO do?
required: true
permissions:
contents: write
jobs:
run:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
with:
prompt: ${{ inputs.task }}
provider: openai
api-key-env: OPENAI_API_KEY
api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
model: gpt-4.1
The
provider,api-key-env, andapi-keytrio is how you stay provider-neutral:api-key-envis the environment variable name the chosen provider reads its key from (for exampleANTHROPIC_API_KEY,GEMINI_API_KEY,OPENROUTER_API_KEY), andapi-keyis the secret value. The action exports that variable for the run and never prints it. If your repository already commits a.zero/config.jsonwith an active provider, you can omitprovider.
Inputs
| Input | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
prompt |
one of prompt/prompt-file |
"" |
The instruction for ZERO to execute. |
prompt-file |
one of prompt/prompt-file |
"" |
Path (relative to working-directory) to a file whose contents are the prompt. |
provider |
no | "" |
Provider id to activate (e.g. openai, anthropic, gemini, ollama, or any compatible endpoint). |
api-key |
no | "" |
The provider API key. Pass from a secret; never logged. |
api-key-env |
no | "" |
Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY). Exported with api-key. |
model |
no | "" |
Model id. Defaults to the resolved provider's default. |
mode |
no | "" |
Run mode (zero exec --mode), e.g. smart, deep, fast. |
auto |
no | low |
Autonomy ceiling (zero exec --auto): low, medium, or high. Conservative by default. |
self-correct |
no | false |
Allow mid-run model escalation (zero exec --allow-escalation). |
add-dir |
no | "" |
Newline-/comma-separated extra write roots (zero exec --add-dir). |
worktree |
no | false |
Run in an isolated git worktree (zero exec --worktree). |
output-format |
no | stream-json |
text, json, or stream-json. Captured to a file. |
post-to |
no | none |
pr-comment, slack, or none. Where to post a summary after the run. |
slack-webhook-url |
no | "" |
Slack incoming-webhook (or generic webhook) URL for post-to: slack. Pass from a secret. |
github-token |
no | ${{ github.token }} |
Token used to post a PR comment. Requires pull-requests: write. |
working-directory |
no | ${{ github.workspace }} |
Directory to run ZERO in. |
zero-version |
no | (action ref → latest) |
ZERO release version/tag to install, e.g. v1.2.3 or latest. |
zero-repo |
no | Gitlawb/zero |
Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
Outputs
| Output | Description |
|---|---|
exit-code |
ZERO's exit code (0 success, 2 usage, 3 provider, non-zero otherwise). |
output-file |
Path to the captured ZERO stdout (the raw output-format stream). |
summary |
A short, single-line summary parsed from the run, when available. |
The step fails when ZERO returns a non-zero exit code, so a failed run fails
the job by default. Use continue-on-error: true on the step (and read
exit-code) if you want to handle failures yourself.
Examples
Run ZERO on every issue labeled zero
name: ZERO issue triage
on:
issues:
types: [labeled]
permissions:
contents: write
issues: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
triage:
if: github.event.label.name == 'zero'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
with:
prompt: |
Investigate this issue and propose a fix.
Title: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
${{ github.event.issue.body }}
provider: anthropic
api-key-env: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
api-key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
auto: low
post-to: slack
slack-webhook-url: ${{ secrets.ZERO_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL }}
Nightly dependency-upgrade PR
name: ZERO nightly deps
on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1" # Mondays 06:00 UTC
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
deps:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
id: zero
with:
prompt-file: .github/zero/upgrade-deps.md
provider: openai
api-key-env: OPENAI_API_KEY
api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
worktree: true
auto: medium
- name: Open pull request
run: |
git checkout -b zero/deps-$(date +%Y%m%d)
git commit -am "chore(deps): nightly upgrade via ZERO" || exit 0
git push -u origin HEAD
gh pr create --fill --label dependencies
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
- name: Upload ZERO output
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: zero-output
path: ${{ steps.zero.outputs.output-file }}
if-no-files-found: warn
Security notes
- Secrets are passed as Action secrets and never logged. The action exports
api-key(underapi-key-env) andslack-webhook-urlinto the step environment only. They are never echoed, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped strings from its own output. - The sandbox is always active. This action never passes
--skip-permissions-unsafe, so writes stay inside the checked-out repository (plus any roots you grant withadd-dir). Unsafe mode is never enabled implicitly. - Autonomy defaults to
low. Raise it deliberately (auto: medium/high) only for tasks you trust to run unattended. - Least-privilege tokens. Grant only the permissions the workflow needs
(
contents: writeto edit files,pull-requests: writeto comment). The defaultGITHUB_TOKENis scoped to the repository. - Pin the action. Reference a tag (
Gitlawb/zero@v1) or a commit SHA so a workflow run uses a known ZERO version.zero-versionlets you pin the installed binary independently of the action ref. - Linux and macOS runners are supported; Windows runners are rejected with a clear error.
Slack / webhook notifier
The action's post-to: slack step sends a one-line summary to a Slack incoming
webhook after the run. ZERO also has a built-in webhook notifier sink
(internal/notify) that an unattended run can use to report
"finished / needs input / verify failed after N retries" to Slack or any generic
webhook:
- Configure the destination with the
ZERO_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URLenvironment variable (or settings). A blank URL disables the sink. - The sink POSTs a JSON body
{ "text", "type", "message", "summary?", "links?" }. Thetextfield is what Slack renders; the structured fields carry the machine-readable detail. - Fail-soft: a non-2xx response or a transport error is logged (redacted) and swallowed — a webhook problem never crashes the run.
- Redaction: the message, summary, links, and the webhook URL itself are run through ZERO's redaction before being sent or logged, so tokens never leak.
- Egress/proxy: the notifier uses the default HTTP transport, which honors
HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXYwhen a proxy is configured.