Files
zero/internal/acp/jsonrpc.go
KRATOS c1937dfac7 feat(acp): add standard session list and resume (#914)
* feat(acp): add standard session list and resume

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* fix(acp): preserve notification wire order

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* fix(acp): bind sessions to persisted workspaces

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* fix(acp): compare workspaces by filesystem identity, not by spelling

@Vasanthdev2004's three findings, all reproduced before changing anything.

TWO SPELLINGS OF ONE DIRECTORY WERE TWO WORKSPACES. Both comparisons were string
equality on ResolveWorkspaceRoot output, and that resolver is abs plus
filepath.Clean plus a stat — it does not fold case and does not resolve
junctions. A session persisted from the TUI was unresumable from an editor
holding a different spelling of the same project folder, and session/list
filtered by the other spelling returned nothing, which makes it an invisible
failure rather than a reported one. It lands on exactly the case this feature
exists for, and on the two processes most likely to disagree about spelling.

os.SameFile asks the filesystem which directories these are, which is the
question. filepath.EvalSymlinks is NOT the fix on Windows — it normalises a
drive letter and returns a junction path unchanged, so the alias survives it,
and junctions need no privilege. String equality stays as the fast path, and a
stat failure falls back to it rather than widening the match: this gate refuses
access to another workspace's files and configuration, so an unanswerable
comparison denies.

THE TEST COULD NOT SEE ANY OF IT. testDeps resolves with the identity function,
so the guard degenerated to "are these two strings different" fed two unrelated
temp directories — it could only ever answer yes. The rejection direction was
pinned and the acceptance direction was asserted nowhere. The new test uses a
resolver reproducing the production normalisation and drives the ACCEPTANCE
direction through an alias, skipping if the filesystem folds the alias away so
it never passes vacuously. Reverting to string equality fails it three ways:
load, resume, and a list that returns zero.

THE WIRE KEYS ARE AN EXTERNAL CONTRACT. Nothing pinned sessionId, cwd, title,
updatedAt, _meta, modelId, createdAt, sessions, nextCursor, cursor, loadSession,
promptCapabilities, sessionCapabilities, list or resume, so renaming a Go field
would break every client and leave the suite green. Renaming modelId to model_id
now fails.

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* fix(acp): test the alias guard where the bug lives, and stop listing unusable sessions

THE TEST COULD NOT RUN ON THE PLATFORM THE BUG IS FROM. @Vasanthdev2004's point,
and he is right that it is not a nit. The alias test built its second name with
os.Symlink, which needs a privilege an ordinary Windows session does not hold, so
it SKIPPED there — and Windows is where junctions exist and where this defect came
from. The identity guard was verified by CI on the two platforms that never had
the problem. It now builds the alias with mklink /J on Windows, which needs no
privilege and is how he found the defect in the first place, and keeps the symlink
arm elsewhere.

This is the second time in this series a correct fix shipped with a test that
could not exercise it: the same helper shape was added to internal/memory for the
same reason a day earlier.

A SESSION WITH NO PERSISTED WORKSPACE IS NOT RESUMABLE, SO IT IS NOT LISTED.
CodeRabbit's finding. activatePersistedSession refuses an empty Cwd, but the
listing advertised it anyway — a menu entry that only fails when taken. The test
asserts both halves, because the listing is only correct relative to what resume
will accept: the omitted session is checked to really fail on resume, and a usable
session is checked to survive the filter.

Mutation-checked: removing the filter advertises the unusable session again.
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* fix(acp): resolve every listed workspace, not only when a filter was supplied

@anandh8x's P1, both halves reproduced before changing anything.

The loop resolved item.Cwd only when a cwd filter was present, and skipped only a
blank one. Two shapes stayed on the menu that session/resume then refuses:

  - a session whose persisted workspace has since been deleted, advertised as
    resumable
  - a legacy entry holding a relative path, reported as cwd "." although ACP
    requires SessionInfo.cwd to be absolute

Every entry is now resolved unconditionally, anything that cannot resolve is
omitted, and the RESOLVED root is what SessionInfo carries — absolute as the
contract requires, and the same value the client hands back on resume. The
optional identity filter then applies to the resolved roots, which is also where
it belonged.

Listing is a menu: activatePersistedSession resolves and refuses what it cannot
reach, so anything this loop cannot resolve is something a client would be
offered and then denied.

Mutation-checked: restoring the resolve-only-when-filtered shape re-advertises
the deleted workspace and re-emits the relative cwd.

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* test(acp): assert the relative entry is retained, not merely absolute

CodeRabbit's catch, and the test was genuinely weaker than it looked. It checked
that the deleted workspace was gone, the live one kept, and every listed cwd
absolute — all of which a "fix" that simply DISCARDED any non-absolute entry
would satisfy, while losing a resumable session.

Presence is now asserted separately from spelling: the relative entry must still
be listed, and listed with an absolute path.

Mutation-checked: skipping non-absolute entries instead of resolving them now
fails with "a session with a resolvable relative workspace was dropped rather
than normalised". The first attempt at that mutation did not compile, so it
proved nothing until it was rewritten — worth saying, because a mutation that
fails to build looks exactly like a test that passes.

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* fix(acp): a relative persisted workspace is omitted, not rebased

Reported by @anandh8x. Resolving a stored relative cwd does not recover the
session's workspace, it invents one: ResolveWorkspaceRoot joins it against
whatever directory the ACP server happens to be running in, and that invented
absolute path was then advertised as the session's workspace and accepted as
its home on resume.

Reproduced on f2c6fc9a, a session persisted with cwd ".":

  LISTED legacy-rel as cwd="/Users/kratos/dev/f914/internal/acp"
  resume with an UNRELATED workspace -> err=... cwd does not match its persisted workspace
  resume with NO cwd (falls back to ".") -> err=<nil>

The mismatch check does its job when the client names a workspace, so the only
opening was the fallback path, where the rebased value was compared against
itself and always agreed. A conversation created for one project could be
resumed against another project's files, configuration and tools.

Both doors now take the same guard: handleSessionList omits an entry whose
persisted cwd is not absolute, and activatePersistedSession refuses one rather
than resolving it. The original base is not knowable from the metadata, so
guessing at it is not an option a fix can take.

This reverses an earlier assertion in TestSessionListResolvesEveryWorkspace,
which expected the relative entry to be normalised and retained. That was
requested in review on the grounds that dropping it loses a resumable session.
It does, but the entry was never resumable into its own workspace, only into
this process's. The test now asserts it is dropped, and a new
TestResumeRefusesARelativePersistedWorkspace covers the fallback path that the
listing filter alone leaves open.

Both guards mutation-checked: removing either one fails its test.
Pre-existing on this branch and on its merge-base, unrelated to this change:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider both exit 3 in this environment.

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* test(acp): the resume guard is asserted through both activating methods

Raised by CodeRabbit: the test is named for resume and called session/load.

session/load and session/resume are separate entry points that today share
activatePersistedSession, so an assertion through either one passes while the
guard holds — but the name promised a surface it was not touching. Both are now
named explicitly, which keeps that true: if resume is ever given its own path,
this fails rather than quietly covering half of what it claims to.

With the guard removed, both methods accept a relative persisted workspace on
the no-cwd fallback. The named-workspace case was already refused by the
existing mismatch check; the fallback was the only door open, and it is open on
both.

Not taken in this PR, from the same review: threading a rooted directory handle
through ResolveWorkspaceRoot and workspace construction so a root rename or link
swap cannot redirect later file operations. That is a real question and a
pre-existing one — this change adds a refusal and no path handling — but it is a
capability refactor across workspace and tool access with its own race test, not
something to fold into a session-list fix. Worth its own issue.

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* fix(acp): activation requires an absolute cwd in the REQUEST, not just the record

Reported by @jatmn.

ResumeSessionParams is a type alias for LoadSessionParams, so JSON decoding turns
an OMITTED resume cwd into an empty string. That blank reached the shared
activation path, whose blank-cwd fallback substitutes meta.Cwd — so
{"sessionId":"known"} activated a persisted session, even though ACP v1 requires
session/resume to carry an absolute working directory.

This is a different hole from the persisted-cwd one fixed earlier on this branch.
That guard asks whether the STORED workspace is identifiable; this asks whether
the CALLER named one at all. The earlier fix does not cover it, because a stored
absolute cwd passes that check and the blank request then silently inherits it.

requestedWorkspace validates the request's own cwd before anything reaches the
fallback: absent, empty and whitespace-only are all invalid params, and so is a
relative path. Applied to both activating methods rather than to resume alone —
load's omitted-cwd fallback was inheriting the same way, and leaving one door
open is how this class survived the last fix.

Mutation-checked at the wire, which is where the defect lives: making the blank
case return no error compiles and fails the regression on four separate requests
— session/load and session/resume, each with cwd omitted and with cwd blank. A
Go-level test would not have caught it, since the defect is in decoding an absent
field.

Two notes from a verification pass, neither a defect:

Error precedence changed: a blank cwd with an UNKNOWN session id now reports the
cwd problem instead of "session not found". Kept deliberately and pinned — it
stops the server confirming whether a session exists to a request that named no
workspace.

AdditionalDirectories is declared on two params structs and consumed nowhere in
the repo. Not a hole today, but it is the same shape — client-supplied paths with
no absoluteness rule — so the field now carries a note saying it must go through
requestedWorkspace when wired up.

Rebased onto ad34dc8d. go test -race ./internal/acp/ -count=5: clean.
Pre-existing here and on main: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(acp): resume the conversation a session became, and fail closed when it cannot

Three defects in ACP session restoration, all reported by @jatmn.

loadHistory read the raw event log and kept only EventMessage. A compacted
session stores its original prefix alongside an EventCompaction naming the
events it replaced and carrying their summary, so restoring from the raw log
replayed superseded turns AND dropped the summary that replaced them. It now
reads the same rehydrated view the TUI and exec paths use, and explicitly
projects the compaction summary -- switching readers alone would still drop it,
because rehydration substitutes the compaction event in place of what it
replaced.

historyErr only suppressed replay and raised a warning: the session was
registered and reported ready regardless, so an unreadable events file left the
caller holding a live, promptable session ID whose next prompt ran as a fresh
conversation under the old identity. Resume now fails. Load keeps the
best-effort policy deliberately rather than by inheriting the shared helper.

Tool calls and their results were dropped from session/load, so a restored
transcript showed prose asserting edits with no record that any tool ran. They
now replay through the same toolCallStart/toolCallResult mapping a live turn
uses, keyed on the stored toolCallId so results pair with their calls. They do
not enter turnRecord, so load and resume still consume the same effective
history. Resume stays replay-free.

Also asserts that an unset sessionCapabilities is omitted rather than
serialized as null, raised by CodeRabbit.

* fix(acp): persist tool activity for session replay

* test(acp): bound replay notification waits

* fix(acp): preserve session restore invariants

* fix(acp): restore session lifecycle boundaries

* fix(acp): preserve replay and restore identity

* fix(acp): commit a completed turn as one store batch

A completed turn was buffered until its outcome was known and then persisted
one event per call. Each call took and released the store's session lock, so a
second ACP instance holding the same session -- its turnMu is its own, only the
store is shared -- could append its whole turn between two of them: user A,
user B, answer B, answer A. Every write was individually locked and the log
was valid, but a fresh load pairs prose by order and reconstructed three wrong
turns from two right ones. Before this branch the user and assistant events
went to AppendEvents together; buffering until the outcome is known was the
right change and splitting the commit into singleton writes was not.

The whole buffer now goes through one Store.AppendEvents call, which writes the
batch under one lock and one file write. That is the contiguity being restored:
not a disk transaction, and not a promise about a crash mid-fsync. The outcome
gate still runs first; a hard failure still commits nothing; cancellation still
commits through the same boundary. A persistence failure is now the failure of
the whole batch, so there is no dependent suffix to protect and the rewritten
regression asserts that nothing of the turn is durable, the warning is raised,
and a fresh load replays none of it.

The two-instance regression holds both writers at the commit boundary until
each has arrived and then delegates to the real batch API under the real lock;
it observes what production hands it rather than batching anything itself, so
reverting to singleton writes fails it before any interleaving has to be
provoked. The restored prompt keeps both prose pairs and no historical tool
output.

Also normalizes the expected workspace in the listing test through
filepath.Clean, matching the resolver's output contract, so a TMPDIR spelled
with a ".." component no longer fails a correct result.

Rebased onto main to pick up the ACP browser metadata, specialist model
restoration and worktree pointer protection changes. Both reported by @jatmn.
2026-09-12 18:18:39 +05:30

497 lines
16 KiB
Go

// Package acp implements the Agent Client Protocol (ACP) surface for ZERO: a
// JSON-RPC 2.0 peer spoken over stdio (newline-delimited JSON) so editors such
// as Zed, JetBrains, and Neovim can drive ZERO's agent core as a backend.
//
// The protocol shapes (method names, message fields) are derived solely from the
// public, Apache-licensed ACP specification at agentclientprotocol.com and the
// agentclientprotocol/agent-client-protocol repository (schema/v1). All logic
// here is written originally against ZERO's own interfaces.
package acp
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
const (
codeParseError = -32700
codeInvalidRequest = -32600
codeMethodNotFound = -32601
codeInvalidParams = -32602
codeInternalError = -32603
)
// rpcError is a JSON-RPC 2.0 error object.
type rpcError struct {
Code int `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"message"`
Data json.RawMessage `json:"data,omitempty"`
}
func (e *rpcError) Error() string {
if e == nil {
return "<nil rpc error>"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("jsonrpc error %d: %s", e.Code, e.Message)
}
// RPCError builds a protocol error to return from a handler. Use it when a
// handler needs to control the wire-level error code; any other error a handler
// returns is reported as a generic internal error.
func RPCError(code int, message string) error {
return &rpcError{Code: code, Message: message}
}
// rpcMessage is the union of request, response, and notification frames. The
// shape is disambiguated by which fields are present (per JSON-RPC 2.0):
// - request: method + id
// - notification: method, no id
// - response: id + (result | error), no method
type rpcMessage struct {
JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"`
ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"`
Method string `json:"method,omitempty"`
Params json.RawMessage `json:"params,omitempty"`
Result json.RawMessage `json:"result,omitempty"`
Error *rpcError `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
func (m rpcMessage) isResponse() bool { return m.Method == "" && len(m.ID) > 0 }
func (m rpcMessage) isRequest() bool { return m.Method != "" && len(m.ID) > 0 }
func (m rpcMessage) isNotify() bool { return m.Method != "" && len(m.ID) == 0 }
// HandlerFunc handles an inbound request and returns the result to encode, or an
// error. Returning an *rpcError controls the wire code; any other error becomes
// a generic internal error.
type HandlerFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error)
// NotifyFunc handles an inbound notification (no response is sent).
type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
// Conn is a JSON-RPC 2.0 peer over a single ndjson stream pair. It both serves
// inbound requests/notifications (via registered handlers) and issues outbound
// requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
// the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
type Conn struct {
rawReader io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
readerCloser io.Closer
w io.Writer
writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w
handlers map[string]HandlerFunc
notifiers map[string]NotifyFunc
// Notifications for one method are an ordered stream: session/update in
// particular is stateful, so dispatching every frame in an unrelated
// goroutine can make a later chunk overtake an earlier one. Different
// methods retain independent tails, keeping session/cancel responsive while
// an update handler is busy.
notifyMu sync.Mutex
notifyTails map[string]chan struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
nextID int64
pending map[int64]chan rpcMessage
closed bool
wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
}
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
// lifetime.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
rawReader: r,
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
notifyTails: make(map[string]chan struct{}),
pending: make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage),
}
}
// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
c := NewConn(r, w)
c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
return c
}
// Handle registers a request handler for method.
func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }
// HandleNotify registers a notification handler for method.
func (c *Conn) HandleNotify(method string, fn NotifyFunc) { c.notifiers[method] = fn }
// Serve runs the read loop until the stream ends, ctx is cancelled, or a fatal
// decode error occurs. Inbound requests and notifications are dispatched on
// their own goroutines so a long-running handler (e.g. session/prompt) never
// blocks the loop from delivering session/cancel or a permission response.
func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
// On exit, cancel in-flight handlers (so a blocked outbound Call unblocks via
// ctx) and then wait for them to finish writing their responses. Without this,
// a finite input stream (e.g. piped ndjson that EOFs right after a request)
// would race the dispatch goroutine and drop the response.
defer func() {
cancel()
c.wg.Wait()
}()
interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
for {
// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
//
// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
before := interruptible.generation()
line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
c.handleLine(ctx, line)
}
if err != nil {
c.failAllPending(err)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
return nil
}
return err
}
}
}
// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
//
// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
//
// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
type interruptibleReader struct {
inner io.Reader
closer io.Closer
ctx context.Context
closeOnce sync.Once
gen atomic.Int64
}
func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
type interruptibleReadResult struct {
n int
err error
}
// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
once sync.Once
}
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
return claimed
}
// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
// publishes a result for Read to join.
func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
defer func() {
if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
}
decision.complete()
}()
res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
return res
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
go func() {
resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
}()
select {
case res := <-resultCh:
return res.n, res.err
case <-r.ctx.Done():
// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
if decision.interrupt() {
r.gen.Add(1)
if r.closer != nil {
r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
}
}
// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
// report) is what the caller should see.
res := <-resultCh
return res.n, res.err
}
}
// handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
// with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
var msg rpcMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(line), &msg); err != nil {
c.writeError(json.RawMessage("null"), &rpcError{Code: codeParseError, Message: "parse error"})
return
}
if msg.JSONRPC != "" && msg.JSONRPC != "2.0" {
if len(msg.ID) > 0 {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeInvalidRequest, Message: "unsupported jsonrpc version"})
}
return
}
switch {
case msg.isResponse():
c.deliver(msg)
case msg.isRequest():
c.wg.Add(1)
go func(m rpcMessage) {
defer c.wg.Done()
c.dispatchRequest(ctx, m)
}(msg)
case msg.isNotify():
if fn := c.notifiers[msg.Method]; fn != nil {
c.dispatchNotification(ctx, msg, fn)
}
default:
// Malformed frame; reply only if we can identify a request id.
if len(msg.ID) > 0 {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeInvalidRequest, Message: "invalid request"})
}
}
}
// dispatchNotification preserves wire order within one method without making
// unrelated notification methods wait for each other. The read loop installs
// each tail before starting its goroutine, so goroutine scheduling cannot
// reorder the chain it observes.
func (c *Conn) dispatchNotification(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage, fn NotifyFunc) {
c.notifyMu.Lock()
previous := c.notifyTails[msg.Method]
done := make(chan struct{})
c.notifyTails[msg.Method] = done
c.notifyMu.Unlock()
c.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer c.wg.Done()
defer func() {
close(done)
c.notifyMu.Lock()
if c.notifyTails[msg.Method] == done {
delete(c.notifyTails, msg.Method)
}
c.notifyMu.Unlock()
}()
if previous != nil {
<-previous
}
fn(ctx, msg.Params)
}()
}
func (c *Conn) dispatchRequest(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage) {
fn := c.handlers[msg.Method]
if fn == nil {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeMethodNotFound, Message: "method not found: " + msg.Method})
return
}
result, err := fn(ctx, msg.Params)
if err != nil {
var re *rpcError
if errors.As(err, &re) {
c.writeError(msg.ID, re)
} else {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeInternalError, Message: err.Error()})
}
return
}
c.writeResult(msg.ID, result)
}
// Call issues an outbound request and blocks until the response arrives, ctx is
// cancelled, or the connection closes.
func (c *Conn) Call(ctx context.Context, method string, params any, result any) error {
raw, err := marshalParams(params)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.mu.Lock()
if c.closed {
c.mu.Unlock()
return errors.New("acp: connection closed")
}
c.nextID++
id := c.nextID
ch := make(chan rpcMessage, 1)
c.pending[id] = ch
c.mu.Unlock()
defer func() {
c.mu.Lock()
delete(c.pending, id)
c.mu.Unlock()
}()
idRaw, _ := json.Marshal(id)
if err := c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: idRaw, Method: method, Params: raw}); err != nil {
return err
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case resp := <-ch:
if resp.Error != nil {
return resp.Error
}
if result != nil && len(resp.Result) > 0 {
return json.Unmarshal(resp.Result, result)
}
return nil
}
}
// Notify issues an outbound notification (no response expected).
func (c *Conn) Notify(method string, params any) error {
raw, err := marshalParams(params)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", Method: method, Params: raw})
}
func (c *Conn) deliver(msg rpcMessage) {
var id int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(msg.ID, &id); err != nil {
return
}
c.mu.Lock()
ch := c.pending[id]
delete(c.pending, id)
c.mu.Unlock()
if ch == nil {
return
}
// Non-blocking: the pending channel is cap-1 and may have been abandoned (e.g.
// a Call cancelled by session/cancel). A duplicate or late response frame must
// never block the read-loop goroutine.
select {
case ch <- msg:
default:
}
}
func (c *Conn) failAllPending(err error) {
c.mu.Lock()
c.closed = true
pending := c.pending
c.pending = make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage)
c.mu.Unlock()
for _, ch := range pending {
select {
case ch <- rpcMessage{Error: &rpcError{Code: codeInternalError, Message: err.Error()}}:
default:
}
}
}
func (c *Conn) writeResult(id json.RawMessage, result any) {
raw, err := json.Marshal(result)
if err != nil {
c.writeError(id, &rpcError{Code: codeInternalError, Message: err.Error()})
return
}
_ = c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: id, Result: raw})
}
func (c *Conn) writeError(id json.RawMessage, e *rpcError) {
_ = c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: id, Error: e})
}
func (c *Conn) write(msg rpcMessage) error {
msg.JSONRPC = "2.0"
data, err := json.Marshal(msg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.writeMu.Lock()
defer c.writeMu.Unlock()
if _, err := c.w.Write(append(data, '\n')); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// marshalParams encodes params, treating nil as an absent params field.
func marshalParams(params any) (json.RawMessage, error) {
if params == nil {
return nil, nil
}
if raw, ok := params.(json.RawMessage); ok {
return raw, nil
}
return json.Marshal(params)
}