Files
zero/internal/agent/deferred_loop_test.go
0176ee49ff feat(agent): add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning (#853)
* feat(agent): add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning

* fix(agent): drop redundant modeName branch, add plan mode regression tests

string(permissionMode) already yields "plan" / "spec-draft", so the
if/else recomputing modeName in the denial message was dead branching
on the same values. Also add plan-mode coverage mirroring three of the
four existing spec-draft regression tests: advertised tool set, and
denied write_file/bash calls. The fourth (submit-and-stop review
control) has no plan-mode analog, since plan mode has no submit tool.

* fix(agent): deny request_permissions in plan/spec-draft even when the registry omits it

request_permissions is dispatched by name in executeToolCall before the
registry-based ToolAdvertised gate runs, so that gate only helps when
the tool happens to be present in the caller's registry. A plan- or
spec-draft-mode registry that simply omits the tool (rather than
registering it as denied) let the call fall through to a real
turn/session-scoped permission grant, defeating the read-only
boundary. Deny it unconditionally at the top of
executeRequestPermissions for both read-only modes instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): suppress executable hooks while plan/spec-draft mode is active

Plan mode promises a read-only turn, but sessionStart/sessionEnd fire on
every run and beforeTool/afterTool fire around allowed read calls, and
all four execute configured host commands outside the advertised-tool
and sandbox gates — so a project hook could mutate the workspace or
spawn a process from a session that advertises it cannot. Gate all four
dispatch points on the run's permission mode, with a regression test
asserting no hook command launches during a plan-mode run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): close plan-mode tool advertisement bypass

toolAdvertisedInPlan whitelisted ask_user and update_plan by name
alone, so a caller could register a mutating tool under either name
and have it advertised and executed in plan mode. Validate every tool
against its Safety() instead. Also exclude lsp_navigate, which is
marked SideEffectRead but lazily spawns a real language-server
process, contradicting plan mode's read-only guarantee. Add
regression tests for both.

* fix(agent): keep trust-gated hooks in spec-draft mode

Plan mode still suppresses executable hooks so a read-only planning turn
cannot spawn host processes via session or tool hooks. Spec-draft keeps
the existing trust model: project hooks fire when the workspace (or its
worktree trust root) is trusted. Unconditionally suppressing hooks in
spec-draft broke TestExecSpecWorktreeInheritsTrustEndToEnd for trusted
worktrees under --use-spec --worktree.

* fix(agent): cover plan-mode spoof and lsp_navigate denials

Expand the name-only spoof regression to both update_plan and ask_user,
and add an execution-path denial for lsp_navigate so plan mode cannot
spawn language servers even when a call still arrives.

* fix(agent): filter tool_search deferred candidates by plan/spec-draft visibility

tool_search resolved and ranked deferred tools by EnabledTools/DisabledTools
only, never by the run's permission-mode visibility. tool_search itself is
already denied at dispatch in plan/spec-draft (its Safety carries no side
effect, so it fails the same SideEffect==Read advertisement gate direct calls
use), so this was not reachable through the normal Run() path today. But it
is a real landmine: if that outer gate is ever loosened independently (e.g.
tool_search's no-side-effect Safety is judged advertisable), the loader had
no gate of its own and would hand a deferred write/mutator tool's name,
description, and full schema straight to a plan/spec-draft model.

Mirror agent.ToolAdvertised's plan/spec-draft branches inside the tools
package (toolAdvertisedForPermissionMode, next to the existing
toolAllowedByFilters mirror that avoids the same import cycle) and apply it
alongside the operator filters in visibleDeferredTools and
visibleEagerToolNames.

Added unit tests in tool_search_test.go for both modes, and an end-to-end
agent test that force-calls tool_search in plan mode and asserts no schema
leaks. Verified by reverting tool_search.go and confirming the new tests fail
(one shows load_tools resolving to the mutator's name); restored and
confirmed they pass. Also confirmed via a temporary probe that if plan mode's
outer advertisement gate is loosened, this filter is what actually stops the
leak.

* fix(agent): require Safety for spec-draft ask_user/submit_spec

Do not advertise or load re-registered control tools by name alone in
spec-draft mode. ask_user must be SideEffectRead+Allow and submit_spec
must be SideEffectWrite+Allow, matching the real tools. Apply the same
filter in tool_search and add spoof regression tests.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#642

* fix(agent): wire plan mode into TUI, CLI, and ACP entry points

Address the P1 finding that PermissionModePlan was documented but never
selected by /plan, zero exec, or ACP mode selectors. /plan on|off now
toggles the session permission mode (restoring the prior mode on off),
zero exec --plan selects plan for a run, and ACP advertises plan as a
client-selectable mode. Integration coverage for each entry path.

* fix(cli): reject --plan combined with --worktree

Worktree preparation runs in runExec before the plan permission mode is
assigned, so `zero exec --plan --worktree` could still trigger workspace
mutation ahead of the read-only gate. Reject the combination during
option validation, alongside the existing --use-spec/--skip-permissions-
unsafe conflict checks, so no worktree prep can occur.

Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.

* test(tools): assert spoofed tool schema doesn't leak via tool_search

The spoofed-control-tool regression only asserted on the description
string; Parameters() exposed no distinctive schema marker, so a
regression that leaked the schema without the description would still
have passed. Add a spoofed_secret property to the test tool's schema
and assert it's absent from result.Output alongside the description.

Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.

* fix(tui): gate local mutating commands behind plan mode

/plan on only flips the agent permission mode, which gates agent tool
calls. Local TUI commands that run entirely inside the TUI process
bypass that gate: /rewind restores workspace files from a checkpoint,
/export writes a transcript to disk, and /sandbox-setup spawns a
native host process. Add a shared plan-mode guard at the start of
dispatchCommand (mirroring the existing BTW-unavailable guard) that
rejects these three commands while permissionMode is
agent.PermissionModePlan, with regression coverage proving each is
blocked with no mutation/process spawn in plan mode and unaffected
outside it.

Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.

* fix(agent,specialist): layer plan mode system prompt and enforce read-only subagent mode

* Fix jatmn review findings for PR 642

* fix(agent,cli,tui): resolve CodeRabbit review comments on active turn model field and --plan permission mode conflict

* fix(agent): propagate permission mode to exec options and serialize ACP mode changes

Parse permissionMode in resolveExecPermissionMode, acquire turnMu.Lock in ACP handleSetMode to serialize mode changes with active turns, and block MCP subcommands in TUI plan mode.

Refs #642

* fix(agent,tui): update tests off removed tools.CoreTools/NewWriteFileTool/NewLSPNavigateTool wrappers

Those were thin unscoped wrappers around the Scoped variants, deleted
upstream in #706 since nothing else called them directly. Only these
tests still did; switch to the Scoped calls main's own tests already
use.

* fix(agent): fail-closed beforeTool vetoes and permission-mode plan guards

Keep beforeTool deny gates active under plan mode so hooksSuppressed no longer
fails open, and stop propagating --permission-mode for auto/ask/member children
so swarm members keep write tools. Apply --plan combination rejects to
--permission-mode plan as well.

Refs #853

* fix(agent): address CodeRabbit findings for plan-mode advertisement and entry paths

Unify plan/spec-draft tool advertisement in tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode
(with PermissionDeny short-circuit), cover ACP config and --permission-mode plan
list-tools paths, and allow bare /mcp while blocking mutating MCP subcommands.

Refs #853

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 10:15:29 +08:00

895 lines
37 KiB
Go

package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"reflect"
"sort"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestOptionsDeferThresholdFieldExists(t *testing.T) {
options := Options{DeferThreshold: 10}
if options.DeferThreshold != 10 {
t.Fatalf("expected DeferThreshold 10, got %d", options.DeferThreshold)
}
}
func TestToolResultLoadedToolsField(t *testing.T) {
result := ToolResult{LoadedTools: []string{"Alpha", "Beta"}}
if len(result.LoadedTools) != 2 || result.LoadedTools[0] != "Alpha" || result.LoadedTools[1] != "Beta" {
t.Fatalf("expected LoadedTools [Alpha Beta], got %#v", result.LoadedTools)
}
// Default zero value is nil for an ordinary result.
if (ToolResult{}).LoadedTools != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected nil LoadedTools by default")
}
}
// loadSignalTool returns Meta["load_tools"] like tool_search does, so we can
// assert executeToolCall lifts it into ToolResult.LoadedTools.
type loadSignalTool struct{ value string }
func (t loadSignalTool) Name() string { return "load_signal" }
func (t loadSignalTool) Description() string { return "emits a load_tools signal" }
func (t loadSignalTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (t loadSignalTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t loadSignalTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok"}
}
func (t loadSignalTool) RunWithOptions(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any, _ tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok", Meta: map[string]string{"load_tools": t.value}}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallLiftsLoadTools(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(loadSignalTool{value: " Alpha , Beta ,, "})
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "load_signal", Arguments: ""},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected abort error: %v", abortErr)
}
want := []string{"Alpha", "Beta"}
if len(result.LoadedTools) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("expected LoadedTools %#v, got %#v", want, result.LoadedTools)
}
for i := range want {
if result.LoadedTools[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("expected LoadedTools %#v, got %#v", want, result.LoadedTools)
}
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallNoLoadToolsMetaLeavesNil(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(secretEmittingTool{output: "plain"})
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "leak", Arguments: ""},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected abort error: %v", abortErr)
}
if result.LoadedTools != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected nil LoadedTools for a tool with no load_tools meta, got %#v", result.LoadedTools)
}
}
// fakeDeferredTool is deferred-eligible (implements Deferred() bool) like an MCP
// tool wrapper, so partitionTools counts and (when active) hides it.
type fakeDeferredTool struct {
name string
desc string
}
func (t fakeDeferredTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t fakeDeferredTool) Description() string { return t.desc }
func (t fakeDeferredTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (t fakeDeferredTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t fakeDeferredTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
// fakeToolSearchTool stands in for component D's tool_search (a non-deferred
// builtin) so the inactive path can assert it is dropped.
type fakeToolSearchTool struct{}
func (fakeToolSearchTool) Name() string { return "tool_search" }
func (fakeToolSearchTool) Description() string { return "load deferred tool schemas" }
func (fakeToolSearchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (fakeToolSearchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectNone, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, AdvertiseInAuto: true}
}
func (fakeToolSearchTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok"}
}
func toolDefinitionByName(definitions []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, name string) *zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
for i := range definitions {
if definitions[i].Name == name {
return &definitions[i]
}
}
return nil
}
func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) {
t.Helper()
for _, message := range request.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(message.Content, "Deferred tools:") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be appended as a user message: %q", message.Content)
}
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "tool a"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
options := Options{DeferThreshold: 0} // 0 => deferral disabled => inactive path.
// DeferThreshold 0 => deferral disabled => inactive path.
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, options, map[string]bool{})
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty reminder on inactive path, got %q", reminder)
}
// Strong byte-identity assertion: build the reference the LEGACY way (the old
// toolDefinitions construction — every visible/advertised tool's full schema,
// EXCEPT tool_search, alpha-sorted by name) and require an exact DeepEqual. This
// pins that the inactive partition produces the pre-deferral output verbatim,
// not merely the same set of names.
reference := legacyToolDefinitions(registry, PermissionModeAuto, options)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(exposed, reference) {
t.Fatalf("inactive partition not byte-identical to legacy toolDefinitions:\n got %#v\nwant %#v", exposed, reference)
}
// Belt-and-suspenders: tool_search is dropped, the deferred tool keeps its full
// schema, and only the expected names are present.
for _, def := range exposed {
if def.Name == "tool_search" {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must be dropped on inactive path, got %#v", exposed)
}
}
wantNames := map[string]bool{"read_file": true, "mcp__srv__a": true}
if len(exposed) != len(wantNames) {
t.Fatalf("expected %d exposed tools, got %d: %#v", len(wantNames), len(exposed), exposed)
}
for _, def := range exposed {
if !wantNames[def.Name] {
t.Fatalf("unexpected exposed tool %q", def.Name)
}
if def.Name == "mcp__srv__a" && def.Parameters["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("expected full schema for deferred tool on inactive path, got %#v", def.Parameters)
}
}
}
// legacyToolDefinitions reconstructs the PRE-deferral tool-list builder: every
// tool that is visible (passes the operator filters) and advertised for the mode,
// EXCEPT tool_search, rendered with its full schema and alpha-sorted by name. It
// is the byte-identity reference for the inactive partition path.
func legacyToolDefinitions(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
for _, tool := range registry.All() {
if !ToolVisible(tool, permissionMode, options.EnabledTools, options.DisabledTools) {
continue
}
if tool.Name() == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
continue
}
definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: tool.Name(),
Description: tool.Description(),
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
})
}
sort.Slice(definitions, func(left, right int) bool {
return definitions[left].Name < definitions[right].Name
})
return definitions
}
// Below-threshold-but-eligible (count < threshold) is also inactive.
func TestPartitionToolsBelowThresholdInactive(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "a"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__b", desc: "b"})
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 10}, map[string]bool{})
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty reminder below threshold, got %q", reminder)
}
if len(exposed) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected both deferred tools exposed below threshold, got %#v", exposed)
}
}
// FIX 6(a): a deferred tool removed by DisabledTools must NOT count toward the
// eligible total. With N deferred registered and threshold == N, disabling one
// drops the surviving eligible count to N-1 < threshold, so the partition takes
// the INACTIVE path (empty discovery text, all VISIBLE tools exposed with full
// schemas, the disabled one filtered out entirely).
func TestPartitionToolsDisabledDeferredDropsBelowThresholdInactive(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DeferThreshold: 2,
DisabledTools: []string{"mcp__srv__beta"},
}, map[string]bool{})
// Eligible drops to 1 (< threshold 2) => inactive: empty reminder.
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected inactive path (empty reminder) when a disable drops eligible below threshold, got %q", reminder)
}
// Only the surviving visible tool is exposed, with its FULL schema; the disabled
// tool is filtered out entirely.
if len(exposed) != 1 || exposed[0].Name != "mcp__srv__alpha" {
t.Fatalf("expected only mcp__srv__alpha exposed on inactive path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if exposed[0].Parameters["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("surviving deferred tool must keep its full schema on inactive path, got %#v", exposed[0].Parameters)
}
}
// FIX 6(b): with deferral ACTIVE, a DisabledTools-hidden deferred tool must never
// influence discovery NOR be exposed — it is filtered out before the partition
// even considers it.
func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__gamma", desc: "gamma"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // usable loader => deferral can activate
// 3 deferred, disable beta => 2 surviving eligible, threshold 2 => active.
exposed, discovery := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DeferThreshold: 2,
DisabledTools: []string{"mcp__srv__beta"},
}, map[string]bool{})
if discovery == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected active path with discovery text for the unloaded tools")
}
if strings.Contains(discovery, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("disabled deferred tool must not appear in discovery text, got %q", discovery)
}
for _, def := range exposed {
if def.Name == "mcp__srv__beta" {
t.Fatalf("disabled deferred tool must not be exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
}
search := toolDefinitionByName(exposed, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must be exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if search.Description != discovery {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery text\n got: %q\nwant: %q", search.Description, discovery)
}
if !strings.Contains(discovery, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("discovery text must list the surviving deferred source, got %q", discovery)
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
loaded := map[string]bool{"mcp__srv__alpha": true}
// 2 eligible deferred tools, threshold 2 => active.
exposed, discovery := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, loaded)
exposedNames := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range exposed {
exposedNames[def.Name] = true
}
if !exposedNames["read_file"] {
t.Fatalf("expected builtin read_file exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if !exposedNames["mcp__srv__alpha"] {
t.Fatalf("expected loaded deferred tool exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
if exposedNames["mcp__srv__beta"] {
t.Fatalf("unloaded deferred tool must be hidden from exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
if discovery == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected non-empty discovery text for the hidden tool")
}
search := toolDefinitionByName(exposed, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("stable tool_search catalog must retain already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // usable loader => deferral can activate
loaded := map[string]bool{"mcp__srv__alpha": true, "mcp__srv__beta": true}
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, loaded)
exposedNames := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range exposed {
exposedNames[def.Name] = true
}
if !exposedNames["mcp__srv__alpha"] || !exposedNames["mcp__srv__beta"] {
t.Fatalf("expected both loaded deferred tools exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("stable catalog must retain all deferred names after loading, got %q", reminder)
}
}
func TestRunLoadsDeferredToolThenAdvertisesNextTurn(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
// load_signal asks the loop to load mcp__srv__alpha next turn.
registry.Register(loadSignalTool{value: "mcp__srv__alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
// A real, usable tool_search must be registered for deferral to activate
// (otherwise the loop falls back to eager so it never strands the loader).
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{ // turn 1: call load_signal
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "load_signal"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // turn 2: final answer
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred tools => active
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected two turns, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
// Turn 1: alpha is hidden (not advertised), and discovery lives on the
// tool_search definition rather than a trailing user message.
turn1Tools := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
turn1Tools[def.Name] = true
}
if turn1Tools["mcp__srv__alpha"] {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 must not advertise the not-yet-loaded deferred tool")
}
assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t, provider.requests[0])
search1 := toolDefinitionByName(provider.requests[0].Tools, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search1 == nil {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 must expose tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(search1.Description, "Tool discovery") || !strings.Contains(search1.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry deferred discovery, got %q", search1.Description)
}
// Turn 2: alpha is now loaded and advertised with a full schema.
turn2Tools := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range provider.requests[1].Tools {
turn2Tools[def.Name] = true
}
if !turn2Tools["mcp__srv__alpha"] {
t.Fatalf("turn 2 must advertise the loaded deferred tool, got %#v", provider.requests[1].Tools)
}
if turn2Tools["mcp__srv__beta"] {
t.Fatalf("beta was never loaded; it must stay hidden in turn 2")
}
// The discovery text must NOT persist into the returned message history.
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Tool discovery") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be persisted in result.Messages")
}
}
}
// TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery drives a mid-run
// context-limit error that triggers reactive compaction+retry while deferral is
// ACTIVE and a deferred tool is already loaded. The retried turn must NOT be
// degraded to the empty-loaded/no-discovery state: it must still advertise the
// loaded tool's FULL schema and keep tool_search discovery for hidden tools.
func TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
// load_signal asks the loop to load mcp__srv__alpha next turn.
registry.Register(loadSignalTool{value: "mcp__srv__alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
// A real, usable tool_search must be registered for deferral to activate
// (otherwise the loop falls back to eager so it never strands the loader).
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
// Request indices (mockProvider plays one turn per request, in order):
// 0: turn 1 — calls load_signal (loads mcp__srv__alpha for later turns)
// 1: turn 2 — emits a context-limit error MID-stream -> reactive recover
// 2: the summarize call inside Compact (must return non-empty text)
// 3: the RETRY request rebuilt after compaction — asserted below
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{ // turn 1: call load_signal
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "load_signal"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // turn 2: mid-stream context-limit error -> reactive compaction
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "prompt is too long: 250000 tokens > 200000 maximum"},
},
{ // summarize call inside Compact
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // retry of turn 2 after compaction: final answer
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
// A large user prompt so the elided middle is big enough that reactive
// compaction actually shrinks the history (recover only retries when it can
// shrink). ContextWindow is set high enough that PROACTIVE compaction (which
// fires at 0.8 * window at the top of a turn) does NOT trigger first — so the
// only summarize call is the reactive one, keeping the request sequence
// predictable: turn1, errored turn2, summarize, retry.
bigPrompt := strings.Repeat("work on this task. ", 2000)
result, err := Run(context.Background(), bigPrompt, provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred tools => active
ContextWindow: 1_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("run returned error: %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer from the retried turn, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
// 4 provider calls: turn1, errored turn2, summarize, retry.
if len(provider.requests) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("expected 4 provider requests (turn1, errored turn2, summarize, retry), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
retry := provider.requests[3]
// The retry must advertise the loaded deferred tool with its FULL schema —
// NOT re-hide it as the empty-loaded partition would.
var alpha *zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
for i := range retry.Tools {
if retry.Tools[i].Name == "mcp__srv__alpha" {
alpha = &retry.Tools[i]
}
if retry.Tools[i].Name == "mcp__srv__beta" {
t.Fatalf("retry must keep the never-loaded deferred tool hidden, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
}
if alpha == nil {
t.Fatalf("retry must still advertise the loaded deferred tool mcp__srv__alpha, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
if alpha.Parameters["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("retry must advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema, got %#v", alpha.Parameters)
}
assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t, retry)
search := toolDefinitionByName(retry.Tools, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("retry must expose tool_search for still-hidden tools, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "Tool discovery") || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("retry tool_search description must carry deferred discovery, got %q", search.Description)
}
// The discovery text must NOT persist into the returned message history, even on
// the reactive-retry path.
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Tool discovery") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be persisted in result.Messages")
}
}
}
// connectErrorProvider returns a connect-time error (StreamCompletion itself
// returns a non-nil error) on the request at index errAtRequest, exercising the
// FIRST reactive-recovery block in the loop (loop.go:99). Every other request
// streams the corresponding turn's events. It mirrors mockProvider's recording so
// the rebuilt retry request can be asserted.
type connectErrorProvider struct {
turns [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent
errAtRequest int
errText string
requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
func (provider *connectErrorProvider) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
provider.requests = append(provider.requests, request)
index := len(provider.requests) - 1
if index == provider.errAtRequest {
return nil, errors.New(provider.errText)
}
events := []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}}
if index < len(provider.turns) {
events = provider.turns[index]
}
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, len(events))
for _, event := range events {
ch <- event
}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
// TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery mirrors
// TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery but drives the
// CONNECT-TIME error path: StreamCompletion itself returns a non-nil
// context-limit error (rather than a mid-stream StreamEventError). With deferral
// ACTIVE and a deferred tool already loaded, the rebuilt retry request must still
// advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema AND carry tool_search discovery —
// i.e. the first reactive block reuses exposed, not the empty-loaded
// partition.
func TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(loadSignalTool{value: "mcp__srv__alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
// A real, usable tool_search must be registered for deferral to activate
// (otherwise the loop falls back to eager so it never strands the loader).
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
// Request indices:
// 0: turn 1 — calls load_signal (loads mcp__srv__alpha for later turns)
// 1: turn 2 — StreamCompletion returns a connect-time context-limit error
// 2: the summarize call inside Compact (must return non-empty text)
// 3: the RETRY request rebuilt after compaction — asserted below
provider := &connectErrorProvider{
errAtRequest: 1,
errText: "prompt is too long: 250000 tokens > 200000 maximum",
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{ // turn 1: call load_signal
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "load_signal"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
nil, // index 1: replaced by the connect-time error
{ // index 2: summarize call inside Compact
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // index 3: retry of turn 2 after compaction: final answer
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
bigPrompt := strings.Repeat("work on this task. ", 2000)
result, err := Run(context.Background(), bigPrompt, provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred tools => active
ContextWindow: 1_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("run returned error: %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer from the retried turn, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
// 4 provider calls: turn1, errored-connect turn2, summarize, retry.
if len(provider.requests) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("expected 4 provider requests (turn1, errored turn2, summarize, retry), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
retry := provider.requests[3]
// The retry must advertise the loaded deferred tool with its FULL schema and
// keep the never-loaded one hidden.
var alpha *zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
for i := range retry.Tools {
if retry.Tools[i].Name == "mcp__srv__alpha" {
alpha = &retry.Tools[i]
}
if retry.Tools[i].Name == "mcp__srv__beta" {
t.Fatalf("retry must keep the never-loaded deferred tool hidden, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
}
if alpha == nil {
t.Fatalf("retry must still advertise the loaded deferred tool mcp__srv__alpha, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
if alpha.Parameters["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("retry must advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema, got %#v", alpha.Parameters)
}
assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t, retry)
search := toolDefinitionByName(retry.Tools, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("retry must expose tool_search for still-hidden tools, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "Tool discovery") || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("retry tool_search description must carry deferred discovery, got %q", search.Description)
}
// The discovery text must NOT persist into the returned message history.
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Tool discovery") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be persisted in result.Messages")
}
}
}
// TestAllowlistedDeferredToolsKeepToolSearchReachable is the FIX 1+2 dead-end
// regression: N deferred tools are registered alongside tool_search, the operator
// allowlists ONLY the N deferred names (NOT tool_search), and DeferThreshold == N.
// Deferral must ACTIVATE, the partition must STILL expose tool_search (the gateway
// to the allowlisted tools), and a tool_search call must be DISPATCH-ALLOWED.
func TestAllowlistedDeferredToolsKeepToolSearchReachable(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
deferredNames := []string{"mcp__srv__alpha", "mcp__srv__beta"}
for _, name := range deferredNames {
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: name, desc: name + " tool"})
}
// The REAL tool_search (so partitionTools can look it up by name and dispatch
// can run it through registry.RunWithOptions).
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
options := Options{
DeferThreshold: len(deferredNames), // threshold == N => active
// Allowlist the deferred tools but NOT tool_search.
EnabledTools: append([]string{}, deferredNames...),
}
exposed, discovery := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, options, map[string]bool{})
// Deferral active => non-empty tool_search discovery for hidden deferred tools.
if discovery == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected deferral active (non-empty discovery) at threshold N, got empty")
}
if !strings.Contains(discovery, "tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("discovery must instruct the model to call tool_search, got %q", discovery)
}
// FIX 2(a): tool_search is exposed even though the allowlist omits it.
exposedNames := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range exposed {
exposedNames[def.Name] = true
}
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must be exposed on the active path despite the allowlist omitting it, got %#v", exposed)
}
search := toolDefinitionByName(exposed, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil || search.Description != discovery {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery text, got %#v discovery=%q", search, discovery)
}
// The allowlisted-but-unloaded deferred tools are hidden (not exposed).
for _, name := range deferredNames {
if exposedNames[name] {
t.Fatalf("unloaded deferred tool %q must be hidden when active, got %#v", name, exposed)
}
}
// FIX 2(b): a tool_search call must be DISPATCH-ALLOWED (not rejected by the
// allowlist that omits it). It runs through the registry and reports a load.
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "tool_search", Arguments: `{"query":"select:mcp__srv__alpha"}`},
PermissionModeAuto,
options,
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected abort error: %v", abortErr)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("tool_search call was rejected: status=%s output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if result.DenialReason == DenialFiltered {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must not be denied by the allowlist, got DenialFiltered: %q", result.Output)
}
if len(result.LoadedTools) != 1 || result.LoadedTools[0] != "mcp__srv__alpha" {
t.Fatalf("tool_search call must load mcp__srv__alpha, got LoadedTools=%#v", result.LoadedTools)
}
}
// TestDisabledToolSearchStaysHiddenAndRejectedWhenActive verifies an explicit
// DisabledTools entry for tool_search is STILL honored on the active path: the
// loader is not exposed and a call to it is rejected (FIX 2 exempts the allowlist
// only, never the denylist).
func TestDisabledToolSearchFallsBackToEager(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
options := Options{
DeferThreshold: 2,
DisabledTools: []string{"tool_search"},
}
// tool_search is explicitly disabled, so it can never run. Deferral must NOT
// activate — otherwise the loop would hide the deferred tools behind a loader
// the dispatch gate rejects (an inescapable dead-end). Expect the eager /
// inactive fallback: every deferred tool exposed with its full schema, no
// tool_search definition, and an empty reminder.
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, options, map[string]bool{})
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("inactive fallback must emit no reminder, got %q", reminder)
}
exposedNames := make(map[string]bool, len(exposed))
for _, def := range exposed {
exposedNames[def.Name] = true
}
if exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must not be advertised when disabled, got %#v", exposed)
}
if !exposedNames["mcp__srv__alpha"] || !exposedNames["mcp__srv__beta"] {
t.Fatalf("deferred tools must be exposed eagerly when deferral is inactive, got %#v", exposed)
}
// The deferred tools themselves stay directly callable (not stranded behind a
// disabled loader).
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "mcp__srv__alpha", Arguments: `{}`},
PermissionModeAuto,
options,
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected abort error: %v", abortErr)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("deferred tool must be callable under eager fallback, got status=%s output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// fakeDeferredMutatorTool is a deferred-eligible tool with mutating Safety
// (SideEffectWrite), standing in for a real write/mutator MCP tool that would
// be hidden behind tool_search once deferral activates.
type fakeDeferredMutatorTool struct{ name string }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Description() string { return "mutates the workspace, deferred" }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "mutates"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "mutated"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
// TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema guards the concern
// raised in PR #642 review (jatmn, P2): that tool_search filters deferred
// candidates only by EnabledTools/DisabledTools, not by plan-mode visibility,
// so a plan-mode model could call `tool_search select:<deferred write tool>`
// and receive that tool's full schema even though a direct call to it is
// correctly denied the following turn.
//
// tool_search's own Safety is SideEffectNone, and ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode (the
// same gate executeToolCall uses to deny a direct call) requires
// SideEffect==Read to advertise a tool in plan mode. That means tool_search
// itself is never advertised, never activates deferral (loaderUsable in
// partitionToolsCached requires ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)), and
// is denied at dispatch like any other hidden tool if a stale/adversarial
// call reaches it anyway — so a deferred mutator's schema can never reach the
// model through tool_search while in plan mode. This test pins that
// end-to-end: tool_search is absent from the advertised tool list, and a
// forced call to it is denied before rendering any tool schema.
func TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate2"})
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{ // turn 1: force a call to tool_search even though it should not be advertised.
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: tools.ToolSearchToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"select:mcp__srv__mutate"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // turn 2: final answer.
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred mutators registered => eligible for deferral.
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// tool_search (and the deferred mutators) must not be advertised in plan
// mode's turn 1 tool list at all.
for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
if def.Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
if def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate" || def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate2" {
t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise a deferred mutator, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
}
// The forced call must be denied outright, never a loaded-schema result:
// the tool result must not mention the mutator's name or carry a
// load_tools signal.
var toolMessage string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolMessage = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(toolMessage, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search call denied in plan mode, got %q", toolMessage)
}
if strings.Contains(toolMessage, "mcp__srv__mutate") {
t.Fatalf("denial must not leak the deferred mutator's name/schema, got %q", toolMessage)
}
}