Files
zero/internal/cli/sandbox.go
55fa05f0ab fix(sandbox): deny reads of Zero credential stores (#681)
* fix(sandbox): deny reads of zero credential stores

* fix(sandbox): address PR review comments

- Deny reads of mcp-oauth-tokens.json.secret in the default Zero
  config candidates: file-backed oauth stores keep their encryption
  secret in a sibling .secret file, so the default MCP token store
  needs the same protection as the override paths (CodeRabbit).
- Clarify that explicit credential-file overrides are still filtered
  by on-disk existence like every other candidate (Copilot).
- Align the zeroUserConfigDir doc comment with config.UserConfigDir:
  macOS honors XDG_CONFIG_HOME before falling back to ~/.config
  (Copilot).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): deny the whole Zero config dir, not itemized filenames

Address code review on PR #681:

- Deny credentialDenyReadPaths' Zero-config candidate as the containing
  directory instead of an itemized filename list. The token/credential/
  config stores each publish through a randomly-named .tmp-<pid>-<nanos>
  sibling before their atomic rename, and the legacy MCP token store
  leaves a mcp-oauth-tokens.json.migrated backup after importing it —
  none of those names were covered by the old itemized list, so a
  sandboxed command could read them under the read-all posture.

- Stop dropping default candidates that don't exist yet at profile-build
  time. A store created later in a long-lived sandboxed session (e.g. a
  concurrent ) previously got no deny rule at all; every
  backend already treats a deny rule over a not-yet-existing path as a
  harmless no-op that still takes effect once the path appears.

- Resolve ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH / ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH overrides
  the same way the token stores resolve them (relative-to-cwd, no ~
  expansion) instead of through normalizeProfilePath, which tilde-expands
  and so could derive a deny path different from where the store actually
  writes.

Adds regression coverage for the directory-wide deny (including the
migrated backup and synthetic temp-file siblings), for building the
profile before the store directory exists, and for the tilde-override
resolution mismatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): address macOS deny-path test and config parity

Recompute the expected Zero config deny path after MkdirAll and resolve
the temp base with EvalSymlinks so macOS /var -> /private/var does not
flake TestPermissionProfileDeniesZeroCredentialFiles. Add a parity test
that sandbox.zeroUserConfigDir stays aligned with config.UserConfigDir.

Co-authored-by: PierrunoYT <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): harden credential deny paths

* test(cli): normalize credential deny baseline

* fix(sandbox): close credential path gaps

* test(sandbox): normalize command credential path

* fix(sandbox): handle absent credential paths safely

* fix(sandbox): protect MCP OAuth siblings

* fix(sandbox): protect OAuth lock siblings

* docs(sandbox): clarify Linux future-path limits

* test(sandbox): probe credential store reads in the Linux smoke test

The smoke test wired HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME at credential directories but never
attempted a read through the sandbox, so it could not catch a real-bwrap
regression for the paths this change protects. Write a secret into ~/.aws and
$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero and add both to the deny-read table.

* fix(sandbox): keep the credential deny usable, current, and unguessable

Four problems with the credential deny baseline, all in the same mechanism.

The whole-directory deny over $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero also hid the supported
user plugin, specialist, and command roots, whose commands and scripts are
executed through this sandbox, so an installed user plugin could no longer
start. Narrowing the deny to itemized files was not an option: the stores
publish through temporary names and a concurrent login can add a store that
did not exist when the profile was built, and only a directory rule covers
both. The directory deny therefore stays, and the non-secret subtrees are
carved back out through a new DenyReadCarveouts field: seatbelt re-allows
them after the deny (SBPL is last-match-wins) plus ancestor metadata so path
resolution can reach them, and bubblewrap masks the directory with --perms
111 instead of 000 -- unlistable but traversable -- and re-binds the carveout
read-only before the tmpfs is remounted read-only.

A relative ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH, ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH, or
XDG_CONFIG_HOME was resolved against the command directory only, while
oauth.ResolveStorePath and mcp.ResolveTokenStorePath call filepath.Abs, i.e.
resolve against the Zero process working directory. A command run from a
subdirectory therefore had the wrong path denied and the real store stayed
readable under the read-all posture. Relative candidates now resolve against
both directories, since the process that resolves the value is not
necessarily the one that writes the store. The regression test runs the
command from a different directory than the process, which the previous
tests did not.

bubblewrap cannot mount over a path that is absent when the namespace is
assembled, so a store created mid-session stayed readable through the live
read-only host-root bind for the rest of a long-lived sandbox session. The
directories Zero owns -- its config directory and the per-store publication
directories -- are now reported as EnsureDenyReadDirs and created (0700)
before the namespace is assembled, so their mask always exists. Third-party
stores such as ~/.aws are still skipped when absent: Zero must not create
them, and that limitation stays documented on the field.

The fixed <store>.tmp publication sibling made the plaintext token, and via
the same path its encryption key, observable to a same-user sandboxed process
with write access to an override parent: it could wait for the known name and
rename the opened inode into an allowed path. Both stores now publish through
a per-store <store>.publish directory with a randomly-named file inside. The
directory name is derived from the store path, so the profile can deny it up
front, while the random name inside is what cannot be waited for or renamed
away. A test keeps the duplicated suffix in step with oauth.PublicationDirSuffix.

Also adds the seatbelt render coverage that was missing: dropping
DenyReadIfExists from denyReadRules made every credential store readable
again on macOS without failing a single test.

* fix(sandbox): close credential deny review gaps

Preserve process credential roots alongside command overrides while limiting host precreation and read carveouts to trusted process-derived paths.

Canonicalize future credential roots through existing path aliases, reject symlink carveouts, and collapse automatic masks already covered by user or automatic directory denies. Normalize the policy golden and add regression coverage across profile, Seatbelt, and bubblewrap rendering.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): normalize credential carveout paths

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): canonicalize backend credential masks

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(sandbox): normalize backend mask expectations

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): fail closed for replaceable token stores

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): allow keyring token path overrides

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbdfa-8469-731e-87c0-b26b7641cf59
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): harden command credential roots

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-c723-74d9-a323-026040b94436
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): close credential deny review gaps

Reapply credential denies after Seatbelt extension carveouts and model the legacy MCP token path as a migration input rather than an atomic writer.

Retain Bubblewrap fail-closed markers for OAuth outputs exposed through readable carveouts, and add regressions for both platform policies.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbf55-f6b0-71fc-b384-652ba32b9645
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: PierrunoYT <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 07:33:29 +08:00

732 lines
25 KiB
Go

package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
zeroSandbox "github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
type sandboxCommandOptions struct {
json bool
confirm bool
effective bool
reason string
path string
}
const permissionProfileScopeNote = "permissionProfile is derived from this process's environment and working directory; a command run with its own environment can add further credential deny-read entries."
func runSandbox(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
if len(args) == 0 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "sandbox subcommand required. Use `zero sandbox policy` or `zero sandbox grants list`.")
}
switch args[0] {
case "-h", "--help", "help":
if err := writeSandboxHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
case "policy":
return runSandboxPolicy(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "setup":
return runSandboxSetup(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "check":
return runSandboxCheck(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "grants":
return runSandboxGrants(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
default:
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown sandbox subcommand %q", args[0]))
}
}
func runSandboxPolicy(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseSandboxCommandOptions(args, sandboxCommandFlags{allowEffective: true})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxPolicyHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot("", deps)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
store, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
// Surface config resolution failures instead of silently falling back to
// DefaultPolicy(), which would otherwise misreport the active sandbox posture.
resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitProvider)
}
policy := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(zeroSandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox)
backend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(zeroSandbox.BackendOptions{})
plan := backend.BuildPlan(workspaceRoot, policy)
if options.effective {
// Compute the effective write roots exactly the way the engine does:
// workspace root first, then the user-granted extras from the global
// config. A stale config entry (e.g. a directory that no longer
// exists) must not crash `zero sandbox policy --effective` — fall
// back to the workspace root and surface the error visibly instead.
writeRoots := []string{workspaceRoot}
var writeRootsErr error
if scope, scopeErr := zeroSandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots); scopeErr != nil {
writeRootsErr = scopeErr
// NewScope only fails on extras, so a workspace-only scope cannot
// fail; use it so the fallback renders the same symlink-resolved
// workspace root as the success path.
if fallback, fallbackErr := zeroSandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, nil); fallbackErr == nil {
writeRoots = fallback.Roots()
}
} else {
writeRoots = scope.Roots()
}
return runSandboxPolicyEffective(options, workspaceRoot, policy, backend, plan, store.FilePath(), writeRoots, writeRootsErr, stdout)
}
if options.json {
// The profile here is built from Zero's own environment and working
// directory, because that is all this command has: no command has been
// chosen yet. A nested command carries its own cwd and env, and the
// credential baseline resolves relative token overrides against those, so
// an executed command can carry MORE denyReadIfExists entries than this
// view lists. Say so in the payload rather than leaving a consumer to
// assume it is the whole picture (see PermissionProfileFromPolicy).
payload := struct {
Policy zeroSandbox.Policy `json:"policy"`
Backend zeroSandbox.Backend `json:"backend"`
Plan zeroSandbox.BackendPlan `json:"plan"`
GrantsPath string `json:"grantsPath"`
PermissionProfileNote string `json:"permissionProfileNote"`
}{
Policy: policy,
Backend: backend,
Plan: plan,
GrantsPath: store.FilePath(),
PermissionProfileNote: permissionProfileScopeNote,
}
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, payload); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, formatSandboxPolicy(workspaceRoot, policy, backend, plan, store.FilePath())); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func runSandboxSetup(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseSandboxCommandOptions(args, sandboxCommandFlags{})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxSetupHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot("", deps)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitProvider)
}
policy := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(zeroSandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox)
backend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(zeroSandbox.BackendOptions{})
if backend.Platform != "windows" {
message := "No native sandbox setup is required for " + displayPlatform(backend.Platform)
return writeSandboxSetupResult(stdout, options.json, sandboxSetupResult{
Platform: displayPlatform(backend.Platform),
Backend: backend.Name,
Ran: false,
Message: message,
})
}
if backend.Name != zeroSandbox.BackendWindowsRestrictedToken || !backend.Available || backend.Executable == "" {
message := "Windows sandbox setup helper is not available"
if strings.TrimSpace(backend.Message) != "" {
message += ": " + backend.Message
}
return writeAppError(stderr, message, exitProvider)
}
scope, err := zeroSandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
profile := zeroSandbox.PermissionProfileFromPolicy(workspaceRoot, policy, scope)
// Resolve the setup helper the same way the runner is resolved: a standalone
// .exe when shipped (release), else self-dispatch via the running zero binary
// (dev / plain build). This mirrors the backend's command-runner resolution
// so `zero sandbox setup` works in every layout, not just release.
setupHelper := zeroSandbox.ResolveWindowsSandboxSetupHelper(nil)
if !setupHelper.Available() {
return writeAppError(stderr, "Windows sandbox setup helper is not available", exitProvider)
}
setupArgs, err := zeroSandbox.BuildWindowsSandboxSetupArgs(zeroSandbox.WindowsSandboxSetupArgsOptions{
CommandCWD: workspaceRoot,
WorkspaceRoots: []string{workspaceRoot},
PermissionProfile: profile,
})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
setupArgs = append(append([]string{}, setupHelper.ArgsPrefix...), setupArgs...)
if err := deps.runSandboxSetupHelper(setupHelper.Name, setupArgs, stdout, stderr); err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "Windows sandbox setup failed: "+err.Error(), exitProvider)
}
return writeSandboxSetupResult(stdout, options.json, sandboxSetupResult{
Platform: "windows",
Backend: backend.Name,
Helper: setupHelper.Name,
Ran: true,
Message: "Windows sandbox setup complete",
})
}
type sandboxSetupResult struct {
Platform string `json:"platform"`
Backend zeroSandbox.BackendName `json:"backend"`
Helper string `json:"helper,omitempty"`
Ran bool `json:"ran"`
Message string `json:"message"`
}
func writeSandboxSetupResult(stdout io.Writer, asJSON bool, result sandboxSetupResult) int {
if asJSON {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, result.Message); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
if result.Helper != "" {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "helper: "+result.Helper); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
return exitSuccess
}
func displayPlatform(platform string) string {
if strings.TrimSpace(platform) == "" {
return "this platform"
}
return platform
}
// sandboxGuards is the resolved set of pre-execution safety guards the engine
// applies for the effective policy. There is no layered/merged config today, so
// the "effective" view is the fully-resolved DefaultPolicy plus the platform
// backend and the always-on static guards.
type sandboxGuards struct {
InteractiveCommand bool `json:"interactiveCommand"`
Network bool `json:"network"`
Workspace bool `json:"workspace"`
}
func resolveSandboxGuards(policy zeroSandbox.Policy) sandboxGuards {
return sandboxGuards{
// Interactive-command detection is a static pre-exec guard that always
// runs in the bash tool regardless of policy toggles.
InteractiveCommand: true,
Network: policy.Network == zeroSandbox.NetworkDeny,
Workspace: policy.EnforceWorkspace,
}
}
func runSandboxPolicyEffective(options sandboxCommandOptions, workspaceRoot string, policy zeroSandbox.Policy, backend zeroSandbox.Backend, plan zeroSandbox.BackendPlan, grantsPath string, writeRoots []string, writeRootsErr error, stdout io.Writer) int {
guards := resolveSandboxGuards(policy)
if options.json {
payload := struct {
WorkspaceRoot string `json:"workspaceRoot"`
WriteRoots []string `json:"writeRoots"`
// WriteRootsError carries the fail-soft scope construction error so
// JSON consumers see the same signal as the text write_roots_error
// line: a stale sandbox.additionalWriteRoots entry means the real
// entrypoints would refuse to launch, not run workspace-only.
WriteRootsError string `json:"writeRootsError,omitempty"`
Policy zeroSandbox.Policy `json:"policy"`
Backend zeroSandbox.Backend `json:"backend"`
Plan zeroSandbox.BackendPlan `json:"plan"`
Guards sandboxGuards `json:"guards"`
GrantsPath string `json:"grantsPath"`
PermissionProfileNote string `json:"permissionProfileNote"`
}{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
WriteRoots: writeRoots,
Policy: policy,
Backend: backend,
Plan: plan,
Guards: guards,
GrantsPath: grantsPath,
PermissionProfileNote: permissionProfileScopeNote,
}
if writeRootsErr != nil {
payload.WriteRootsError = writeRootsErr.Error()
}
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, payload); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, formatEffectiveSandboxPolicy(workspaceRoot, policy, backend, plan, guards, grantsPath, writeRoots, writeRootsErr)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func formatEffectiveSandboxPolicy(workspaceRoot string, policy zeroSandbox.Policy, backend zeroSandbox.Backend, plan zeroSandbox.BackendPlan, guards sandboxGuards, grantsPath string, writeRoots []string, writeRootsErr error) string {
lines := []string{
"Zero effective sandbox policy",
"root: " + workspaceRoot,
"mode: " + string(policy.Mode),
"network: " + string(policy.Network),
"enforce_workspace: " + fmt.Sprintf("%t", policy.EnforceWorkspace),
"write_roots: " + strings.Join(writeRoots, ", "),
"permission_profile_note: " + permissionProfileScopeNote,
}
if writeRootsErr != nil {
// Fail soft, visibly: a stale sandbox.additionalWriteRoots entry must
// not hide the rest of the status output.
lines = append(lines, "write_roots_error: "+writeRootsErr.Error())
}
lines = append(lines,
"backend: "+string(backend.Name),
"target_backend: "+string(plan.TargetBackend),
"support_level: "+string(plan.SupportLevel),
"command_wrapped: "+fmt.Sprintf("%t", plan.CommandWrapped),
"enforcement_level: "+string(plan.EnforcementLevel),
"requires_platform_sandbox: "+fmt.Sprintf("%t", plan.RequiresPlatformSandbox),
"interactive_command_guard: "+enabledLabel(guards.InteractiveCommand),
"network_guard: "+enabledLabel(guards.Network),
"workspace_guard: "+enabledLabel(guards.Workspace),
"grants: "+grantsPath,
)
if plan.DowngradeReason != "" {
lines = append(lines, "downgrade_reason: "+plan.DowngradeReason)
}
if backend.Platform != "" {
lines = append(lines, "backend_platform: "+backend.Platform)
}
for _, restriction := range plan.Restrictions {
lines = append(lines, "restriction: "+restriction)
}
for _, warning := range plan.Warnings {
lines = append(lines, "warning: "+warning)
}
return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
func enabledLabel(enabled bool) string {
if enabled {
return "enabled"
}
return "disabled"
}
func runSandboxGrants(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
if len(args) == 0 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "sandbox grants subcommand required. Use `zero sandbox grants list`.")
}
switch args[0] {
case "-h", "--help", "help":
if err := writeSandboxGrantsHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
case "list":
options, help, err := parseSandboxCommandOptions(args[1:], sandboxCommandFlags{})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxGrantsHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
store, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
grants, err := store.List()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
prefixes, err := store.ListCommandPrefixes()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, struct {
Grants []zeroSandbox.Grant `json:"grants"`
CommandPrefixes []zeroSandbox.CommandPrefixGrant `json:"commandPrefixes,omitempty"`
}{Grants: grants, CommandPrefixes: prefixes}); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, zeroSandbox.FormatGrantListWithCommandPrefixes(grants, prefixes)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
case "allow", "deny":
return runSandboxGrantSet(args[0], args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "revoke":
return runSandboxGrantRevoke(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "clear":
return runSandboxGrantClear(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
default:
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown sandbox grants subcommand %q", args[0]))
}
}
func runSandboxGrantSet(command string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, positional, help, err := parseSandboxPositionalOptions(args)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxGrantSetHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if len(positional) != 1 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero sandbox grants "+command+" <tool> [--path file] [--reason text] [--json]")
}
decision := zeroSandbox.GrantAllow
if command == "deny" {
decision = zeroSandbox.GrantDeny
}
store, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
input := zeroSandbox.GrantInput{
ToolName: positional[0],
Decision: decision,
Reason: options.reason,
}
if options.path != "" {
// --path persists an exact-file grant. Resolve to an absolute path so it
// matches how scopes are stored (and how `revoke --path` looks them up).
abs, absErr := filepath.Abs(options.path)
if absErr != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, absErr.Error())
}
input.Scope = abs
input.ScopeKind = zeroSandbox.ScopeFile
}
grant, err := store.Grant(input)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, struct {
Grant zeroSandbox.Grant `json:"grant"`
}{Grant: grant}); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Sandbox grant saved: %s [%s]\n", grant.ToolName, grant.Decision); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func runSandboxGrantRevoke(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, positional, help, err := parseSandboxPositionalOptions(args)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxGrantRevokeHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if len(positional) != 1 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero sandbox grants revoke <tool> [--path file] [--json]")
}
store, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
// With --path, revoke only the grant scoped to that exact file/dir; otherwise
// revoke every grant for the tool (the pre-existing behavior).
var revoked int
if options.path != "" {
revoked, err = store.RevokePath(positional[0], options.path)
} else {
revoked, err = store.Revoke(positional[0])
}
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, struct {
Revoked int `json:"revoked"`
}{Revoked: revoked}); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Sandbox grants revoked: %d\n", revoked); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func runSandboxGrantClear(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseSandboxCommandOptions(args, sandboxCommandFlags{allowConfirm: true})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxGrantClearHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if !options.confirm {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "zero sandbox grants clear requires --confirm")
}
store, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
cleared, err := store.Clear()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, struct {
Cleared int `json:"cleared"`
}{Cleared: cleared}); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Sandbox grants cleared: %d\n", cleared); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
type sandboxCommandFlags struct {
allowConfirm bool
allowEffective bool
}
func parseSandboxCommandOptions(args []string, flags sandboxCommandFlags) (sandboxCommandOptions, bool, error) {
options := sandboxCommandOptions{}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
switch {
case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
return options, true, nil
case arg == "--json":
options.json = true
case flags.allowConfirm && arg == "--confirm":
options.confirm = true
case flags.allowEffective && arg == "--effective":
options.effective = true
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown sandbox flag %q", arg)}
default:
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected sandbox argument %q", arg)}
}
}
return options, false, nil
}
func parseSandboxPositionalOptions(args []string) (sandboxCommandOptions, []string, bool, error) {
options := sandboxCommandOptions{}
positional := []string{}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
switch {
case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
return options, positional, true, nil
case arg == "--json":
options.json = true
case arg == "--reason":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, positional, false, err
}
options.reason = value
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--reason="):
options.reason = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--reason="))
case arg == "--path":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, positional, false, err
}
// An explicit but empty --path is a user error, not "tool-wide": treating
// it as unset would silently widen an allow to the whole tool, or make a
// revoke drop every grant for the tool. Fail closed.
if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
return options, positional, false, execUsageError{"--path requires a non-empty file path"}
}
options.path = strings.TrimSpace(value)
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--path="):
value := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--path="))
if value == "" {
return options, positional, false, execUsageError{"--path requires a non-empty file path"}
}
options.path = value
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
return options, positional, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown sandbox grants flag %q", arg)}
default:
positional = append(positional, strings.TrimSpace(arg))
}
}
return options, positional, false, nil
}
func formatSandboxPolicy(workspaceRoot string, policy zeroSandbox.Policy, backend zeroSandbox.Backend, plan zeroSandbox.BackendPlan, grantsPath string) string {
lines := []string{
"Zero sandbox policy",
"root: " + workspaceRoot,
"mode: " + string(policy.Mode),
"network: " + string(policy.Network),
"backend: " + string(backend.Name),
"target_backend: " + string(plan.TargetBackend),
"support_level: " + string(plan.SupportLevel),
"command_wrapped: " + fmt.Sprintf("%t", plan.CommandWrapped),
"enforcement_level: " + string(plan.EnforcementLevel),
"requires_platform_sandbox: " + fmt.Sprintf("%t", plan.RequiresPlatformSandbox),
}
if plan.DowngradeReason != "" {
lines = append(lines, "downgrade_reason: "+plan.DowngradeReason)
}
if backend.Platform != "" {
lines = append(lines, "backend_platform: "+backend.Platform)
}
lines = append(lines,
"backend_available: "+fmt.Sprintf("%t", backend.Available),
"backend_fallback: "+fmt.Sprintf("%t", backend.Fallback),
"backend_command_wrapping: "+fmt.Sprintf("%t", backend.CommandWrapping),
"backend_native_isolation: "+fmt.Sprintf("%t", backend.NativeIsolation),
"grants: "+grantsPath,
)
if backend.Message != "" {
lines = append(lines, "backend_message: "+backend.Message)
}
for _, warning := range plan.Warnings {
lines = append(lines, "warning: "+warning)
}
return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
func writeSandboxHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox <command>
Commands:
policy Inspect active sandbox policy and platform backend
setup Run native platform sandbox setup
check Evaluate the sandbox decision for a hypothetical tool action
grants Manage persistent sandbox grants
`)
return err
}
func writeSandboxPolicyHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox policy [flags]
Flags:
--effective Print the resolved effective policy (merged config + guards)
--json Print JSON output
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func writeSandboxSetupHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox setup [flags]
Runs native platform sandbox setup when the selected backend requires it.
Flags:
--json Print JSON output
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func writeSandboxGrantsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox grants <command>
Commands:
list List persistent sandbox grants
allow Persistently allow a tool
deny Persistently deny a tool
revoke Revoke a tool grant
clear Clear all sandbox grants
`)
return err
}
func writeSandboxGrantSetHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox grants allow <tool> [flags]
zero sandbox grants deny <tool> [flags]
Flags:
--reason <text> Human-readable reason for the grant
--path <path> Scope the grant to one exact file (default: tool-wide)
--json Print JSON output
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func writeSandboxGrantRevokeHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox grants revoke <tool> [flags]
Flags:
--path <path> Revoke only the grant scoped to this exact file/dir
(default: revoke every grant for the tool)
--json Print JSON output
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func writeSandboxGrantClearHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox grants clear --confirm [flags]
Flags:
--confirm Confirm removal of all sandbox grants
--json Print JSON output
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}