Files
zero/internal/cli/sandbox_check.go
Anandan ac6addaa83 Align sandbox permission blocks and backend states (#253)
* Prompt for shell network permissions

Route network-risk shell calls through the existing permission prompt instead of hard-denying them at sandbox preflight. Approved network prompts apply the current turn/session request-permissions overlay so the effective sandbox policy is widened only after user approval.

Move network command detection into the shell AST analyzer for package installers, gh/git network subcommands, and python http.server so quoted process patterns such as pkill -f "python3 -m http.server 8000" are not misclassified as network activity.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBash|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Auto-allow native-sandboxed shell commands

Remove the old hidden bash auto-allow environment/config path. Ordinary shell commands now use the active native sandbox as the permission boundary by default, while network, destructive, and workspace policy checks still run first.

Policy-only and disabled sandbox backends continue to require approval for shell commands, so unsandboxed execution is not silently allowed.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxedBash|TestShellSandboxActive|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBashAuto|TestBashStillPromptsWithoutActiveSandbox|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicy|TestApplyConfiguredAutonomyCeiling'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/daemon -run 'TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Prompt for destructive shell approval

Remove the separate DenyDestructiveShell policy layer from active sandbox decisions. Destructive shell classification now produces an approval prompt in ask/auto flows instead of a sandbox hard-deny, while no-approval paths remain blocked.

Drop the removed destructive-shell policy field from sandbox policy output, backend capabilities, snapshots, and Windows golden data.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicy|TestEffectiveSandboxPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/zerocommands -run 'TestSandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicyFillsEffectiveMode'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove web-tool network policy switch

Remove the old EnforceToolNetwork policy option and the NetworkHostAllowed per-tool gate so sandbox network policy only controls sandboxed shell egress.

Keep web_search and web_fetch on their own tool permission and URL safety paths, with tests proving deny/scoped shell network policy no longer blocks in-process web tools.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy|TestEngineAllowsNetworkSideEffectWhenShellPolicyBlocksNetwork|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestScopedNetworkGateInEvaluate'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestWebSearchRunWithSandbox|TestWebFetchRunWithSandbox|TestRegistryRoutesWebFetchThroughSandboxPath'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Prompt for outside-workspace file access

Convert recoverable outside-workspace file path violations into permission prompts instead of hard-denying in ask/auto modes.

Approved prompts now grant the requested filesystem scope through the existing request_permissions overlay for the current turn or session, so the follow-up sandbox evaluation and scoped file tools use the same policy path.

Keep unsafe mode, apply_patch escapes, symlink traversal, and non-recoverable path cases hard-denied.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDeniesOutOfWorkspacePaths|TestGrantRequestPermissionsReadDoesNotGrantWrite|TestGrantRequestPermissionsSessionPersists'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsAndAllowsOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunSessionAllowsLaterOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryAppliesSandboxBeforeToolExecution|TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys|TestRegistryAllowsPromptToolWithPersistentSandboxGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxCheckJSONDeniesOutOfWorkspaceWrite'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix Windows network prompt test fixture

Use a Windows curl.cmd shim and cmd.exe PATH syntax for TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant while keeping the POSIX fake curl fixture for Linux and macOS.

This keeps the test focused on network prompt approval and turn network grants instead of relying on a POSIX shell script being executable on Windows.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestClassifyASTCatchesNetworkProgramsRegexMisses|TestClassifyFlagsPipedInstallerVariants'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Remove sandbox autonomy ceilings

Sandbox permission decisions now match grants by tool and scope only, without MaxAutonomy or request autonomy checks. Persistent/session grants, permission approvals, workspace-write auto-allow, and native-sandbox shell auto-allow no longer route through an autonomy ceiling.

Remove the sandbox.maxAutonomy config and CLI surfaces, including grant --auto, policy output, sandbox check autonomy input, and sandbox grant snapshots.

MCP permission autonomy is intentionally unchanged because it is a separate MCP permission model.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/config ./internal/cli ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Fail closed without native sandbox

Remove AllowPolicyOnlyRunner from sandbox policy and snapshots. A restricted/managed command plan now errors when native sandbox support is unavailable instead of running through a policy-only direct runner.

Policy-only backend data remains as diagnostics for capability/reporting paths, but it no longer authorizes command execution when a platform sandbox is required.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/cli ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove scoped shell network policy

Drop the domain-scoped shell network mode and the local scoped-egress proxy path from the active sandbox model.

Shell network policy now serializes and evaluates only deny or allow. Request-permissions network grants widen to allow without domain lists, and platform profiles consume the binary mode directly.

The Linux helper no longer accepts proxy-route flags, Windows network hashes only the binary mode, and web tool tests assert they remain separate from shell network policy.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/notify

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Align permission grant ordering and prompt text

Move persistent and session grant matching ahead of recoverable sandbox prompts while keeping explicit denies and non-recoverable path violations fail-closed.

Clean TUI permission transcript/card text so normal prompts show action, reason, scope, and readable block details instead of raw permission/risk/violation key-value metadata.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove policy-only sandbox terminology

Replace the unavailable native-backend diagnostic path with explicit unavailable support/backend states, and stop presenting missing native isolation as a policy-only fallback.

Rename structured sandbox denial metadata from violation to block across permission events, stream-json, snapshots, TUI rendering, and sandbox-check output so user-facing flow matches blocked action language.

Update README, work split docs, smoke test selectors, and Windows sandbox policy golden output for the new backend/support names and block payloads.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/tui ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/streamjson

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix sandbox review follow-ups

Fail closed for unknown network modes, keep network prompts ahead of bash allow grants, preserve v1 grant-file reads, and classify unparseable commands with obvious network programs as network-risk.

Bump stream-json schema to v2 and document the block metadata field after the violation-to-block rename.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/streamjson ./internal/specialist ./internal/cli -run 'TestExec.*Stream|TestStreamJSON|TestExecProtocol|TestExecReadsStreamJSONImages|TestExecAcceptsImageOnlyStreamJSONMessage|TestExecInputFormatStreamJSON'

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tests: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tests: git diff --check
2026-06-19 19:50:12 +05:30

265 lines
8.6 KiB
Go

package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
zeroSandbox "github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zerocommands"
)
type sandboxCheckOptions struct {
tool string
sideEffect string
path string
reason string
json bool
}
// sandboxCheckReport is the combined snapshot `zero sandbox check` emits: the
// active plan (policy + backend + restrictions), the decision the engine would
// make for the described tool action, and any persistent grant that matches the
// tool. It is the production consumer of the zerocommands sandbox-snapshot
// contract, giving operators and CI a stable, redacted JSON view of "what would
// the sandbox do for this action?".
type sandboxCheckReport struct {
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Plan zerocommands.SandboxPlanSnapshot `json:"plan"`
Decision zerocommands.SandboxDecisionSnapshot `json:"decision"`
Grant zerocommands.SandboxGrantMatchSnapshot `json:"grant"`
}
func runSandboxCheck(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseSandboxCheckArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeSandboxCheckHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.tool) == "" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "tool name is required: zero sandbox check <tool> [flags]")
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot("", deps)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
store, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitProvider)
}
policy := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(zeroSandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox)
backend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(zeroSandbox.BackendOptions{})
plan := backend.BuildPlan(workspaceRoot, policy)
sideEffect, err := parseSandboxCheckSideEffect(options.sideEffect)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
requestArgs := map[string]any{}
scopeAbs := workspaceRoot
if path := strings.TrimSpace(options.path); path != "" {
requestArgs["path"] = path
if filepath.IsAbs(path) {
scopeAbs = filepath.Clean(path)
} else {
scopeAbs = filepath.Join(workspaceRoot, path)
}
}
// Build the engine with the SAME write scope the real entrypoints use
// (workspace root + configured additional write roots) so the check's
// decision matches actual enforcement and a stale extra-root config surfaces
// here too, instead of silently falling back to a workspace-only scope.
scope, err := zeroSandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitProvider)
}
engine := zeroSandbox.NewEngine(zeroSandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: policy,
Store: store,
Backend: backend,
Scope: scope,
})
ctx, stop := signalContext()
defer stop()
decision := engine.Evaluate(ctx, zeroSandbox.Request{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
ToolName: options.tool,
SideEffect: sideEffect,
PermissionMode: zeroSandbox.PermissionModeAsk,
Args: requestArgs,
Reason: strings.TrimSpace(options.reason),
})
lookup, err := store.Lookup(options.tool, scopeAbs)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
report := sandboxCheckReport{
Tool: strings.TrimSpace(options.tool),
Plan: zerocommands.SandboxPlanSnapshotFromPlan(plan),
Decision: zerocommands.SandboxDecisionSnapshotFromDecision(decision),
Grant: zerocommands.SandboxGrantMatchSnapshotFromLookup(options.tool, lookup),
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, report); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, formatSandboxCheckReport(report)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func parseSandboxCheckArgs(args []string) (sandboxCheckOptions, bool, error) {
options := sandboxCheckOptions{}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
switch {
case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
return options, true, nil
case arg == "--json":
options.json = true
case arg == "--side-effect" || arg == "--path" || arg == "--reason":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
assignSandboxCheckFlag(&options, arg, value)
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--side-effect="):
value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--side-effect")
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.sideEffect = value
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--path="):
value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--path")
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.path = value
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--reason="):
value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--reason")
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.reason = value
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown flag %q", arg)}
default:
if options.tool != "" {
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected argument %q", arg)}
}
options.tool = arg
}
}
return options, false, nil
}
func assignSandboxCheckFlag(options *sandboxCheckOptions, flag string, value string) {
switch flag {
case "--side-effect":
options.sideEffect = value
case "--path":
options.path = value
case "--reason":
options.reason = value
}
}
// parseSandboxCheckSideEffect validates --side-effect against the closed set the
// help advertises (empty defaults to read), so a typo returns a usage error
// instead of being passed to the engine as an unknown side effect.
func parseSandboxCheckSideEffect(value string) (zeroSandbox.SideEffect, error) {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(value)) {
case "", "read":
return zeroSandbox.SideEffectRead, nil
case "write":
return zeroSandbox.SideEffectWrite, nil
case "shell":
return zeroSandbox.SideEffectShell, nil
case "network":
return zeroSandbox.SideEffectNetwork, nil
case "none":
return zeroSandbox.SideEffectNone, nil
default:
return "", execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid --side-effect %q: expected read, write, shell, network, or none", value)}
}
}
func formatSandboxCheckReport(report sandboxCheckReport) string {
lines := []string{
"Sandbox check: " + report.Tool,
"decision: " + report.Decision.Action,
}
if reason := strings.TrimSpace(report.Decision.Reason); reason != "" {
lines = append(lines, "reason: "+reason)
}
risk := report.Decision.Risk
riskLine := "risk: " + risk.Level
if len(risk.Categories) > 0 {
riskLine += " [" + strings.Join(risk.Categories, ", ") + "]"
}
lines = append(lines, riskLine)
if block := report.Decision.Block; block != nil {
line := "block: [" + block.Code + "] " + block.Reason
if block.Path != "" {
line += " (path: " + block.Path + ")"
}
lines = append(lines, line)
}
if report.Grant.Matched && report.Grant.Grant != nil {
lines = append(lines, "grant: matched "+report.Grant.Grant.Decision)
} else {
lines = append(lines, "grant: no grant matched this action")
}
lines = append(lines,
"policy: mode="+report.Plan.Policy.EffectiveMode+" network="+report.Plan.Policy.Network+fmt.Sprintf(" enforceWorkspace=%t", report.Plan.Policy.EnforceWorkspace),
"backend: "+report.Plan.Backend.Name+fmt.Sprintf(" (available=%t)", report.Plan.Backend.Available),
)
if len(report.Plan.Restrictions) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, "restrictions:")
for _, restriction := range report.Plan.Restrictions {
lines = append(lines, " - "+restriction)
}
}
return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
func writeSandboxCheckHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero sandbox check <tool> [flags]
Evaluates the sandbox decision for a hypothetical tool action against the
resolved policy, and prints the plan, the decision (allow/prompt/deny with risk
and any block), and any persistent grant that matches the tool. Secrets in
grant reasons are redacted.
Flags:
--side-effect <kind> read | write | shell | network | none (default read)
--path <path> Target path for the action (read/write checks)
--reason <text> Reason recorded with the request
--json Print the machine-readable snapshot
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}