Files
zero/internal/peermsg/private_dir_windows_test.go
Anandan f922cb378e Add cross-session messaging (#884)
* Add cross-session messaging

* Harden cross-session messaging

Authenticate sender metadata against live registry records, bound peer lifecycle state, preserve records across transient discovery failures, and make receipt delivery direct and bounded.

Also serialize TUI peer approvals, harden platform runtime paths and transport deadlines, widen session references, and add regression coverage for identity spoofing, queue limits, path boundaries, and tool failures.

* Support canonical macOS socket paths

Resolve Unix transport directories to their physical path before applying strict no-symlink traversal, allowing the standard /var to /private/var macOS alias without weakening runtime-directory validation.

* Fix macOS socket path regression test

Create the canonicalization fixture beneath a guaranteed short Unix path so it exercises the primary endpoint on macOS, and report temporary-directory cleanup failures.

* Harden peer messaging lifecycle

* Fix Windows peer directory traversal

* Handle Windows token-owned peer directories

* Accept equivalent Windows ACL masks

* Build Windows peer ACL explicitly

* Pin Windows ACL trustee SIDs

* Validate Windows peer ACL semantics

* Propagate Windows peer handle cleanup errors

* Use null handle for Windows close failure test

* Test held-message eviction callback
2026-08-09 18:12:09 +05:30

224 lines
6.6 KiB
Go

//go:build windows
package peermsg
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
func TestEnsurePrivateDirAppliesOwnerOnlyProtectedDACL(t *testing.T) {
const directoryAllAccess = windows.STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED | windows.SYNCHRONIZE | 0x1ff
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "peers", "registry")
if err := os.MkdirAll(path, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
worldSID, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinWorldSid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var pinner runtime.Pinner
pinner.Pin(worldSID)
defer pinner.Unpin()
broadDACL, err := windows.ACLFromEntries([]windows.EXPLICIT_ACCESS{{
AccessPermissions: windows.GENERIC_ALL,
AccessMode: windows.GRANT_ACCESS,
Inheritance: windows.SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT,
Trustee: windows.TRUSTEE{
TrusteeForm: windows.TRUSTEE_IS_SID,
TrusteeType: windows.TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP,
TrusteeValue: windows.TrusteeValueFromSID(worldSID),
},
}}, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := windows.SetNamedSecurityInfo(
path,
windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT,
windows.DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION|windows.PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
nil,
nil,
broadDACL,
nil,
); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !windowsDirectoryDACLContains(t, path, worldSID) {
t.Fatal("test setup did not grant the broad Everyone ACE")
}
if err := ensurePrivateDir(path); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
descriptor, err := windows.GetNamedSecurityInfo(
path,
windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT,
windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION|windows.DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
control, _, err := descriptor.Control()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if control&windows.SE_DACL_PROTECTED == 0 {
t.Fatal("runtime directory DACL inherits access from its parent")
}
user, err := windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().GetTokenUser()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
owner, _, err := descriptor.Owner()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tokenOwner, err := windowsTokenOwner(windows.GetCurrentProcessToken())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !owner.Equals(user.User.Sid) && !owner.Equals(tokenOwner) {
t.Fatalf("runtime directory owner = %s, want user %s or token owner %s", owner.String(), user.User.Sid.String(), tokenOwner.String())
}
systemSID, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinLocalSystemSid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
dacl, _, err := descriptor.DACL()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
wantTrustees := []*windows.SID{user.User.Sid, systemSID}
seen := make([]bool, len(wantTrustees))
for index := uint32(0); ; index++ {
var ace *windows.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE
if err := windows.GetAce(dacl, index, &ace); err != nil {
break
}
hasFullAccess := ace.Mask == windows.GENERIC_ALL || ace.Mask&directoryAllAccess == directoryAllAccess
if ace.Header.AceType != windows.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE || !hasFullAccess {
t.Fatalf("DACL ACE %d has type %d and mask %#x", index, ace.Header.AceType, ace.Mask)
}
trustee := (*windows.SID)(unsafe.Pointer(&ace.SidStart))
matched := false
for trusteeIndex, wanted := range wantTrustees {
if trustee.Equals(wanted) {
seen[trusteeIndex] = true
matched = true
break
}
}
if !matched {
t.Fatalf("DACL ACE %d grants access to unexpected trustee %s", index, trustee.String())
}
}
for index, found := range seen {
if !found {
t.Fatalf("DACL does not grant access to required trustee %s", wantTrustees[index].String())
}
}
}
func windowsDirectoryDACLContains(t *testing.T, path string, wanted *windows.SID) bool {
t.Helper()
descriptor, err := windows.GetNamedSecurityInfo(path, windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT, windows.DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
dacl, _, err := descriptor.DACL()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for index := uint32(0); ; index++ {
var ace *windows.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE
if err := windows.GetAce(dacl, index, &ace); err != nil {
return false
}
if (*windows.SID)(unsafe.Pointer(&ace.SidStart)).Equals(wanted) {
return true
}
}
}
func TestSecurePrivateDirectoryRejectsOwnerMismatch(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "private")
if err := ensurePrivateDir(path); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
handle, err := openWindowsDirectory(path, windows.FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY|windows.FILE_TRAVERSE|windows.SYNCHRONIZE|windows.READ_CONTROL|windows.WRITE_DAC)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer windows.CloseHandle(handle)
descriptor, _, _, err := privateDirectoryDescriptor()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
unexpectedOwner, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinWorldSid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := securePrivateDirectory(handle, path, descriptor, unexpectedOwner); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not owned") {
t.Fatalf("owner mismatch error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestSecurePrivateDirectoryReportsDACLWriteFailure(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "private")
if err := ensurePrivateDir(path); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
handle, err := openWindowsDirectory(path, windows.FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY|windows.FILE_TRAVERSE|windows.SYNCHRONIZE|windows.READ_CONTROL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer windows.CloseHandle(handle)
descriptor, userSID, tokenOwnerSID, err := privateDirectoryDescriptor()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := securePrivateDirectory(handle, path, descriptor, userSID, tokenOwnerSID); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secure private runtime directory") {
t.Fatalf("DACL write error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestClosePrivateWindowsHandleReportsFailure(t *testing.T) {
err := closePrivateWindowsHandle(windows.Handle(0), `C:\private`)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "close private runtime directory") {
t.Fatalf("close handle error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestEnsurePrivateDirRejectsWindowsReparseParent(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(root, "target")
if err := os.Mkdir(target, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
link := filepath.Join(root, "link")
if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
t.Skipf("cannot create Windows directory symlink: %v", err)
}
if err := ensurePrivateDir(filepath.Join(link, "peers")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected reparse-point parent to be rejected")
}
}
func TestEnsurePrivateDirRejectsWindowsFileComponent(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
file := filepath.Join(root, "file")
if err := os.WriteFile(file, []byte("not a directory"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := ensurePrivateDir(filepath.Join(file, "peers")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected file path component to be rejected")
}
}