Files
zero/internal/cli/auth_test.go
KRATOS bb7de29c80 feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + zero auth CLI (#210)
* feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + `zero auth` CLI

Add internal/oauth: a transport/identity-agnostic OAuth 2.0 engine that powers
provider login alongside the MCP-server OAuth zero already has. It is additive
and provider-neutral — NO providers, endpoints, or client identities are baked
into the binary; every provider is configured entirely via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
env vars, so the engine works with any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server.

Engine (internal/oauth):
- PKCE (S256 mandatory; "plain" refused) + per-flow CSRF state.
- Authorization-code flow: BuildAuthorizationURL / ExchangeCode / Refresh, with
  an https-only token-endpoint guard (loopback exempt) and error bodies that
  carry only error/error_description (never token material).
- Loopback callback server: 127.0.0.1-only, OS-assigned port, single use, state
  verified, then closed.
- Device-authorization grant (RFC 8628): RequestDeviceCode + PollDeviceToken
  honoring authorization_pending / slow_down / interval / expiry (headless/SSH).
- RFC 8414 + OIDC discovery (issuer-driven endpoint resolution).
- Namespaced token store ("provider:<name>" / "mcp:<name>"), 0600, file-locked
  (ownership-aware), atomic writes, malformed-fails-closed; GetFresh (on-demand
  refresh) + Handle401 (forced refresh).
- Opt-in proactive RefreshScheduler.

CLI (zero auth):
- login <provider> [--device] [--scope ...], logout, status [provider],
  refresh <provider> [--watch]. Status/output never print token material.
- Registered in app.go dispatch + top-level help.

MCP OAuth (internal/mcp) is left byte-for-byte unchanged (zero regression);
sharing the engine with MCP and encrypted-at-rest/keyring storage are documented
follow-ups. Tests cover every path (PKCE, auth URL, https-guard + redaction,
exchange/refresh, loopback capture + state-mismatch + timeout, device pending/
slow_down/expired, store namespacing/0600/locking, provider env resolution,
manager login (loopback+device)/GetFresh/Handle401, scheduler). Gates: gofmt /
vet / build (host+linux+windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) /
govulncheck (0) / deadcode (no new) all pass.

* oauth: fix Windows smoke — use OS-appropriate path in store-path test

TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride hardcoded a unix "/tmp/custom/tok.json"
literal, which is not absolute on Windows (no drive), so ResolveStorePath
correctly resolves it against the current drive and the verbatim comparison
failed (D:\tmp\custom\tok.json). The production code is correct; the test now
builds the override with filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ...) so it is absolute and
clean on every OS.

* oauth: address CodeRabbit review (11 findings)

Security / correctness:
- flow: caller-supplied ExtraAuthParams/extraParams can no longer override the
  reserved OAuth/PKCE fields (state, redirect_uri, code_challenge[_method],
  response_type, client_id) — e.g. forcing method=plain.
- device: a device-authorization response without expires_in now gets a bounded
  default lifetime (fail closed), and the poll loop re-checks expiry AFTER the
  interval sleep so it never polls past the deadline (e.g. after slow_down).
- lock: handle WriteString/Close errors on the token lock file — a partial write
  no longer strands an undeletable lock.
- store: a non-nil env map is now authoritative (hermetic) — a controlled map
  never falls back to ambient ZERO_OAUTH_* / HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
- scheduler: a transient loadForKey error backs off and retries (bounded) instead
  of permanently stopping proactive refresh.
- cli auth: reject flags a subcommand does not accept (e.g. login --watch,
  status --device) and reject empty --scope values — fail fast.

Lint blockers:
- manager: restructured the discovery fallback so the non-nil-err branch no longer
  returns nil (nilerr).
- providers: dropped the ineffectual flow initializer (ineffassign).

Tests: assert Save/Load errors in the scheduler test; the slow_down device test
no longer depends on post-expiry polling. Added tests for reserved-param
stripping, hermetic env, device default-expiry, and CLI flag validation. The
store-path test was already made OS-portable in the Windows-smoke fix.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI

The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)

* oauth: address CodeRabbit re-review (4 findings)

- loopback (security): NewLoopbackListener refuses an empty CSRF state — an empty
  state would match a callback carrying no state at all, defeating the check.
- device (correctness): RequestDeviceCode now sends client_secret when set, so a
  confidential client authenticates on the device-authorization endpoint too
  (consistent with the token poll).
- cli auth: document --watch in the help Flags section.
- scheduler test: assert the seed Save error instead of ignoring it.

Also scrubbed a stray third-party reference from a loopback.go comment.
Tests added: empty-state rejection, device client_secret is sent. Gates:
gofmt/vet/build/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new)
all pass.

* mcp(oauth): delegate the OAuth engine to internal/oauth (dedup) (#212)

OAuth Phase 2: the MCP OAuth code now reuses the shared internal/oauth engine
instead of carrying its own copy of the transport/identity-agnostic primitives.
internal/mcp/oauth.go drops ~110 lines (526 -> 418): newPKCE, newState,
discoverAuthorizationServer, the authorize-URL builder, token exchange/refresh,
the token-response parser, and joinWellKnown now delegate to internal/oauth.

Behavior-preserving: MCP keeps its own OAuthConfig/StoredToken types,
LoginOptions/Login orchestration, loopback handling, registerClient (dynamic
client registration — not part of the shared engine), CLI output, and on-disk
token format (mcp-oauth-tokens.json, raw server-name keys). The existing mcp
oauth tests pass UNCHANGED. The only behavioral delta is a hardening inherited
from the shared engine: the token endpoint must be https (loopback exempt) —
a credential is no longer sent to a plaintext non-loopback endpoint.

Stacks on #210 (the internal/oauth package). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+
linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new
vs base) all pass; `zero mcp oauth status` output is identical.
2026-06-15 18:47:43 +05:30

130 lines
4.4 KiB
Go

package cli
import (
"bytes"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/oauth"
)
// withAuthStore points the provider OAuth store at a temp file for the test.
func withAuthStore(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "oauth-tokens.json")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
return path
}
func TestRunAuthStatusEmpty(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "status"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "No OAuth provider logins are stored.") {
t.Fatalf("status output = %q", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestRunAuthStatusReportsLoginWithoutSecret(t *testing.T) {
path := withAuthStore(t)
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("demo"), oauth.Token{
AccessToken: "super-secret", RefreshToken: "super-secret-rt", Account: "[email protected]",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err)
}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "status"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "demo") || !strings.Contains(out, "[email protected]") {
t.Fatalf("status should show provider + account: %q", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "super-secret") {
t.Fatalf("status leaked token material: %q", out)
}
}
func TestRunAuthLogoutNothing(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "logout", "demo"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "No OAuth login stored for demo") {
t.Fatalf("logout output = %q", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestRunAuthLoginValidation(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
// Missing provider.
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("login with no provider should fail")
}
// --json is rejected for the interactive login.
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "demo", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("login --json should be rejected")
}
}
func TestRunAuthLoginUnknownProvider(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "does-not-exist"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("unknown provider login should fail")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "not configured") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want not-configured error", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunAuthRefreshNoToken(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_DEMO_CLIENT_ID", "client") // so config resolves; refresh still fails (no token)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "refresh", "demo"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("refresh with no stored token should fail")
}
}
func TestRunAuthRejectsWrongFlags(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
cases := [][]string{
{"auth", "login", "demo", "--watch"}, // watch is refresh-only
{"auth", "login", "demo", "--json"}, // json not for interactive login
{"auth", "status", "demo", "--device"}, // device is login-only
{"auth", "logout", "demo", "--scope", "x"}, // scope is login-only
{"auth", "refresh", "demo", "--json"}, // json not for refresh
{"auth", "login", "demo", "--scope", ""}, // empty scope rejected
}
for _, args := range cases {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps(args, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Errorf("args %v should be rejected, got success", args)
}
}
}
func TestRunAuthHelp(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d", code)
}
for _, want := range []string{"zero auth", "login", "logout", "status", "refresh", "--device"} {
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
t.Fatalf("help missing %q:\n%s", want, stdout.String())
}
}
}