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* feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + `zero auth` CLI
Add internal/oauth: a transport/identity-agnostic OAuth 2.0 engine that powers
provider login alongside the MCP-server OAuth zero already has. It is additive
and provider-neutral — NO providers, endpoints, or client identities are baked
into the binary; every provider is configured entirely via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
env vars, so the engine works with any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server.
Engine (internal/oauth):
- PKCE (S256 mandatory; "plain" refused) + per-flow CSRF state.
- Authorization-code flow: BuildAuthorizationURL / ExchangeCode / Refresh, with
an https-only token-endpoint guard (loopback exempt) and error bodies that
carry only error/error_description (never token material).
- Loopback callback server: 127.0.0.1-only, OS-assigned port, single use, state
verified, then closed.
- Device-authorization grant (RFC 8628): RequestDeviceCode + PollDeviceToken
honoring authorization_pending / slow_down / interval / expiry (headless/SSH).
- RFC 8414 + OIDC discovery (issuer-driven endpoint resolution).
- Namespaced token store ("provider:<name>" / "mcp:<name>"), 0600, file-locked
(ownership-aware), atomic writes, malformed-fails-closed; GetFresh (on-demand
refresh) + Handle401 (forced refresh).
- Opt-in proactive RefreshScheduler.
CLI (zero auth):
- login <provider> [--device] [--scope ...], logout, status [provider],
refresh <provider> [--watch]. Status/output never print token material.
- Registered in app.go dispatch + top-level help.
MCP OAuth (internal/mcp) is left byte-for-byte unchanged (zero regression);
sharing the engine with MCP and encrypted-at-rest/keyring storage are documented
follow-ups. Tests cover every path (PKCE, auth URL, https-guard + redaction,
exchange/refresh, loopback capture + state-mismatch + timeout, device pending/
slow_down/expired, store namespacing/0600/locking, provider env resolution,
manager login (loopback+device)/GetFresh/Handle401, scheduler). Gates: gofmt /
vet / build (host+linux+windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) /
govulncheck (0) / deadcode (no new) all pass.
* oauth: fix Windows smoke — use OS-appropriate path in store-path test
TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride hardcoded a unix "/tmp/custom/tok.json"
literal, which is not absolute on Windows (no drive), so ResolveStorePath
correctly resolves it against the current drive and the verbatim comparison
failed (D:\tmp\custom\tok.json). The production code is correct; the test now
builds the override with filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ...) so it is absolute and
clean on every OS.
* oauth: address CodeRabbit review (11 findings)
Security / correctness:
- flow: caller-supplied ExtraAuthParams/extraParams can no longer override the
reserved OAuth/PKCE fields (state, redirect_uri, code_challenge[_method],
response_type, client_id) — e.g. forcing method=plain.
- device: a device-authorization response without expires_in now gets a bounded
default lifetime (fail closed), and the poll loop re-checks expiry AFTER the
interval sleep so it never polls past the deadline (e.g. after slow_down).
- lock: handle WriteString/Close errors on the token lock file — a partial write
no longer strands an undeletable lock.
- store: a non-nil env map is now authoritative (hermetic) — a controlled map
never falls back to ambient ZERO_OAUTH_* / HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
- scheduler: a transient loadForKey error backs off and retries (bounded) instead
of permanently stopping proactive refresh.
- cli auth: reject flags a subcommand does not accept (e.g. login --watch,
status --device) and reject empty --scope values — fail fast.
Lint blockers:
- manager: restructured the discovery fallback so the non-nil-err branch no longer
returns nil (nilerr).
- providers: dropped the ineffectual flow initializer (ineffassign).
Tests: assert Save/Load errors in the scheduler test; the slow_down device test
no longer depends on post-expiry polling. Added tests for reserved-param
stripping, hermetic env, device default-expiry, and CLI flag validation. The
store-path test was already made OS-portable in the Windows-smoke fix.
Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.
* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI
The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)
* oauth: address CodeRabbit re-review (4 findings)
- loopback (security): NewLoopbackListener refuses an empty CSRF state — an empty
state would match a callback carrying no state at all, defeating the check.
- device (correctness): RequestDeviceCode now sends client_secret when set, so a
confidential client authenticates on the device-authorization endpoint too
(consistent with the token poll).
- cli auth: document --watch in the help Flags section.
- scheduler test: assert the seed Save error instead of ignoring it.
Also scrubbed a stray third-party reference from a loopback.go comment.
Tests added: empty-state rejection, device client_secret is sent. Gates:
gofmt/vet/build/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new)
all pass.
* mcp(oauth): delegate the OAuth engine to internal/oauth (dedup) (#212)
OAuth Phase 2: the MCP OAuth code now reuses the shared internal/oauth engine
instead of carrying its own copy of the transport/identity-agnostic primitives.
internal/mcp/oauth.go drops ~110 lines (526 -> 418): newPKCE, newState,
discoverAuthorizationServer, the authorize-URL builder, token exchange/refresh,
the token-response parser, and joinWellKnown now delegate to internal/oauth.
Behavior-preserving: MCP keeps its own OAuthConfig/StoredToken types,
LoginOptions/Login orchestration, loopback handling, registerClient (dynamic
client registration — not part of the shared engine), CLI output, and on-disk
token format (mcp-oauth-tokens.json, raw server-name keys). The existing mcp
oauth tests pass UNCHANGED. The only behavioral delta is a hardening inherited
from the shared engine: the token endpoint must be https (loopback exempt) —
a credential is no longer sent to a plaintext non-loopback endpoint.
Stacks on #210 (the internal/oauth package). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+
linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new
vs base) all pass; `zero mcp oauth status` output is identical.
144 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
144 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
package oauth
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func TestRequestDeviceCodeSendsClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
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var gotSecret string
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server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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_ = r.ParseForm()
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gotSecret = r.Form.Get("client_secret")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"U","verification_uri":"https://x","expires_in":600,"interval":5}`))
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}))
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defer server.Close()
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// A confidential client must authenticate on the device endpoint too.
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_, err := RequestDeviceCode(context.Background(), server.Client(), Config{ClientID: "c", ClientSecret: "shh", DeviceAuthorizationEndpoint: server.URL}, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceCode: %v", err)
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}
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if gotSecret != "shh" {
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t.Fatalf("client_secret = %q, want shh", gotSecret)
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}
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}
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func TestRequestDeviceCode(t *testing.T) {
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server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"WXYZ-1234","verification_uri":"https://x/dev","verification_uri_complete":"https://x/dev?c=WXYZ","expires_in":600,"interval":3}`))
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}))
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defer server.Close()
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cfg := Config{ClientID: "c", DeviceAuthorizationEndpoint: server.URL, Scopes: []string{"a"}}
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auth, err := RequestDeviceCode(context.Background(), server.Client(), cfg, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceCode: %v", err)
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}
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if auth.DeviceCode != "dc" || auth.UserCode != "WXYZ-1234" {
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t.Fatalf("device auth = %+v", auth)
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}
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if auth.Interval != 3*time.Second {
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t.Fatalf("interval = %v, want 3s", auth.Interval)
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}
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if auth.VerificationURIComplete == "" {
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t.Fatal("missing verification_uri_complete")
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}
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}
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func TestRequestDeviceCodeDefaultsInterval(t *testing.T) {
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server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"U","verification_uri":"https://x"}`))
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}))
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defer server.Close()
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auth, err := RequestDeviceCode(context.Background(), server.Client(), Config{ClientID: "c", DeviceAuthorizationEndpoint: server.URL}, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceCode: %v", err)
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}
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if auth.Interval != 5*time.Second {
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t.Fatalf("default interval = %v, want 5s", auth.Interval)
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}
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// A response without expires_in must still get a bounded expiry (fail closed),
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// so the poll loop's expiry gate stays active.
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if auth.ExpiresAt.IsZero() {
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t.Fatal("missing expires_in must default to a bounded ExpiresAt, got zero")
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}
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}
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func TestPollDeviceTokenHonorsPendingThenSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
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var calls atomic.Int32
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server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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n := calls.Add(1)
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if n < 3 {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"authorization_pending"}`))
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return
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}
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"access_token":"at","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":3600}`))
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}))
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defer server.Close()
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cfg := Config{ClientID: "c", TokenEndpoint: server.URL}
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// Small interval + future expiry so the loop is fast.
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auth := DeviceAuth{DeviceCode: "dc", Interval: 5 * time.Millisecond, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)}
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tok, err := PollDeviceToken(context.Background(), server.Client(), cfg, auth, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PollDeviceToken: %v", err)
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}
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if tok.AccessToken != "at" {
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t.Fatalf("token = %+v", tok)
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}
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if calls.Load() != 3 {
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t.Fatalf("polled %d times, want 3 (2 pending + 1 success)", calls.Load())
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}
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}
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func TestPollDeviceTokenSlowDown(t *testing.T) {
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var calls atomic.Int32
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server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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if calls.Add(1) == 1 {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"slow_down"}`))
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return
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}
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"access_token":"at"}`))
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}))
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defer server.Close()
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cfg := Config{ClientID: "c", TokenEndpoint: server.URL}
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// Expiry well beyond the slow_down back-off (+5s) so the success path never
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// depends on polling after the device code has expired.
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auth := DeviceAuth{DeviceCode: "dc", Interval: 5 * time.Millisecond, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second)}
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tok, err := PollDeviceToken(context.Background(), server.Client(), cfg, auth, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PollDeviceToken (slow_down): %v", err)
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}
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if tok.AccessToken != "at" {
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t.Fatalf("token = %+v", tok)
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}
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}
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func TestPollDeviceTokenExpired(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := Config{ClientID: "c", TokenEndpoint: "https://unused/token"}
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auth := DeviceAuth{DeviceCode: "dc", Interval: time.Millisecond, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(-time.Second)}
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_, err := PollDeviceToken(context.Background(), http.DefaultClient, cfg, auth, nil)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected expired error")
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}
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}
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func TestPollDeviceTokenAccessDenied(t *testing.T) {
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server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"access_denied"}`))
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}))
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defer server.Close()
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cfg := Config{ClientID: "c", TokenEndpoint: server.URL}
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auth := DeviceAuth{DeviceCode: "dc", Interval: 5 * time.Millisecond, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)}
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_, err := PollDeviceToken(context.Background(), server.Client(), cfg, auth, nil)
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "denied") {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want access denied", err)
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}
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}
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