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* Prompt for shell network permissions Route network-risk shell calls through the existing permission prompt instead of hard-denying them at sandbox preflight. Approved network prompts apply the current turn/session request-permissions overlay so the effective sandbox policy is widened only after user approval. Move network command detection into the shell AST analyzer for package installers, gh/git network subcommands, and python http.server so quoted process patterns such as pkill -f "python3 -m http.server 8000" are not misclassified as network activity. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBash|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Auto-allow native-sandboxed shell commands Remove the old hidden bash auto-allow environment/config path. Ordinary shell commands now use the active native sandbox as the permission boundary by default, while network, destructive, and workspace policy checks still run first. Policy-only and disabled sandbox backends continue to require approval for shell commands, so unsandboxed execution is not silently allowed. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxedBash|TestShellSandboxActive|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBashAuto|TestBashStillPromptsWithoutActiveSandbox|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicy|TestApplyConfiguredAutonomyCeiling' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/daemon -run 'TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Prompt for destructive shell approval Remove the separate DenyDestructiveShell policy layer from active sandbox decisions. Destructive shell classification now produces an approval prompt in ask/auto flows instead of a sandbox hard-deny, while no-approval paths remain blocked. Drop the removed destructive-shell policy field from sandbox policy output, backend capabilities, snapshots, and Windows golden data. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicy|TestEffectiveSandboxPolicy' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/zerocommands -run 'TestSandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicyFillsEffectiveMode' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove web-tool network policy switch Remove the old EnforceToolNetwork policy option and the NetworkHostAllowed per-tool gate so sandbox network policy only controls sandboxed shell egress. Keep web_search and web_fetch on their own tool permission and URL safety paths, with tests proving deny/scoped shell network policy no longer blocks in-process web tools. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy|TestEngineAllowsNetworkSideEffectWhenShellPolicyBlocksNetwork|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestScopedNetworkGateInEvaluate' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestWebSearchRunWithSandbox|TestWebFetchRunWithSandbox|TestRegistryRoutesWebFetchThroughSandboxPath' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Prompt for outside-workspace file access Convert recoverable outside-workspace file path violations into permission prompts instead of hard-denying in ask/auto modes. Approved prompts now grant the requested filesystem scope through the existing request_permissions overlay for the current turn or session, so the follow-up sandbox evaluation and scoped file tools use the same policy path. Keep unsafe mode, apply_patch escapes, symlink traversal, and non-recoverable path cases hard-denied. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDeniesOutOfWorkspacePaths|TestGrantRequestPermissionsReadDoesNotGrantWrite|TestGrantRequestPermissionsSessionPersists' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsAndAllowsOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunSessionAllowsLaterOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryAppliesSandboxBeforeToolExecution|TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys|TestRegistryAllowsPromptToolWithPersistentSandboxGrant' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxCheckJSONDeniesOutOfWorkspaceWrite' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Fix Windows network prompt test fixture Use a Windows curl.cmd shim and cmd.exe PATH syntax for TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant while keeping the POSIX fake curl fixture for Linux and macOS. This keeps the test focused on network prompt approval and turn network grants instead of relying on a POSIX shell script being executable on Windows. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestClassifyASTCatchesNetworkProgramsRegexMisses|TestClassifyFlagsPipedInstallerVariants' Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: git diff --check * Remove sandbox autonomy ceilings Sandbox permission decisions now match grants by tool and scope only, without MaxAutonomy or request autonomy checks. Persistent/session grants, permission approvals, workspace-write auto-allow, and native-sandbox shell auto-allow no longer route through an autonomy ceiling. Remove the sandbox.maxAutonomy config and CLI surfaces, including grant --auto, policy output, sandbox check autonomy input, and sandbox grant snapshots. MCP permission autonomy is intentionally unchanged because it is a separate MCP permission model. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/config ./internal/cli ./internal/tui Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Fail closed without native sandbox Remove AllowPolicyOnlyRunner from sandbox policy and snapshots. A restricted/managed command plan now errors when native sandbox support is unavailable instead of running through a policy-only direct runner. Policy-only backend data remains as diagnostics for capability/reporting paths, but it no longer authorizes command execution when a platform sandbox is required. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/cli ./internal/tui Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove scoped shell network policy Drop the domain-scoped shell network mode and the local scoped-egress proxy path from the active sandbox model. Shell network policy now serializes and evaluates only deny or allow. Request-permissions network grants widen to allow without domain lists, and platform profiles consume the binary mode directly. The Linux helper no longer accepts proxy-route flags, Windows network hashes only the binary mode, and web tool tests assert they remain separate from shell network policy. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/notify Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Align permission grant ordering and prompt text Move persistent and session grant matching ahead of recoverable sandbox prompts while keeping explicit denies and non-recoverable path violations fail-closed. Clean TUI permission transcript/card text so normal prompts show action, reason, scope, and readable block details instead of raw permission/risk/violation key-value metadata. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/tools Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... * Remove policy-only sandbox terminology Replace the unavailable native-backend diagnostic path with explicit unavailable support/backend states, and stop presenting missing native isolation as a policy-only fallback. Rename structured sandbox denial metadata from violation to block across permission events, stream-json, snapshots, TUI rendering, and sandbox-check output so user-facing flow matches blocked action language. Update README, work split docs, smoke test selectors, and Windows sandbox policy golden output for the new backend/support names and block payloads. Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/tui ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/streamjson Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh Tested: git diff --check * Fix sandbox review follow-ups Fail closed for unknown network modes, keep network prompts ahead of bash allow grants, preserve v1 grant-file reads, and classify unparseable commands with obvious network programs as network-risk. Bump stream-json schema to v2 and document the block metadata field after the violation-to-block rename. Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/streamjson ./internal/specialist ./internal/cli -run 'TestExec.*Stream|TestStreamJSON|TestExecProtocol|TestExecReadsStreamJSONImages|TestExecAcceptsImageOnlyStreamJSONMessage|TestExecInputFormatStreamJSON' Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... Tests: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh Tests: git diff --check
246 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
246 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
//go:build linux
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package sandbox
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"unsafe"
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"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
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)
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// ApplyLandlockFilesystemProfile applies the helper's fallback Linux filesystem
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// sandbox to the current process. The caller must exec the final command after
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// this returns.
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func ApplyLandlockFilesystemProfile(profile PermissionProfile, cwd string) error {
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if err := validateLandlockProfile(profile); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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needsFilesystemRules := profile.FileSystem.Kind != FileSystemUnrestricted
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needsNetworkDeny := profile.Network.Mode == NetworkDeny
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if !needsFilesystemRules && !needsNetworkDeny {
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return nil
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}
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if err := unix.Prctl(unix.PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("set no_new_privs: %w", err)
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}
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if needsNetworkDeny {
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if err := ApplyLinuxNetworkDeny(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if !needsFilesystemRules {
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return nil
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}
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writeRoots := landlockWritableRoots(profile.FileSystem, cwd)
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if len(writeRoots) == 0 {
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return errors.New("Landlock requires at least one writable root")
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}
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return installLandlockFilesystemRules(writeRoots)
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}
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func validateLandlockProfile(profile PermissionProfile) error {
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fs := profile.FileSystem
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if fs.Kind != FileSystemRestricted {
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return nil
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}
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if len(fs.DenyRead) > 0 {
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return errors.New("deny-read paths require the bubblewrap helper mode")
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}
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if len(fs.DenyWrite) > 0 {
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return errors.New("deny-write paths require the bubblewrap helper mode")
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}
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for _, root := range fs.WriteRoots {
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if len(root.ReadOnlySubpaths) > 0 || len(root.ProtectedMetadataNames) > 0 {
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return errors.New("read-only write-root subpaths require the bubblewrap helper mode")
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}
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}
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if !landlockHasFullReadAccess(fs) {
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return errors.New("restricted read roots are not supported by Landlock helper mode")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func landlockHasFullReadAccess(fs FileSystemPolicy) bool {
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if fs.Kind == FileSystemUnrestricted {
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return true
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}
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for _, root := range fs.ReadRoots {
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if filepath.Clean(root) == string(filepath.Separator) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func landlockWritableRoots(fs FileSystemPolicy, cwd string) []string {
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roots := make([]string, 0, len(fs.WriteRoots)+1)
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add := func(root string) {
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root = strings.TrimSpace(root)
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if root == "" {
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return
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}
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if abs, err := filepath.Abs(root); err == nil {
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root = abs
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}
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if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(root); err == nil {
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root = resolved
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}
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if pathExists(root) {
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roots = append(roots, filepath.Clean(root))
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}
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}
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add(cwd)
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for _, root := range fs.WriteRoots {
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add(root.Root)
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}
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return dedupeStrings(roots)
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}
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func installLandlockFilesystemRules(writeRoots []string) error {
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abi, err := queryLandlockABI()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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handledAccess := landlockHandledFilesystemAccess(abi)
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if handledAccess == 0 {
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return errors.New("kernel did not report a usable Landlock filesystem ABI")
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}
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rulesetAttr := unix.LandlockRulesetAttr{Access_fs: handledAccess}
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rulesetFD, err := landlockCreateRuleset(&rulesetAttr, unsafe.Sizeof(rulesetAttr), 0)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("create ruleset: %w", err)
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}
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defer unix.Close(rulesetFD)
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readAccess := landlockReadFilesystemAccess(abi)
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if err := landlockAddPathRule(rulesetFD, string(filepath.Separator), readAccess); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if pathExists("/dev/null") {
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if err := landlockAddPathRule(rulesetFD, "/dev/null", landlockFileReadWriteAccess(abi)); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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for _, root := range writeRoots {
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if err := landlockAddPathRule(rulesetFD, root, handledAccess); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := landlockRestrictSelf(rulesetFD); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("restrict self: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func queryLandlockABI() (int, error) {
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abi, err := landlockCreateRuleset(nil, 0, unix.LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("query ABI: %w", err)
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}
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if abi <= 0 {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("query ABI returned %d", abi)
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}
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return abi, nil
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}
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func landlockCreateRuleset(attr *unix.LandlockRulesetAttr, size uintptr, flags int) (int, error) {
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var attrPtr uintptr
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if attr != nil {
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attrPtr = uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(attr))
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}
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fd, _, errno := unix.Syscall(unix.SYS_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, attrPtr, size, uintptr(flags))
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if errno != 0 {
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return -1, errno
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}
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return int(fd), nil
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}
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func landlockAddPathRule(rulesetFD int, path string, allowedAccess uint64) error {
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pathFD, err := unix.Open(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
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return nil
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("open rule path %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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defer unix.Close(pathFD)
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rule := unix.LandlockPathBeneathAttr{
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Allowed_access: allowedAccess,
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Parent_fd: int32(pathFD),
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}
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_, _, errno := unix.Syscall6(
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unix.SYS_LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE,
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uintptr(rulesetFD),
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uintptr(unix.LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH),
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uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&rule)),
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0,
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0,
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0,
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)
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if errno != 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("add path rule %s: %w", path, errno)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func landlockRestrictSelf(rulesetFD int) error {
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_, _, errno := unix.Syscall(unix.SYS_LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF, uintptr(rulesetFD), 0, 0)
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if errno != 0 {
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return errno
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}
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return nil
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}
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func landlockHandledFilesystemAccess(abi int) uint64 {
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access := uint64(unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM)
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if abi >= 2 {
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access |= unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
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}
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if abi >= 3 {
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access |= unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
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}
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if abi >= 5 {
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access |= unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
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}
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return access
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}
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func landlockReadFilesystemAccess(abi int) uint64 {
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access := uint64(unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)
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if abi >= 5 {
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access |= unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
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}
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return access
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}
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func landlockFileReadWriteAccess(abi int) uint64 {
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access := uint64(unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
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unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)
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if abi >= 3 {
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access |= unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
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}
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if abi >= 5 {
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access |= unix.LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
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}
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return access
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}
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