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Felix-Ayush
84c1b15540
* fix(oauth): use the crash-safe secret store and sync token publications The encrypted-file OAuth backend carried its own AES-GCM secret implementation that had drifted from internal/securefile: a crash during first login left <secret>.lock behind and every later Save timed out instead of reclaiming it, and the secret and token blobs were published without fsync.\n\nUse securefile.Crypter with an opt-in publication directory so the secret still publishes through the sandbox-denied .secret.publish directory, add file and directory barriers to the encrypted token blob, and extend securefile with the publication directory plus destination-directory sync.\n\nMove the concurrent-creation and wrong-sized-secret coverage to securefile, add a stale-lock regression through the OAuth store, and test publication-dir use, sync ordering, sync-failure preservation, and retry after a failed secret sync. The stale-lock test fails on the previous code. * test(oauth): cover post-rename directory-sync failures The existing failure tests inject a file sync error before the rename. Add coverage for a destination-directory barrier failure after the token or secret has been atomically replaced: the write must report the error and the newly published bytes must remain readable. Also cover the corresponding securefile secret path, including its expected size. * fix(securefile): never clobber a newer lock when restoring a reclaimed one reclaimStaleLock could rename a lock that had just been replaced, then restore the quarantined copy with os.Rename, replacing a third holder's new lock. Both holders could then publish different secrets for the same file. Restore with O_CREATE|O_EXCL and discard the quarantined copy when the destination is already held. Extend the directory-sync failure test to prove a later caller actually loads the published secret, not just its size. Add restore tests for the free and already-held cases.