Feature: Granular Security Policies for Tool Execution #8820

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opened 2026-02-16 18:10:56 -05:00 by yindo · 0 comments
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Originally created by @Protocol-zero-0 on GitHub (Feb 8, 2026).

Originally assigned to: @thdxr on GitHub.

Problem

Currently, agents execute tools with broad user permissions. This poses a risk when running autonomous workflows or untrusted agent instructions. A rogue command or misunderstood prompt can modify critical system files or exfiltrate data.

Proposal

Implement a lightweight policy engine (e.g., security.yaml) that allows users to define:

  • Command Whitelists: Only allow specific binaries (e.g., git, npm, ls).
  • Path Restrictions: Read-only access to sensitive directories, write access limited to the workspace.
  • Network Constraints: Allowlist domains for web_search or curl.

Impact

This would enable safer autonomous operation ('daemon mode') and enterprise adoption where security boundaries are critical.

Protocol Zero

Originally created by @Protocol-zero-0 on GitHub (Feb 8, 2026). Originally assigned to: @thdxr on GitHub. ## Problem Currently, agents execute tools with broad user permissions. This poses a risk when running autonomous workflows or untrusted agent instructions. A rogue command or misunderstood prompt can modify critical system files or exfiltrate data. ## Proposal Implement a lightweight policy engine (e.g., `security.yaml`) that allows users to define: - **Command Whitelists**: Only allow specific binaries (e.g., `git`, `npm`, `ls`). - **Path Restrictions**: Read-only access to sensitive directories, write access limited to the workspace. - **Network Constraints**: Allowlist domains for `web_search` or `curl`. ## Impact This would enable safer autonomous operation ('daemon mode') and enterprise adoption where security boundaries are critical. ⚡ **Protocol Zero**
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Reference: anomalyco/opencode#8820