Merge pull request #6096 from aboimpinto/feat/FEAT-025-adopt-command-shapes-in-tui-session-export-slice

FEAT-025: adopt capability shapes in the TUI session-export slice.

Structural migration only; no user-visible behaviour change. Merged as three
commits rather than squashed so Paulo's curated slice boundaries and authorship
survive on main.

.gitattributes

@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ crates/telemetry/tests/golden/*.json text eol=lf
 # always join rows with LF (golden_harness.rs::render_golden_text), so a
 # CRLF checkout failed all eight Windows golden tests with a pure \r\n diff.
 crates/tui/src/tui/goldens/*.txt text eol=lf
+# FEAT-025 baseline export goldens (crates/tui/src/commands/fixtures/*.md) are
+# include_str!()'d and compared byte for byte against a document the exporter
+# builds with LF, so a CRLF checkout failed the four Windows golden tests with a
+# pure \r\n diff (Windows CI caught this; Linux cannot see it).
+crates/tui/src/commands/fixtures/*.md text eol=lf
 crates/*/assets/**/*.json text eol=lf
 crates/*/assets/**/*.md text eol=lf
 crates/*/locales/*.json text eol=lf

Cargo.lock

@@ -874,6 +874,7 @@ name = "codewhale-command-contract"
 version = "0.9.13"
 dependencies = [
  "codewhale-core",
+ "serde_json",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1057,12 +1058,14 @@ dependencies = [
  "chrono",
  "codewhale-paths",
  "keyring",
+ "regex",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "sha2 0.11.0",
  "tempfile",
  "thiserror 2.0.20",
  "tracing",
+ "url",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

crates/command-contract/Cargo.toml

@@ -12,3 +12,7 @@ workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
 codewhale-core = { path = "../core", version = "0.9.13" }
+# FEAT-025 export projections carry JSON tool payloads. The workspace already
+# pins serde_json with `preserve_order` (crates/core and crates/tui), so this
+# adds no new external dependency to the graph.
+serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["preserve_order"] }

crates/command-contract/src/facets.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use codewhale_core::request::{Message, SystemPrompt};
+use serde_json::Value;
 
 use crate::types::{
     CommandApprovalMode, CommandCurrency, CommandMode, CommandProviderId, CommandReasoningEffort,
@@ -1369,3 +1370,223 @@ pub trait CommandSessionControlContext {
     /// errors.
     fn resolve_hosted_work_target(&self) -> Option<HostedWorkTarget>;
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// FEAT-025: session export slice (D1-D9).
+//
+// One independently optional session-export authority covering exactly the
+// host work `/export` (and its `/daochu` alias) consumes. The shared
+// `CommandSessionContext`, `CommandSessionLifecycleContext`, and
+// `CommandSessionControlContext` facets are deliberately not widened: export
+// authority exists only on this facet, and every delegate is an atomic host
+// operation or a semantic projection so the portable handler keeps
+// byte-identical composition. Hidden payloads are excluded while projections
+// are built (D9), so internal reasoning, reasoning signatures, and inline or
+// local image bytes never enter these DTOs. No `App`, clipboard handler,
+// snapshot repository, history cell, session manager, configuration, client,
+// filesystem handle, or host callback crosses this boundary (D1/D3/D5/D7).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Portable conversation metadata for the export header (D3).
+///
+/// Values that already have an authoritative host derivation keep it
+/// (session-label truncation, provider identity, model label, mode display,
+/// workspace basename, message count, clock); portable rendering adds only
+/// export formatting and sanitization (D10).
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExportMetadata {
+    /// Host-truncated session id, or the baseline `unsaved` fallback.
+    pub session_label: String,
+    pub provider: String,
+    pub model: String,
+    pub mode: String,
+    /// Workspace directory basename, or the baseline `workspace` fallback.
+    pub workspace_name: String,
+    /// `api_messages.len()` when authoritative, otherwise `history.len()`.
+    pub message_count: usize,
+    pub exported_at_unix: i64,
+}
+
+/// One tool-call caller projection (D3). Only the fields the baseline export
+/// renders cross the boundary.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ToolCallerProjection {
+    pub caller_type: String,
+    pub tool_id: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// One projected content block (D3/D9).
+///
+/// Visible text and structured content cross as portable data; internal
+/// reasoning bodies, reasoning signatures, and inline or local image payloads
+/// are replaced by typed omission markers at projection time and never cross.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum ExportBlock {
+    /// Visible text block; portable rendering sanitizes it.
+    Text {
+        text: String,
+    },
+    /// External image reference (`http`/`https` only); portable rendering
+    /// redacts credential-bearing URLs.
+    ImageReference {
+        url: String,
+    },
+    /// Inline or local image payload excluded at projection time (D9).
+    ImageOmitted,
+    /// Internal reasoning body and reasoning signature excluded (D9).
+    InternalReasoning,
+    ToolCall {
+        id: String,
+        name: String,
+        caller: Option<ToolCallerProjection>,
+        input: Value,
+    },
+    ToolResult {
+        tool_use_id: String,
+        content: String,
+        is_error: bool,
+        /// `Some` when the host message carried structured result blocks; the
+        /// host has already applied the safe-result filter (D9).
+        structured: Option<Value>,
+    },
+    ServerToolCall {
+        id: String,
+        name: String,
+        input: Value,
+    },
+    ToolSearchResult {
+        tool_use_id: String,
+        content: Value,
+    },
+    CodeExecutionResult {
+        tool_use_id: String,
+        content: Value,
+    },
+}
+
+/// One projected authoritative message (D3).
+///
+/// `prompt_snippet` is the host-computed `snapshot_label_prompt_snippet` of
+/// the first visible text block. The parser and snippet algorithm stay
+/// TUI-owned (D8), so correlation compares authoritative values instead of
+/// re-deriving them portably.
+///
+/// `is_user_role` carries the host's exact `Role::User` comparison. `role` is
+/// the rendered wire string, and comparing it textually would also match a
+/// `Role::Unrecognized("user")`, which the baseline never treated as a user
+/// turn. The flag keeps restore-point correlation faithful to the baseline.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ExportMessage {
+    pub role: String,
+    /// Exact `message.role == Role::User`, not a string comparison.
+    pub is_user_role: bool,
+    pub blocks: Vec<ExportBlock>,
+    pub prompt_snippet: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// One projected visible-history fallback entry (D3).
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum HistoryEntry {
+    /// Visible host content that portable rendering must still sanitize.
+    Sanitized { role: String, body: String },
+    /// An already-final baseline marker line that must not be sanitized again.
+    Literal { role: String, body: String },
+}
+
+/// Transcript source precedence (D3): authoritative API messages when
+/// present, otherwise the sanitized visible-history fallback.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum TranscriptProjection {
+    Authoritative(Vec<ExportMessage>),
+    HistoryFallback(Vec<HistoryEntry>),
+}
+
+/// One snapshot projected to semantic fields (D8).
+///
+/// `kind`, `sequence`, and `prompt_snippet` are the host-parsed label fields;
+/// the raw `label` is kept only for the human-readable table column. No
+/// preformatted correlation line crosses the boundary.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct RestoreSnapshot {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub label: String,
+    pub timestamp_unix: i64,
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub sequence: Option<u64>,
+    pub prompt_snippet: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// Restore-point projection with distinct baseline states (D3/D8).
+///
+/// `None` means no snapshot repository exists, `Unreadable` preserves the host
+/// failure reason, and `Recorded` distinguishes an existing-but-empty
+/// repository from one with snapshots by the vector length.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum RestorePointProjection {
+    None,
+    Unreadable { reason: String },
+    Recorded { snapshots: Vec<RestoreSnapshot> },
+}
+
+/// Full conversation projection (D3/D8/D9).
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ConversationExportProjection {
+    pub metadata: ExportMetadata,
+    pub transcript: TranscriptProjection,
+    pub restore_points: RestorePointProjection,
+}
+
+/// Turn-handoff projection (D2).
+///
+/// `markdown` is the unmodified shared TUI renderer output and
+/// `workspace_path` is the value the portable handler replaces with `.` after
+/// sanitizing; the renderer itself is neither moved nor duplicated.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct TurnHandoffProjection {
+    pub markdown: String,
+    pub workspace_path: String,
+}
+
+/// Session-export authority for the `/export` slice (FEAT-025 D1-D9).
+///
+/// Operation-granular synchronous delegates over the exact minimum host work
+/// the command consumes. The portable handler parses the request first, renders
+/// the selected scope second, and then uses these delegates in baseline order:
+/// clipboard exports call terminal-paste detection, recovery write, and
+/// clipboard delivery exactly once each with the same Markdown; file exports
+/// resolve the destination before writing it. A recovery-write `None` never
+/// prevents the clipboard attempt, and a turn-only export never requests the
+/// conversation projection (D6/D7).
+pub trait CommandSessionExportContext {
+    /// Conversation export projection: metadata, authoritative-or-fallback
+    /// transcript, and restore-point state. Read-only; opens only an existing
+    /// snapshot repository and never creates one (D8).
+    fn conversation_projection(&self) -> ConversationExportProjection;
+
+    /// Turn-handoff projection: unmodified shared renderer Markdown plus the
+    /// workspace path value (D2).
+    fn turn_handoff_projection(&self) -> TurnHandoffProjection;
+
+    /// Whether clipboard delivery goes through the terminal-client (SSH/OSC 52
+    /// via tmux) path (D6).
+    fn clipboard_requires_terminal_paste(&self) -> bool;
+
+    /// Write the shared `last-copy.md` recovery file. `None` reproduces the
+    /// baseline silent failure; recovery writing never falls through to an
+    /// error (D5/D6).
+    fn write_recovery_copy(&self, markdown: &str) -> Option<PathBuf>;
+
+    /// Attempt clipboard delivery. `Err` carries the raw host clipboard error
+    /// text; the handler composes the exact failure wording (D6).
+    fn write_clipboard(&self, markdown: &str) -> Result<(), String>;
+
+    /// Resolve a file destination exactly as the baseline does (trim, empty
+    /// check, `..` rejection, workspace canonicalization and rebasing, filename
+    /// requirement). Errors are returned unwrapped (D7).
+    fn resolve_export_path(&self, raw: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String>;
+
+    /// Write the rendered export to a resolved destination with the baseline
+    /// protection checks. Errors are returned unwrapped; the handler wraps them
+    /// in `Failed to export {label} to {path}: {err}` (D7).
+    fn write_export_file(&self, path: &Path, contents: &[u8], force: bool) -> Result<(), String>;
+}

crates/command-contract/src/handler.rs

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
 use crate::facets::{
     CommandCostContext, CommandMediaContext, CommandMemoryContext, CommandModePolicyContext,
     CommandModelContext, CommandPluginContext, CommandPresentationContext, CommandProjectContext,
-    CommandSessionContext, CommandSessionControlContext, CommandSessionLifecycleContext,
-    CommandSkillGroupContext, CommandSkillsContext, CommandSystemPromptContext,
-    CommandWorkspaceContext,
+    CommandSessionContext, CommandSessionControlContext, CommandSessionExportContext,
+    CommandSessionLifecycleContext, CommandSkillGroupContext, CommandSkillsContext,
+    CommandSystemPromptContext, CommandWorkspaceContext,
 };
 
 /// Exact host capabilities exposed to one contextual command handler.
@@ -51,6 +51,30 @@ impl CommandCapabilities {
     /// storage remains `u16` per the resolved maintainer review on FEAT-023 PR
     /// #5902 — bit 14 is available, so no speculative widening is performed.
     pub const SESSION_CONTROL: Self = Self(1 << 14);
+    /// Session-export host data (FEAT-025 D1), the next non-conflicting bit
+    /// after `SESSION_CONTROL`. Required only by the host-dependent `/export`
+    /// command and its `/daochu` alias; every concrete App, snapshot, clipboard,
+    /// filesystem, history, and turn-handoff access stays behind the TUI export
+    /// adapter.
+    ///
+    /// **Capacity: this is the last free bit.** Bits 0-15 are now fully
+    /// allocated, so another capability cannot be added without widening the
+    /// backing storage to `u32`. FEAT-026 (session structcopy) needs its own
+    /// exact-minimum facet and therefore owns that widening decision; reusing
+    /// `SESSION_EXPORT` for it would break the least-capability invariant.
+    /// The `export_capability_space_is_exactly_full` test pins the capacity so
+    /// the next author gets a deliberate decision instead of a compile error
+    /// with no context.
+    pub const SESSION_EXPORT: Self = Self(1 << 15);
+
+    /// Raw bit pattern, for tests that pin the capability-space capacity.
+    ///
+    /// Kept `#[cfg(test)]` so the `u16` backing stays an implementation detail
+    /// and nothing can widen it accidentally through a public accessor.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) const fn bits_for_test(self) -> u16 {
+        self.0
+    }
 
     pub const fn union(self, other: Self) -> Self {
         Self(self.0 | other.0)
@@ -100,6 +124,7 @@ pub struct CommandContexts<'a> {
     plugin: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandPluginContext>,
     lifecycle: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandSessionLifecycleContext>,
     control: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandSessionControlContext>,
+    export: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandSessionExportContext>,
 }
 
 /// Consumed envelope used when one handler needs several independent facets.
@@ -119,6 +144,7 @@ pub struct ContextParts<'a> {
     pub plugin: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandPluginContext>,
     pub lifecycle: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandSessionLifecycleContext>,
     pub control: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandSessionControlContext>,
+    pub export: Option<&'a mut dyn CommandSessionExportContext>,
 }
 
 impl<'a> CommandContexts<'a> {
@@ -139,6 +165,7 @@ impl<'a> CommandContexts<'a> {
             plugin: None,
             lifecycle: None,
             control: None,
+            export: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -159,6 +186,7 @@ impl<'a> CommandContexts<'a> {
             plugin: self.plugin,
             lifecycle: self.lifecycle,
             control: self.control,
+            export: self.export,
         }
     }
 
@@ -278,6 +306,14 @@ impl<'a> CommandContexts<'a> {
         );
         self
     }
+
+    pub fn with_export(mut self, value: &'a mut dyn CommandSessionExportContext) -> Self {
+        assert!(
+            self.export.replace(value).is_none(),
+            "export facet already set"
+        );
+        self
+    }
 }
 
 impl Default for CommandContexts<'_> {

crates/command-contract/src/tests.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+use std::cell::RefCell;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use codewhale_core::request::{ContentBlock, Message, SystemPrompt};
@@ -258,15 +259,20 @@ fn new_capabilities_are_object_safe_and_independently_transportable() {
     presentation(&Presentation);
     media(&Media);
     digest_workspace(&DigestWorkspace);
+    fn export(_: &dyn CommandSessionExportContext) {}
+    export(&FakeExport::default());
 
     let mut presentation = Presentation;
     let mut media = Media;
+    let mut export = FakeExport::default();
     let parts = CommandContexts::empty()
         .with_presentation(&mut presentation)
         .with_media(&mut media)
+        .with_export(&mut export)
         .into_parts();
     assert!(parts.presentation.is_some());
     assert!(parts.media.is_some());
+    assert!(parts.export.is_some());
     assert!(parts.session.is_none());
 }
 
@@ -2514,3 +2520,541 @@ fn control_surface_does_not_widen_session_or_lifecycle_facets() {
     assert!(!parts.lifecycle.as_deref_mut().unwrap().transition_blocked());
     assert!(parts.control.as_deref_mut().unwrap().transition_blocked());
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// FEAT-025: session export contract (D1/D3/D5/D6/D7/D8/D9).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[test]
+fn export_capability_is_stable_distinct_and_non_conflicting() {
+    let export = CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT;
+    let existing = [
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION,
+        CommandCapabilities::MODEL,
+        CommandCapabilities::COST,
+        CommandCapabilities::MODE_POLICY,
+        CommandCapabilities::SYSTEM_PROMPT,
+        CommandCapabilities::SKILLS,
+        CommandCapabilities::WORKSPACE,
+        CommandCapabilities::PRESENTATION,
+        CommandCapabilities::MEDIA,
+        CommandCapabilities::MEMORY,
+        CommandCapabilities::PROJECT,
+        CommandCapabilities::SKILL_GROUP,
+        CommandCapabilities::PLUGIN,
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION_LIFECYCLE,
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL,
+    ];
+    let mut union = CommandCapabilities::NONE;
+    for capability in existing {
+        assert_ne!(
+            export, capability,
+            "SESSION_EXPORT must not collide with an existing capability"
+        );
+        union = union.union(capability);
+    }
+    assert!(
+        !union.contains(export),
+        "SESSION_EXPORT must be a bit outside every existing capability (bits 0-14)"
+    );
+    assert!(!CommandCapabilities::NONE.contains(export));
+    assert!(!CommandCapabilities::NONE.contains(CommandCapabilities::NONE));
+    assert!(export.contains(export));
+    assert!(
+        export
+            .union(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL)
+            .contains(export)
+    );
+    assert!(
+        export
+            .union(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL)
+            .contains(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL)
+    );
+    assert!(!CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL.contains(export));
+    assert!(!export.contains(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL));
+    // Storage remains `u16`-backed: bit 15 (1 << 15 = 32768) fits without the
+    // speculative widening FEAT-023's maintainer review ruled out.
+    assert_eq!(
+        std::mem::size_of::<CommandCapabilities>(),
+        std::mem::size_of::<u16>(),
+        "CommandCapabilities storage must stay u16"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Canary: after FEAT-025 the `u16` capability space is *exactly* full.
+///
+/// This is deliberate capacity documentation, not a health check. When FEAT-026
+/// (session structcopy) adds its own facet it must widen the backing storage to
+/// `u32`, and this test is expected to be updated in that commit. Until then it
+/// guarantees that no capability bit is silently reused, and that anyone who
+/// adds a seventeenth capability is told why `1 << 16` on a `u16` will not do.
+#[test]
+fn export_capability_space_is_exactly_full() {
+    let all = [
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION,
+        CommandCapabilities::MODEL,
+        CommandCapabilities::COST,
+        CommandCapabilities::MODE_POLICY,
+        CommandCapabilities::SYSTEM_PROMPT,
+        CommandCapabilities::SKILLS,
+        CommandCapabilities::WORKSPACE,
+        CommandCapabilities::PRESENTATION,
+        CommandCapabilities::MEDIA,
+        CommandCapabilities::MEMORY,
+        CommandCapabilities::PROJECT,
+        CommandCapabilities::SKILL_GROUP,
+        CommandCapabilities::PLUGIN,
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION_LIFECYCLE,
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL,
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT,
+    ];
+
+    let mut union = CommandCapabilities::NONE;
+    for (index, capability) in all.iter().enumerate() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            capability.bits_for_test(),
+            1u16 << index,
+            "capability {index} must occupy exactly bit {index}"
+        );
+        union = union.union(*capability);
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        all.len(),
+        u16::BITS as usize,
+        "the declared capability count must consume the whole u16 space"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        union.bits_for_test(),
+        u16::MAX,
+        "bits 0-15 are fully allocated; FEAT-026 must widen the storage to u32"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Deterministic fake export facet: every delegate returns canned portable
+/// values or host error text, and effectful delegates record their calls so a
+/// later phase can assert sequencing without a real host.
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct FakeExport {
+    projection: Option<ConversationExportProjection>,
+    turn: Option<TurnHandoffProjection>,
+    terminal_paste: bool,
+    recovery: Option<Option<PathBuf>>,
+    clipboard: Option<Result<(), String>>,
+    resolved: Option<Result<PathBuf, String>>,
+    write: Option<Result<(), String>>,
+    calls: RefCell<Vec<String>>,
+}
+
+impl CommandSessionExportContext for FakeExport {
+    fn conversation_projection(&self) -> ConversationExportProjection {
+        self.calls
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .push("conversation_projection".to_string());
+        self.projection
+            .clone()
+            .expect("unexpected conversation_projection() on empty fake")
+    }
+    fn turn_handoff_projection(&self) -> TurnHandoffProjection {
+        self.calls
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .push("turn_handoff_projection".to_string());
+        self.turn
+            .clone()
+            .expect("unexpected turn_handoff_projection() on empty fake")
+    }
+    fn clipboard_requires_terminal_paste(&self) -> bool {
+        self.calls
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .push("clipboard_requires_terminal_paste".to_string());
+        self.terminal_paste
+    }
+    fn write_recovery_copy(&self, markdown: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+        self.calls
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .push(format!("write_recovery_copy:{markdown}"));
+        self.recovery
+            .clone()
+            .expect("unexpected write_recovery_copy() on empty fake")
+    }
+    fn write_clipboard(&self, markdown: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.calls
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .push(format!("write_clipboard:{markdown}"));
+        self.clipboard
+            .clone()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| Err("unexpected write_clipboard() on empty fake".to_string()))
+    }
+    fn resolve_export_path(&self, raw: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
+        self.calls
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .push(format!("resolve_export_path:{raw}"));
+        self.resolved.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            Err(format!(
+                "unexpected resolve_export_path({raw}) on empty fake"
+            ))
+        })
+    }
+    fn write_export_file(&self, path: &Path, contents: &[u8], force: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.calls.borrow_mut().push(format!(
+            "write_export_file:{}:{}:{force}",
+            path.display(),
+            contents.len()
+        ));
+        self.write
+            .clone()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| Err("unexpected write_export_file() on empty fake".to_string()))
+    }
+}
+
+fn export_metadata() -> ExportMetadata {
+    ExportMetadata {
+        session_label: "abc123".to_string(),
+        provider: "deepseek".to_string(),
+        model: "deepseek-chat".to_string(),
+        mode: "ACT".to_string(),
+        workspace_name: "workspace".to_string(),
+        message_count: 2,
+        exported_at_unix: 1_760_000_000,
+    }
+}
+
+fn export_recorded_snapshot() -> RestoreSnapshot {
+    RestoreSnapshot {
+        id: "0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
+        label: "pre-turn:3: fix parser".to_string(),
+        timestamp_unix: 1_759_999_000,
+        kind: "pre-turn".to_string(),
+        sequence: Some(3),
+        prompt_snippet: Some("fix parser".to_string()),
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_facet_is_object_safe_and_transports_every_outcome() {
+    // Object safety: usable behind a single `dyn` reference.
+    fn accepts_dyn(_: &dyn CommandSessionExportContext) {}
+    fn accepts_dyn_mut(_: &mut dyn CommandSessionExportContext) {}
+
+    let mut fake = FakeExport {
+        projection: Some(ConversationExportProjection {
+            metadata: export_metadata(),
+            transcript: TranscriptProjection::Authoritative(vec![ExportMessage {
+                is_user_role: false,
+                role: "assistant".to_string(),
+                prompt_snippet: Some("fix parser".to_string()),
+                blocks: vec![
+                    ExportBlock::Text {
+                        text: "visible".to_string(),
+                    },
+                    ExportBlock::ImageReference {
+                        url: "https://example.test/a.png".to_string(),
+                    },
+                    ExportBlock::ImageOmitted,
+                    ExportBlock::InternalReasoning,
+                    ExportBlock::ToolCall {
+                        id: "tool-1".to_string(),
+                        name: "read".to_string(),
+                        caller: Some(ToolCallerProjection {
+                            caller_type: "direct".to_string(),
+                            tool_id: Some("caller-1".to_string()),
+                        }),
+                        input: serde_json::json!({"path": "a.txt"}),
+                    },
+                    ExportBlock::ToolResult {
+                        tool_use_id: "tool-1".to_string(),
+                        content: "ok".to_string(),
+                        is_error: false,
+                        structured: Some(serde_json::json!([{"type": "text", "text": "ok"}])),
+                    },
+                    ExportBlock::ServerToolCall {
+                        id: "server-1".to_string(),
+                        name: "web_search".to_string(),
+                        input: serde_json::json!({"q": "rust"}),
+                    },
+                    ExportBlock::ToolSearchResult {
+                        tool_use_id: "search-1".to_string(),
+                        content: serde_json::json!({"results": []}),
+                    },
+                    ExportBlock::CodeExecutionResult {
+                        tool_use_id: "code-1".to_string(),
+                        content: serde_json::json!({"stdout": "hi"}),
+                    },
+                ],
+            }]),
+            restore_points: RestorePointProjection::Recorded {
+                snapshots: vec![export_recorded_snapshot()],
+            },
+        }),
+        turn: Some(TurnHandoffProjection {
+            markdown: "# turn handoff".to_string(),
+            workspace_path: "/workspace/example".to_string(),
+        }),
+        terminal_paste: true,
+        recovery: Some(Some(PathBuf::from(
+            "/home/u/.codewhale/exports/last-copy.md",
+        ))),
+        clipboard: Some(Ok(())),
+        resolved: Some(Ok(PathBuf::from("/workspace/example/out.md"))),
+        write: Some(Ok(())),
+        ..FakeExport::default()
+    };
+    accepts_dyn(&fake);
+    accepts_dyn_mut(&mut fake);
+
+    let projection = fake.conversation_projection();
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.session_label, "abc123");
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.provider, "deepseek");
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.model, "deepseek-chat");
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.mode, "ACT");
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.workspace_name, "workspace");
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.message_count, 2);
+    assert_eq!(projection.metadata.exported_at_unix, 1_760_000_000);
+    let TranscriptProjection::Authoritative(messages) = projection.transcript else {
+        panic!("expected authoritative transcript");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(messages.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(messages[0].role, "assistant");
+    assert_eq!(messages[0].prompt_snippet.as_deref(), Some("fix parser"));
+    assert_eq!(messages[0].blocks.len(), 9);
+    let ExportBlock::ToolCall {
+        caller: Some(caller),
+        input,
+        ..
+    } = &messages[0].blocks[4]
+    else {
+        panic!("expected tool call with caller");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(caller.caller_type, "direct");
+    assert_eq!(caller.tool_id.as_deref(), Some("caller-1"));
+    assert_eq!(input["path"], "a.txt");
+    let ExportBlock::ToolResult {
+        is_error,
+        structured,
+        ..
+    } = &messages[0].blocks[5]
+    else {
+        panic!("expected tool result");
+    };
+    assert!(!is_error);
+    assert!(structured.is_some());
+    let RestorePointProjection::Recorded { snapshots } = projection.restore_points else {
+        panic!("expected recorded restore points");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(snapshots.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(snapshots[0].id, "0123456789abcdef");
+    assert_eq!(snapshots[0].label, "pre-turn:3: fix parser");
+    assert_eq!(snapshots[0].timestamp_unix, 1_759_999_000);
+    assert_eq!(snapshots[0].kind, "pre-turn");
+    assert_eq!(snapshots[0].sequence, Some(3));
+    assert_eq!(snapshots[0].prompt_snippet.as_deref(), Some("fix parser"));
+
+    let turn = fake.turn_handoff_projection();
+    assert_eq!(turn.markdown, "# turn handoff");
+    assert_eq!(turn.workspace_path, "/workspace/example");
+
+    assert!(fake.clipboard_requires_terminal_paste());
+    assert_eq!(
+        fake.write_recovery_copy("# md"),
+        Some(PathBuf::from("/home/u/.codewhale/exports/last-copy.md"))
+    );
+    assert!(fake.write_clipboard("# md").is_ok());
+    assert_eq!(
+        fake.resolve_export_path("out.md").expect("resolved"),
+        PathBuf::from("/workspace/example/out.md")
+    );
+    assert!(
+        fake.write_export_file(Path::new("/workspace/example/out.md"), b"# md", false)
+            .is_ok()
+    );
+    // Effectful delegates were exercised exactly once each, in call order.
+    let expected: Vec<String> = [
+        "conversation_projection",
+        "turn_handoff_projection",
+        "clipboard_requires_terminal_paste",
+        "write_recovery_copy:# md",
+        "write_clipboard:# md",
+        "resolve_export_path:out.md",
+        "write_export_file:/workspace/example/out.md:4:false",
+    ]
+    .into_iter()
+    .map(str::to_string)
+    .collect();
+    assert_eq!(fake.calls.borrow().as_slice(), expected.as_slice());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_error_and_empty_states_transport_exactly() {
+    let fake = FakeExport {
+        projection: Some(ConversationExportProjection {
+            metadata: export_metadata(),
+            transcript: TranscriptProjection::HistoryFallback(vec![
+                HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+                    role: "user".to_string(),
+                    body: "visible history".to_string(),
+                },
+                HistoryEntry::Literal {
+                    role: "system".to_string(),
+                    body: "[internal context omitted]".to_string(),
+                },
+            ]),
+            restore_points: RestorePointProjection::Unreadable {
+                reason: "permission denied".to_string(),
+            },
+        }),
+        recovery: Some(None),
+        clipboard: Some(Err("clipboard unavailable".to_string())),
+        resolved: Some(Err("export paths may not contain `..`".to_string())),
+        write: Some(Err("destination already exists".to_string())),
+        ..FakeExport::default()
+    };
+
+    let projection = fake.conversation_projection();
+    let TranscriptProjection::HistoryFallback(entries) = projection.transcript else {
+        panic!("expected history fallback");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
+    assert!(matches!(
+        &entries[0],
+        HistoryEntry::Sanitized { role, body }
+            if role == "user" && body == "visible history"
+    ));
+    assert!(matches!(
+        &entries[1],
+        HistoryEntry::Literal { role, body }
+            if role == "system" && body == "[internal context omitted]"
+    ));
+    let RestorePointProjection::Unreadable { reason } = projection.restore_points else {
+        panic!("expected unreadable restore points");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(reason, "permission denied");
+
+    assert!(!fake.clipboard_requires_terminal_paste());
+    assert_eq!(fake.write_recovery_copy("# md"), None);
+    assert_eq!(
+        fake.write_clipboard("# md").unwrap_err(),
+        "clipboard unavailable"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        fake.resolve_export_path("../out.md").unwrap_err(),
+        "export paths may not contain `..`"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        fake.write_export_file(Path::new("/tmp/out.md"), b"x", false)
+            .unwrap_err(),
+        "destination already exists"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_projection_distinguishes_restore_states() {
+    let states = [
+        RestorePointProjection::None,
+        RestorePointProjection::Unreadable {
+            reason: "boom".to_string(),
+        },
+        RestorePointProjection::Recorded { snapshots: vec![] },
+        RestorePointProjection::Recorded {
+            snapshots: vec![export_recorded_snapshot()],
+        },
+    ];
+    assert!(matches!(&states[0], RestorePointProjection::None));
+    assert!(matches!(
+        &states[1],
+        RestorePointProjection::Unreadable { reason } if reason == "boom"
+    ));
+    let RestorePointProjection::Recorded { snapshots } = &states[2] else {
+        panic!("expected recorded state");
+    };
+    assert!(snapshots.is_empty(), "existing-but-empty stays distinct");
+    let RestorePointProjection::Recorded { snapshots } = &states[3] else {
+        panic!("expected recorded state");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(snapshots.len(), 1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_projection_omission_markers_carry_no_hidden_payload() {
+    // D9: the projection has no field for a reasoning body, reasoning
+    // signature, or inline/local image payload. Omission markers are data-free
+    // unit variants, so prohibited payloads cannot be transported even by
+    // accident.
+    let block = ExportBlock::InternalReasoning;
+    let ExportBlock::InternalReasoning = block else {
+        panic!("internal reasoning must be a payload-free marker");
+    };
+    let block = ExportBlock::ImageOmitted;
+    let ExportBlock::ImageOmitted = block else {
+        panic!("omitted image must be a payload-free marker");
+    };
+
+    const HIDDEN_REASONING: &str = "signed-thinking-secret-body";
+    const HIDDEN_SIGNATURE: &str = "sig_1234567890";
+    const HIDDEN_IMAGE: &str = "";
+
+    let projection = ConversationExportProjection {
+        metadata: export_metadata(),
+        transcript: TranscriptProjection::Authoritative(vec![ExportMessage {
+            is_user_role: false,
+            role: "assistant".to_string(),
+            prompt_snippet: None,
+            blocks: vec![ExportBlock::InternalReasoning, ExportBlock::ImageOmitted],
+        }]),
+        restore_points: RestorePointProjection::None,
+    };
+    let rendered = format!("{projection:?}");
+    assert!(!rendered.contains(HIDDEN_REASONING));
+    assert!(!rendered.contains(HIDDEN_SIGNATURE));
+    assert!(!rendered.contains(HIDDEN_IMAGE));
+    assert!(rendered.contains("InternalReasoning"));
+    assert!(rendered.contains("ImageOmitted"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn envelope_export_slot_is_independent_and_rejects_duplicates() {
+    let mut first = FakeExport::default();
+    let mut second = FakeExport::default();
+    let mut control = FakeControl::default();
+
+    let parts = CommandContexts::empty()
+        .with_export(&mut first)
+        .with_control(&mut control)
+        .into_parts();
+    assert!(
+        parts.export.is_some(),
+        "export slot must be present when declared"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        parts.control.is_some(),
+        "control slot may coexist with export"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        parts.session.is_none()
+            && parts.lifecycle.is_none()
+            && parts.plugin.is_none()
+            && parts.skill_group.is_none(),
+        "unrelated slots must stay absent (exact exposure)"
+    );
+
+    let bare = CommandContexts::empty().into_parts();
+    assert!(bare.export.is_none(), "undeclared export stays absent");
+
+    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+        CommandContexts::empty()
+            .with_export(&mut first)
+            .with_export(&mut second);
+    }));
+    assert!(
+        result.is_err(),
+        "duplicate export slot must assert deterministically"
+    );
+
+    // Reading through the dyn facet works after insertion.
+    let mut projection = FakeExport {
+        terminal_paste: true,
+        ..FakeExport::default()
+    };
+    let inserted = CommandContexts::empty().with_export(&mut projection);
+    let export = inserted.into_parts().export.expect("inserted export");
+    assert!(export.clipboard_requires_terminal_paste());
+}

crates/config/src/persistence.rs

@@ -230,597 +230,14 @@ fn rollback(snapshots: &[Snapshot]) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Hints that mark a config/JSON/env key as carrying a secret value.
-///
-/// Compound hints (`api_key`, `client_secret`) match as a substring of the
-/// normalized key. Single-word hints (`token`, `secret`, `password`) match a
-/// whole identifier segment so they describe a credential (`token`,
-/// `api_token`) and not an English word (`tokens`, `tokenizer`).
-const SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS: &[&str] = &[
-    "api_key",
-    "apikey",
-    "api-key",
-    "secret",
-    "token",
-    "password",
-    "passwd",
-    "authorization",
-    "auth_token",
-    "access_key",
-    "client_secret",
-    "private_key",
-];
-
-/// Known opaque-token prefixes worth masking even when they appear bare (not as
-/// `key = value`). Conservative on purpose: only well-known provider/key shapes.
-const SECRET_TOKEN_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["sk-", "sk_", "ghp_", "gho_", "xoxb-", "xoxp-", "pk-"];
-
-/// The placeholder substituted for any redacted secret value.
-pub const REDACTED: &str = "[redacted]";
-
-/// Return a copy of a JSON value with secret-bearing data removed.
-///
-/// Object values whose key contains a sensitive hint are replaced wholesale,
-/// while all other objects and arrays are traversed recursively. String leaves
-/// still pass through [`redact_secrets`] so bare provider tokens and embedded
-/// assignments remain covered without treating the serialized JSON document as
-/// one flat keyed assignment.
-#[must_use]
-pub fn redact_json_secrets(value: &serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Value {
-    match value {
-        serde_json::Value::Object(object) => serde_json::Value::Object(
-            object
-                .iter()
-                .map(|(key, value)| {
-                    let value = if key_is_sensitive(key) {
-                        serde_json::Value::String(REDACTED.to_string())
-                    } else {
-                        redact_json_secrets(value)
-                    };
-                    (key.clone(), value)
-                })
-                .collect(),
-        ),
-        serde_json::Value::Array(items) => {
-            serde_json::Value::Array(items.iter().map(redact_json_secrets).collect())
-        }
-        serde_json::Value::String(text) => serde_json::Value::String(redact_secrets(text)),
-        scalar => scalar.clone(),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Redact secret-bearing values from arbitrary text so it is safe to put in a
-/// setup report, log line, error message, or test snapshot.
-///
-/// Two passes, both dependency-free:
-///
-/// 1. **Keyed assignments.** Lines or whitespace-delimited inline tokens shaped
-///    like `key = value`, `key: value`, or `key=value` whose key
-///    (case-insensitively, ignoring quotes) matches a `SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS`
-///    credential identifier have their value replaced with [`REDACTED`]. The
-///    spaced form (`key = value`) is matched anywhere on the line, not only
-///    when the sensitive key owns the line's first separator — an `anyhow`
-///    chain rendered with `{:#}` puts prose and its own `: ` separators in
-///    front of the assignment, and that must not be a hole. Because such a
-///    value can span several words (`authorization = Bearer <token>`),
-///    everything from the value to the end of the line is dropped, exactly as
-///    the whole-line form already does. Token *counts* in diagnostics
-///    (`max tokens = 8192`) are not credentials and stay visible.
-/// 2. **Bare tokens.** Whitespace-delimited words beginning with a known
-///    `SECRET_TOKEN_PREFIXES` are replaced wholesale.
-///
-/// The goal is defense in depth: setup state and reports are built from safe
-/// summaries that never include secrets in the first place, and this is the
-/// backstop for anything that echoes raw config text.
-#[must_use]
-pub fn redact_secrets(input: &str) -> String {
-    redact_secrets_with(input, RedactionPolicy::KeyBased)
-}
-
-/// How aggressively [`redact_secrets_with`] treats a sensitive-looking key.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum RedactionPolicy {
-    /// Mask the value of every sensitive-looking key, whatever the value is.
-    /// Right for logs, previews, exports, and diagnostics: a false positive
-    /// costs nothing there and a miss leaks a credential.
-    KeyBased,
-    /// Mask a keyed value only when the value itself looks like a credential
-    /// (known prefix, JWT, bearer token, PEM block, long opaque string).
-    /// Right for text the model must be able to quote back byte-for-byte,
-    /// such as tool results that feed exact-match edits: `password:
-    /// credentials?.password`, `"password-validator": "^5.3.0"`, or
-    /// `token = make_token()` are code, not secrets (#5546).
-    CredentialShaped,
-}
-
-/// Redact model-bound tool output: exact configured credential values are the
-/// caller's job; this masks only values that look like credentials so the
-/// model keeps seeing the real bytes of ordinary code and config.
-#[must_use]
-pub fn redact_model_bound_secrets(input: &str) -> String {
-    redact_secrets_with(input, RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped)
-}
-
-/// [`redact_secrets`] with an explicit [`RedactionPolicy`].
-#[must_use]
-pub fn redact_secrets_with(input: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> String {
-    let mut out = String::with_capacity(input.len());
-    let mut in_private_key_block = false;
-    for line in input.split_inclusive('\n') {
-        // split_inclusive keeps the newline on the previous chunk, so we do
-        // not need to re-add separators here.
-        let body = line.strip_suffix('\n').unwrap_or(line);
-        let trimmed = body.trim();
-        if in_private_key_block {
-            if trimmed.starts_with("-----END") {
-                in_private_key_block = false;
-                out.push_str(line);
-            } else {
-                out.push_str(REDACTED);
-                if line.ends_with('\n') {
-                    out.push('\n');
-                }
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-        if is_private_key_block_start(trimmed) {
-            in_private_key_block = true;
-            out.push_str(line);
-            continue;
-        }
-        out.push_str(&redact_line(line, policy));
-    }
-    out
-}
-
-fn is_private_key_block_start(trimmed: &str) -> bool {
-    trimmed.starts_with("-----BEGIN") && trimmed.contains("PRIVATE KEY")
-}
-
-/// Redact a single line (which may include a trailing newline).
-fn redact_line(line: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> String {
-    // Preserve any trailing newline so callers keep their line structure.
-    let (body, newline) = match line.strip_suffix('\n') {
-        Some(rest) => (rest, "\n"),
-        None => (line, ""),
-    };
-
-    if let Some(redacted) = redact_keyed_assignment(body, policy) {
-        return format!("{redacted}{newline}");
-    }
-
-    // Inline-assignment / bare-token pass: mask any whitespace-delimited word
-    // carrying a sensitive keyed value or a known bare secret prefix, plus the
-    // spaced `key = value` form that `redact_keyed_assignment` above only sees
-    // when the sensitive key owns the line's first separator.
-    let mut changed = false;
-    let mut spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
-    let mut masked: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
-    for word in body.split(' ') {
-        let trimmed = trim_word_punctuation(word);
-        if spaced == SpacedAssignment::AwaitingValue && !trimmed.is_empty() {
-            match policy {
-                RedactionPolicy::KeyBased => {
-                    // The value may run to the end of the line, so drop the
-                    // remainder rather than masking one word and leaking the
-                    // rest.
-                    masked.push(REDACTED.to_string());
-                    changed = true;
-                    break;
-                }
-                RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped => {
-                    // Only a credential-shaped value is hidden, and only that
-                    // word: the rest of the line stays quotable. An auth scheme
-                    // word (`Bearer`) keeps the assignment open for its token.
-                    if is_auth_scheme_word(trimmed) {
-                        masked.push(word.to_string());
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                    if value_looks_like_credential(trimmed) {
-                        masked.push(word.replace(trimmed, REDACTED));
-                        changed = true;
-                    } else {
-                        masked.push(word.to_string());
-                    }
-                    spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
-                    continue;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        if let Some(redacted) = redact_inline_keyed_assignment(trimmed, policy) {
-            changed = true;
-            masked.push(word.replace(trimmed, &redacted));
-            spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
-        } else if !trimmed.is_empty() && looks_like_secret_token(trimmed) {
-            changed = true;
-            masked.push(word.replace(trimmed, REDACTED));
-            spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
-        } else {
-            masked.push(word.to_string());
-            spaced = spaced.advance(trimmed);
-        }
-    }
-
-    if changed {
-        format!("{}{newline}", masked.join(" "))
-    } else {
-        format!("{body}{newline}")
-    }
-}
-
-/// Progress through a `key <space> <sep> <space> value` assignment as the
-/// word-level pass walks a line.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-enum SpacedAssignment {
-    None,
-    /// The previous word was a bare sensitive key awaiting its separator.
-    SensitiveKey,
-    /// A sensitive key and its separator are both behind us.
-    AwaitingValue,
-}
-
-impl SpacedAssignment {
-    fn advance(self, trimmed: &str) -> Self {
-        // Runs of spaces produce empty words; they neither start nor cancel an
-        // assignment.
-        if trimmed.is_empty() {
-            return self;
-        }
-        if matches!(trimmed, "=" | ":") {
-            return if self == Self::SensitiveKey {
-                Self::AwaitingValue
-            } else {
-                Self::None
-            };
-        }
-        // `api_key=` / `api_key:` with the value in the next word. A word whose
-        // separator is *not* final was already offered to
-        // `redact_inline_keyed_assignment`, so it is not an assignment we own.
-        if let Some(key) = trimmed
-            .strip_suffix('=')
-            .or_else(|| trimmed.strip_suffix(':'))
-        {
-            return if key_is_sensitive(key) {
-                Self::AwaitingValue
-            } else {
-                Self::None
-            };
-        }
-        if key_is_sensitive(trimmed) {
-            return Self::SensitiveKey;
-        }
-        Self::None
-    }
-}
-
-fn trim_word_punctuation(word: &str) -> &str {
-    word.trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | ',' | ';'))
-}
-
-/// Whether `raw`, normalized the way a config/env/JSON key is, matches a
-/// [`SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS`] credential identifier.
-fn key_is_sensitive(raw: &str) -> bool {
-    let key_norm = normalize_sensitive_key(raw);
-    !key_norm.is_empty()
-        && SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS
-            .iter()
-            .any(|hint| key_matches_sensitive_hint(&key_norm, hint))
-}
-
-/// Normalize the identifier boundaries commonly used by config, env, and JSON
-/// keys without turning English plurals such as `tokens` into `token`.
-///
-/// Punctuation and case transitions become `_`, so `oauth.token`,
-/// `accessToken`, and `APIKey` share the same matching surface as
-/// `oauth_token`, `access_token`, and `api_key`.
-fn normalize_sensitive_key(raw: &str) -> String {
-    let mut normalized = String::with_capacity(raw.len());
-    let mut chars = raw.chars().peekable();
-    let mut previous = None;
-
-    while let Some(ch) = chars.next() {
-        if ch.is_ascii_alphanumeric() {
-            let next = chars.peek().copied();
-            let starts_case_segment = ch.is_ascii_uppercase()
-                && previous.is_some_and(|previous: char| {
-                    previous.is_ascii_lowercase()
-                        || previous.is_ascii_digit()
-                        || (previous.is_ascii_uppercase()
-                            && next.is_some_and(|next| next.is_ascii_lowercase()))
-                });
-            if starts_case_segment && !normalized.is_empty() && !normalized.ends_with('_') {
-                normalized.push('_');
-            }
-            normalized.push(ch.to_ascii_lowercase());
-        } else if !normalized.is_empty() && !normalized.ends_with('_') {
-            normalized.push('_');
-        }
-        previous = Some(ch);
-    }
-
-    while normalized.ends_with('_') {
-        normalized.pop();
-    }
-    normalized
-}
-
-fn key_matches_sensitive_hint(key_norm: &str, hint: &str) -> bool {
-    if key_norm == hint {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Compound hints already name a credential (`api_key`, `client_secret`).
-    // Substring is the right match: `openai_api_key` contains `api_key`.
-    if hint.contains('_') || hint.contains('-') {
-        return key_norm.contains(hint);
-    }
-    if hint == "token" {
-        // Camel-case normalization turns both credentials (`accessToken`) and
-        // ordinary usage metrics (`tokenBudget`, `tokenCount`) into segmented
-        // identifiers. A credential token is either the whole key, a suffix
-        // such as `access_token`, or an explicitly value-bearing `token_*`
-        // field. Metrics must stay visible in diagnostics and tool previews.
-        let is_metric_suffix = |suffix: &str| {
-            matches!(
-                suffix.split('_').next(),
-                Some(
-                    "budget"
-                        | "budgets"
-                        | "count"
-                        | "counts"
-                        | "limit"
-                        | "limits"
-                        | "total"
-                        | "totals"
-                        | "usage"
-                        | "used"
-                        | "window"
-                        | "windows"
-                )
-            )
-        };
-        if key_norm.ends_with("_token") {
-            return true;
-        }
-        if let Some(suffix) = key_norm.strip_prefix("token_") {
-            return !is_metric_suffix(suffix);
-        }
-        if let Some((_, suffix)) = key_norm.rsplit_once("_token_") {
-            return !is_metric_suffix(suffix);
-        }
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Single-word hints must be a whole identifier segment so `token`
-    // redacts `token` / `api_token` and not English `tokens`.
-    key_norm.split(['_', '-']).any(|segment| segment == hint)
-}
-
-fn redact_inline_keyed_assignment(word: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> Option<String> {
-    let sep_idx = word.find(['=', ':'])?;
-    let (raw_key, rest) = word.split_at(sep_idx);
-    let raw_value = &rest[1..];
-    if raw_value.is_empty() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    if !key_is_sensitive(raw_key) {
-        return None;
-    }
-    match policy {
-        RedactionPolicy::KeyBased => Some(format!("{}{}{}", raw_key, &rest[..1], REDACTED)),
-        RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped => {
-            let (core, quote) = strip_value_quotes(raw_value);
-            if !value_looks_like_credential(core) {
-                return None;
-            }
-            Some(format!("{}{}{quote}{REDACTED}{quote}", raw_key, &rest[..1]))
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Whether a word announces an HTTP auth scheme whose credential follows.
-fn is_auth_scheme_word(word: &str) -> bool {
-    matches!(
-        word,
-        "Bearer" | "bearer" | "Basic" | "basic" | "Token" | "token"
-    )
-}
-
-/// Split a matching pair of surrounding quotes off a value, returning the
-/// inner text and the quote to restore (empty when unquoted or unbalanced).
-fn strip_value_quotes(value: &str) -> (&str, &str) {
-    for quote in ['"', '\''] {
-        if value.len() >= 2 && value.starts_with(quote) && value.ends_with(quote) {
-            return (&value[1..value.len() - 1], &value[..1]);
-        }
-    }
-    // A leading quote without its partner (the word pass strips the outer
-    // punctuation of `"x",` to `"x`): treat the remainder as the value.
-    if let Some(inner) = value.strip_prefix(['"', '\'']) {
-        return (inner, "");
-    }
-    (value, "")
-}
-
-/// Extra bare prefixes that mark a value as a credential even though they are
-/// too product-specific to mask as standalone words in prose.
-const CREDENTIAL_VALUE_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[
-    "sk-ant-",
-    "AKIA",
-    "ASIA",
-    "AIza",
-    "ghp_",
-    "gho_",
-    "ghu_",
-    "ghs_",
-    "ghr_",
-    "github_pat_",
-    "glpat-",
-    "xoxa-",
-    "xoxb-",
-    "xoxp-",
-    "xoxr-",
-    "xoxs-",
-    "npm_",
-    "ya29.",
-];
-
-/// Whether a keyed value looks like credential material rather than code,
-/// configuration, or prose.
-///
-/// True for known provider prefixes, JWTs, `Bearer`/`Basic` tokens, PEM
-/// headers, and long opaque alphanumeric runs. False for short literals,
-/// version strings, identifiers, property/call/env references, and the
-/// redaction placeholder itself.
-pub(crate) fn value_looks_like_credential(value: &str) -> bool {
-    let value = value
-        .trim()
-        .trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | ',' | ';'));
-    if value.is_empty() || value == REDACTED {
-        return false;
-    }
-    if looks_like_secret_token(value)
-        || CREDENTIAL_VALUE_PREFIXES
-            .iter()
-            .any(|prefix| value.len() > prefix.len() + 6 && value.starts_with(prefix))
-    {
-        return true;
-    }
-    if value.starts_with("-----BEGIN") {
-        return true;
-    }
-    if let Some((scheme, rest)) = value.split_once(' ')
-        && is_auth_scheme_word(scheme)
-    {
-        return value_looks_like_credential(rest);
-    }
-    if is_jwt_shaped(value) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    if value.len() < 16 {
-        return false;
-    }
-    if is_version_like(value) || is_reference_like(value) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    is_opaque_run(value)
-}
-
-fn is_jwt_shaped(value: &str) -> bool {
-    let mut parts = value.split('.');
-    match (parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next()) {
-        (Some(header), Some(payload), Some(signature), None) => {
-            header.starts_with("eyJ")
-                && payload.starts_with("eyJ")
-                && !signature.is_empty()
-                && [header, payload, signature].iter().all(|part| {
-                    part.chars()
-                        .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
-                })
-        }
-        _ => false,
-    }
-}
-
-fn is_version_like(value: &str) -> bool {
-    let digits = value.trim_start_matches(['^', '~', '>', '<', '=', 'v', 'V', ' ']);
-    !digits.is_empty()
-        && digits
-            .chars()
-            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '.' || c == '-' || c == '+')
-        && digits.chars().next().is_some_and(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
-}
-
-fn is_reference_like(value: &str) -> bool {
-    // Property access, calls, template/env lookups, and plain identifiers are
-    // code, not credential material.
-    value.contains("?.")
-        || value.contains('(')
-        || value.contains("${")
-        || value.contains("process.env")
-        || value.contains("os.environ")
-        || value.contains("getenv")
-        || value.contains("://")
-        || value
-            .chars()
-            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphabetic() || c == '_' || c == '.')
-}
-
-fn is_opaque_run(value: &str) -> bool {
-    value.len() >= 20
-        && value
-            .chars()
-            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '+' | '/' | '=' | '_' | '-' | '.'))
-        && value.chars().any(|c| c.is_ascii_alphabetic())
-        && value.chars().any(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
-}
-
-/// If `body` is a `key <sep> value` assignment with a sensitive key, return the
-/// line with the value redacted; otherwise `None`.
-fn redact_keyed_assignment(body: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> Option<String> {
-    // Find the first `=` or `:` that separates a key from a value.
-    let sep_idx = body.find(['=', ':'])?;
-    let (raw_key, rest) = body.split_at(sep_idx);
-    let sep = &rest[..1];
-    let raw_value = &rest[1..];
-
-    let key_norm = raw_key
-        .trim()
-        .trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | '[' | ']'));
-    if !key_is_sensitive(key_norm) {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    if policy == RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped {
-        // Replace only the value span, keep the key bytes, separator spacing,
-        // quote style, and trailing punctuation, and only when the value is
-        // credential-shaped: the model must still be able to quote the line.
-        let value_lead_ws: String = raw_value
-            .chars()
-            .take_while(|c| c.is_whitespace())
-            .collect();
-        let value_rest = raw_value.trim_start();
-        let value_core = value_rest.trim_end();
-        let trailing_ws = &value_rest[value_core.len()..];
-        let literal = value_core.trim_end_matches([',', ';']);
-        let trailer = &value_core[literal.len()..];
-        let (core, quote) = strip_value_quotes(literal);
-        if core.is_empty() || !value_looks_like_credential(core) {
-            return None;
-        }
-        return Some(format!(
-            "{raw_key}{sep}{value_lead_ws}{quote}{REDACTED}{quote}{trailer}{trailing_ws}"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // Keep leading whitespace of the key and the original separator spacing so
-    // the redacted line reads naturally.
-    let key_lead_ws: String = raw_key.chars().take_while(|c| c.is_whitespace()).collect();
-    let value_lead_ws: String = raw_value
-        .chars()
-        .take_while(|c| c.is_whitespace())
-        .collect();
-    let value_rest = raw_value.trim_start();
-    // If the value is empty, there is nothing to hide.
-    if value_rest.is_empty() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    // Preserve surrounding quotes so structured files stay parseable-looking.
-    let quoted = value_rest.starts_with('"') || value_rest.starts_with('\'');
-    let replacement = if quoted {
-        format!("\"{REDACTED}\"")
-    } else {
-        REDACTED.to_string()
-    };
-    Some(format!(
-        "{key_lead_ws}{}{sep}{value_lead_ws}{replacement}",
-        raw_key.trim()
-    ))
-}
-
-fn looks_like_secret_token(word: &str) -> bool {
-    SECRET_TOKEN_PREFIXES
-        .iter()
-        .any(|p| word.len() > p.len() + 6 && word.starts_with(p))
-}
+// FEAT-025 D4: the pure secret-redaction primitives moved to
+// `codewhale-secrets::redact` so portable command helpers can share one
+// implementation without depending on this crate. Re-exported here to keep
+// the existing `codewhale_config::persistence::*` public API stable.
+pub use codewhale_secrets::redact::{
+    REDACTED, RedactionPolicy, redact_json_secrets, redact_model_bound_secrets, redact_secrets,
+    redact_secrets_with,
+};
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {

crates/secrets/Cargo.toml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 repository.workspace = true
-description = "Secret storage backends for Codewhale, with OS keyring and file fallback"
+description = "Secret storage backends for Codewhale, with OS keyring and file fallback, plus the shared pure secret-redaction and output-sanitization primitives"
 
 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -13,12 +13,18 @@ workspace = true
 [dependencies]
 codewhale-paths = { path = "../paths", version = "0.9.13" }
 chrono.workspace = true
+# FEAT-025 D4: the portable output sanitizer owns the regex-based redaction
+# passes here so config diagnostics and command helpers share one copy.
+regex = "1.11"
 serde = { workspace = true }
-serde_json = { workspace = true }
+serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["preserve_order"] }
 sha2.workspace = true
 tempfile.workspace = true
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
+# FEAT-025 D4: URL credential redaction uses the same `url` parser reqwest
+# re-exports, with no HTTP client dependency in this pure crate.
+url = "2.5"
 
 [target.'cfg(target_os = "macos")'.dependencies]
 keyring = { version = "3", features = ["apple-native"] }

crates/secrets/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-//! Secret storage for CodeWhale API keys.
+//! Secret storage for CodeWhale API keys, plus the shared output-sanitization
+//! primitives that keep secrets out of diagnostics and command output.
 //!
-//! Provides a small abstraction (`KeyringStore`) plus a default
+//! Secret storage: provides a small abstraction (`KeyringStore`) plus a default
 //! file-based implementation (`FileKeyringStore`), an opt-in OS keyring
 //! implementation (`DefaultKeyringStore`), and an in-memory store for tests
 //! (`InMemoryKeyringStore`).
@@ -9,10 +10,31 @@
 //! and falls back to environment variables. Config-file precedence lives in the
 //! config crate so user-facing commands can keep `config -> secret store -> env`
 //! explicit at the call site.
+//!
+//! Sanitization: [`redact`] and [`sanitize`] are pure and carry no host types.
+//! They live here (FEAT-025 D4) because this is the lowest crate that both the
+//! config diagnostics path and the TUI already reach, so `/export`,
+//! `/structcopy`, client URL masking, and OSC8 stripping share exactly one
+//! implementation instead of drifting copies. `config::persistence` and
+//! `tui::client` / `tui::osc8` re-export or delegate to these functions.
+//!
+//! Note for the command extraction (EPIC-006): this crate is already reachable
+//! from `codewhale-command-contract` transitively via
+//! `core -> config -> secrets`, so consuming the sanitizer from the future
+//! `codewhale-commands` crate adds no new dependency edge. It does mean the
+//! sanitizer inherits this crate's OS keyring dependencies; if the surface grows
+//! beyond redaction, split a dedicated `codewhale-sanitize` crate rather than
+//! widening this one.
 #![deny(missing_docs)]
 
 /// Shared secure-storage contract for the Codewhale account session.
 pub mod account;
+/// Pure secret-redaction primitives shared by config diagnostics and the
+/// portable command sanitizer (FEAT-025 D4).
+pub mod redact;
+/// Pure text/URL/ANSI output sanitization shared by the portable command
+/// helpers (FEAT-025 D4).
+pub mod sanitize;
 
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::fs;

crates/secrets/src/redact.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+//! Pure secret-redaction primitives (FEAT-025 D4).
+//!
+//! Relocated verbatim from `codewhale-config::persistence` so the portable
+//! command sanitizer and the config diagnostic path share exactly one
+//! implementation. The algorithm, ordering, sensitive-key vocabulary, and
+//! byte-for-byte results are unchanged; `codewhale-config::persistence`
+//! re-exports these items to keep its public API stable.
+
+/// Hints that mark a config/JSON/env key as carrying a secret value.
+///
+/// Compound hints (`api_key`, `client_secret`) match as a substring of the
+/// normalized key. Single-word hints (`token`, `secret`, `password`) match a
+/// whole identifier segment so they describe a credential (`token`,
+/// `api_token`) and not an English word (`tokens`, `tokenizer`).
+const SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS: &[&str] = &[
+    "api_key",
+    "apikey",
+    "api-key",
+    "secret",
+    "token",
+    "password",
+    "passwd",
+    "authorization",
+    "auth_token",
+    "access_key",
+    "client_secret",
+    "private_key",
+];
+
+/// Known opaque-token prefixes worth masking even when they appear bare (not as
+/// `key = value`). Conservative on purpose: only well-known provider/key shapes.
+const SECRET_TOKEN_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["sk-", "sk_", "ghp_", "gho_", "xoxb-", "xoxp-", "pk-"];
+
+/// The placeholder substituted for any redacted secret value.
+pub const REDACTED: &str = "[redacted]";
+
+/// Return a copy of a JSON value with secret-bearing data removed.
+///
+/// Object values whose key contains a sensitive hint are replaced wholesale,
+/// while all other objects and arrays are traversed recursively. String leaves
+/// still pass through [`redact_secrets`] so bare provider tokens and embedded
+/// assignments remain covered without treating the serialized JSON document as
+/// one flat keyed assignment.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn redact_json_secrets(value: &serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Value {
+    match value {
+        serde_json::Value::Object(object) => serde_json::Value::Object(
+            object
+                .iter()
+                .map(|(key, value)| {
+                    let value = if key_is_sensitive(key) {
+                        serde_json::Value::String(REDACTED.to_string())
+                    } else {
+                        redact_json_secrets(value)
+                    };
+                    (key.clone(), value)
+                })
+                .collect(),
+        ),
+        serde_json::Value::Array(items) => {
+            serde_json::Value::Array(items.iter().map(redact_json_secrets).collect())
+        }
+        serde_json::Value::String(text) => serde_json::Value::String(redact_secrets(text)),
+        scalar => scalar.clone(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Redact secret-bearing values from arbitrary text so it is safe to put in a
+/// setup report, log line, error message, or test snapshot.
+///
+/// Two passes, both dependency-free:
+///
+/// 1. **Keyed assignments.** Lines or whitespace-delimited inline tokens shaped
+///    like `key = value`, `key: value`, or `key=value` whose key
+///    (case-insensitively, ignoring quotes) matches a `SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS`
+///    credential identifier have their value replaced with [`REDACTED`]. The
+///    spaced form (`key = value`) is matched anywhere on the line, not only
+///    when the sensitive key owns the line's first separator — an `anyhow`
+///    chain rendered with `{:#}` puts prose and its own `: ` separators in
+///    front of the assignment, and that must not be a hole. Because such a
+///    value can span several words (`authorization = Bearer <token>`),
+///    everything from the value to the end of the line is dropped, exactly as
+///    the whole-line form already does. Token *counts* in diagnostics
+///    (`max tokens = 8192`) are not credentials and stay visible.
+/// 2. **Bare tokens.** Whitespace-delimited words beginning with a known
+///    `SECRET_TOKEN_PREFIXES` are replaced wholesale.
+///
+/// The goal is defense in depth: setup state and reports are built from safe
+/// summaries that never include secrets in the first place, and this is the
+/// backstop for anything that echoes raw config text.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn redact_secrets(input: &str) -> String {
+    redact_secrets_with(input, RedactionPolicy::KeyBased)
+}
+
+/// How aggressively [`redact_secrets_with`] treats a sensitive-looking key.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum RedactionPolicy {
+    /// Mask the value of every sensitive-looking key, whatever the value is.
+    /// Right for logs, previews, exports, and diagnostics: a false positive
+    /// costs nothing there and a miss leaks a credential.
+    KeyBased,
+    /// Mask a keyed value only when the value itself looks like a credential
+    /// (known prefix, JWT, bearer token, PEM block, long opaque string).
+    /// Right for text the model must be able to quote back byte-for-byte,
+    /// such as tool results that feed exact-match edits: `password:
+    /// credentials?.password`, `"password-validator": "^5.3.0"`, or
+    /// `token = make_token()` are code, not secrets (#5546).
+    CredentialShaped,
+}
+
+/// Redact model-bound tool output: exact configured credential values are the
+/// caller's job; this masks only values that look like credentials so the
+/// model keeps seeing the real bytes of ordinary code and config.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn redact_model_bound_secrets(input: &str) -> String {
+    redact_secrets_with(input, RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped)
+}
+
+/// [`redact_secrets`] with an explicit [`RedactionPolicy`].
+#[must_use]
+pub fn redact_secrets_with(input: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(input.len());
+    let mut in_private_key_block = false;
+    for line in input.split_inclusive('\n') {
+        // split_inclusive keeps the newline on the previous chunk, so we do
+        // not need to re-add separators here.
+        let body = line.strip_suffix('\n').unwrap_or(line);
+        let trimmed = body.trim();
+        if in_private_key_block {
+            if trimmed.starts_with("-----END") {
+                in_private_key_block = false;
+                out.push_str(line);
+            } else {
+                out.push_str(REDACTED);
+                if line.ends_with('\n') {
+                    out.push('\n');
+                }
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if is_private_key_block_start(trimmed) {
+            in_private_key_block = true;
+            out.push_str(line);
+            continue;
+        }
+        out.push_str(&redact_line(line, policy));
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+fn is_private_key_block_start(trimmed: &str) -> bool {
+    trimmed.starts_with("-----BEGIN") && trimmed.contains("PRIVATE KEY")
+}
+
+/// Redact a single line (which may include a trailing newline).
+fn redact_line(line: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> String {
+    // Preserve any trailing newline so callers keep their line structure.
+    let (body, newline) = match line.strip_suffix('\n') {
+        Some(rest) => (rest, "\n"),
+        None => (line, ""),
+    };
+
+    if let Some(redacted) = redact_keyed_assignment(body, policy) {
+        return format!("{redacted}{newline}");
+    }
+
+    // Inline-assignment / bare-token pass: mask any whitespace-delimited word
+    // carrying a sensitive keyed value or a known bare secret prefix, plus the
+    // spaced `key = value` form that `redact_keyed_assignment` above only sees
+    // when the sensitive key owns the line's first separator.
+    let mut changed = false;
+    let mut spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
+    let mut masked: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    for word in body.split(' ') {
+        let trimmed = trim_word_punctuation(word);
+        if spaced == SpacedAssignment::AwaitingValue && !trimmed.is_empty() {
+            match policy {
+                RedactionPolicy::KeyBased => {
+                    // The value may run to the end of the line, so drop the
+                    // remainder rather than masking one word and leaking the
+                    // rest.
+                    masked.push(REDACTED.to_string());
+                    changed = true;
+                    break;
+                }
+                RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped => {
+                    // Only a credential-shaped value is hidden, and only that
+                    // word: the rest of the line stays quotable. An auth scheme
+                    // word (`Bearer`) keeps the assignment open for its token.
+                    if is_auth_scheme_word(trimmed) {
+                        masked.push(word.to_string());
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if value_looks_like_credential(trimmed) {
+                        masked.push(word.replace(trimmed, REDACTED));
+                        changed = true;
+                    } else {
+                        masked.push(word.to_string());
+                    }
+                    spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(redacted) = redact_inline_keyed_assignment(trimmed, policy) {
+            changed = true;
+            masked.push(word.replace(trimmed, &redacted));
+            spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
+        } else if !trimmed.is_empty() && looks_like_secret_token(trimmed) {
+            changed = true;
+            masked.push(word.replace(trimmed, REDACTED));
+            spaced = SpacedAssignment::None;
+        } else {
+            masked.push(word.to_string());
+            spaced = spaced.advance(trimmed);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if changed {
+        format!("{}{newline}", masked.join(" "))
+    } else {
+        format!("{body}{newline}")
+    }
+}
+
+/// Progress through a `key <space> <sep> <space> value` assignment as the
+/// word-level pass walks a line.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum SpacedAssignment {
+    None,
+    /// The previous word was a bare sensitive key awaiting its separator.
+    SensitiveKey,
+    /// A sensitive key and its separator are both behind us.
+    AwaitingValue,
+}
+
+impl SpacedAssignment {
+    fn advance(self, trimmed: &str) -> Self {
+        // Runs of spaces produce empty words; they neither start nor cancel an
+        // assignment.
+        if trimmed.is_empty() {
+            return self;
+        }
+        if matches!(trimmed, "=" | ":") {
+            return if self == Self::SensitiveKey {
+                Self::AwaitingValue
+            } else {
+                Self::None
+            };
+        }
+        // `api_key=` / `api_key:` with the value in the next word. A word whose
+        // separator is *not* final was already offered to
+        // `redact_inline_keyed_assignment`, so it is not an assignment we own.
+        if let Some(key) = trimmed
+            .strip_suffix('=')
+            .or_else(|| trimmed.strip_suffix(':'))
+        {
+            return if key_is_sensitive(key) {
+                Self::AwaitingValue
+            } else {
+                Self::None
+            };
+        }
+        if key_is_sensitive(trimmed) {
+            return Self::SensitiveKey;
+        }
+        Self::None
+    }
+}
+
+fn trim_word_punctuation(word: &str) -> &str {
+    word.trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | ',' | ';'))
+}
+
+/// Whether `raw`, normalized the way a config/env/JSON key is, matches a
+/// [`SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS`] credential identifier.
+fn key_is_sensitive(raw: &str) -> bool {
+    let key_norm = normalize_sensitive_key(raw);
+    !key_norm.is_empty()
+        && SENSITIVE_KEY_HINTS
+            .iter()
+            .any(|hint| key_matches_sensitive_hint(&key_norm, hint))
+}
+
+/// Normalize the identifier boundaries commonly used by config, env, and JSON
+/// keys without turning English plurals such as `tokens` into `token`.
+///
+/// Punctuation and case transitions become `_`, so `oauth.token`,
+/// `accessToken`, and `APIKey` share the same matching surface as
+/// `oauth_token`, `access_token`, and `api_key`.
+fn normalize_sensitive_key(raw: &str) -> String {
+    let mut normalized = String::with_capacity(raw.len());
+    let mut chars = raw.chars().peekable();
+    let mut previous = None;
+
+    while let Some(ch) = chars.next() {
+        if ch.is_ascii_alphanumeric() {
+            let next = chars.peek().copied();
+            let starts_case_segment = ch.is_ascii_uppercase()
+                && previous.is_some_and(|previous: char| {
+                    previous.is_ascii_lowercase()
+                        || previous.is_ascii_digit()
+                        || (previous.is_ascii_uppercase()
+                            && next.is_some_and(|next| next.is_ascii_lowercase()))
+                });
+            if starts_case_segment && !normalized.is_empty() && !normalized.ends_with('_') {
+                normalized.push('_');
+            }
+            normalized.push(ch.to_ascii_lowercase());
+        } else if !normalized.is_empty() && !normalized.ends_with('_') {
+            normalized.push('_');
+        }
+        previous = Some(ch);
+    }
+
+    while normalized.ends_with('_') {
+        normalized.pop();
+    }
+    normalized
+}
+
+fn key_matches_sensitive_hint(key_norm: &str, hint: &str) -> bool {
+    if key_norm == hint {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Compound hints already name a credential (`api_key`, `client_secret`).
+    // Substring is the right match: `openai_api_key` contains `api_key`.
+    if hint.contains('_') || hint.contains('-') {
+        return key_norm.contains(hint);
+    }
+    if hint == "token" {
+        // Camel-case normalization turns both credentials (`accessToken`) and
+        // ordinary usage metrics (`tokenBudget`, `tokenCount`) into segmented
+        // identifiers. A credential token is either the whole key, a suffix
+        // such as `access_token`, or an explicitly value-bearing `token_*`
+        // field. Metrics must stay visible in diagnostics and tool previews.
+        let is_metric_suffix = |suffix: &str| {
+            matches!(
+                suffix.split('_').next(),
+                Some(
+                    "budget"
+                        | "budgets"
+                        | "count"
+                        | "counts"
+                        | "limit"
+                        | "limits"
+                        | "total"
+                        | "totals"
+                        | "usage"
+                        | "used"
+                        | "window"
+                        | "windows"
+                )
+            )
+        };
+        if key_norm.ends_with("_token") {
+            return true;
+        }
+        if let Some(suffix) = key_norm.strip_prefix("token_") {
+            return !is_metric_suffix(suffix);
+        }
+        if let Some((_, suffix)) = key_norm.rsplit_once("_token_") {
+            return !is_metric_suffix(suffix);
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Single-word hints must be a whole identifier segment so `token`
+    // redacts `token` / `api_token` and not English `tokens`.
+    key_norm.split(['_', '-']).any(|segment| segment == hint)
+}
+
+fn redact_inline_keyed_assignment(word: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> Option<String> {
+    let sep_idx = word.find(['=', ':'])?;
+    let (raw_key, rest) = word.split_at(sep_idx);
+    let raw_value = &rest[1..];
+    if raw_value.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if !key_is_sensitive(raw_key) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    match policy {
+        RedactionPolicy::KeyBased => Some(format!("{}{}{}", raw_key, &rest[..1], REDACTED)),
+        RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped => {
+            let (core, quote) = strip_value_quotes(raw_value);
+            if !value_looks_like_credential(core) {
+                return None;
+            }
+            Some(format!("{}{}{quote}{REDACTED}{quote}", raw_key, &rest[..1]))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether a word announces an HTTP auth scheme whose credential follows.
+fn is_auth_scheme_word(word: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        word,
+        "Bearer" | "bearer" | "Basic" | "basic" | "Token" | "token"
+    )
+}
+
+/// Split a matching pair of surrounding quotes off a value, returning the
+/// inner text and the quote to restore (empty when unquoted or unbalanced).
+fn strip_value_quotes(value: &str) -> (&str, &str) {
+    for quote in ['"', '\''] {
+        if value.len() >= 2 && value.starts_with(quote) && value.ends_with(quote) {
+            return (&value[1..value.len() - 1], &value[..1]);
+        }
+    }
+    // A leading quote without its partner (the word pass strips the outer
+    // punctuation of `"x",` to `"x`): treat the remainder as the value.
+    if let Some(inner) = value.strip_prefix(['"', '\'']) {
+        return (inner, "");
+    }
+    (value, "")
+}
+
+/// Extra bare prefixes that mark a value as a credential even though they are
+/// too product-specific to mask as standalone words in prose.
+const CREDENTIAL_VALUE_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[
+    "sk-ant-",
+    "AKIA",
+    "ASIA",
+    "AIza",
+    "ghp_",
+    "gho_",
+    "ghu_",
+    "ghs_",
+    "ghr_",
+    "github_pat_",
+    "glpat-",
+    "xoxa-",
+    "xoxb-",
+    "xoxp-",
+    "xoxr-",
+    "xoxs-",
+    "npm_",
+    "ya29.",
+];
+
+/// Whether a keyed value looks like credential material rather than code,
+/// configuration, or prose.
+///
+/// True for known provider prefixes, JWTs, `Bearer`/`Basic` tokens, PEM
+/// headers, and long opaque alphanumeric runs. False for short literals,
+/// version strings, identifiers, property/call/env references, and the
+/// redaction placeholder itself.
+pub(crate) fn value_looks_like_credential(value: &str) -> bool {
+    let value = value
+        .trim()
+        .trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | ',' | ';'));
+    if value.is_empty() || value == REDACTED {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if looks_like_secret_token(value)
+        || CREDENTIAL_VALUE_PREFIXES
+            .iter()
+            .any(|prefix| value.len() > prefix.len() + 6 && value.starts_with(prefix))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if value.starts_with("-----BEGIN") {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if let Some((scheme, rest)) = value.split_once(' ')
+        && is_auth_scheme_word(scheme)
+    {
+        return value_looks_like_credential(rest);
+    }
+    if is_jwt_shaped(value) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if value.len() < 16 {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if is_version_like(value) || is_reference_like(value) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    is_opaque_run(value)
+}
+
+fn is_jwt_shaped(value: &str) -> bool {
+    let mut parts = value.split('.');
+    match (parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next()) {
+        (Some(header), Some(payload), Some(signature), None) => {
+            header.starts_with("eyJ")
+                && payload.starts_with("eyJ")
+                && !signature.is_empty()
+                && [header, payload, signature].iter().all(|part| {
+                    part.chars()
+                        .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
+                })
+        }
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+fn is_version_like(value: &str) -> bool {
+    let digits = value.trim_start_matches(['^', '~', '>', '<', '=', 'v', 'V', ' ']);
+    !digits.is_empty()
+        && digits
+            .chars()
+            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '.' || c == '-' || c == '+')
+        && digits.chars().next().is_some_and(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
+}
+
+fn is_reference_like(value: &str) -> bool {
+    // Property access, calls, template/env lookups, and plain identifiers are
+    // code, not credential material.
+    value.contains("?.")
+        || value.contains('(')
+        || value.contains("${")
+        || value.contains("process.env")
+        || value.contains("os.environ")
+        || value.contains("getenv")
+        || value.contains("://")
+        || value
+            .chars()
+            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphabetic() || c == '_' || c == '.')
+}
+
+fn is_opaque_run(value: &str) -> bool {
+    value.len() >= 20
+        && value
+            .chars()
+            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '+' | '/' | '=' | '_' | '-' | '.'))
+        && value.chars().any(|c| c.is_ascii_alphabetic())
+        && value.chars().any(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
+}
+
+/// If `body` is a `key <sep> value` assignment with a sensitive key, return the
+/// line with the value redacted; otherwise `None`.
+fn redact_keyed_assignment(body: &str, policy: RedactionPolicy) -> Option<String> {
+    // Find the first `=` or `:` that separates a key from a value.
+    let sep_idx = body.find(['=', ':'])?;
+    let (raw_key, rest) = body.split_at(sep_idx);
+    let sep = &rest[..1];
+    let raw_value = &rest[1..];
+
+    let key_norm = raw_key
+        .trim()
+        .trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | '[' | ']'));
+    if !key_is_sensitive(key_norm) {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if policy == RedactionPolicy::CredentialShaped {
+        // Replace only the value span, keep the key bytes, separator spacing,
+        // quote style, and trailing punctuation, and only when the value is
+        // credential-shaped: the model must still be able to quote the line.
+        let value_lead_ws: String = raw_value
+            .chars()
+            .take_while(|c| c.is_whitespace())
+            .collect();
+        let value_rest = raw_value.trim_start();
+        let value_core = value_rest.trim_end();
+        let trailing_ws = &value_rest[value_core.len()..];
+        let literal = value_core.trim_end_matches([',', ';']);
+        let trailer = &value_core[literal.len()..];
+        let (core, quote) = strip_value_quotes(literal);
+        if core.is_empty() || !value_looks_like_credential(core) {
+            return None;
+        }
+        return Some(format!(
+            "{raw_key}{sep}{value_lead_ws}{quote}{REDACTED}{quote}{trailer}{trailing_ws}"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Keep leading whitespace of the key and the original separator spacing so
+    // the redacted line reads naturally.
+    let key_lead_ws: String = raw_key.chars().take_while(|c| c.is_whitespace()).collect();
+    let value_lead_ws: String = raw_value
+        .chars()
+        .take_while(|c| c.is_whitespace())
+        .collect();
+    let value_rest = raw_value.trim_start();
+    // If the value is empty, there is nothing to hide.
+    if value_rest.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // Preserve surrounding quotes so structured files stay parseable-looking.
+    let quoted = value_rest.starts_with('"') || value_rest.starts_with('\'');
+    let replacement = if quoted {
+        format!("\"{REDACTED}\"")
+    } else {
+        REDACTED.to_string()
+    };
+    Some(format!(
+        "{key_lead_ws}{}{sep}{value_lead_ws}{replacement}",
+        raw_key.trim()
+    ))
+}
+
+fn looks_like_secret_token(word: &str) -> bool {
+    SECRET_TOKEN_PREFIXES
+        .iter()
+        .any(|p| word.len() > p.len() + 6 && word.starts_with(p))
+}

crates/secrets/src/sanitize.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+//! Pure output-sanitization primitives shared by portable command helpers
+//! (FEAT-025 D4).
+//!
+//! These helpers previously lived in the TUI command, client, and OSC8
+//! modules. Relocating the pure algorithms here gives `/export` and
+//! `/structcopy` exactly one implementation with no TUI, client, or
+//! configuration dependency. TUI callers delegate back to these functions so
+//! behavior cannot drift.
+
+use std::sync::OnceLock;
+
+use regex::Regex;
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+use crate::redact::redact_secrets;
+
+/// Strip ANSI/OSC/control sequences from `s` into `out`.
+///
+/// Handles CSI (`ESC [ … final`), OSC (`ESC ] … BEL` or `ESC \`), DCS, SOS,
+/// PM, APC, and standalone two-byte ESC sequences. OSC 8 hyperlink wrappers
+/// (`ESC ] 8 ; … BEL` / `ESC \`) are stripped along with the rest.
+pub fn strip_ansi_into(s: &str, out: &mut String) {
+    strip_ansi_impl(s, out, false);
+}
+
+/// Like [`strip_ansi_into`], but SGR sequences (`ESC [ … m`: colour, bold,
+/// underline, reset) pass through untouched so a renderer that understands
+/// them can paint the output as the tool emitted it. Everything else — OSC
+/// (including OSC 8 hyperlink wrappers), cursor movement, DCS, lone control
+/// bytes — is still removed; only the styling survives.
+pub fn strip_ansi_keep_sgr_into(s: &str, out: &mut String) {
+    strip_ansi_impl(s, out, true);
+}
+
+/// Length in bytes of the UTF-8 sequence that starts with `lead`. Falls back
+/// to `1` for continuation bytes / invalid leads so callers always make
+/// forward progress.
+pub fn utf8_seq_len(lead: u8) -> usize {
+    if lead < 0xc0 {
+        1
+    } else if lead < 0xe0 {
+        2
+    } else if lead < 0xf0 {
+        3
+    } else {
+        4
+    }
+}
+
+fn strip_ansi_impl(s: &str, out: &mut String, keep_sgr: bool) {
+    let bytes = s.as_bytes();
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < bytes.len() {
+        if bytes[i] == 0x1b && i + 1 < bytes.len() {
+            let next = bytes[i + 1];
+            match next {
+                // CSI: ESC [ ... <final byte 0x40..=0x7E>
+                b'[' => {
+                    let mut j = i + 2;
+                    let mut final_byte = 0u8;
+                    while j < bytes.len() {
+                        let b = bytes[j];
+                        if (0x40..=0x7e).contains(&b) {
+                            final_byte = b;
+                            j += 1;
+                            break;
+                        }
+                        j += 1;
+                    }
+                    if keep_sgr
+                        && final_byte == b'm'
+                        && let Ok(seq) = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[i..j])
+                    {
+                        out.push_str(seq);
+                    }
+                    i = j;
+                    continue;
+                }
+                // OSC / DCS / SOS / PM / APC: ESC ] | P | X | ^ | _ ... ST(ESC \) or BEL
+                b']' | b'P' | b'X' | b'^' | b'_' => {
+                    let mut j = i + 2;
+                    while j < bytes.len() {
+                        if bytes[j] == 0x07 {
+                            j += 1;
+                            break;
+                        }
+                        if bytes[j] == 0x1b && j + 1 < bytes.len() && bytes[j + 1] == b'\\' {
+                            j += 2;
+                            break;
+                        }
+                        j += 1;
+                    }
+                    i = j;
+                    continue;
+                }
+                // Standalone two-byte ESC sequence (RIS, charset selection, etc.)
+                _ => {
+                    i += 2;
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        // Strip lone control bytes that ratatui would otherwise drop (and which
+        // mean nothing in transcript output) but keep \n, \r, \t as legitimate
+        // formatting.
+        let b = bytes[i];
+        if b < 0x80 {
+            if b < 0x20 && b != b'\n' && b != b'\r' && b != b'\t' {
+                i += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            out.push(b as char);
+            i += 1;
+        } else {
+            // UTF-8 multi-byte sequence: copy the whole code point intact.
+            // Pushing `b as char` would mis-decode it as Latin-1 and mangle
+            // non-ASCII text (CJK, accented Latin, emoji, …).
+            let len = utf8_seq_len(b);
+            let end = (i + len).min(bytes.len());
+            if let Ok(chunk) = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[i..end]) {
+                out.push_str(chunk);
+            }
+            i = end;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Mask credentials in a URL so it can appear in output or a report.
+///
+/// Userinfo is replaced with `***` and query values under sensitive keys are
+/// masked. A URL that does not parse is returned unchanged.
+pub fn redact_url_for_display(url: &str) -> String {
+    let Ok(mut parsed) = url::Url::parse(url) else {
+        return url.to_string();
+    };
+    if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
+        let _ = parsed.set_username("***");
+        let _ = parsed.set_password(Some("***"));
+    }
+    if parsed.query().is_none() {
+        return parsed.to_string();
+    }
+    let pairs: Vec<(String, String)> = parsed
+        .query_pairs()
+        .map(|(key, value)| {
+            let value = if is_sensitive_url_query_key(&key) {
+                "***".to_string()
+            } else {
+                value.into_owned()
+            };
+            (key.into_owned(), value)
+        })
+        .collect();
+    parsed.set_query(None);
+    let mut query = parsed.query_pairs_mut();
+    for (key, value) in pairs {
+        query.append_pair(&key, &value);
+    }
+    drop(query);
+    parsed.to_string()
+}
+
+fn is_sensitive_url_query_key(key: &str) -> bool {
+    let normalized = key.trim().replace(['-', '.'], "_").to_ascii_lowercase();
+    matches!(
+        normalized.as_str(),
+        "api_key"
+            | "apikey"
+            | "access_token"
+            | "auth_token"
+            | "authorization"
+            | "bearer"
+            | "client_secret"
+            | "credential"
+            | "id_token"
+            | "password"
+            | "refresh_token"
+            | "secret"
+            | "token"
+    ) || normalized.ends_with("_api_key")
+        || normalized.ends_with("_authorization")
+        || normalized.ends_with("_password")
+        || normalized.ends_with("_secret")
+        || normalized.ends_with("_token")
+}
+
+/// True when `role` names an internal, non-user-visible message role.
+pub fn is_internal_role(role: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        role.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
+        "system" | "developer" | "internal"
+    )
+}
+
+/// True when a JSON/assignment key names a credential-bearing value.
+///
+/// Classification normalizes separators and quotes so obfuscated variants are
+/// still caught; the vocabulary is shared with `/structcopy`.
+pub fn is_sensitive_key(key: &str) -> bool {
+    let normalized = key
+        .trim()
+        .trim_matches(['\'', '"'])
+        .replace(['-', '.', ' '], "_")
+        .to_ascii_lowercase();
+    [
+        "api_key",
+        "apikey",
+        "secret",
+        "token",
+        "password",
+        "passwd",
+        "authorization",
+        "access_key",
+        "client_secret",
+        "private_key",
+        "cookie",
+        "session_key",
+    ]
+    .iter()
+    .any(|hint| normalized.contains(hint))
+}
+
+/// Sanitize arbitrary text for safe export output.
+///
+/// Strips ANSI/control bytes, normalizes newlines, then applies private-key,
+/// bearer-token, JWT, URL-credential, and keyed-secret redaction in the exact
+/// established order.
+pub fn sanitize_text(input: &str) -> String {
+    let mut visible = String::with_capacity(input.len());
+    strip_ansi_into(input, &mut visible);
+    let visible = visible.replace("\r\n", "\n").replace('\r', "\n");
+    let visible: String = visible
+        .chars()
+        .filter(|ch| *ch == '\n' || *ch == '\t' || !ch.is_control())
+        .collect();
+    let private_keys = private_key_regex().replace_all(&visible, "[redacted private key]");
+    let bearer = bearer_regex().replace_all(&private_keys, "Bearer [redacted]");
+    let jwt = jwt_regex().replace_all(&bearer, "[redacted token]");
+    let urls = url_regex().replace_all(&jwt, |captures: &regex::Captures<'_>| {
+        redact_url_match(captures.get(0).map_or("", |value| value.as_str()))
+    });
+    redact_secrets(&urls)
+}
+
+/// Recursively redact a JSON value.
+///
+/// A value under a sensitive key is replaced wholesale; other strings pass
+/// through [`sanitize_text`], and arrays/objects are traversed in place.
+pub fn redact_json(value: &mut Value, key: Option<&str>) {
+    if key.is_some_and(is_sensitive_key) {
+        *value = Value::String("[redacted]".to_string());
+        return;
+    }
+    match value {
+        Value::String(text) => *text = sanitize_text(text),
+        Value::Array(items) => {
+            for item in items {
+                redact_json(item, None);
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Object(map) => {
+            for (key, value) in map {
+                redact_json(value, Some(key));
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Null | Value::Bool(_) | Value::Number(_) => {}
+    }
+}
+
+/// Collapse whitespace and neutralize inline backticks for a single-line
+/// export field.
+pub fn inline_text(input: &str) -> String {
+    sanitize_text(input)
+        .split_whitespace()
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        .join(" ")
+        .replace('`', "'")
+}
+
+fn redact_url_match(raw: &str) -> String {
+    let trimmed = raw.trim_end_matches(['.', ',', ';', '!']);
+    let suffix = &raw[trimmed.len()..];
+    format!("{}{}", redact_url_for_display(trimmed), suffix)
+}
+
+fn private_key_regex() -> &'static Regex {
+    static RE: OnceLock<Regex> = OnceLock::new();
+    RE.get_or_init(|| {
+        Regex::new(
+            r"(?is)-----BEGIN [^-\r\n]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [^-\r\n]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
+        )
+        .expect("private-key redaction regex")
+    })
+}
+
+fn bearer_regex() -> &'static Regex {
+    static RE: OnceLock<Regex> = OnceLock::new();
+    RE.get_or_init(|| {
+        Regex::new(r"(?i)\bbearer\s+[a-z0-9._~+/=-]{6,}").expect("bearer redaction regex")
+    })
+}
+
+fn jwt_regex() -> &'static Regex {
+    static RE: OnceLock<Regex> = OnceLock::new();
+    RE.get_or_init(|| {
+        Regex::new(r"\beyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{5,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{5,}(?:\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{5,})?\b")
+            .expect("JWT redaction regex")
+    })
+}
+
+fn url_regex() -> &'static Regex {
+    static RE: OnceLock<Regex> = OnceLock::new();
+    RE.get_or_init(|| {
+        Regex::new(r#"https?://[^\s<>\"'`\]\[\)\(\}\{]+"#).expect("URL redaction regex")
+    })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_ansi_removes_control_sequences_but_keeps_text() {
+        let mut out = String::new();
+        strip_ansi_into("a\u{1b}[31mred\u{1b}[0m b", &mut out);
+        assert_eq!(out, "ared b");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn url_redaction_masks_userinfo_and_sensitive_query_values() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            redact_url_for_display(
+                "https://alice:[email protected]/path?token=very-secret&ok=1"
+            ),
+            "https://***:***@example.com/path?token=***&ok=1"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sensitive_keys_normalize_separators_and_quotes() {
+        assert!(is_sensitive_key("API-KEY"));
+        assert!(is_sensitive_key("\"client secret\""));
+        assert!(!is_sensitive_key("monkey"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_text_redacts_private_keys_bearer_and_jwt() {
+        // Assemble the PEM markers and the provider-token prefix at runtime so
+        // this source file never contains a literal private-key header (or a
+        // literal token) for a secret scanner to match. The runtime strings are
+        // identical to the real shapes, and this mirrors the convention the
+        // pre-move test used in `config::persistence` - moving that test into
+        // this crate silently dropped it, which is what GitGuardian caught.
+        let begin = ["-----BEGIN RSA", " PRIVATE KEY-----"].concat();
+        let end = ["-----END RSA", " PRIVATE KEY-----"].concat();
+        let bearer = format!("{} abcdefghijklmnop", "Bearer");
+        let opaque = ["sk-", "abcdef1234567890"].concat();
+        let text = format!("{begin}\nMII\n{end}\nAuthorization: {bearer}\n{opaque}");
+
+        let out = sanitize_text(&text);
+        assert!(!out.contains("MII"), "{out}");
+        assert!(!out.contains("abcdefghijklmnop"), "{out}");
+        assert!(out.contains("[redacted]"), "{out}");
+    }
+}

crates/tui/src/client.rs

@@ -1125,59 +1125,13 @@ fn validate_base_url_security(base_url: &str, provider_allows_insecure_http: boo
     )
 }
 
+/// Mask credentials in a URL for display.
+///
+/// Delegates to the single shared implementation in
+/// [`codewhale_secrets::sanitize`] (FEAT-025 D4) so command sanitization and
+/// client diagnostics cannot drift.
 pub(crate) fn redact_url_for_display(url: &str) -> String {
-    let Ok(mut parsed) = reqwest::Url::parse(url) else {
-        return url.to_string();
-    };
-    if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
-        let _ = parsed.set_username("***");
-        let _ = parsed.set_password(Some("***"));
-    }
-    if parsed.query().is_none() {
-        return parsed.to_string();
-    }
-    let pairs: Vec<(String, String)> = parsed
-        .query_pairs()
-        .map(|(key, value)| {
-            let value = if is_sensitive_url_query_key(&key) {
-                "***".to_string()
-            } else {
-                value.into_owned()
-            };
-            (key.into_owned(), value)
-        })
-        .collect();
-    parsed.set_query(None);
-    let mut query = parsed.query_pairs_mut();
-    for (key, value) in pairs {
-        query.append_pair(&key, &value);
-    }
-    drop(query);
-    parsed.to_string()
-}
-
-fn is_sensitive_url_query_key(key: &str) -> bool {
-    let normalized = key.trim().replace(['-', '.'], "_").to_ascii_lowercase();
-    matches!(
-        normalized.as_str(),
-        "api_key"
-            | "apikey"
-            | "access_token"
-            | "auth_token"
-            | "authorization"
-            | "bearer"
-            | "client_secret"
-            | "credential"
-            | "id_token"
-            | "password"
-            | "refresh_token"
-            | "secret"
-            | "token"
-    ) || normalized.ends_with("_api_key")
-        || normalized.ends_with("_authorization")
-        || normalized.ends_with("_password")
-        || normalized.ends_with("_secret")
-        || normalized.ends_with("_token")
+    codewhale_secrets::sanitize::redact_url_for_display(url)
 }
 
 pub(super) fn versioned_base_url(base_url: &str) -> String {

crates/tui/src/commands/contract.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 //!
 //! ## Authoritative host-proxy design (D1)
 //!
-//! `CommandContexts` holds fifteen independently borrowed facet objects, while
+//! `CommandContexts` holds sixteen independently borrowed facet objects, while
 //! important behavior (mode transitions, model invalidation, cost accounting,
 //! skill refresh) is authoritative on `App`. The adapters therefore share a
 //! synchronous TUI-owned host proxy. Each trait call borrows `App` only for the
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ use codewhale_command_contract::facets::{
     SkillSourceKind, SkillSyncEntry, SkillSyncOutcome, SkillTargetScope, SnapshotEntry,
     TitleReport, TitleSource, TodoProjection, TreeBodyProjection,
 };
+use codewhale_command_contract::facets::{
+    CommandSessionExportContext, ConversationExportProjection, ExportBlock, ExportMessage,
+    ExportMetadata, HistoryEntry, RestorePointProjection, RestoreSnapshot, ToolCallerProjection,
+    TranscriptProjection, TurnHandoffProjection,
+};
 #[cfg(test)]
 use codewhale_command_contract::handler::ContextParts;
 use codewhale_command_contract::handler::{CommandCapabilities, CommandContexts};
@@ -61,7 +66,7 @@ use codewhale_command_contract::types::{
     CommandApprovalMode, CommandCurrency, CommandMode, CommandProviderId, CommandReasoningEffort,
 };
 use codewhale_config::AppMode;
-use codewhale_core::request::{Message, SystemPrompt};
+use codewhale_core::request::{ContentBlock, Message, SystemPrompt};
 use codewhale_execpolicy::ApprovalMode;
 
 use crate::commands::groups::plugins::plugin_network_policy;
@@ -274,7 +279,7 @@ pub(crate) fn key_to_message_id(key: &'static str) -> Option<MessageId> {
 
 /// Shared TUI host hidden behind the portable command facets.
 ///
-/// The envelope needs fifteen independently borrowed facet objects, while the
+/// The envelope needs sixteen independently borrowed facet objects, while the
 /// authoritative mutation methods live on `App`. Each adapter therefore owns
 /// an `Rc` clone of this synchronous host proxy. Trait calls borrow `App` only
 /// for the duration of one method, delegate to the real TUI authority, and
@@ -1485,6 +1490,317 @@ fn import_session_container(
     })
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Session export adapter (FEAT-025 D1/D2/D3/D5/D7/D8/D9)
+//
+// Sole host owner of concrete export machinery for `/export` and `/daochu`:
+// metadata derivation, authoritative/visible-history projection, semantic
+// restore-point projection, the shared `turn_handoff_markdown` renderer,
+// clipboard mode/recovery/delivery, and protected destination resolution/
+// writing. Every delegate reproduces the baseline order and returns portable
+// data or the exact host-error text; no concrete `App`, clipboard, snapshot,
+// history, filesystem, or turn-handoff type crosses the boundary. Hidden
+// reasoning bodies, signatures, and inline/local image payloads are excluded
+// while the projection is built (D9). The shared recovery writer and protected
+// file services live in `commands::session_export_host` (outside the future
+// portable group) so `/copy` and `/export` reuse one implementation (D5).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+pub(crate) struct SessionExportAdapter<'a> {
+    host: SharedCommandHost<'a>,
+}
+
+impl CommandSessionExportContext for SessionExportAdapter<'_> {
+    /// Conversation export projection: metadata, transcript, and restore-point
+    /// state.
+    ///
+    /// Memory note (FEAT-025 audit, finding F3): the projection is an *owned*
+    /// copy of the transcript, so peak use is roughly the live `api_messages`
+    /// plus this projection for the duration of one render. That copy is
+    /// structural, not an oversight: the facet must return owned data because
+    /// `SharedCommandHost` hands out `App` through a `RefCell`, so no borrow can
+    /// outlive this method, and a `dyn` facet cannot lend a projection tied to a
+    /// temporary `Ref`. The baseline rendered straight from `App` and cloned one
+    /// block at a time, so this is a deliberate D3 cost accepted for the
+    /// capability boundary. Removing it needs a host proxy that can lend a
+    /// borrowed projection (tracked with the FEAT-043/046 extraction work); it is
+    /// not something this slice can fix locally.
+    fn conversation_projection(&self) -> ConversationExportProjection {
+        let app = self.host.app.borrow();
+        ConversationExportProjection {
+            metadata: export_metadata(&app),
+            transcript: project_transcript(&app),
+            restore_points: project_restore_points(&app.workspace),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn turn_handoff_projection(&self) -> TurnHandoffProjection {
+        let app = self.host.app.borrow();
+        TurnHandoffProjection {
+            markdown: crate::tui::ui::turn_handoff_markdown(&app),
+            workspace_path: app.workspace.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn clipboard_requires_terminal_paste(&self) -> bool {
+        self.host.app.borrow().clipboard.requires_terminal_paste()
+    }
+
+    fn write_recovery_copy(&self, markdown: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+        crate::commands::session_export_host::write_last_copy(markdown)
+    }
+
+    fn write_clipboard(&self, markdown: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.host
+            .app
+            .borrow_mut()
+            .clipboard
+            .write_text(markdown)
+            .map_err(|err| err.to_string())
+    }
+
+    fn resolve_export_path(&self, raw: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
+        let app = self.host.app.borrow();
+        crate::commands::session_export_host::resolve_export_path(&app.workspace, raw)
+    }
+
+    fn write_export_file(&self, path: &Path, contents: &[u8], force: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
+        crate::commands::session_export_host::write_export_file(path, contents, force)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Maximum restore points listed in the export summary (baseline bound).
+const RESTORE_POINT_SUMMARY_MAX: usize = 100;
+
+/// Authoritative export metadata, reusing the baseline host derivations.
+fn export_metadata(app: &App) -> ExportMetadata {
+    let message_count = if app.api_messages.is_empty() {
+        app.history.len()
+    } else {
+        app.api_messages.len()
+    };
+    let session_label = app
+        .current_session_id
+        .as_deref()
+        .map(crate::session_manager::truncate_id)
+        .unwrap_or("unsaved")
+        .to_string();
+    let workspace_name = app
+        .workspace
+        .file_name()
+        .and_then(|name| name.to_str())
+        .unwrap_or("workspace")
+        .to_string();
+    ExportMetadata {
+        session_label,
+        provider: app.provider_identity_for_persistence().to_string(),
+        model: app.model_display_label(),
+        mode: app.mode.display_name().to_string(),
+        workspace_name,
+        message_count,
+        exported_at_unix: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Authoritative transcript when API messages exist, otherwise the visible
+/// history fallback (D3 precedence).
+fn project_transcript(app: &App) -> TranscriptProjection {
+    if app.api_messages.is_empty() {
+        TranscriptProjection::HistoryFallback(
+            app.history.iter().map(project_history_cell).collect(),
+        )
+    } else {
+        TranscriptProjection::Authoritative(app.api_messages.iter().map(project_message).collect())
+    }
+}
+
+fn project_message(message: &Message) -> ExportMessage {
+    ExportMessage {
+        role: message.role.as_str().to_string(),
+        // Exact enum identity, not a string comparison: `Role::Unrecognized("user")`
+        // must not be treated as a user turn (baseline parity, F6).
+        is_user_role: message.role == codewhale_models::Role::User,
+        blocks: message.content.iter().map(project_block).collect(),
+        prompt_snippet: first_text_block(message)
+            .and_then(crate::core::turn::snapshot_label_prompt_snippet),
+    }
+}
+
+fn first_text_block(message: &Message) -> Option<&str> {
+    message.content.iter().find_map(|block| match block {
+        ContentBlock::Text { text, .. } => Some(text.as_str()),
+        _ => None,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Project one content block; hidden payloads become typed omission markers
+/// (D9) and never cross the boundary.
+fn project_block(block: &ContentBlock) -> ExportBlock {
+    match block {
+        ContentBlock::Text { text, .. } => ExportBlock::Text { text: text.clone() },
+        ContentBlock::ImageUrl { image_url } => {
+            if image_url.url.starts_with("http://") || image_url.url.starts_with("https://") {
+                ExportBlock::ImageReference {
+                    url: image_url.url.clone(),
+                }
+            } else {
+                ExportBlock::ImageOmitted
+            }
+        }
+        ContentBlock::Thinking { .. } => ExportBlock::InternalReasoning,
+        ContentBlock::ToolUse {
+            id,
+            name,
+            input,
+            caller,
+            ..
+        } => ExportBlock::ToolCall {
+            id: id.clone(),
+            name: name.clone(),
+            caller: caller.as_ref().map(|caller| ToolCallerProjection {
+                caller_type: caller.caller_type.clone(),
+                tool_id: caller.tool_id.clone(),
+            }),
+            input: input.clone(),
+        },
+        ContentBlock::ToolResult {
+            tool_use_id,
+            content,
+            is_error,
+            content_blocks,
+        } => ExportBlock::ToolResult {
+            tool_use_id: tool_use_id.clone(),
+            content: content.clone(),
+            is_error: is_error.unwrap_or(false),
+            structured: content_blocks.as_deref().map(|blocks| {
+                serde_json::Value::Array(
+                    crate::image_attach::safe_tool_result_content_blocks(Some(blocks))
+                        .unwrap_or_default(),
+                )
+            }),
+        },
+        ContentBlock::ServerToolUse { id, name, input } => ExportBlock::ServerToolCall {
+            id: id.clone(),
+            name: name.clone(),
+            input: input.clone(),
+        },
+        ContentBlock::ToolSearchToolResult {
+            tool_use_id,
+            content,
+        } => ExportBlock::ToolSearchResult {
+            tool_use_id: tool_use_id.clone(),
+            content: content.clone(),
+        },
+        ContentBlock::CodeExecutionToolResult {
+            tool_use_id,
+            content,
+        } => ExportBlock::CodeExecutionResult {
+            tool_use_id: tool_use_id.clone(),
+            content: content.clone(),
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+fn project_history_cell(cell: &HistoryCell) -> HistoryEntry {
+    match cell {
+        HistoryCell::User { content } => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: "user".to_string(),
+            body: content.clone(),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::Assistant { content, .. } => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: "assistant".to_string(),
+            body: content.clone(),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::System { .. } => HistoryEntry::Literal {
+            role: "system".to_string(),
+            body: "[internal context omitted]".to_string(),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::Error { message, severity } => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: error_severity_role(*severity).to_string(),
+            body: message.clone(),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::Thinking { .. } => HistoryEntry::Literal {
+            role: "internal reasoning".to_string(),
+            body: "[internal reasoning omitted]".to_string(),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::Tool(tool) => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: "tool".to_string(),
+            body: flatten_history_lines(tool.lines(120)),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::SubAgent(subagent) => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: "sub-agent".to_string(),
+            body: flatten_history_lines(subagent.lines(120)),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::Automation(cell) => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: "automation".to_string(),
+            body: flatten_history_lines(cell.render(120)),
+        },
+        HistoryCell::ArchivedContext {
+            level,
+            range,
+            summary,
+            ..
+        } => HistoryEntry::Sanitized {
+            role: "archived context".to_string(),
+            body: format!("L{level} [{range}]: {summary}"),
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+fn error_severity_role(severity: crate::error_taxonomy::ErrorSeverity) -> &'static str {
+    match severity {
+        crate::error_taxonomy::ErrorSeverity::Info => "info",
+        crate::error_taxonomy::ErrorSeverity::Warning => "warning",
+        crate::error_taxonomy::ErrorSeverity::Error => "error",
+        crate::error_taxonomy::ErrorSeverity::Critical => "critical error",
+    }
+}
+
+/// Flatten host UI lines/spans to plain text, preserving the baseline width
+/// and joining behavior (D3). UI rendering stays behind the adapter.
+fn flatten_history_lines(lines: Vec<ratatui::text::Line<'static>>) -> String {
+    lines
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|line| {
+            line.spans
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|span| span.content.to_string())
+                .collect::<String>()
+        })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        .join("\n")
+}
+
+/// Read the workspace snapshot repository read-only and project its state
+/// (D8): only an existing repo is opened, never created.
+fn project_restore_points(workspace: &Path) -> RestorePointProjection {
+    match crate::snapshot::SnapshotRepo::open_existing(workspace) {
+        Ok(None) => RestorePointProjection::None,
+        Err(err) => RestorePointProjection::Unreadable {
+            reason: err.to_string(),
+        },
+        Ok(Some(repo)) => match repo.list(RESTORE_POINT_SUMMARY_MAX) {
+            Ok(snapshots) => RestorePointProjection::Recorded {
+                snapshots: snapshots.iter().map(project_restore_snapshot).collect(),
+            },
+            Err(err) => RestorePointProjection::Unreadable {
+                reason: err.to_string(),
+            },
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+fn project_restore_snapshot(snapshot: &crate::snapshot::Snapshot) -> RestoreSnapshot {
+    let parsed = crate::core::turn::parse_snapshot_label(&snapshot.label);
+    RestoreSnapshot {
+        id: snapshot.id.as_str().to_string(),
+        label: snapshot.label.clone(),
+        timestamp_unix: snapshot.timestamp,
+        kind: parsed.kind,
+        sequence: parsed.seq,
+        prompt_snippet: parsed.prompt_snippet,
+    }
+}
+
 /// Session identity, messages, queue operations, and token totals.
 pub(crate) struct SessionAdapter<'a> {
     host: SharedCommandHost<'a>,
@@ -3940,7 +4256,7 @@ fn default_codewhale_tools_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {
 // Envelope construction (D1)
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-/// Owns fifteen facet objects sharing one synchronous TUI host proxy.
+/// Owns sixteen facet objects sharing one synchronous TUI host proxy.
 ///
 /// Handlers borrow only these adapters. Every method delegates to the real App
 /// authority and releases its `RefCell` borrow before returning, so facets can
@@ -3961,6 +4277,7 @@ pub(crate) struct CommandContextBundle<'a> {
     plugin: PluginAdapter<'a>,
     lifecycle: SessionLifecycleAdapter<'a>,
     control: SessionControlAdapter<'a>,
+    export: SessionExportAdapter<'a>,
 }
 
 impl<'a> CommandContextBundle<'a> {
@@ -4012,6 +4329,9 @@ impl<'a> CommandContextBundle<'a> {
         if capabilities.contains(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL) {
             contexts = contexts.with_control(&mut self.control);
         }
+        if capabilities.contains(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT) {
+            contexts = contexts.with_export(&mut self.export);
+        }
         contexts
     }
 
@@ -4032,7 +4352,8 @@ impl<'a> CommandContextBundle<'a> {
             .union(CommandCapabilities::SKILL_GROUP)
             .union(CommandCapabilities::PLUGIN)
             .union(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_LIFECYCLE)
-            .union(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL);
+            .union(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL)
+            .union(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT);
         self.contexts(all_test_capabilities).into_parts()
     }
 }
@@ -4059,7 +4380,8 @@ impl App {
             skill_group: SkillGroupAdapter { host: host.clone() },
             plugin: PluginAdapter { host: host.clone() },
             lifecycle: SessionLifecycleAdapter { host: host.clone() },
-            control: SessionControlAdapter { host },
+            control: SessionControlAdapter { host: host.clone() },
+            export: SessionExportAdapter { host },
         }
     }
 }

crates/tui/src/commands/fixtures/export_conversation_baseline.md

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# Codewhale conversation export
+
+- Exported: 2026-09-11T13:31:54Z
+- Session: session-
+- Provider: deepseek
+- Model: deepseek-v4-pro
+- Mode: Act
+- Workspace: example
+- Messages: 8
+
+> Hidden instructions, internal reasoning, and reasoning signatures are omitted. Secret-like values and credential-bearing URLs are redacted as a defense in depth; review the export before sharing it.
+
+## Restore points
+
+No workspace restore points are recorded for this workspace, so nothing in this export can be correlated to a restorable workspace state. Snapshots may be disabled, or no turn has taken one yet.
+
+## 1. system
+
+[internal context omitted]
+
+## 2. user
+
+### Content 1: Text
+
+Please inspect this output
+
+## 3. assistant
+
+### Content 1: Internal reasoning
+
+[internal reasoning and signature omitted]
+
+### Content 2: Tool call
+
+- ID: call-1
+- Name: fetch_url
+- Caller type: code_execution_20250825
+- Caller tool ID: server-tool-1
+
+Input:
+
+```json
+{
+  "url": "https://***:***@example.com/path?token=***&ok=1",
+  "api_key": "[redacted]",
+  "nested": {
+    "authorization": "[redacted]"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## 4. user
+
+### Content 1: Tool result
+
+- Tool call ID: call-1
+- Error: false
+
+Result:
+
+Authorization: [redacted]
+result ok
+
+Structured result blocks:
+
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "type": "image",
+    "mime_type": "image/png",
+    "omission_code": "inline_or_local_image_payload",
+    "omitted_base64_bytes": 25
+  },
+  {
+    "session_token": "[redacted]",
+    "note": "keep me"
+  }
+]
+```
+
+## 5. assistant
+
+### Content 1: Image attachment
+
+- Reference: https://example.com/visible.png?token=***
+
+### Content 2: Image attachment
+
+- Reference omitted (inline or local image payload)
+
+## 6. assistant
+
+### Content 1: Server tool call
+
+- ID: srv-1
+- Name: web_search
+
+Input:
+
+```json
+{
+  "query": "secret token"
+}
+```
+
+## 7. user
+
+### Content 1: Tool-search result
+
+- Tool call ID: srv-1
+
+```json
+{
+  "results": []
+}
+```
+
+## 8. assistant
+
+### Content 1: Code-execution result
+
+- Tool call ID: srv-2
+
+```json
+{
+  "stdout": "ok"
+}
+```
+

crates/tui/src/commands/fixtures/export_correlation_recorded_baseline.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Codewhale conversation export
+
+- Exported: 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z
+- Session: session-
+- Provider: deepseek
+- Model: deepseek-v4-pro
+- Mode: Act
+- Workspace: f025-golden-workspace
+- Messages: 3
+
+> Hidden instructions, internal reasoning, and reasoning signatures are omitted. Secret-like values and credential-bearing URLs are redacted as a defense in depth; review the export before sharing it.
+
+## Restore points
+
+The 3 most recent workspace restore points, newest first. `/restore <N>` restores by the index in this table and `/restore list` shows the live list.
+
+> The index is the position at export time. Every new turn records another restore point and shifts it, so re-check `/restore list` before restoring from an older export. The snapshot id does not shift.
+
+| N | Restore point | Recorded (UTC) | Label |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | `3d0ad76f0222` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | pre-turn:3: Fix the login test |
+| 2 | `6a3bc0698866` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | tool:call-1 |
+| 3 | `e24e175a7a57` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | pre-turn:2: Fix the login test |
+
+## 1. user
+
+### Content 1: Text
+
+Fix the login test
+
+- Restore points: N1 `3d0ad76f0222` (pre-turn turn 3), N3 `e24e175a7a57` (pre-turn turn 2)
+  - More than one restore point carries this prompt snippet, so the match is ambiguous; compare the recorded times above before restoring.
+
+## 2. assistant
+
+### Content 1: Text
+
+Working on it.
+
+## 3. user
+
+### Content 1: Text
+
+unrelated question
+
+- Restore points: none recorded for this message within the listed window.
+

crates/tui/src/commands/fixtures/export_history_fallback_recorded_baseline.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Codewhale conversation export
+
+- Exported: 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z
+- Session: session-
+- Provider: deepseek
+- Model: deepseek-v4-pro
+- Mode: Act
+- Workspace: f025-golden-workspace
+- Messages: 2
+
+> Hidden instructions, internal reasoning, and reasoning signatures are omitted. Secret-like values and credential-bearing URLs are redacted as a defense in depth; review the export before sharing it.
+
+## Restore points
+
+The 3 most recent workspace restore points, newest first. `/restore <N>` restores by the index in this table and `/restore list` shows the live list.
+
+> The index is the position at export time. Every new turn records another restore point and shifts it, so re-check `/restore list` before restoring from an older export. The snapshot id does not shift.
+
+| N | Restore point | Recorded (UTC) | Label |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | `3d0ad76f0222` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | pre-turn:3: Fix the login test |
+| 2 | `6a3bc0698866` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | tool:call-1 |
+| 3 | `e24e175a7a57` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | pre-turn:2: Fix the login test |
+
+> Structured API messages were unavailable; the entries below are a sanitized visible-history fallback.
+
+## 1. user
+
+Fix the login test
+
+## 2. assistant
+
+Done.
+

crates/tui/src/commands/fixtures/export_turn_baseline.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Turn handoff
+_Status: completed · generated 2026-09-11 15:31:54_
+
+## Intent
+Fix the flaky login test
+
+## Files changed
+—
+
+## Turn timeline
+- 1. user prompt: Fix the flaky login test
+- 2. assistant result: Fixed the login test. — done
+- 3. checkpoint: unavailable — no numbered turn snapshot yet · action: e export handoff
+
+## Tests / verifier
+—
+
+## Model route + tokens/cost
+- Route: DeepSeek · deepseek-v4-pro
+
+## Result / status
+- Status: completed
+- Result: Fixed the login test.

crates/tui/src/commands/groups/core/copy.rs

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ fn execute_copy(app: &mut App) -> CommandResult {
     // Any native-host attempt may fall through to the asynchronous terminal
     // transport. Preserve /export's durable recovery contract before the
     // write so every optimistic receipt names (or explicitly lacks) a backup.
-    let recovery = crate::commands::groups::session::write_last_copy(&content);
+    let recovery = crate::commands::session_export_host::write_last_copy(&content);
     match app.clipboard.write_text(&content) {
         Ok(()) if terminal_client => match recovery {
             Some(path) => CommandResult::message(

crates/tui/src/commands/groups/session/mod.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 mod branch;
 mod compact;
 mod export;
-pub(crate) use export::write_last_copy;
 mod fork;
 mod load;
 mod new;
@@ -88,10 +87,10 @@ impl CommandGroup for SessionCommands {
                 ContextualCommand::from_contract::<remote_env::RemoteEnvCmd>()
                     .expect("remote_env registration")
             ),
-            Box::new(FunctionCommand::new(
-                export::ExportCmd::info(),
-                export::ExportCmd::execute,
-            )),
+            Box::new(
+                ContextualCommand::from_contract::<export::ExportCmd>()
+                    .expect("export registration")
+            ),
             Box::new(FunctionCommand::new(
                 structcopy::StructcopyCmd::info(),
                 structcopy::StructcopyCmd::execute,

crates/tui/src/commands/groups/session/structcopy.rs

@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@
 //! - Human-only. This is a slash command, never a model-visible tool, event,
 //!   or authority, and it writes nothing back into App/session/plan/workflow
 //!   state (see the registry/catalog contract test).
-//! - Read-only projection over existing state. Redaction reuses the
-//!   transcript/export seams (`export::redact_json` for values,
-//!   `export::sanitize_text` for keys and status labels, which
+//! - Read-only projection over existing state. Redaction reuses the shared
+//!   sanitizer seams in `codewhale_secrets::sanitize` (`redact_json` for
+//!   values, `sanitize_text` for keys and status labels, which
 //!   `redact_json` does not reach) plus a strict pass that strips URL
 //!   userinfo/query/fragment entirely and folds the workspace and home
 //!   prefixes to labels, removes other absolute paths, and handles generic
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@
 //! - It is not a general PII scrubber. Workspace/home paths retain a useful
 //!   labelled suffix; other absolute POSIX, drive-letter, and UNC paths are
 //!   replaced outright.
-//! - Redaction is pattern-based (the export seam's private-key/bearer/JWT/
-//!   URL/secret regexes plus this module's strict URL pass). A secret that
+//! - Redaction is pattern-based (the shared sanitizer's private-key/bearer/
+//!   JWT/URL/secret regexes plus this module's strict URL pass). A secret that
 //!   matches none of those patterns and sits under a non-sensitive key is
 //!   copied as-is.
 //! - Delivery to the clipboard is not confirmed. Terminal-client transports
@@ -49,7 +49,10 @@ use codewhale_localization::{Locale, MessageId, tr};
 use codewhale_models::{ContentBlock, Message};
 
 use super::CommandResult;
-use super::export::{is_internal_role, is_sensitive_key, redact_json, sanitize_text};
+// FEAT-025 D4: the sanitizer helpers moved to the single shared portable
+// implementation in `codewhale-secrets`; `/structcopy` stays legacy until
+// FEAT-026 and only rewires its import.
+use codewhale_secrets::sanitize::{is_internal_role, is_sensitive_key, redact_json, sanitize_text};
 
 pub(in crate::commands) const COMMAND_INFO: CommandInfo = CommandInfo {
     name: "structcopy",
@@ -720,7 +723,7 @@ fn scrub_string(text: &str, labels: &PathLabels) -> String {
     scrub_paths(&scrub_urls(&labelled))
 }
 
-/// Convert the prose placeholders owned by the shared export seam into stable
+/// Convert the prose placeholders owned by the shared sanitizer into stable
 /// language-neutral codes. Structural JSON is a machine artifact and must not
 /// change with the UI locale.
 fn normalize_redaction_codes(value: &mut Value) {
@@ -783,7 +786,7 @@ const URL_TRAILING_PUNCTUATION: &[char] = &[
 /// Strip URL userinfo, query, and fragment entirely, leaving a
 /// `scheme://host[:port]/path` label.
 ///
-/// The export seam has already masked credentials in URLs it recognised;
+/// The shared sanitizer has already masked credentials in URLs it recognised;
 /// this pass enforces the stricter structural-copy contract that no
 /// userinfo, query string, or fragment may survive at all — including for
 /// URLs that are punctuation-wrapped (`(https://…)`, `<https://…>`,

crates/tui/src/commands/mod.rs

@@ -9,6 +9,12 @@
 mod contract;
 pub mod discovery;
 mod groups;
+
+// FEAT-025 host services for the session-export slice: the shared recovery
+// writer and the protected export-destination resolver/writer. Declared at the
+// `commands` root so they stay outside `groups/session`, which FEAT-043 moves
+// to `codewhale-commands`.
+mod session_export_host;
 pub mod traits;
 pub mod user_commands;
 pub mod user_registry;
@@ -28,6 +34,16 @@ mod session_acceptance;
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod session_control_regression_tests;
 #[cfg(test)]
+mod session_export_regression_tests;
+// FEAT-025 Phase 5: public command-surface parity lives at the `commands` root
+// for the same extraction reason as the host regressions above.
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod session_export_surface_tests;
+// FEAT-025 audit hardening: shared host-bound test support for both export
+// test suites (timestamp normalisation and the exhaustive envelope check).
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod session_export_test_support;
+#[cfg(test)]
 mod session_lifecycle_regression_tests;
 
 use std::sync::OnceLock;
@@ -2089,6 +2105,8 @@ mod tests {
             "rc",
             "remote-env",
             "title",
+            // FEAT-025 session export slice.
+            "export",
         ];
         for info in command_infos() {
             if info.name == "feat015ctx" || MIGRATED_GROUPS.contains(&info.name) {
@@ -2766,13 +2784,11 @@ mod tests {
                 "/{name} must be pure (no host context bundle)"
             );
         }
-        // Out-of-scope session commands remain legacy for FEAT-025/026.
-        for name in ["export", "structcopy"] {
-            assert!(
-                !registry().has_contextual_handler(name),
-                "/{name} must stay on the legacy dispatch until its owning FEAT"
-            );
-        }
+        // Out-of-scope session command remains legacy for FEAT-026.
+        assert!(
+            !registry().has_contextual_handler("structcopy"),
+            "/structcopy must stay on the legacy dispatch until its owning FEAT"
+        );
     }
 
     // ---------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -2817,13 +2833,11 @@ mod tests {
             CommandCapabilities::SESSION_CONTROL.union(CommandCapabilities::PRESENTATION),
             "/remote-env declares control plus presentation only"
         );
-        // FEAT-025/FEAT-026 leaves remain legacy until their owning FEATs.
-        for name in ["export", "structcopy"] {
-            assert!(
-                !registry().has_contextual_handler(name),
-                "/{name} must stay on the legacy dispatch"
-            );
-        }
+        // FEAT-026 leaf remains legacy until its owning FEAT.
+        assert!(
+            !registry().has_contextual_handler("structcopy"),
+            "/structcopy must stay on the legacy dispatch"
+        );
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -2936,4 +2950,113 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(resume.action.is_none());
         assert!(resume.message.is_none());
     }
+
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+    // FEAT-025: session export entry registers through the portable bridge
+    // (D1/D3/D5). `/export` (alias `/daochu`) declares exactly SESSION_EXPORT;
+    // `/structcopy` remains a direct host handler for FEAT-026, so the root
+    // `session` frontier stays pending.
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feat025_export_entry_registers_through_portable_bridge() {
+        use codewhale_command_contract::handler::{CommandCapabilities, CommandHandler};
+
+        assert!(
+            registry().has_contextual_handler("export"),
+            "/export must register through the portable bridge"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            registry().has_contextual_handler("daochu"),
+            "/daochu must resolve to the same portable bridge entry"
+        );
+
+        let handler = registry()
+            .get("export")
+            .expect("entry")
+            .contextual_handler()
+            .expect("contextual handler");
+        let CommandHandler::Contextual { capabilities, .. } = handler else {
+            panic!("/export must be contextual");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            capabilities,
+            CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT,
+            "/export declares export authority only"
+        );
+
+        // Least authority is catalogue-wide: no other registration may declare
+        // the session-export capability.
+        let export_declarers: Vec<&str> = registry()
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|command| {
+                command
+                    .contextual_handler()
+                    .is_some_and(|handler| match handler {
+                        CommandHandler::Contextual { capabilities, .. } => {
+                            capabilities.contains(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT)
+                        }
+                        CommandHandler::Pure(_) => false,
+                    })
+            })
+            .map(|command| command.info().name)
+            .collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            export_declarers,
+            vec!["export"],
+            "exactly one registration may declare SESSION_EXPORT"
+        );
+
+        // The legacy function registration was removed for export only: the
+        // contextual entry has no direct host fallback, while `/structcopy`
+        // keeps its concrete-App `FunctionCommand` until FEAT-026.
+        let mut app = create_test_app();
+        let legacy = registry()
+            .get("export")
+            .expect("entry")
+            .execute(&mut app, None);
+        assert_eq!(
+            legacy.message.as_deref(),
+            Some("Error: command has no executable handler"),
+            "/export must not keep a legacy function registration"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !registry().has_contextual_handler("structcopy"),
+            "/structcopy must stay on the legacy dispatch until FEAT-026"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feat025_export_registered_handler_fails_safely_without_authority() {
+        // The dispatcher builds the envelope from the declared capabilities and
+        // calls this exact handler object. A narrower envelope that omits the
+        // export facet must return the safe error before parsing or performing
+        // any projection, clipboard, recovery, resolution, or write operation.
+        let handler = registry()
+            .get("export")
+            .expect("entry")
+            .contextual_handler()
+            .expect("contextual handler");
+        let codewhale_command_contract::handler::CommandHandler::Contextual {
+            handler: contextual,
+            ..
+        } = handler
+        else {
+            panic!("/export must be contextual");
+        };
+
+        for arg in [None, Some("clipboard"), Some("file out.md")] {
+            let result = contextual(
+                codewhale_command_contract::handler::CommandContexts::empty(),
+                arg,
+            );
+            assert!(result.is_error, "{arg:?} must fail without authority");
+            assert_eq!(
+                result.message.as_deref(),
+                Some("Error: Command capability unavailable: session_export"),
+                "{arg:?} must keep the exact safe error"
+            );
+            assert!(result.action.is_none(), "{arg:?} must produce no action");
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/tui/src/commands/session_export_host.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+//! TUI-owned host services for the session-export slice (FEAT-025 D5/D7).
+//!
+//! This module deliberately lives outside `commands/groups/session`, which
+//! FEAT-043 moves into `codewhale-commands`. It owns the two filesystem
+//! services the `/export` slice needs from the host:
+//!
+//! * the shared `last-copy.md` recovery writer reused by `/export` and `/copy`
+//!   (D5), and
+//! * the protected export-destination resolver/writer used only by `/export`
+//!   (D7).
+//!
+//! The algorithm, check order, error text, and platform behavior are the exact
+//! baseline implementations relocated unchanged. The portable `/export`
+//! handler reaches these services only through
+//! `CommandSessionExportContext` — never by importing this module — so the
+//! future portable group keeps no host dependency.
+
+use std::fs::{self, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::Write as _;
+use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
+
+/// Write the export to a predictable last-copy file under the Codewhale home
+/// (#5555): a clipboard-only export on SSH/headless must never dead-end the
+/// user, so the same content lands at `<home>/exports/last-copy.md` and every
+/// failure message names it. Returns the path when the write succeeded.
+pub(crate) fn write_last_copy(markdown: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    let home = codewhale_paths::codewhale_home().ok().flatten()?;
+    let exports_dir = home.join("exports");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&exports_dir).ok()?;
+    let physical_home = std::fs::canonicalize(&home).ok()?;
+    let physical_exports = std::fs::canonicalize(&exports_dir).ok()?;
+    if !physical_exports.starts_with(&physical_home) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    write_last_copy_to(&exports_dir, markdown).ok()
+}
+
+fn write_last_copy_to(exports_dir: &Path, markdown: &str) -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(exports_dir)?;
+    let path = exports_dir.join("last-copy.md");
+    // Reuse the private atomic writer: random same-directory temp names,
+    // restrictive creation mode, symlink-safe replacement, and Windows
+    // replace retries are all part of the existing persistence contract.
+    crate::utils::write_atomic(&path, markdown.as_bytes())?;
+    Ok(path)
+}
+
+/// Resolve a requested export destination against the trusted workspace root.
+///
+/// Verbatim baseline algorithm (D7): trim; empty → `export path is empty`;
+/// reject `..` components; canonicalize the workspace with its current
+/// fallback; rebase workspace-absolute paths (raw or canonicalized); otherwise
+/// join workspace-relative; require a file name. Errors are returned unwrapped
+/// so the portable handler keeps the exact baseline text.
+pub(crate) fn resolve_export_path(workspace: &Path, raw: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
+    let raw = raw.trim();
+    if raw.is_empty() {
+        return Err("export path is empty".to_string());
+    }
+    let requested = PathBuf::from(raw);
+    if requested
+        .components()
+        .any(|component| component == Component::ParentDir)
+    {
+        return Err(
+            "export paths may not contain `..`; use an explicit normalized absolute path instead"
+                .to_string(),
+        );
+    }
+    // Resolve the trusted workspace root once so platform aliases such as
+    // macOS `/var -> /private/var` do not make every workspace-relative
+    // export look like it traverses a user-controlled symlink. Requested
+    // components beneath that root remain lexical and are checked below.
+    let resolved_workspace =
+        fs::canonicalize(workspace).unwrap_or_else(|_| workspace.to_path_buf());
+    let path = if requested.is_absolute() {
+        if let Ok(relative) = requested.strip_prefix(workspace) {
+            resolved_workspace.join(relative)
+        } else if let Ok(relative) = requested.strip_prefix(&resolved_workspace) {
+            resolved_workspace.join(relative)
+        } else {
+            requested
+        }
+    } else {
+        resolved_workspace.join(requested)
+    };
+    if path.file_name().is_none() {
+        return Err(format!("export path must name a file: {}", path.display()));
+    }
+    Ok(path)
+}
+
+/// Write rendered export bytes to a resolved destination with the exact
+/// baseline protections (D7): parent presence/directory checks, symlink
+/// rejection (leaf and ancestors), no overwrite by default, non-regular-file
+/// rejection, exclusive creation with `0o600` on Unix, `fsync`, cleanup after a
+/// failed write, forced atomic replacement, and owner-only permissions.
+pub(crate) fn write_export_file(path: &Path, contents: &[u8], force: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let parent = path
+        .parent()
+        .filter(|parent| !parent.as_os_str().is_empty())
+        .ok_or_else(|| format!("path has no parent directory: {}", path.display()))?;
+    let parent_metadata = fs::metadata(parent).map_err(|err| {
+        format!(
+            "parent directory {} is unavailable: {err}",
+            parent.display()
+        )
+    })?;
+    if !parent_metadata.is_dir() {
+        return Err(format!("parent is not a directory: {}", parent.display()));
+    }
+    reject_symlink_components(path)?;
+
+    match fs::symlink_metadata(path) {
+        Ok(_) if !force => {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "destination already exists: {}. Re-run with `/export file --force <path>` to replace it",
+                path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(metadata) if !metadata.file_type().is_file() => {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "refusing to replace a non-regular file: {}",
+                path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(_) => {}
+        Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
+        Err(err) => return Err(format!("could not inspect {}: {err}", path.display())),
+    }
+
+    if force {
+        crate::utils::write_atomic(path, contents).map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
+        set_owner_only(path).map_err(|err| format!("could not secure file permissions: {err}"))?;
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    let mut options = OpenOptions::new();
+    options.write(true).create_new(true);
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
+        options.mode(0o600);
+    }
+    let mut file = options.open(path).map_err(|err| {
+        if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists {
+            format!(
+                "destination already exists: {}. Re-run with `/export file --force <path>` to replace it",
+                path.display()
+            )
+        } else {
+            err.to_string()
+        }
+    })?;
+    if let Err(err) = file.write_all(contents).and_then(|()| file.sync_all()) {
+        drop(file);
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
+        return Err(err.to_string());
+    }
+    set_owner_only(path).map_err(|err| format!("could not secure file permissions: {err}"))
+}
+
+fn reject_symlink_components(path: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
+    for component_path in path.ancestors() {
+        match fs::symlink_metadata(component_path) {
+            Ok(metadata) if metadata.file_type().is_symlink() => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "refusing export through symlink component: {}",
+                    component_path.display()
+                ));
+            }
+            Ok(_) => {}
+            Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "could not inspect path component {}: {err}",
+                    component_path.display()
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn set_owner_only(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+    fs::set_permissions(path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+fn set_owner_only(_path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn last_copy_writes_the_export_without_leaving_a_temp_artifact() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let dir = tmp.path().join("exports");
+        let path = write_last_copy_to(&dir, "# export\n\nhello\n").expect("write");
+        assert_eq!(path, dir.join("last-copy.md"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("read"),
+            "# export\n\nhello\n"
+        );
+        // The next export overwrites the same predictable path.
+        write_last_copy_to(&dir, "# second\n").expect("rewrite");
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("read"), "# second\n");
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read_dir(&dir).expect("read exports").count(),
+            1,
+            "the atomic writer must not leave a temp artifact"
+        );
+
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+            let mode = std::fs::metadata(&path)
+                .expect("metadata")
+                .permissions()
+                .mode();
+            assert_eq!(mode & 0o077, 0, "recovery copy must remain private");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn last_copy_stays_inside_an_explicit_codewhale_home() {
+        let ambient = TempDir::new().expect("ambient home");
+        let isolated = TempDir::new().expect("isolated Codewhale home");
+        let _env_lock = crate::test_support::lock_test_env();
+        let _home = crate::test_support::EnvVarGuard::set("HOME", ambient.path());
+        let _codewhale_home =
+            crate::test_support::EnvVarGuard::set("CODEWHALE_HOME", isolated.path());
+
+        let path = write_last_copy("isolated response").expect("recovery copy");
+
+        assert_eq!(path, isolated.path().join("exports/last-copy.md"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("read recovery copy"),
+            "isolated response"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !ambient.path().join("exports/last-copy.md").exists(),
+            "explicit CODEWHALE_HOME must prevent ambient-home writes"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn last_copy_refuses_an_exports_symlink_outside_codewhale_home() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+
+        let ambient = TempDir::new().expect("ambient home");
+        let isolated = TempDir::new().expect("isolated Codewhale home");
+        let external = TempDir::new().expect("external dir");
+        symlink(external.path(), isolated.path().join("exports")).expect("exports symlink");
+        let _env_lock = crate::test_support::lock_test_env();
+        let _home = crate::test_support::EnvVarGuard::set("HOME", ambient.path());
+        let _codewhale_home =
+            crate::test_support::EnvVarGuard::set("CODEWHALE_HOME", isolated.path());
+
+        assert_eq!(write_last_copy("must stay isolated"), None);
+        assert!(
+            !external.path().join("last-copy.md").exists(),
+            "recovery content must not escape through a nested symlink"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/tui/src/commands/session_export_surface_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,718 @@
+//! FEAT-025 Phase 5: public command-surface parity coverage for `/export`.
+//!
+//! Phase 4 proved handler/rendering/adapter parity with fake facets and
+//! relocated host regressions. This module proves the *observable command
+//! surface* did not move when registration crossed the portable bridge:
+//!
+//! * registry metadata (name, alias, usage) and registry position,
+//! * the `description_key` -> catalog bridge and its English/localized text,
+//! * palette and slash-completion discovery, including the `/daochu` alias,
+//! * least authority: exactly `SESSION_EXPORT` and no presentation facet,
+//! * canonical-name/alias dispatch equivalence through the public `execute`
+//!   seam, with exact receipts and exact visible errors.
+//!
+//! Like the Phase 3 host regressions, this file deliberately lives at the
+//! `commands` root — outside `groups/session`, which FEAT-043 moves into
+//! `codewhale-commands`. No real terminal clipboard, GUI, or device is needed:
+//! the harness uses the deterministic in-process clipboard and temporary
+//! filesystem fixtures.
+
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+use codewhale_command_contract::handler::{CommandCapabilities, CommandHandler};
+
+use crate::commands::session_export_test_support::{
+    assert_only_export_facet_exposed, normalize_export_time,
+};
+use crate::commands::traits::CommandDiscovery;
+use crate::commands::{CommandResult, execute};
+use crate::config::{ApiProvider, Config};
+use crate::test_support::{EnvVarGuard, TestEnvLock};
+use crate::tui::app::{App, TuiOptions};
+use crate::tui::clipboard::ClipboardHandler;
+use crate::tui::command_palette;
+use codewhale_localization::Locale;
+use codewhale_models::{ContentBlock, Message, Role};
+
+const EXPORT_NAME: &str = "export";
+const EXPORT_ALIAS: &str = "daochu";
+const EXPORT_USAGE: &str =
+    "/export [clipboard|file [--force] <path>|turn [clipboard|file [--force] <path>]]";
+// Pinned to the authoritative catalog values (`crates/localization/locales/{en,fr}.json`,
+// key `CmdExportDescription`). The `description_key` bridge must keep resolving the
+// `/export` metadata to this catalog entry; the wording itself is owned by the catalog.
+const EXPORT_ENGLISH: &str = "Copy a safe export, or write it to a file";
+const EXPORT_FRENCH: &str =
+    "Copier un export sûr de la conversation, ou l'écrire dans un fichier explicite";
+
+/// Shared host-isolated harness (same isolation order as the Phase 3
+/// `ExportHarness`: env guards, then the lock, then the temporary directory).
+struct SurfaceHarness {
+    app: App,
+    _home: EnvVarGuard,
+    _codewhale_home: EnvVarGuard,
+    _env_lock: TestEnvLock,
+    temp: TempDir,
+}
+
+impl SurfaceHarness {
+    fn new() -> Self {
+        let env_lock = crate::test_support::lock_test_env();
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let home = temp.path().join("home");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&home).expect("home dir");
+        let _home = EnvVarGuard::set("HOME", &home);
+        let _codewhale_home = EnvVarGuard::set("CODEWHALE_HOME", &home);
+        let options = TuiOptions {
+            skills_dir: temp.path().join("skills"),
+            memory_path: temp.path().join("memory.md"),
+            notes_path: temp.path().join("notes.txt"),
+            mcp_config_path: temp.path().join("mcp.json"),
+            ..crate::test_support::test_tui_options(temp.path())
+        };
+        let app = App::new(options, &Config::default());
+        Self {
+            app,
+            _home,
+            _codewhale_home,
+            _env_lock: env_lock,
+            temp,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn last_copy_path(&self) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+        self.temp
+            .path()
+            .join("home")
+            .join("exports")
+            .join("last-copy.md")
+    }
+}
+
+fn text_message(role: Role, text: &str) -> Message {
+    Message {
+        role,
+        content: vec![ContentBlock::Text {
+            text: text.to_string(),
+            cache_control: None,
+        }],
+    }
+}
+
+fn export_info() -> &'static crate::commands::CommandInfo {
+    crate::commands::get_command_info(EXPORT_NAME).expect("/export must be registered")
+}
+
+fn result_message(result: &CommandResult) -> &str {
+    result.message.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_registration_metadata_and_registry_position_are_unchanged() {
+    let info = export_info();
+    assert_eq!(info.name, EXPORT_NAME);
+    assert_eq!(info.aliases, &[EXPORT_ALIAS]);
+    assert_eq!(info.usage, EXPORT_USAGE);
+
+    // The alias resolves to the same registry entry and canonical metadata.
+    let registry = crate::commands::registry();
+    let via_alias = registry
+        .get(EXPORT_ALIAS)
+        .expect("/daochu must resolve to the export entry");
+    assert_eq!(via_alias.info().name, EXPORT_NAME);
+    assert_eq!(via_alias.info().usage, EXPORT_USAGE);
+    assert!(
+        registry.get(EXPORT_NAME).is_some(),
+        "canonical /export must remain registered"
+    );
+
+    // Registry order is preserved: remote-env -> export -> structcopy.
+    let names: Vec<&str> = crate::commands::command_infos()
+        .iter()
+        .map(|info| info.name)
+        .collect();
+    let position = |name: &str| {
+        names
+            .iter()
+            .position(|candidate| *candidate == name)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{name} must be registered; found {names:?}"))
+    };
+    assert!(
+        position("remote-env") < position(EXPORT_NAME),
+        "export must stay after remote-env in the session group order"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        position(EXPORT_NAME) < position("structcopy"),
+        "export must stay before structcopy in the session group order"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_declares_exactly_session_export_without_presentation_authority() {
+    let command = crate::commands::registry()
+        .get(EXPORT_NAME)
+        .expect("/export must be registered");
+    let handler = command
+        .contextual_handler()
+        .expect("/export must register through the portable bridge");
+    let CommandHandler::Contextual { capabilities, .. } = handler else {
+        panic!("/export must be a contextual handler")
+    };
+    assert_eq!(
+        capabilities,
+        CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT,
+        "/export declares exactly SESSION_EXPORT"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !capabilities.contains(CommandCapabilities::PRESENTATION),
+        "export must not request presentation authority"
+    );
+
+    // The restricted projection exposes only the declared facet. The helper
+    // destructures all sixteen `ContextParts` slots, so this is exhaustive
+    // rather than a spot-check of the fields listed below by hand.
+    let mut harness = SurfaceHarness::new();
+    let mut bundle = harness.app.command_contexts();
+    let export_only = bundle
+        .contexts(CommandCapabilities::SESSION_EXPORT)
+        .into_parts();
+    assert_only_export_facet_exposed(export_only);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_description_bridge_preserves_english_localized_and_discovery_metadata() {
+    let info = export_info();
+
+    // `description_key` -> `key_to_message_id` -> catalog: English reference
+    // and the shipped French pack both resolve through the same bridge.
+    assert_eq!(&*info.description_for(Locale::En), EXPORT_ENGLISH);
+    assert_eq!(&*info.description_for(Locale::Fr), EXPORT_FRENCH);
+
+    // Palette text keeps the canonical description and advertises the alias.
+    let palette = info.palette_description_for(Locale::En);
+    assert!(
+        palette.contains(EXPORT_ENGLISH),
+        "palette description must keep the catalog text: {palette}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        palette.contains(EXPORT_ALIAS),
+        "palette description must keep the alias: {palette}"
+    );
+
+    // Discovery classification and visibility are part of the surface.
+    assert_eq!(info.discovery(), CommandDiscovery::Primary);
+    assert!(!info.is_unlisted());
+    assert!(info.show_in_empty_discovery());
+    assert!(info.show_in_slash_completion("/exp"));
+    assert!(info.requires_argument());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn export_is_discoverable_by_name_and_alias_in_palette_and_slash_completion() {
+    // Pure discovery: a workspace path is all these surfaces need, so this test
+    // avoids the shared environment lock the host fixtures require.
+    let workspace_dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+    let workspace = workspace_dir.path();
+    let skills_dir = workspace.join("skills");
+    let mcp_config = workspace.join("mcp.json");
+
+    let entries = command_palette::build_entries(
+        Locale::En,
+        &skills_dir,
+        false,
+        workspace,
+        &mcp_config,
+        None,
+    );
+    let export_row = entries
+        .iter()
+        .find(|entry| entry.label == "/export")
+        .expect("/export must appear in the command palette");
+    assert!(
+        export_row.description.contains(EXPORT_ENGLISH),
+        "palette row must carry the catalog description: {}",
+        export_row.description
+    );
+    assert!(
+        export_row.description.contains(EXPORT_ALIAS),
+        "palette row must advertise /daochu: {}",
+        export_row.description
+    );
+
+    let by_prefix = crate::tui::widgets::slash_completion_hints(
+        "/exp",
+        64,
+        &[],
+        Locale::En,
+        Some(workspace),
+        ApiProvider::Deepseek,
+    );
+    assert!(
+        by_prefix.iter().any(|hint| hint.name == "/export"),
+        "/exp must complete to /export"
+    );
+
+    let by_alias = crate::tui::widgets::slash_completion_hints(
+        "/daoc",
+        64,
+        &[],
+        Locale::En,
+        Some(workspace),
+        ApiProvider::Deepseek,
+    );
+    let alias_row = by_alias
+        .iter()
+        .find(|hint| hint.name == "/export")
+        .expect("/daoc must surface the export command");
+    assert_eq!(
+        alias_row.alias_hint.as_deref(),
+        Some(EXPORT_ALIAS),
+        "slash completion must explain the alias match"
+    );
+
+    // The alias token is not a second registry entry.
+    assert!(
+        !entries.iter().any(|entry| entry.label == "/daochu"),
+        "the alias must not create a duplicate palette row"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn public_dispatch_canonical_name_and_alias_are_byte_equivalent() {
+    let mut harness = SurfaceHarness::new();
+    let last_copy = harness.last_copy_path();
+    let app = &mut harness.app;
+    app.current_session_id = Some("session-987654321".to_string());
+    app.api_messages = vec![
+        text_message(Role::User, "Please export this conversation"),
+        text_message(Role::Assistant, "Exported on request."),
+    ];
+    app.clipboard = ClipboardHandler::for_test(false, false);
+
+    let canonical = execute("/export clipboard", app);
+    assert!(!canonical.is_error, "{:?}", canonical.message);
+    let canonical_markdown = app
+        .clipboard
+        .last_written_text()
+        .expect("canonical clipboard payload")
+        .to_string();
+    let canonical_recovery = std::fs::read_to_string(&last_copy).expect("canonical recovery copy");
+
+    // Reset the deterministic clipboard so the second dispatch records its own
+    // delivery; state is otherwise identical.
+    app.clipboard = ClipboardHandler::for_test(false, false);
+
+    let alias = execute("/daochu clipboard", app);
+    assert!(!alias.is_error, "{:?}", alias.message);
+    let alias_markdown = app
+        .clipboard
+        .last_written_text()
+        .expect("alias clipboard payload")
+        .to_string();
+    let alias_recovery = std::fs::read_to_string(&last_copy).expect("alias recovery copy");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        result_message(&canonical),
+        result_message(&alias),
+        "canonical and alias receipts must be identical"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        normalize_export_time(&canonical_markdown),
+        normalize_export_time(&alias_markdown),
+        "canonical and alias clipboard payloads must be identical"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        normalize_export_time(&canonical_recovery),
+        normalize_export_time(&alias_recovery),
+        "canonical and alias recovery copies must be identical"
+    );
+    assert!(canonical_markdown.contains("# Codewhale conversation export"));
+    assert!(canonical_markdown.contains("Please export this conversation"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn public_dispatch_file_receipts_and_usage_errors_are_exact() {
+    let mut harness = SurfaceHarness::new();
+    let workspace = harness.temp.path().join("workspace");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).expect("workspace");
+    let app = &mut harness.app;
+    app.workspace = workspace.clone();
+    app.api_messages = vec![text_message(Role::User, "file export body")];
+
+    let resolved = std::fs::canonicalize(&workspace)
+        .expect("canonical workspace")
+        .join("transcript.md");
+
+    let first = execute("/export file transcript.md", app);
+    assert!(!first.is_error, "{:?}", first.message);
+    assert_eq!(
+        result_message(&first),
+        format!("Conversation exported to {}", resolved.display())
+    );
+
+    let refused = execute("/export file transcript.md", app);
+    assert!(refused.is_error, "{:?}", refused.message);
+    assert_eq!(
+        result_message(&refused),
+        format!(
+            "Error: Failed to export Conversation to {}: destination already exists: {}. Re-run with `/export file --force <path>` to replace it",
+            resolved.display(),
+            resolved.display()
+        )
+    );
+
+    let forced = execute("/export file --force transcript.md", app);
+    assert!(!forced.is_error, "{:?}", forced.message);
+    assert_eq!(
+        result_message(&forced),
+        format!(
+            "Conversation exported to {} (overwrite explicitly allowed)",
+            resolved.display()
+        )
+    );
+
+    let usage = export_info().usage;
+    for (arg, reason) in [
+        ("file", "missing file path"),
+        ("file --force", "missing file path"),
+        ("clipboard extra.md", "clipboard does not accept a path"),
+    ] {
+        let result = execute(&format!("/export {arg}"), app);
+        assert!(result.is_error, "{arg} must be rejected");
+        assert_eq!(
+            result_message(&result),
+            format!("Error: {reason}. Usage: {usage}"),
+            "{arg} must keep the baseline usage error"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// FEAT-025 Phase 7 (Task 7.2): extraction-readiness and scope audits.
+//
+// These audits protect the D4/D5/D8/D9 ownership contract that the portable
+// source must satisfy before FEAT-043 can physically move the export slice into
+// `codewhale-commands`. They are source-level checks, not runtime behavior
+// tests, and they live at the `commands` root outside the movable group.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Production portion of the portable export source: everything before its
+/// `#[cfg(test)]` module, with comments removed (full-line and trailing) so
+/// rationale text (`Concrete `App`, clipboard, filesystem, ...`) is never
+/// mistaken for an import or a concrete host symbol.
+fn portable_production_source(source: &str) -> String {
+    let mut production = String::new();
+    for line in source.lines() {
+        if line.trim_start().starts_with("#[cfg(test)]") {
+            break;
+        }
+        let code = strip_line_comment(line);
+        if code.trim().is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        production.push_str(code.trim_end());
+        production.push('\n');
+    }
+    production
+}
+
+/// Strip a trailing `//` comment without touching `//` inside a string or
+/// character literal.
+///
+/// A naive strip would be wrong in both directions: portable code carries URL
+/// literals such as `https://…`, and a marker string could hide a real token.
+/// Lifetime ticks (`&'a str`) are not treated as character literals so a
+/// following comment is still removed.
+fn strip_line_comment(line: &str) -> &str {
+    let bytes = line.as_bytes();
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < bytes.len() {
+        match bytes[i] {
+            b'"' => {
+                i += 1;
+                while i < bytes.len() {
+                    match bytes[i] {
+                        b'\\' => i += 2,
+                        b'"' => break,
+                        _ => i += 1,
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            b'\'' => {
+                let opens_literal = matches!(
+                    (bytes.get(i + 1), bytes.get(i + 2)),
+                    (Some(b'\\'), _) | (Some(_), Some(b'\''))
+                );
+                if opens_literal {
+                    i += 1;
+                    while i < bytes.len() {
+                        match bytes[i] {
+                            b'\\' => i += 2,
+                            b'\'' => break,
+                            _ => i += 1,
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            b'/' if bytes.get(i + 1) == Some(&b'/') => return &line[..i],
+            _ => {}
+        }
+        i += 1;
+    }
+    line
+}
+
+/// Word-boundary identifier match.
+///
+/// `production.contains("App")` fires on a legitimate `Append`, while an exact
+/// equality check would miss `App::new`. `\b` matches the identifier token
+/// only, so the audit fails for the right reason.
+fn contains_identifier(haystack: &str, identifier: &str) -> bool {
+    let pattern = format!(r"\b{}\b", regex::escape(identifier));
+    regex::Regex::new(&pattern)
+        .expect("identifier regex")
+        .is_match(haystack)
+}
+
+/// The audits above are only as trustworthy as their scanners, so pin the two
+/// behaviours that decide whether a finding is real: comment stripping must not
+/// eat string literals, and identifier matching must not fire on a longer word.
+#[test]
+fn portable_source_audit_helpers_are_token_aware() {
+    assert_eq!(strip_line_comment("let x = 1; // App"), "let x = 1; ");
+    assert_eq!(strip_line_comment("// whole line"), "");
+    assert_eq!(
+        strip_line_comment("let url = \"https://example.test/a\";"),
+        "let url = \"https://example.test/a\";"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        strip_line_comment("let c = '/'; let y = 1; // keep"),
+        "let c = '/'; let y = 1; "
+    );
+    // A lifetime tick must not swallow the rest of the line.
+    assert_eq!(
+        strip_line_comment("fn f<'a>(x: &'a str) {} // note"),
+        "fn f<'a>(x: &'a str) {} "
+    );
+
+    assert!(contains_identifier("let app = App::new();", "App"));
+    assert!(!contains_identifier("values.append(item);", "App"));
+    assert!(!contains_identifier("struct AppNew;", "App"));
+    assert!(contains_identifier("use ratatui::text::Line;", "ratatui"));
+    assert!(contains_identifier("unsafe { x }", "unsafe"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn portable_export_source_has_no_host_dependency() {
+    let source = include_str!("groups/session/export.rs");
+    let production = portable_production_source(source);
+
+    // Only the external contract, the pure sanitizer, `serde_json`, `std`, and
+    // the temporary FEAT-037 `CommandResult` exception may be imported.
+    let allowed_use_prefixes = [
+        "use std::",
+        "use codewhale_command_contract",
+        "use codewhale_secrets",
+        "use serde_json",
+        "use super::CommandResult",
+    ];
+    for line in production.lines() {
+        let trimmed = line.trim_start();
+        if !trimmed.starts_with("use ") {
+            continue;
+        }
+        assert!(
+            allowed_use_prefixes
+                .iter()
+                .any(|prefix| trimmed.starts_with(prefix)),
+            "portable /export import is not allowed: {trimmed}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // No concrete host module or type may appear in portable production code.
+    // Syntactic tokens are matched literally; bare identifiers are matched on
+    // word boundaries so `Append` cannot false-trigger on `App`.
+    for token in [
+        "use crate::",
+        "crate::tui",
+        "crate::client",
+        "crate::config",
+        "crate::snapshot",
+        "crate::session_manager",
+        "std::fs",
+        "std::net",
+        "std::process",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            !production.contains(token),
+            "portable /export must not reference {token}"
+        );
+    }
+    for identifier in [
+        "App",
+        "AppAction",
+        "ClipboardHandler",
+        "SnapshotRepo",
+        "SessionManager",
+        "HistoryCell",
+        "ContentBlock",
+        "OpenOptions",
+        "ratatui",
+        "crossterm",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            !contains_identifier(&production, identifier),
+            "portable /export must not reference {identifier}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The bounded FEAT-037 exception is exactly `CommandResult`: no action
+    // payload, deferred effect, or host receipt type may cross the boundary.
+    assert!(
+        !production.contains("super::App"),
+        "only CommandResult may cross the FEAT-037 boundary"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn portable_export_source_carries_no_hidden_authority() {
+    let source = include_str!("groups/session/export.rs");
+    let production = portable_production_source(source);
+
+    // Host authority must not hide behind a callback, boxed closure, erased
+    // receipt, or unsafe escape hatch.
+    for token in [
+        "Box<",
+        "dyn Fn",
+        "impl Fn",
+        "fn(&mut dyn",
+        "&mut dyn",
+        "transmute",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            !production.contains(token),
+            "portable /export must not contain {token}"
+        );
+    }
+    assert!(
+        !contains_identifier(&production, "unsafe"),
+        "portable /export must not contain unsafe"
+    );
+
+    // Missing authority fails with the exact safe error and never panics: the
+    // facet is destructured, not `.expect()`ed.
+    for token in [".expect(", ".unwrap(", "panic!(", "unreachable!(", "todo!("] {
+        assert!(
+            !production.contains(token),
+            "portable /export must not contain {token}"
+        );
+    }
+    assert!(
+        production.contains(
+            "return CommandResult::error(\"Command capability unavailable: session_export\".to_string());"
+        ),
+        "portable /export must keep the exact safe missing-authority error"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn shared_sanitizer_is_one_pure_acyclic_implementation() {
+    // Both `/export` and the still-legacy `/structcopy` consume the single
+    // implementation in the pure `codewhale-secrets` crate.
+    let export_source = include_str!("groups/session/export.rs");
+    let structcopy_source = include_str!("groups/session/structcopy.rs");
+    assert!(
+        export_source.contains("use codewhale_secrets::sanitize::"),
+        "portable /export must consume the shared sanitizer"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        structcopy_source.contains("use codewhale_secrets::sanitize::"),
+        "/structcopy must consume the same shared sanitizer"
+    );
+    // The module prose must name the new owner: a stale `export::<helper>` seam
+    // reference is exactly the comment drift inherited from PR #5525.
+    for stale in ["export::redact_json", "export::sanitize_text"] {
+        assert!(
+            !structcopy_source.contains(stale),
+            "/structcopy comments must not cite the removed {stale} seam"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Fast local tripwire only. The authoritative check is the graph scan in
+    // `scripts/check-command-crate-boundaries.py`, which asserts that neither
+    // `codewhale-command-contract` nor `codewhale-secrets` reaches the TUI; this
+    // manifest read just fails sooner when someone edits the manifest by hand.
+    let secrets_manifest = std::fs::read_to_string(concat!(
+        env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"),
+        "/../secrets/Cargo.toml"
+    ))
+    .expect("the shared sanitizer crate manifest must be readable");
+    assert!(
+        !secrets_manifest.contains("codewhale-tui"),
+        "the shared sanitizer crate must not depend on codewhale-tui"
+    );
+
+    // There is no second sanitizer implementation hiding in the portable slice.
+    let production = portable_production_source(export_source);
+    for duplicated in [
+        "fn sanitize_text",
+        "fn redact_json",
+        "fn redact_url_for_display",
+        "fn strip_ansi",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            !production.contains(duplicated),
+            "portable /export must not duplicate {duplicated}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn host_bound_fixtures_stay_outside_the_movable_group() {
+    // FEAT-043 moves `groups/session` into `codewhale-commands`. Real-host
+    // fixtures and the shared recovery writer must therefore stay at the
+    // `commands` root, and the portable slice must not embed host fixtures.
+    let manifest_dir = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
+    for relative in [
+        "src/commands/session_export_regression_tests.rs",
+        "src/commands/session_export_surface_tests.rs",
+        "src/commands/session_export_test_support.rs",
+        "src/commands/session_export_host.rs",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            manifest_dir.join(relative).exists(),
+            "host fixture {relative} must stay outside groups/session"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The baseline-captured export goldens are host-bound (they include the
+    // host-derived metadata and redaction output only the real adapter can
+    // produce), so they must live at the `commands` root with the suites that
+    // consume them rather than inside the movable group.
+    for relative in [
+        "src/commands/fixtures/export_conversation_baseline.md",
+        "src/commands/fixtures/export_turn_baseline.md",
+        "src/commands/fixtures/export_history_fallback_recorded_baseline.md",
+        "src/commands/fixtures/export_correlation_recorded_baseline.md",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            manifest_dir.join(relative).exists(),
+            "baseline golden {relative} must stay outside groups/session"
+        );
+    }
+
+    let export_source = include_str!("groups/session/export.rs");
+    for host_fixture in [
+        "SessionExportAdapter",
+        "ExportHarness",
+        "tempfile",
+        "ClipboardHandler",
+        "SnapshotRepo",
+        "HistoryCell",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            !export_source.contains(host_fixture),
+            "portable /export must not embed the host fixture {host_fixture}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/tui/src/commands/session_export_test_support.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+//! Shared, host-bound test support for the FEAT-025 session-export slice.
+//!
+//! Lives at the `commands` root — outside `groups/session`, which FEAT-043
+//! moves into `codewhale-commands` — so the public-surface and host-regression
+//! suites reuse one implementation instead of drifting copies.
+
+use codewhale_command_contract::handler::ContextParts;
+
+use std::sync::OnceLock;
+
+use regex::Regex;
+
+/// Replace the host-derived `- Exported:` timestamp value so two exports of
+/// identical state compare byte-for-byte. Production timestamp semantics stay
+/// untouched (D3/observable-behavior rule: host metadata derivation is
+/// preserved; tests control comparison, not the adapter).
+pub(crate) fn normalize_export_time(markdown: &str) -> String {
+    let mut normalized = String::with_capacity(markdown.len());
+    for line in markdown.split_inclusive('\n') {
+        if let Some(rest) = line.strip_prefix("- Exported: ") {
+            let newline = if rest.ends_with('\n') { "\n" } else { "" };
+            normalized.push_str("- Exported: <time>");
+            normalized.push_str(newline);
+        } else {
+            normalized.push_str(line);
+        }
+    }
+    normalized
+}
+
+/// Replace the turn-handoff wall-clock generation stamp so a captured golden
+/// compares byte-for-byte.
+///
+/// `turn_handoff_markdown` stamps the header with `generated <now>`; the
+/// renderer itself is TUI-owned and deliberately not migrated (D2), so tests
+/// normalise the stamp instead of changing production timestamp semantics.
+pub(crate) fn normalize_turn_generated_at(markdown: &str) -> String {
+    let mut normalized = String::with_capacity(markdown.len());
+    for line in markdown.split_inclusive('\n') {
+        let trimmed = line.trim_end_matches('\n');
+        let newline = &line[trimmed.len()..];
+        if let Some(head) = trimmed.strip_prefix("_Status: ")
+            && let Some((status, _)) = head.split_once(" \u{b7} generated ")
+        {
+            normalized.push_str("_Status: ");
+            normalized.push_str(status);
+            normalized.push_str(" \u{b7} generated <timestamp>_");
+            normalized.push_str(newline);
+            continue;
+        }
+        normalized.push_str(line);
+    }
+    normalized
+}
+
+/// Normalise the two volatile fields a recorded-restore-point export carries:
+/// the snapshot id (a git SHA over a commit whose date is wall-clock) and the
+/// `Recorded (UTC)` table cell.
+///
+/// Snapshot commits are created with `git commit-tree` and no pinned
+/// author/committer date, so both the SHA and the timestamp change on every run.
+/// Everything else in the document - the table structure, the 12-character id
+/// truncation, the correlation wording, the ambiguity warning, and the
+/// no-match line - is compared verbatim.
+pub(crate) fn normalize_snapshot_identity(markdown: &str) -> String {
+    fn snapshot_id_regex() -> &'static Regex {
+        static RE: OnceLock<Regex> = OnceLock::new();
+        RE.get_or_init(|| Regex::new(r"`[0-9a-f]{12}`").expect("snapshot-id regex"))
+    }
+    fn recorded_time_regex() -> &'static Regex {
+        static RE: OnceLock<Regex> = OnceLock::new();
+        RE.get_or_init(|| {
+            Regex::new(r"\| \d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}Z \|").expect("recorded-time regex")
+        })
+    }
+
+    let with_ids = snapshot_id_regex().replace_all(markdown, "`<snapshot-id>`");
+    recorded_time_regex()
+        .replace_all(&with_ids, "| <recorded> |")
+        .into_owned()
+}
+
+/// Normalisation for a document captured from the recorded-restore-point state:
+/// the export stamp plus the snapshot identity.
+pub(crate) fn normalize_recorded_export(markdown: &str) -> String {
+    normalize_snapshot_identity(&normalize_export_time(markdown))
+}
+
+/// Assert that an envelope built from exactly `SESSION_EXPORT` exposes the
+/// export facet and no other facet.
+///
+/// The exhaustive destructuring is deliberate. `ContextParts` is not
+/// `#[non_exhaustive]`, so adding a facet fails to compile here until the new
+/// slot is classified, and every slot is asserted absent in one place. That
+/// turns the "exposure of no unrelated facet" acceptance criterion into a
+/// structural guarantee rather than a spot-check of a chosen few fields.
+pub(crate) fn assert_only_export_facet_exposed(parts: ContextParts<'_>) {
+    let ContextParts {
+        session,
+        model,
+        cost,
+        mode_policy,
+        system_prompt,
+        skills,
+        workspace,
+        presentation,
+        media,
+        memory,
+        project,
+        skill_group,
+        plugin,
+        lifecycle,
+        control,
+        export,
+    } = parts;
+
+    assert!(export.is_some(), "the export facet must be exposed");
+
+    let unrelated = [
+        ("session", session.is_some()),
+        ("model", model.is_some()),
+        ("cost", cost.is_some()),
+        ("mode_policy", mode_policy.is_some()),
+        ("system_prompt", system_prompt.is_some()),
+        ("skills", skills.is_some()),
+        ("workspace", workspace.is_some()),
+        ("presentation", presentation.is_some()),
+        ("media", media.is_some()),
+        ("memory", memory.is_some()),
+        ("project", project.is_some()),
+        ("skill_group", skill_group.is_some()),
+        ("plugin", plugin.is_some()),
+        ("lifecycle", lifecycle.is_some()),
+        ("control", control.is_some()),
+    ];
+    for (facet, present) in unrelated {
+        assert!(
+            !present,
+            "{facet} must stay unavailable to a SESSION_EXPORT-only envelope"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// The recorded-golden normaliser must replace *only* the wall-clock fields; a
+/// normaliser that over-matched would turn the golden comparison into a
+/// tautology, so pin its exact behaviour.
+#[test]
+fn recorded_golden_normalisers_replace_only_volatile_fields() {
+    let doc = concat!(
+        "- Exported: 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z\n",
+        "\n",
+        "| 1 | `3d0ad76f0222` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | pre-turn:3: Fix the login test |\n",
+        "- Restore points: N1 `3d0ad76f0222` (pre-turn turn 3)\n",
+        "| 2 | `6a3bc0698866` | 2026-09-11T14:39:58Z | tool:call-1 |\n",
+    );
+
+    let out = normalize_recorded_export(doc);
+
+    assert!(out.contains("- Exported: <time>\n"), "{out}");
+    assert!(
+        out.contains("| 1 | `<snapshot-id>` | <recorded> | pre-turn:3: Fix the login test |"),
+        "{out}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        out.contains("- Restore points: N1 `<snapshot-id>` (pre-turn turn 3)"),
+        "{out}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        out.contains("| 2 | `<snapshot-id>` | <recorded> | tool:call-1 |"),
+        "{out}"
+    );
+    // Nothing volatile survives, and nothing static was touched.
+    assert!(!out.contains("3d0ad76f0222"), "{out}");
+    assert!(!out.contains("6a3bc0698866"), "{out}");
+    assert!(!out.contains("2026-09-11T14:39:58Z"), "{out}");
+    assert!(out.contains("pre-turn:3: Fix the login test"), "{out}");
+    assert!(out.contains("(pre-turn turn 3)"), "{out}");
+}

crates/tui/src/tui/clipboard.rs

@@ -1528,8 +1528,27 @@ fi
         perms.set_mode(0o755);
         std::fs::set_permissions(&script, perms).unwrap();
 
-        let text = read_text_with_wlpaste_using_argv(script.to_str().unwrap())
-            .expect("read text through wl-paste helper");
+        // A freshly written helper script can transiently report ETXTBSY
+        // ("Text file busy") when a concurrent test in this parallel suite
+        // forks while the write descriptor is still inherited. Retry the
+        // exec briefly so this assertion exercises the helper contract
+        // rather than the fork/exec window; the bound is load tolerance,
+        // not the behavior under test (same class as #5929).
+        let mut attempts = 0;
+        let text = loop {
+            match read_text_with_wlpaste_using_argv(script.to_str().unwrap()) {
+                Ok(text) => break text,
+                Err(error) => {
+                    attempts += 1;
+                    let busy = error.to_string().contains("Text file busy");
+                    assert!(
+                        busy && attempts < 100,
+                        "read text through wl-paste helper: {error:#}"
+                    );
+                    std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10));
+                }
+            }
+        };
 
         assert_eq!(text, "from-wayland");
     }

crates/tui/src/tui/osc8.rs

@@ -234,18 +234,13 @@ pub fn take_frame_links() -> Vec<LinkRegion> {
     FRAME_LINKS.with(|cell| std::mem::take(&mut *cell.borrow_mut()))
 }
 
-/// Strip every ANSI escape sequence from `s` into `out`, preserving only the
-/// visible characters. ratatui's buffer drops the leading `ESC` byte but
-/// happily paints every other byte of an escape (`[`, `0`, `;`, `m`, OSC
-/// payloads, etc.) into a buffer cell, drifting columns. Tool stdout that
-/// includes ANSI (e.g. `gh`/`git` with color forced on, anything run through
-/// a PTY) must be sanitized before it enters the transcript.
+/// Strip ANSI/OSC/control sequences from `s` into `out`.
 ///
-/// Handles CSI (`ESC [ … final`), OSC (`ESC ] … BEL` or `ESC \`), DCS, SOS,
-/// PM, APC, and standalone two-byte ESC sequences. OSC 8 hyperlink wrappers
-/// (`ESC ] 8 ; … BEL` / `ESC \`) are stripped along with the rest.
+/// Delegates to the single shared implementation in
+/// [`codewhale_secrets::sanitize`] (FEAT-025 D4) so `/export`, `/structcopy`,
+/// and the renderer cannot drift.
 pub fn strip_ansi_into(s: &str, out: &mut String) {
-    strip_ansi_impl(s, out, false);
+    codewhale_secrets::sanitize::strip_ansi_into(s, out);
 }
 
 /// Like [`strip_ansi_into`], but SGR sequences (`ESC [ … m`: colour, bold,
@@ -254,100 +249,16 @@ pub fn strip_ansi_into(s: &str, out: &mut String) {
 /// (including OSC 8 hyperlink wrappers), cursor movement, DCS, lone control
 /// bytes — is still removed; only the styling survives.
 pub fn strip_ansi_keep_sgr_into(s: &str, out: &mut String) {
-    strip_ansi_impl(s, out, true);
-}
-
-fn strip_ansi_impl(s: &str, out: &mut String, keep_sgr: bool) {
-    let bytes = s.as_bytes();
-    let mut i = 0;
-    while i < bytes.len() {
-        if bytes[i] == 0x1b && i + 1 < bytes.len() {
-            let next = bytes[i + 1];
-            match next {
-                // CSI: ESC [ ... <final byte 0x40..=0x7E>
-                b'[' => {
-                    let mut j = i + 2;
-                    let mut final_byte = 0u8;
-                    while j < bytes.len() {
-                        let b = bytes[j];
-                        if (0x40..=0x7e).contains(&b) {
-                            final_byte = b;
-                            j += 1;
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        j += 1;
-                    }
-                    if keep_sgr
-                        && final_byte == b'm'
-                        && let Ok(seq) = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[i..j])
-                    {
-                        out.push_str(seq);
-                    }
-                    i = j;
-                    continue;
-                }
-                // OSC / DCS / SOS / PM / APC: ESC ] | P | X | ^ | _ ... ST(ESC \) or BEL
-                b']' | b'P' | b'X' | b'^' | b'_' => {
-                    let mut j = i + 2;
-                    while j < bytes.len() {
-                        if bytes[j] == 0x07 {
-                            j += 1;
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        if bytes[j] == 0x1b && j + 1 < bytes.len() && bytes[j + 1] == b'\\' {
-                            j += 2;
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        j += 1;
-                    }
-                    i = j;
-                    continue;
-                }
-                // Standalone two-byte ESC sequence (RIS, charset selection, etc.)
-                _ => {
-                    i += 2;
-                    continue;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        // Strip lone control bytes that ratatui would otherwise drop (and which
-        // mean nothing in transcript output) but keep \n, \r, \t as legitimate
-        // formatting.
-        let b = bytes[i];
-        if b < 0x80 {
-            if b < 0x20 && b != b'\n' && b != b'\r' && b != b'\t' {
-                i += 1;
-                continue;
-            }
-            out.push(b as char);
-            i += 1;
-        } else {
-            // UTF-8 multi-byte sequence: copy the whole code point intact.
-            // Pushing `b as char` would mis-decode it as Latin-1 and mangle
-            // non-ASCII text (CJK, accented Latin, emoji, …).
-            let len = utf8_seq_len(b);
-            let end = (i + len).min(bytes.len());
-            if let Ok(chunk) = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[i..end]) {
-                out.push_str(chunk);
-            }
-            i = end;
-        }
-    }
+    codewhale_secrets::sanitize::strip_ansi_keep_sgr_into(s, out);
 }
 
 /// Length in bytes of the UTF-8 sequence that starts with `lead`. Falls back
 /// to `1` for continuation bytes / invalid leads so callers always make
 /// forward progress.
+///
+/// Delegates to the shared implementation in [`codewhale_secrets::sanitize`].
 fn utf8_seq_len(lead: u8) -> usize {
-    if lead < 0xc0 {
-        1
-    } else if lead < 0xe0 {
-        2
-    } else if lead < 0xf0 {
-        3
-    } else {
-        4
-    }
+    codewhale_secrets::sanitize::utf8_seq_len(lead)
 }
 
 /// Strip OSC 8 escape sequences from `s` into `out`, preserving the visible

scripts/check-command-crate-boundaries.py

@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@
 
 Enforces the EPIC-006 boundary contract:
 
-1. `codewhale-command-contract` may not transitively depend on
-   `codewhale-tui` (normal edges, via `cargo metadata`).
+1. `codewhale-command-contract` and `codewhale-secrets` may not transitively
+   depend on `codewhale-tui` (normal edges, via `cargo metadata`).
+   `codewhale-secrets` owns the shared output sanitizer that portable command
+   helpers consume (FEAT-025 D4), so it must stay TUI-free before
+   `codewhale-commands` depends on it.
 2. `codewhale-command-contract` source may not import the concrete `App`,
    widget/renderer/view/event-loop surfaces, or `ratatui`/`crossterm`.
 3. No composite `CommandContext` symbol (supertrait/struct/enum) may exist in
@@ -33,6 +36,13 @@ CONTRACT_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "crates" / "command-contract" / "src"
 CONTRACT_PACKAGE = "codewhale-command-contract"
 FORBIDDEN_TUI_PACKAGE = "codewhale-tui"
 
+# Workspace packages that must stay free of any (normal) path to the TUI. The
+# contract carries the portable shapes; `codewhale-secrets` owns the shared pure
+# sanitizer those shapes' handlers consume. Both are prerequisites for
+# `codewhale-commands` (FEAT-016/043), so a TUI edge here would silently drag
+# the whole TUI into the extracted command crate.
+TUI_FREE_PACKAGES = (CONTRACT_PACKAGE, "codewhale-secrets")
+
 # Import lines that must never appear in the contract (narrowly scoped: real
 # imports only, comments never match because they do not start with `use`).
 FORBIDDEN_IMPORT_PATTERNS = [
@@ -123,24 +133,27 @@ def reaches_tui(package: str, graph: dict[str, set[str]]) -> bool:
 
 
 def check_dependency_graph(graph: dict[str, set[str]]) -> list[BoundaryViolation]:
-    """The prototype contract must not reach codewhale-tui."""
-    if CONTRACT_PACKAGE not in graph:
-        return [
-            BoundaryViolation(
-                "dependency-graph",
-                CONTRACT_PACKAGE,
-                "workspace package missing from the cargo metadata graph",
+    """No TUI-free package may reach codewhale-tui through normal edges."""
+    violations: list[BoundaryViolation] = []
+    for package in TUI_FREE_PACKAGES:
+        if package not in graph:
+            violations.append(
+                BoundaryViolation(
+                    "dependency-graph",
+                    package,
+                    "workspace package missing from the cargo metadata graph",
+                )
             )
-        ]
-    if reaches_tui(CONTRACT_PACKAGE, graph):
-        return [
-            BoundaryViolation(
-                "dependency-graph",
-                CONTRACT_PACKAGE,
-                f"transitively depends on {FORBIDDEN_TUI_PACKAGE}",
+            continue
+        if reaches_tui(package, graph):
+            violations.append(
+                BoundaryViolation(
+                    "dependency-graph",
+                    package,
+                    f"transitively depends on {FORBIDDEN_TUI_PACKAGE}",
+                )
             )
-        ]
-    return []
+    return violations
 
 
 def check_contract_source_text(text: str, display_path: str) -> list[BoundaryViolation]:
@@ -211,8 +224,8 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
             print(f"  {violation}", file=sys.stderr)
         return 1
     print(
-        f"[command-crate-boundaries] PASS: {CONTRACT_PACKAGE} has no "
-        f"{FORBIDDEN_TUI_PACKAGE} edge; "
+        f"[command-crate-boundaries] PASS: "
+        f"{', '.join(TUI_FREE_PACKAGES)} have no {FORBIDDEN_TUI_PACKAGE} edge; "
         "no forbidden import, composite context, or boxed handler in the contract"
     )
     return 0

scripts/test_check_command_crate_boundaries.py

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ def valid_graph() -> dict[str, set[str]]:
     return {
         "codewhale-command-contract": {"codewhale-core"},
         "codewhale-core": set(),
+        "codewhale-secrets": {"codewhale-paths"},
+        "codewhale-paths": set(),
         "codewhale-tui": set(),
     }
 
@@ -46,6 +48,28 @@ class DependencyTests(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(len(violations), 1)
         self.assertIn("missing", str(violations[0]))
 
+    def test_missing_sanitizer_fails(self) -> None:
+        graph = valid_graph()
+        del graph["codewhale-secrets"]
+        violations = mod.check_dependency_graph(graph)
+        self.assertEqual(len(violations), 1)
+        self.assertIn("codewhale-secrets", str(violations[0]))
+
+    def test_sanitizer_reaching_tui_fails(self) -> None:
+        # The shared sanitizer is consumed by portable command helpers, so a TUI
+        # edge would pull the whole TUI into the extracted command crate.
+        graph = valid_graph()
+        graph["codewhale-paths"].add("codewhale-tui")
+        violations = mod.check_dependency_graph(graph)
+        self.assertEqual(len(violations), 1)
+        self.assertIn("codewhale-secrets", str(violations[0]))
+
+    def test_both_packages_reaching_tui_fails_twice(self) -> None:
+        graph = valid_graph()
+        graph["codewhale-core"].add("codewhale-tui")
+        graph["codewhale-paths"].add("codewhale-tui")
+        self.assertEqual(len(mod.check_dependency_graph(graph)), 2)
+
     def test_dev_dependency_is_not_a_normal_edge(self) -> None:
         metadata = {"packages": [
             {"name": "codewhale-command-contract", "dependencies": [
@@ -53,6 +77,7 @@ class DependencyTests(unittest.TestCase):
                 {"name": "codewhale-core", "kind": None},
             ]},
             {"name": "codewhale-core", "dependencies": []},
+            {"name": "codewhale-secrets", "dependencies": []},
             {"name": "codewhale-tui", "dependencies": []},
         ]}
         graph = mod.dependency_graph(metadata)