Files
CodeWhale Bot 88fd50d7c9 feat(plugins): update reviewed DSH compatibility to rc.5 [skip ci]
Use founder-selected DSH 0.2.1-rc.5 and Cordis 4.0.5. Refresh vendored
loader/include/group and pure hook helpers, npm pins, provenance and license
notices. Retain reviewed imports, non-writing composition and the explicitly
older preset adapter; Engine remains the only execution/prompt authority.

Compatibility v3 groups the same 17 injectable names into DSH, Cordis and
Codewhale sources. Boolean deferLoading is a no-op hint; non-booleans and when
are refused. A direct probe caught the inherited when acceptance gap and
verified its repair. The changed compatibility digest requires fresh Native
plugin review/trust; no live trust state was edited.

Local checks: typecheck/build pass; Node 413 pass, 7 skip; Bun 414 pass,
6 skip. Four direct admission/execution probes pass on each runtime. Twenty-five
vendored source/candidate hash pairs verified, plus unchanged built-in hashes
and the copied Rust compatibility asset. Native batch: 354/357 initially pass;
two goal goldens and stale notice headings repaired, then 3/3 affected checks
pass using the same binaries. Four metric tests pass; 55 budgets match exactly.
Engine/TUI/plugins clippy --tests passes, fmt and blocking/dead-code budgets
pass. Frozen native inputs remained unchanged. Six JS compiled-image cases
and two Rust compiled-image cases remain unqualified; native test-link unwind
warnings remain. No hosted CI, live-provider call or release qualification.

CW-7054. Receipts: artifacts/dsh-upgrade-takeover-20261031/REPORT.md.
2026-10-31 19:06:40 -07:00

41 KiB

Writing an extension tool or command

The experimental TypeScript extension host runs reviewed plugin code in a shared Node process (or, as an opt-in, Bun). Rust still owns sessions, tool admission, approval and execution. Extensions currently contribute tools and slash commands; they cannot provide an approval service, run a second agent loop or replace built-in tools or commands.

Quick start

Start with hello-extension and its plugin.json. The example is executed unchanged by the host tests. It returns a greeting and does not read files or use the network.

  1. Explicitly enable [features] extension_host = true in your configuration, or start Codewhale with codewhale --enable extension_host (the flag goes before any subcommand).
  2. Install the example's directory using /plugin install <local-directory>.
  3. Run /plugin validate hello-extension, then /plugin show hello-extension.
  4. Run /plugin enable hello-extension to open its content/capability review. Read the review and personally run its exact /plugin trust <token> command, then enable the plugin. Trust alone does not execute the code.
  5. Ask Codewhale to use hello_greet. The tool follows the normal approval gate.
  6. Run /hello-greet Codewhale. The command runs when you type it, and shows its answer in the transcript with its origin, extension:hello-extension.

An authoring agent should stop after installation and validation and present the review to the person. Do not trust or enable a bundle automatically.

Locations, installation and trust

User bundles live under ~/.codewhale/plugins/; workspace bundles live under <workspace>/.codewhale/plugins/. New bundles use Agent Plugins v1.0.0 plugin.json. Declare extensions["net.codewhale"].native.path as one regular .mjs, .js or .mts file inside the bundle. Directories and other extensions fail validation when the host is enabled. With the flag off, native entries remain inventory-only.

A plugin may split its code across several entries with native.paths (up to 64, alone or beside path). They are activated in the order declared, as the fibers of one plugin: they share one owner, so one disable, review change or crash tears all of them down together. Each entry is a separate module with its own apply, and tool and command names must be unique across them. If an entry fails to activate (throws, requires a service the host does not provide, or has a registration refused), only that entry is withdrawn: entries that already activated stay registered, later entries still activate, and the plugin fails only when no entry activates. Listing the same file twice is one entry.

Runtime

[extension_host] runtime selects what runs the host. Node is the default. Bun is an opt-in: it is qualified on macOS only, and becomes the default only after an explicit, recorded cutover.

[extension_host]
runtime = "node"   # default: Node only
# runtime = "bun"  # Bun only; fails rather than falling back to Node
# runtime = "auto" # Bun >= 1.4.0 if one is found and starts, otherwise Node
# bun = "~/.bun/bin/bun"          # the only Bun tried when set
# node = "/opt/homebrew/bin/node" # the only Node tried when set
# mcp_backend = "rust" # temporary opt-out; default is "host"

The default mcp_backend = "host" uses the pinned MCP SDK independently of [features] extension_host, which controls optional Native extensions. Existing stdio and HTTP servers use modern discovery when supported; explicitly configured legacy SSE servers use their legacy handshake. Rust retains process and network authority, credential resolution, catalog admission, tool approval and cancellation. The SDK receives opaque session selectors and exact operation grants. Modern requests carry Rust-approved protocol metadata and headers without a session id.

A typed discovery refusal can admit a legacy handshake. Only an explicit HTTP transport refusal during that handshake can admit legacy SSE with a fresh exact Rust grant. Legacy HTTP retains its GET preflight and bounded OAuth refresh; modern HTTP does not inherit those session or resend behaviors. Incomplete result flows are reported without automatically repeating the operation. Credentials, configured URLs, OAuth browser/login operations and Computer Use decision keys stay in Rust.

Both backends share recorded semantic MCP goldens and retain separate transport goldens, including discovery, authentication and session evidence. The Host default requires those fixtures and the actual broker acceptance checks, plus the platform isolation and measured gates in Ops CURRENT_DECISIONS §26. An explicit mcp_backend = "rust" remains available for one release after the qualified default flip, before the native protocol adapters retire. Missing or unsupported Node uses the existing doctor runtime diagnostic. Host failures never select Rust automatically.

The stock finance, data and speech adapters have independent experimental flags: [features] finance_host = true, data_host = true and speech_host = true. Each defaults to Rust. Speech preparation is shared by CLI speech/tts and the model tools; clone samples, provider requests and output writes stay in Rust. Selecting either uses the pinned Builtin harness and its existing operation broker, even when Native extensions are disabled. Rust retains network/file access, parsing diagnostics and permissions. A selected Host failure is reported; it never silently switches to the Rust adapter.

Node must satisfy ^22.19 || >=24; Bun must be 1.4.0 or newer. Leaving runtime unset means node, except that a table which sets only bun means bun. A configured node or bun path is the only candidate for that runtime: if it does not run or is below the floor, the host fails with that reason instead of searching PATH. Without one, every node (or bun, then $BUN_INSTALL/bin, default ~/.bun/bin) on PATH is tried in order, and one inside a node_modules directory or the working directory is skipped without being run; set the path explicitly to use such a runtime. The working-directory check does not apply when Codewhale starts in a directory that contains your home directory, such as ~ or /.

Under auto, if the Bun it found fails to start the host, /plugin reports why once and Node runs the host for the rest of the session. The runtime is pinned once a host on it completes its handshake, and restarts reuse it. A runtime binary replaced at that path mid-session is refused; restart Codewhale to use it. codewhale doctor and /plugin show which runtime runs the host, its version and path, how its memory cap is enforced, and, when auto used Node, why Bun was not used.

When the host cannot take a call, /plugin and the failing extension tool call give the same reason: not started, starting, unresponsive, restarting after a crash (with how it exited), failed to start or out of crash budget (with the reason; change or reload a plugin to retry), or disabled by config. Every call into the host has a deadline, 120 s for a tool call; past it Codewhale cancels the call, reports a timeout, and the host keeps serving other calls. A plugin that ignores cancellation keeps running inside the host until the host is torn down.

Write extensions for both runtimes. Use Node's APIs (Bun implements them) and only erasable TypeScript in .mts. Enums, decorators and syntax that needs transformation require a separate author build to JavaScript. Bun would accept more, but Node would not. Node never reads a tsconfig.json for the host. Bun does: a tsconfig.json next to or above an extension's files applies its paths, baseUrl and JSX settings to that extension's imports, so an import that resolves under Bun can fail under Node. Do not rely on it. Known limit: that includes a tsconfig.json in a directory above the reviewed bundle, which is not part of what you reviewed. See Node's TypeScript rules. Under Bun the host runs with --no-install: a missing package fails the import; it is never downloaded.

Reviewed DSH compositions admit every local module against its recorded path and SHA-256 before importing it. Node checks runtime resolution; Bun prepares the reviewed JavaScript syntax and checks computed imports before they run. Unreviewed files and ambient package imports are refused. Bun currently cannot preserve query/fragment module identity, and computed CommonJS resolution also requires Node. These cases stop with a diagnostic: select [extension_host] runtime = "node" for that composition. Ordinary UTF-8 source and reviewed computed file/JSON imports work on both runtimes.

Extensions cannot run native code inside the host. On both runtimes process.dlopen, process.execve and Worker threads are unavailable (a Worker is a new JavaScript realm that would start without these restrictions). Under Bun, bun:ffi, Bun.FFI, bun:sqlite, node:sqlite and ShadowRealm are unavailable too; under Node, node:sqlite and node:ffi are switched off (SQLite extensions and FFI load native libraries). The host refuses to start when one of these restrictions does not hold on the installed runtime. Known limit: these are the native-code entry points found so far (Bun 1.4, Node 22 and 26); one a newer runtime adds is not covered until it is added. A process an extension starts is outside this policy; on macOS and Linux it runs under the same sandbox as the host. Include local imports in the bundle; trust stages reviewed content, and the entry is rehashed before import. Changes to reviewed bytes or capabilities require another review. See bundle rules.

Imports and services

Export a Cordis plugin function or an object with apply. The host supplies one shared Cordis and the supported DSH compatibility services. The example's inject = ['tools', 'commands'] asks for the tool and command registries. The supplied service names are tools, commands, prompt, storage, skills, shellHooks, avatars, mcp, logger, events, reflect and registry. ctx.avatars.registerPack({path}) registers a reviewed bundle-relative avatar pack; see the whale-avatar example. A tool can ask the core to run a core tool through exec.core (see Asking the core to run a tool); Reviewed Native entries can propose MCP definitions through ctx.mcp as described below. Programmable pre-execute listeners use ctx.on as described below. A required service that is unavailable fails activation with a diagnostic.

Package runtime dependencies and local imports within the reviewed bundle. Do not install packages or fetch code during activation. Register cleanup through ctx.effect; asynchronous disposers are awaited with a deadline.

ctx.prompt.registerSection({ id, text }) contributes an attributed plain-text section and returns its disposer. Rust delivers the complete current snapshot as a user-role runtime message; changes replace earlier snapshots and an empty snapshot explicitly withdraws earlier sections. Rust admits sections only for the caller's live reviewed owners, sorts them by owner/id, and withdraws them on unregister, disable, revoke or host exit. Each section is limited to 4 KiB UTF-8 text, each owner to 32 KiB and 128 sections, and the host to 128 KiB and 1,024 sections. The final attributed prompt has the same 128 KiB limit. IDs use lower-case letters, digits, _ and -, start with a letter, and contain at most 64 characters. Duplicate owner-local IDs require disposing the earlier section first. The author cannot replace the core system prompt or select another session's sections.

To interpolate Core's accepted turn facts, register {id, text, interpolate: 'model-cwd'}. Only {{model}} and {{cwd}} are supported; Rust expands them once when it captures the turn's prompt. Literal sections retain braces unchanged. Both source and expanded text must fit the section and snapshot limits. Scoped contributions keep their exact selected entry identity through capture and withdrawal. The fixed DSH persona bridge uses this path for additive prefix/suffix text; complete prompt replacement and runtime-context suppression are refused.

Reviewed DSH compositions can register Claude Code and Codex command hooks through shellHooks. Codewhale's existing fifteen firepoints use the same pinned Builtin runner and Rust-owned process driver when the host feature is enabled. Rust retains hook approval, process environment and final verdicts; ShellEnv values remain in Rust. Forced continuation, observer steering, noncommand hooks and asynchronous dialect commands are unsupported and reported explicitly. A Native hook's allow cannot approve a tool.

ctx.storage.get(key), set(key, json) and delete(key) persist owner-local JSON under the dataDir Rust assigned. The API refuses access once owner disposal begins, symlinked storage, corrupt data and writes that exceed its bounded key/value/owner limits. It does not expose session history or secrets. Tool and command invocations also expose frozen sessionId, agentId and originTurnId strings when Rust supplies them for that particular call. Tool invocations with an authoritative session and workspace also expose frozen exec.agent.id and exec.agent.session.header.cwd; root identity uses the session id and a child uses its supplied agent id. The projection has no methods and retaining it grants no operations after the invocation ends.

An entry injecting sessions can call ctx.sessions.flush(exec.agent.session) while its directly invoked root tool holds an Engine checkpoint ticket. The argument must be that invocation's exact session object. The Engine captures its committed prefix and waits for the owning Runtime, terminal, or exec store to acknowledge persistence. Runtime retains its existing receipt-secret redaction policy; success describes that persisted projection. It does not include the running tool's future result or the plugin's separate journal. Runtime recovery retains later tool results without replaying the tool. Checkpoint-bearing Runtime turns require schema version 5; older readers refuse them rather than silently reconstructing incomplete history.

false is reserved for a deliberately ephemeral host with no persistence backend. Missing authority, foreign or expired handles, child checkpoints, superseded writes, storage failure, cancellation and unavailable consumers reject. Cancellation can race a disk write, so a rejected call does not prove nothing was written. Other sessions methods remain unsupported.

An entry injecting subagents can start one independent child agent from its directly invoked root tool. ctx.subagents.getProvider('spawn') describes the only provider: a fresh child with no inherited conversation. ctx.subagents.startActivation({ provider: 'spawn', childId, request: { parent: exec.agent, prompt, agentOptions: { model } }, signal, delivery }) runs the entry's own agent/created listeners first. There the child's ctx.systemPrompt.section({ name: PERSONA_PREFIX_SECTION, ... }) sets a persona of at most 32 KiB, appended to that child's own system prompt and recorded in its launch manifest. ctx.tools.restrict({ deny }) adds to the tools the child may not use. Then the Engine starts the child as an ordinary agent start through this turn's approval gate. The plugin's call needs its own approval and never reuses the model's grants. The child runs in Codewhale's existing sub-agent manager inside the parent's permission and budget limits. The returned activation resolves once the child accepted its first message. result waits for the child to finish and returns its text output and stop reason. dispose() stops that exact child and its own descendants. delivery: 'caller' hands the result only to the plugin, not to the parent model. A child the plugin never disposes is stopped when the invocation ends. ctx.tools.get(name, exec.agent) reports whether the calling agent has a tool. Prompts are text only. Only the model agent option is accepted. The service is unavailable inside a child agent's own tool calls. Non-text output and the other DSH agent APIs are not supported, and agents and root-level systemPrompt offer no methods.

MCP definitions

ctx.mcp.registerServer({ serverName, server }) returns an idempotent disposer and proposes a literal MCP definition to the existing Rust catalog. Include mcp in the entry's inject list. Rust owns transport connections, tool admission, permissions and authentication; this service does not expose credentials or grant extensions direct process or network access.

Definitions retain their exact reviewed, selected Native entry receipt. The limits are 64 servers per owner, 256 per host and 64 KiB per definition. Literal stdio, streamable HTTP and SSE definitions are supported by the bridge; credential values, endpoint query data and unsupported startup/reconnect controls are refused. Disposing an entry, changing its caller selection, disabling its plugin or changing reviewed bytes withdraws its definitions and cancels affected calls. An uncertain write is never replayed.

The raw DSH skill-filesystem bridge uses the same reviewed skill-root service below. Its configuration must explicitly set includeDefaultRoots: false and watch: false, and list bundle-relative customSkillDirs. Ambient filesystem roots and independent watchers remain unsupported.

Skill roots

ctx.skills.registerRoot({ path: 'profiles/review-skills' }) returns an idempotent disposer and contributes reviewed instructions to Rust's existing skill catalog. Include skills in the entry's inject list. For example:

export const inject = ['skills']
export function apply(ctx) {
  ctx.skills.registerRoot({ path: 'profiles/review-skills' })
}

Place each skill in a child package directory such as profiles/review-skills/quick-check/SKILL.md. Paths are bundle-relative, at most 512 UTF-8 bytes, with normal slash-separated components. Absolute paths, links, empty components, . and .. are refused. Rust parses only files covered by the reviewed bundle inventory, through the existing frontmatter and invocation contract. The existing nesting rules apply: hidden child directories are skipped, and a package containing SKILL.md claims its nested examples. An invalid skill or an empty root refuses admission. Native review covers this registration; the entry does not need a separate declarative Skills component.

Pending and admitted roots count toward the host shim's limits: 8 roots per owner and 64 per host. Rust stops each root proposal at 128 candidate SKILL.md files or 4 MiB of raw input. Retained instruction fields are also limited to 128 skills / 4 MiB per owner and 1,024 skills / 32 MiB per host. These are logical catalog limits. Duplicate owner-local root paths require disposing the earlier root first.

Disposal, disable, revocation and host exit remove the root from later discovery. Loading a selected skill rechecks the reviewed Native receipt and the live registration. Queued selections also recheck it; selections saved before a process or host restart require selecting the skill again. Completed session history remains the record of instructions already used. Roots have no watcher, companion-file access or tool permission grant; core approval and sandbox policy continue to apply.

Tool rules

Register a unique name with ctx.tools.register, a description, a JSON object input schema and an execute(input, exec) function. Names start with a letter, contain only letters, digits, _ and -, and are at most 64 characters. Use a plugin-specific prefix, such as hello_greet. Core names, core approval-name families, and mcp_/ext_ prefixes are reserved. Refusals explain the rule.

Every extension tool is Required and never treated as read-only based on a plugin's claim. Full Access, Bypass or an exact session grant for the reviewed plugin receipt may satisfy that requirement without another prompt. Tools are deferred by default; [tools].always_load can pin a tool through the normal tool configuration. Registration never grants permission to execute it.

The core checks every call's input against that schema (JSON Schema, draft 2020-12 unless the schema names another) before it asks for approval and again before anything is sent to the host, so additionalProperties: false, required, types and bounds hold even when execute does not check them. A call that fails is returned to the model as an invalid-input error naming what to correct, and the host never sees it. A schema that cannot be compiled (an invalid keyword value, or a $ref to anything outside the schema itself; nothing is fetched) is refused at registration, which fails activation with the reason. Declare the narrowest schema you can: it is both what the model sees and what is enforced.

Return a JSON value or text; the host renders it into ordinary tool output. Avoid secrets in descriptions, logs and results. An approval card's wording and identity come from Rust, never from plugin-supplied labels.

For DSH definitions with output, declare both output.schema and output.render. The host validates the canonical JSON result before rendering it. This adapter currently accepts plain text blocks only; unsupported rich content or extra block fields produce an explicit error instead of disappearing. A boolean deferLoading is accepted as a presentation hint; the Engine keeps its existing tool-loading policy. Non-boolean values are refused. Nonempty registration options, when, projectContent, finalizeContent and timeoutMs remain unsupported and are refused. The shared compatibility.json pins the definition API to DSH 0.2.1-rc.5 and records service, row-bridge and module mappings. Its bytes participate in Native content and capability review, so changing the compatibility contract invalidates prior trust.

Successful and soft-failure tool results carry Rust-stamped extension metadata identifying the plugin, reviewed content, entry, generation, caller selection, handle and process boot. Plugin-supplied output cannot choose this identity.

Command rules

Register a slash command with ctx.commands.register, which returns an idempotent disposer (the registration is also removed when the plugin unloads):

ctx.commands.register({
  name: 'hello-greet',            // /hello-greet
  description: 'Greet someone.',  // one line, shown in the palette and /help
  argumentHint: '[name]',         // optional; a command with a hint waits in
                                  // the composer for arguments
  handler({ args, signal }) {
    return { kind: 'success', text: `Hello, ${args || 'world'}!` }
  },
})

Names are lower case, start with a letter and use only a-z, 0-9, _ and - (at most 64 characters). A command can never take the name of a built-in command (or one of its aliases) or of another plugin's command: the registration is refused, activation fails, and the reason is in /plugin. A user, workspace or plugin-manifest markdown command with the same name wins the spelling and the extension command is left out of the registry. Descriptions (1 KiB) and hints (256 bytes) are single-line text.

A handler runs only when the user types the command; invoking it is the user's own action and needs no approval. It can only return an answer:

  • a string, or { kind: 'success', text? }: shown in the transcript;
  • { kind: 'error', text } or a thrown error: shown as a failure;
  • { kind: 'submit', prompt, text? }: prompt enters the ordinary turn with Runtime provenance and visible plugin attribution. Every model tool call is gated as usual. text is shown beside the prompt.

The handler cannot call the model, a tool or approval. Output is stripped of terminal escape sequences and cut at 64 KiB; a prompt over 128 KiB is refused, not truncated. A command has 30 seconds: past it Codewhale cancels the call (signal aborts) and reports a timeout. If the host is down, the command fails at once with why.

args is what follows the command name, trimmed. The invocation also carries signal, a commandId and an empty attachments. DSH plugins using ctx.commands.register({ name, description, input: { hint }, handler }) and returning { kind: 'success' | 'error', text } run unchanged, including import { CommandDefinitionId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-commands/brand' (the only dsh-commands import the host resolves; definitionId is accepted and ignored). DSH's rawInput is provided (it keeps the leading separator, ' name'). When Rust supplies the caller session, invocation.agent exposes its read-only id and followup(message). A handler may capture exactly one JSON user message with a bounded id, a source containing only kind, and one plain text content block. Successful completion converts it to the same Submit result; an error result, cancellation or exception never submits it. Explicit Submit plus followup, multiple messages, attachments, empty text and text above 128 KiB are refused. The handle closes when the invocation settles. Core owns the resulting turn identity and provenance; this is not a general agent service or persistence of the supplied DSH message identity. Missing caller context refuses access.

Not provided: attachments (input.attachments: true fails activation), a list/find/ execute surface, and DSH command lifecycle events. The Runtime API records Codewhale command admission, completion and cancellation in its existing event store.

Thread snapshots also include bounded command_receipts for the most recent 100 terminal commands that did not submit a turn. Each receipt has a stable identity, completion time, status, text and extension attribution. This is a projection of the existing event log; reopening a native App conversation can display the result without rerunning a command or adding it to model history.

Runtime API and native App

Read GET /v1/commands?thread_id=<id> to discover commands for that thread's workspace and plugin selection. Extension entries have kind and binding set to extension, an origin and an opaque registration_id. A listing without a thread has no invocable registration identity.

Submit name, args, registration_id, operation_key and expected_workspace to POST /v1/threads/<id>/commands. Reuse the same operation key only for the exact same request. A completed retry returns the stored outcome; a pending or uncertain invocation is never executed again. GET /v1/threads/<id>/commands/<operation_key> reads the result. If a recorded invocation has lost its worker, lookup settles an explicit uncertain outcome and recovers any admitted turn without rerunning the callback. DELETE requests cancellation, including cancellation before admission and interruption of an associated active turn. A stale registration or changed workspace requires discovering and selecting again.

The Engine admits a returned prompt through its ordinary turn lifecycle with Runtime provenance. TUI and App present it as attributed plugin input and exclude it from ordinary human recall, edit and retry. Clients must not resubmit that prompt. Results include the accepted turn when present and the exact extension receipt. The native App uses these routes for its command palette and slash input, preserves edited drafts and refreshes the catalog after plugin changes and reconnects.

Execution context

A tool's execute(input, exec) gets, in exec:

  • signal, the call's cancellation signal; check it and propagate it to asynchronous operations;
  • callId, which identifies the call, and args, its input (also the first argument);
  • workspace, the root path of the workspace of the session that made the call, and no other (it is absent only if that path is not valid UTF-8);
  • dataDir, the plugin's own directory;
  • core, only while the call runs under the turn's permission gate: exec.core.call.

A command's handler gets workspace (where the user ran it) and dataDir in its invocation beside args, signal and commandId. All of these are read-only strings (exec and the invocation are frozen). Nothing else about the machine is passed: no home directory, no other workspace, no credential path. A call id or plugin trust grants no new privileges.

The workspace is where the call comes from, so read it per call: one host serves every session in the Codewhale process, and a tool called from another workspace sees that one. The host process's working directory is its data directory, not the caller's workspace; do not use process.chdir in this shared process, and resolve relative paths against exec.workspace yourself. Reading a workspace file is your code's own filesystem access, under the host's sandbox, not something the core checks per file.

dataDir is ~/.codewhale/extension-host/data/plugins/<name>-<id>, created by Codewhale (mode 0700 on Unix) before the plugin activates, and the same directory for every generation and every entry of that plugin, so it keeps files across restarts and updates. It sits inside the host's one writable root, which is where the sandbox allows writes. It is not a boundary between plugins: they share a process, and one can write into another's directory. Codewhale never deletes it, including on uninstall.

Configuration

A user configures a plugin in their own config.toml, keyed by the plugin's manifest name:

[plugins."hello-extension".config]
greeting = "Howdy"

That table is delivered as the second argument of apply(ctx, config) ({} when there is none). If the entry module exports a Config schema (import Schema from '@deepseek-ai/schemastery'; export const Config = Schema.object({ ... })), the host validates the table against it before apply runs, applies its defaults, and a mismatch fails activation with the reason, so the plugin only ever sees a config its own schema accepts. Every entry of a multi-entry plugin gets the same table and checks it against its own Config. hello.mts reads one such setting.

  • It is the user's data, not part of what was reviewed: the user can change it without a new trust review, which is why only the user's config can set it (a project's .codewhale/config.toml cannot).
  • Plain TOML values only (a date-time is refused), at most 16 KiB serialized and 16 levels deep. A table over a limit fails that plugin's activation with the reason, in /plugin show; it is never delivered cut short.
  • /plugin show <name> lists the configured keys (not the values) and says when the config is refused. Do not put a secret in it: the plugin's code reads every value, and so does any other plugin in the shared process.
  • Codewhale reads [plugins] at start, and again at /plugin reload (or any plugin command that changes plugins). A plugin whose table changed is revoked and activated again as a new generation, with the new values; one whose table did not change is left alone. A file that cannot be read keeps the previous settings.

Programmable tool admission

A reviewed native mod may register ctx.on('tools/pre-execute', async (exec, next) => ...). The frozen call view carries name, callId, arguments, signal, workspace, mode, and model. It has no session, agent, tool, or approval handle. next() returns an abstention; Rust evaluates the remaining listeners and gates.

Return {kind:'deny', reason}, {kind:'ask', reason?}, {kind:'revise', input} (a JSON object), {kind:'annotate', text}, or {kind:'abstain'}. undefined also abstains. DSH-shaped allow is an abstention and logs a warning once per owner. A malformed answer, thrown error, timeout, or withdrawn owner fails the call closed. The listener batch has a five-second deadline and observes cancellation through exec.signal.

Native hooks run first, then mod listeners in core registration order. Denial always wins; the last accepted input revision wins. Rust re-prepares revised arguments and reruns the existing authority, policy, and approval checks. Input revisions use the existing 32 KiB hook limit; context and reasons use the existing sanitizers. Unloading a fiber removes its listener, and disabling or revoking an owner retires its admitted handles before host teardown. Other workspaces do not receive the call.

This bridge runs on Engine sessions, including model tools, gated code-mode calls, and exec.core calls. The standalone ACP execution path has no TypeScript host attachment. Prepend/global listener ordering, DSH runtime/agent handles, around-execution wrappers, and post-result rewriting are not provided. Native tool_call_after remains an observer contract.

Asking the core to run a tool

A tool can ask the core to run one of the core's tools for it:

async execute({ path }, exec) {
  if (!exec.core) return { error: 'not run under the turn gate' }
  try {
    const { content, isError, structured } = await exec.core.call('read', { path })
    return { content, isError }
  } catch (error) {
    // error.name === 'CoreCallError'; error.code is 'refused' | 'denied' |
    // 'cancelled' | 'unavailable' | 'failed'
    return { error: error.code, message: error.message }
  }
}

The call is planned and approved exactly like a call the model makes: the allow and deny lists, hooks, Auto-Review, repo law, the worker authority envelope and the approval card all apply. You never decide any of that. There is no way to approve, to supply a card's text, an argv, a URL or a ticket. Rust composes the card ("Requested by extension:<plugin> from inside its tool <tool>") and decides whether one is shown.

When exec.core exists. Only when the model called your tool directly and the turn loop is serving its permission gate for that call. It is absent for a command, a timer, activation code, and a tool run from inside execute_tools (code mode gives nested tools no gate); the core refuses a core/call from any of them. It also ends with the call: when your execute returns, fails, times out or is cancelled, or your plugin is disabled, or the host exits, pending core calls are cancelled and a waiting approval card is withdrawn (recorded as cancelled; an answer given afterwards changes nothing). Cancelling your exec.signal cancels them too, and call(name, input, {signal}) can cancel one.

Refused outright (error.code === 'refused', nothing runs, no card): every tool code mode refuses (execute_tools, the interpreters, agent, workflow, rlm, request_user_input, interactive shells, sandbox escalation, Computer Use consent and scripts, MCP sign-in); any extension tool, yours included (no recursion); tool search and tool-result retrieval; the memory writer (remember) and tools that change what the session may do or schedule work (request_plugin_install, goals, automations, send_later, starting MCP servers); and every MCP tool, Computer Use included (not in v1). Names match case-insensitively and after the core resolves aliases and after any hook rewrites the call.

What prompts. Every call needs approval except a read-only, workspace-local tool from a short list (read, read_file, list_dir, file_search, grep_files) when nothing else asks for one. Your plugin's own approvals are separate: the user approved your tool, not what it asks the core to do. Approval keys are scoped to your plugin build: a grant the user gave the model for a tool never covers your call of it, and a grant for your call never covers the model's. Shell and network calls force a prompt: a session grant is not consulted. Ask and Full Access both ask the user every time; explicit session denials still refuse the call. Auto-Review and Never refuse it without opening a card. In Full Access every other call an extension makes is auto-approved, as it is for the model. error.code === 'denied' is the user's "no": do not retry it.

Limits, per invocation: 50 core calls in all, 4 at once, and one approval card at a time; per host, 256 requests in flight. A host that presents invalid tickets in a burst is ended as a protocol violation. Your tool/call deadline (120 s) stops while a core call waits on an approval card. The result is the tool's text (content) and, when it was JSON, the parsed value (structured); a long one is cut with a note, and images are dropped. What your tool asked the core to run is recorded (bounded) in your tool result's core_calls metadata, with each call's decision and outcome.

Lifecycle, diagnostics and restarts

Use /plugin show <name> for that plugin's owner state, live tool names and up to 20 recent retained diagnostic messages. The host retains a bounded 64-entry shared diagnostic ring; this view is not a persistent per-plugin log. Warnings, errors, activation/refusal/fault messages and teardown outcomes are attributed to the plugin when known. Display text is escaped. /plugin list includes overall host health and bounded diagnostics.

Do not block the event loop. Heartbeats mark an unanswered host Unresponsive after 3 seconds and kill it after 10 seconds. Unexpected exits restart with a short backoff; the third crash within 5 minutes stops automatic recovery. Opening another engine does not reset that budget. Explicit plugin changes or reload retry deliberately. Launch failures also allow a newly attached engine to retry after a one-minute cooldown.

Recovery verifies current attachments and persisted trust again, then creates fresh owner tokens and tool handles. Outstanding calls fail and are never replayed; failed/faulted receipts remain suppressed until explicit retry or changed authority. Two dirty teardowns within 10 minutes request maintenance when active calls finish. This restart preserves the unexpected-crash budget. Dispose within 2 seconds and avoid leaving background work behind.

Sandbox

Trust is not a complete security boundary. Native plugins share one process and data-access cohort and can interfere with each other. Owner labels and JavaScript method locks do not isolate mutually untrusted plugins.

Native hosts use a positive filesystem-read policy on macOS Seatbelt and Linux bubblewrap (/usr/bin/bwrap). Grants cover the selected runtime and required system files, the host bundle, Core-managed reviewed snapshot stores, and the Native data/private temporary directories. Ordinary workspace files, including project .env files, are outside those grants. Child processes inherit the same boundary. Direct network access is denied; writes stay in the Native data and private temporary directories. The general shell profile's Cargo, npm and Darwin cache write grants do not apply to this Native profile.

Snapshot-store grants include other reviewed snapshots in the shared Native cohort, not just the currently selected entry. They do not grant repository access. A plugin that directly runs git over the user's project therefore needs a separately scoped operation bridge before it can work in this profile.

Native extensions require a verified OS wrapper at each launch. On Linux, missing bwrap or a failed namespace probe refuses Native activation and reports the concrete error. Windows uses the existing LPAC filesystem/network wrapper and refuses Native activation when that wrapper cannot be established. Source support is not evidence of platform or bundled-artifact qualification. The pinned Builtin tier retains an explicitly diagnosed unsandboxed exception; every effect still requires Rust operation tickets. That exception does not qualify Native extensions or the mandatory-host/default-runtime cutover. Planning creates the sibling Builtin data directory before masking it for Native launch. Review the current design limits before enabling third-party code.

Limits

The host process has a 1 GiB memory cap. On Linux it is RLIMIT_DATA (or a lower hard limit Codewhale itself inherited) and on Windows the Job Object's per-process limit, so an allocation past it fails; both also apply to each process an extension starts. Those two have been tested with a Node host only. On macOS the Bun host applies a jetsam limit to itself before any extension loads, and the kernel kills it past the cap; processes it starts are not covered. A Node host on macOS has no kernel limit: Codewhale checks its resident size at each 3-second heartbeat and kills it past the cap. Under Node the JavaScript heap is also limited to 256 MiB. The host has a 32 MiB frame limit, 256 in-flight request limit (plus a reserved heartbeat), 128 tools per owner and 1024 per host, and 64 commands per owner and 256 per host. Tool descriptions are at most 4 KiB and schemas 64 KiB. Tool calls have a 120-second deadline and commands a 30-second one. The feature stays Experimental and off by default; local fixture tests do not establish sandbox parity, provider behavior or release readiness.