mirror of
https://github.com/esengine/DeepSeek-Reasonix.git
synced 2026-11-07 10:45:59 -10:00
YHH
23f0a011c4
A workspace's reasonix.toml and .reasonix/settings.json are read as
untrusted input.
- [sandbox]: bash may only move to enforce and network only to false;
forbid_read and denied_domains add to the user's; allow_write entries
and workspace_root apply only when they resolve inside the workspace.
${VAR} in sandbox and proxy paths expands from the process environment
only.
- [permissions] mode, allow and allow_dynamic_bash, [network] proxy
settings and [desktop] default_tool_approval_mode are read from the
user config only; deny and ask add to the user's. An "always allow"
given in a workspace is stored under the Reasonix home
(project-grants.json) rather than in the checkout.
- Programs a workspace declares (hooks, language servers, providers,
tools.search.rg_path, tools.shell.path, [browser], tools.system_one
endpoints and the local Laya runtime) run only once approved for that
folder. An approval records the declaration and a digest of the files
it names, is kept under the Reasonix home, and is checked again before
each start; a change refuses the start with ErrProjectProgramChanged.
`reasonix trust` lists and approves them, and saving hooks from the
hooks page approves the block written. Model settings that named only
a held-back provider fall back to the user's choice.
- Single program paths may not point into the workspace, a temporary
directory, an allow_write root or a toolchain cache.
- Sandbox write roots and host write directories keep the identity they
had when first granted; a root whose identity changed is dropped with
sandbox.write_root_redirected or sandbox.write_root_changed. The
host-writable directory list lives in internal/base/hostwrite.
- Every ignored value is reported as a load warning with a typed reason
(Config.IgnoredProjectSettings); held-back programs raise the
project_programs_awaiting_approval notice.
61 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
61 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
package boot
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import (
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"reasonix/internal/tools/builtin"
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)
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// A steered name missing from the provider schema cannot be called, so the whole
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// recommendation reads as unreliable and the model falls back to shell reads.
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// Asserted against the real boot surface, not the declared allowlist, so a tool
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// dropped during registration fails here too.
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func TestBashSteerNamesReachTheProviderSurface(t *testing.T) {
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isolateConfigHome(t)
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dir := robustTempDir(t)
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t.Chdir(dir)
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writeFile(t, dir, "reasonix.toml", `
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default_model = "test-model"
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[agent]
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system_prompt = "BASE"
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[[providers]]
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name = "test-model"
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kind = "boot-token-profile-test"
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model = "x"
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`)
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approveWorkspace(t, dir)
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req, _ := captureTokenProfileSurface(t, "")
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visible := toolSchemaNames(req.Tools)
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steered := builtin.BashSteerTools()
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if len(steered) == 0 {
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t.Fatal("bash steer recommends no tools; the shell recipes in the description go uncountered")
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}
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for _, name := range steered {
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if !slices.Contains(visible, name) {
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t.Fatalf("bash description recommends %q but it is not provider-visible\nvisible=%v", name, visible)
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}
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}
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var bashDesc string
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for _, s := range req.Tools {
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if s.Name == "bash" {
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bashDesc = s.Description
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break
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}
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}
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if bashDesc == "" {
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t.Fatalf("bash missing from provider surface; visible=%v", visible)
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}
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for _, name := range steered {
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if !strings.Contains(bashDesc, name) {
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t.Fatalf("bash description does not mention steered tool %q\ndescription=%q", name, bashDesc)
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}
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}
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}
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