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YHH
23f0a011c4
A workspace's reasonix.toml and .reasonix/settings.json are read as
untrusted input.
- [sandbox]: bash may only move to enforce and network only to false;
forbid_read and denied_domains add to the user's; allow_write entries
and workspace_root apply only when they resolve inside the workspace.
${VAR} in sandbox and proxy paths expands from the process environment
only.
- [permissions] mode, allow and allow_dynamic_bash, [network] proxy
settings and [desktop] default_tool_approval_mode are read from the
user config only; deny and ask add to the user's. An "always allow"
given in a workspace is stored under the Reasonix home
(project-grants.json) rather than in the checkout.
- Programs a workspace declares (hooks, language servers, providers,
tools.search.rg_path, tools.shell.path, [browser], tools.system_one
endpoints and the local Laya runtime) run only once approved for that
folder. An approval records the declaration and a digest of the files
it names, is kept under the Reasonix home, and is checked again before
each start; a change refuses the start with ErrProjectProgramChanged.
`reasonix trust` lists and approves them, and saving hooks from the
hooks page approves the block written. Model settings that named only
a held-back provider fall back to the user's choice.
- Single program paths may not point into the workspace, a temporary
directory, an allow_write root or a toolchain cache.
- Sandbox write roots and host write directories keep the identity they
had when first granted; a root whose identity changed is dropped with
sandbox.write_root_redirected or sandbox.write_root_changed. The
host-writable directory list lives in internal/base/hostwrite.
- Every ignored value is reported as a load warning with a typed reason
(Config.IgnoredProjectSettings); held-back programs raise the
project_programs_awaiting_approval notice.