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Simon J. Gerraty
9ca2cfeb4e
For 2027 we need to support new, stronger signatures and hashes. Re-work Makefile.inc and local.trust.mk to define VE_SIGN_URL_LIST or VE_SIGNATURE_LIST (can be derrived from VE_SIGN_URL_LIST) containing tuples of sig/method/hash/flags and for VE_SIGN_URL_LIST the same plus /url. From VE_SIGNATURE_LIST we derrive VE_SIGNATURE_EXT_LIST used to populate signature_ext_list which defines the order in which we look for signatures for a manifest. We also populate signature_info_list which maps a signature ext to the needed hash and flags to indicate whether that hash needs to be repeated. verify_sig will lookup signature_info_list, no match means not supported. For asc we just call verify_asc() otherwise we call verify_ec() or verify_rsa() depending on the key type found in the certificate chain, we pass the signature_info entry to these so they know which hash to use and whether to repeat it. The need to repeat the hash is a consequence of sending a hash to a server using signature methods that insiste on hashing their input. To-date only our original ECDSA signatures use this. A FakeHash class added in 2012 avoids that wrinkle. This is a much more flexible arrangement and should be more readily usable by others. Sponsored by: Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP. Reviewed by: imp Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D61007
89 lines
3.2 KiB
C
89 lines
3.2 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2017, Juniper Networks, Inc.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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*/
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#ifndef _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_
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#define _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_
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/* public api */
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#include "libsecureboot.h"
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struct stat;
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typedef struct {
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unsigned char *data;
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size_t hash_size;
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} hash_data;
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/*
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* When supporting multiple signature formats
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* we need a mapping from sig (ext) to hash_id
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* and a clue about the method doesn't hurt.
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* flags can indicate whether we need to hash the hash
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* (to match a potential use of signing server; to-date
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* only our original use of ECDSA requires this).
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*/
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typedef struct {
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const char *sig; /* extension */
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const char *method; /* ECDSA,RSA */
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int hash_id; /* br_<hash>_ID */
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int flags;
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} signature_info;
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/* signature_info flags */
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#define SIF_HASH_TWICE 1
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int ve_check_hash(br_hash_compat_context *, const br_hash_class *,
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const char *, const char *, size_t);
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size_t ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t);
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size_t ve_forbidden_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t);
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void ve_forbidden_digest_add(hash_data *digest, size_t);
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char *fingerprint_info_lookup(int, const char *);
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br_x509_certificate * parse_certificates(unsigned char *, size_t, size_t *);
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int certificate_to_trust_anchor_inner(br_x509_trust_anchor *,
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br_x509_certificate *);
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int verify_rsa_digest(br_rsa_public_key *pkey,
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const unsigned char *hash_oid,
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unsigned char *mdata, size_t mlen,
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unsigned char *sdata, size_t slen);
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int is_verified(struct stat *stp);
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void add_verify_status(struct stat *stp, int status);
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int openpgp_trust_init(void);
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int openpgp_trust_add_buf(unsigned char *, size_t);
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int openpgp_trust_revoke(const char *);
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int openpgp_self_tests(void);
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int efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
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br_x509_certificate* efi_get_trusted_certs(size_t *count);
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br_x509_certificate* efi_get_forbidden_certs(size_t *count);
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hash_data* efi_get_forbidden_digests(size_t *count);
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#endif /* _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_ */
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