mirror of
https://github.com/joel16/android_kernel_sony_msm8994.git
synced 2024-11-27 14:11:04 +00:00
sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the 2nd and subsequent ones. The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the 1st chunk. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
parent
103ba5d1d1
commit
7a24f3aa70
@ -3428,6 +3428,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
|
||||
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
|
||||
commands);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
|
||||
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length));
|
||||
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
|
||||
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
|
||||
commands);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
|
||||
* do things that are type appropriate.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -3459,12 +3465,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
|
||||
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length));
|
||||
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
|
||||
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
|
||||
commands);
|
||||
|
||||
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
|
||||
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user