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pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream. As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -1110,9 +1110,19 @@ out:
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return ret;
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}
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static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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/* do not disclose physical addresses to unprivileged
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userspace (closes a rowhammer attack vector) */
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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return 0;
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}
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const struct file_operations proc_pagemap_operations = {
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.llseek = mem_lseek, /* borrow this */
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.read = pagemap_read,
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.open = pagemap_open,
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};
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#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR */
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