When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Following patch stores struct netlink_callback in netlink_sock
to avoid allocating and freeing it on every netlink dump msg.
Only one dump operation is allowed for a given socket at a time
therefore we can safely convert cb pointer to cb struct inside
netlink_sock.
Change-Id: I376b6feef396010e3ebd98673a30518b62af9425
Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.
The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
add bssid count element to exactly refer in NL-TLV parsing.
This change need to sync with
/hardware/broadcom/wlan/bcmdhd/wifi_hal/gscan.cpp
where GSCAN_ATTRIBUTE_HOTLIST_BSSID_COUNT supposed to be called.
Bug: 32474971
Signed-off-by: Insun Song <insun.song@broadcom.com>
Change-Id: Id2b019bb43fb99b3843fe1b32f59e58c7af7cdad
buffer overrun case found when length parameter manipulated.
1. if input parameter buffer length is less than 4k,
then allocate 4k by default. It help to get enough margin
for output string overwritten.
2. added additional length check not to override user space
allocated buffer size.
bug=29000183
Change-Id: I0c15d764c1648920f0214ec47ada689ca44ebfba
Signed-off-by: Insun Song <insun.song@broadcom.com>
gcc-wrapper simulates building with -Werror, but with a few hardcoded
file:line combinations that don't get promoted to errors.
We're already building with -Werror anyway without issue, so this script
is redundant and just adds a dependency on Python 2.
This reverts commit d214aec9.
Change-Id: Id4a75ff16fb75e7d621c532a37ddcbe0efa01040
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
In case PCIe BUS already down, we're not supposed to do access BAR0
area in any reason. One instance seen on test that made kernel panic.
removed disable irq calling which is useless in bus down case.
bug=24739315
Change-Id: I474e08c14c4dec0f4cc4cd207f29fef32e85ead7
Signed-off-by: Insun Song <isong@broadcom.com>
Change all qdsp6v2 audio driver to use %pK instead
of %p. %pK hides addresses when the users doesn't
have kernel permissions. If address information
is needed echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict.
Change-Id: Ifcd61bd2615505be80dd834e9dbee9c22f3d72ac
Signed-off-by: Viraja Kommaraju <virajak@codeaurora.org>
Matt reported that we have a NULL pointer dereference
in ppp_pernet() from ppp_connect_channel(),
i.e. pch->chan_net is NULL.
This is due to that a parallel ppp_unregister_channel()
could happen while we are in ppp_connect_channel(), during
which pch->chan_net set to NULL. Since we need a reference
to net per channel, it makes sense to sync the refcnt
with the life time of the channel, therefore we should
release this reference when we destroy it.
Fixes: 1f461dcdd296 ("ppp: take reference on channels netns")
Reported-by: Matt Bennett <Matt.Bennett@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: linux-ppp@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Change-Id: I43b1673bc31b3af05789e461b39c55062735cc56
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Change-Id: I3bac84ef7f8a65b7b2e749a7caf1b6d0c3b67168
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ben Hawkes says:
integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can
lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap
corruption.
Change-Id: I0315b595eaa263166a815fc9d5648bc0433f150e
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
commit f24e230d257af1ad7476c6e81a8dc3127a74204e upstream.
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Base chains enforce absolute verdict.
User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return,
xtables userspace adds them automatically.
But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule.
CVE-2016-3134
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The variable debug_buffer is a global variable which is allocated
and free'd when open/close is called on debugfs file -
"/sys/kernel/debug/rmt_storage/info". The current code doesn't
have locks to handle concurrent accesses to the above file.
This results into use after free issue when debug_buffer is
accessed by two threads at the same time. Fix this by adding
a mutex lock to protect this global variable.
Change-Id: I6bc3f0ae2d7fca3ca9fe8561612f5863b6c3268a
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Bug: 33845464
Changes to address possible integer overflow and incorrect
array indexing conditions.
CRs-Fixed: 897259
Change-Id: Ib134320cd6f7b34d7a10572ec347ec12127049a9
Signed-off-by: Trilokesh Rangam <tranga@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Guang <guyang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: VijayaKumar T M <vtmuni@codeaurora.org>
smbencrypt() points a scatterlist to the stack, which is breaks if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Fix it by switching to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(). The new code
should be considerably faster as an added benefit.
This code is nearly identical to some code that Eric Biggers
suggested.
Change-Id: I45547cbb590e72ccd6dc9c276e44c9fb6edd9988
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9 only
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream.
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
Change-Id: I6de980b2acea168c640cbb5f83b65510045458de
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: open-code U8_MAX]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Change-Id: Ifd653dd5310229f4aa8c50f3b3bc27dd886c89a3
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Change-Id: I78657a52270c43f71c0a80af1310b39c35344ec3
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
fix to prevent kernel heap buffer overflow allows user
controlled data to be written to the heap via the
msm_camera actuator IOCTLs
Change-Id: I4458831e28e0081fb2f5ae55506be866100e1b4f
Signed-off-by: Vasko Kalanoski <vaskok@codeaurora.org>
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
This is just for exceptional case where user has updated kernel to the
latest, but still used non-patched firmware. The non-patched firmware
could deliver ETHER_TYPE_BRCM packet to host.
If attacker inject packet with its header length forged, it could bypass
current host driver's length check routine and cause memory corruption.
Proposed fix is enhancing length check to validate its header length.
Change-Id: I90fc5101bddfd1d427e0a52758ddf8bc16577555
Bug: 37168488
Signed-off-by: Insun Song <insun.song@broadcom.com>
config
Since there's no boundary checking while looping NL structures, it could
corrupt kernel memory heap and leave room for security vulnerability
issue.
The proposed fix is adding a new NL attribute indicating how many SWC
bssids included. and it bounds NL iteration not to overwrite the
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Insun Song <insun.song@broadcom.com>
Bug: 34973477
Change-Id: I03e079b6054b930487230ca313bb96a7f9e63e64
added boundary check not to override allocated buffer.
Signed-off-by: Insun Song <insun.song@broadcom.com>
Change-Id: I76211db7ef595fc41cf5d5d58de79cedfe80e521
Bug: 32125310
CVE-2017-0567
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket()
It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time,
which is very bad.
Very similar to commit 8b485ce69876 ("tcp: do not inherit
fastopen_req from parent")
Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one.
Thanks a lot to them !
Change-Id: Ic605a944356cfe485021e0ca8dbfae550803dd29
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
commit a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94 upstream.
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Change-Id: I19f91639b3c52027034b4742b8d3c001e6890fe7
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b upstream.
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Change-Id: I1355f6043290f23132d123c37c2c0fb3b5a7f671
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow.
Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign.
Change-Id: I6a4ea0cbe87cfd3db0979896c9bf9b3c626ec1d6
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
With the optimizations around not clearing the full request at alloc
time, we are leaving some of the needed init for REQ_TYPE_BLOCK_PC
up to the user allocating the request.
Add a blk_rq_set_block_pc() that sets the command type to
REQ_TYPE_BLOCK_PC, and properly initializes the members associated
with this type of request. Update callers to use this function instead
of manipulating rq->cmd_type directly.
Includes fixes from Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> for my half-assed
attempt.
Change-Id: Ifc386dfb951c5d6adebf48ff38135dda28e4b1ce
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
commit d199fab63c11998a602205f7ee7ff7c05c97164b upstream.
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
[js] no rollover in 3.12
Fixes: dc99f60069 ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 2a272abc4e543f488b3a73292ee75a06f20d077a)
Bug: 37897645
Change-Id: I3b021869ee26b88d10f4d6408ce34d351543ce74
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0c ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: Ic8000917deb6ce7ca4ce2af0c8ce951355051ec9
Everything should now be ready to finally allow SYN
packets processing without holding listener lock.
Tested:
3.5 Mpps SYNFLOOD. Plenty of cpu cycles available.
Next bottleneck is the refcount taken on listener,
that could be avoided if we remove SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU
strict semantic for listeners, and use regular RCU.
13.18% [kernel] [k] __inet_lookup_listener
9.61% [kernel] [k] tcp_conn_request
8.16% [kernel] [k] sha_transform
5.30% [kernel] [k] inet_reqsk_alloc
4.22% [kernel] [k] sock_put
3.74% [kernel] [k] tcp_make_synack
2.88% [kernel] [k] ipt_do_table
2.56% [kernel] [k] memcpy_erms
2.53% [kernel] [k] sock_wfree
2.40% [kernel] [k] tcp_v4_rcv
2.08% [kernel] [k] fib_table_lookup
1.84% [kernel] [k] tcp_openreq_init_rwin
Change-Id: Ia09d0cc5e61adf74238f35e33461b1c053d5975e
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Change-Id: Ice26d74094d3ad563808342c1604ad444234844b
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Xing Gao <xgao01@email.wm.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <me@jessfraz.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931
The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and the
address rounded down to 0. For the regular mmap case, the protection
mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the address --
arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and return that
address. So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things get funky for
shmat().
The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will not
have a problem attaching a nil-page. There are two possible fixes to
this. The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root to
crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking up
the testcase and adding mmap(... |MAP_FIXED). While this approach is the
safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the rounded
address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags. This makes the behavior
of shmat() identical to the mmap() case. The downside of this is
obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains semantics
after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.
Passes shm related ltp tests.
Change-Id: I840c924440a34cd049c50639eb5bd1e69f6ac9cc
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Gareth Evans <gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec68
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Bug: 35136920
Upstream commit: 0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125
Change-Id: I41ba111bd79f6f60306316eb6de0425b1b7d8d19
Introduce FMODE_SPLICE_READ and FMODE_SPLICE_WRITE. These modes check
whether it is legal to read or write a file using splice. Both get
automatically set on regular files and are not checked when a 'struct
fileoperations' includes the splice_{read,write} methods.
Change-Id: Ice6a3fab20bf0ac131f8d908f4bb0f7dc34bf4e3
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
[ Upstream commit 0eab121ef8750a5c8637d51534d5e9143fb0633f ]
Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there
was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header,
and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the
iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is
EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem
prior to v3.19.
This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761
CVE-2016-8399
Change-Id: I795b2ad57e1d2f73af0ade550756424be51859c3
Reported-by: Qidan He <i@flanker017.me>
Fixes: c319b4d76b ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Change-Id: I4d8432bef1c67c4f9061f79bd6246852c801269d
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
commit 07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7 upstream.
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Change-Id: I109ad90b5836a5422380816671f9eb1a37e0557e
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Change-Id: Ie11267915312ed0638d968982c460f2123fd4485
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.
There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:
"... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."
Change-Id: I554cae76340899bb6f00e2e06230f3a27da186a1
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Change-Id: I5d9de7edf05dec142138a1d49b9025cb017340d0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
commit 3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876 upstream.
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041 ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Conflicts:
fs/fuse/file.c
Change-Id: If1112e238627fec6fc94d09d339ea0a6140e5a1a
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b8 ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
