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security: Minor improvements to no_new_privs documentation
The documentation didn't actually mention how to enable no_new_privs. This also adds a note about possible interactions between no_new_privs and LSMs (i.e. why teaching systemd to set no_new_privs is not necessarily a good idea), and it references the new docs from include/linux/prctl.h. Suggested-by: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ bits will no longer change the uid or gid; file capabilities will not
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add to the permitted set, and LSMs will not relax constraints after
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execve.
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To set no_new_privs, use prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0).
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Be careful, though: LSMs might also not tighten constraints on exec
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in no_new_privs mode. (This means that setting up a general-purpose
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service launcher to set no_new_privs before execing daemons may
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interfere with LSM-based sandboxing.)
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Note that no_new_privs does not prevent privilege changes that do not
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involve execve. An appropriately privileged task can still call
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setuid(2) and receive SCM_RIGHTS datagrams.
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@ -141,6 +141,8 @@
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* Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example,
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* asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
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* in execve returning -EPERM.
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*
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* See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
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*/
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#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
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#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
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