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[NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.

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This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within
the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required
capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside
of the lsm modules to use the interface.  It also updates the SELinux
implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv
hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.
This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.
Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by:  James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Darrel Goeddel 2006-06-27 13:26:11 -07:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent 576a30eb64
commit c7bdb545d2
12 changed files with 35 additions and 34 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

13
include/linux/security.h
View File

@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct xfrm_state;
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb);
extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
/*
* Values used in the task_security_ops calls
@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* Check permission before processing the received netlink message in
* @skb.
* @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
* @cap indicates the capability required
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
* Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
@ -1266,7 +1267,7 @@ struct security_operations {
struct sembuf * sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
int (*netlink_send) (struct sock * sk, struct sk_buff * skb);
int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff * skb);
int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff * skb, int cap);
/* allow module stacking */
int (*register_security) (const char *name,
@ -2032,9 +2033,9 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff * skb)
return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
}
static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff * skb)
static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff * skb, int cap)
{
return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb);
return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
}
/* prototypes */
@ -2670,9 +2671,9 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return cap_netlink_send (sk, skb);
}
static inline int security_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb)
static inline int security_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
{
return cap_netlink_recv (skb);
return cap_netlink_recv (skb, cap);
}
static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name,

8
kernel/audit.c
View File

@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi,
* Check for appropriate CAP_AUDIT_ capabilities on incoming audit
* control messages.
*/
static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
{
int err = 0;
@ -459,13 +459,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
case AUDIT_DEL:
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
char *ctx;
u32 len;
err = audit_netlink_ok(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, msg_type);
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
return err;

2
net/core/rtnetlink.c
View File

@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *errp)
sz_idx = type>>2;
kind = type&3;
if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb)) {
if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
*errp = -EPERM;
return -1;
}

2
net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
View File

@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */

2
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
View File

@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
return;
if (security_netlink_recv(skb))
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
write_lock_bh(&queue_lock);

2
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
View File

@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
return;
if (security_netlink_recv(skb))
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
write_lock_bh(&queue_lock);

2
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
View File

@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb,
NFNL_SUBSYS_ID(nlh->nlmsg_type),
NFNL_MSG_TYPE(nlh->nlmsg_type));
if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
DEBUGP("missing CAP_NET_ADMIN\n");
*errp = -EPERM;
return -1;

2
net/netlink/genetlink.c
View File

@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int genl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
goto errout;
}
if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && security_netlink_recv(skb)) {
if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto errout;
}

2
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
View File

@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *err
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
if (security_netlink_recv(skb)) {
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
*errp = -EPERM;
return -1;
}

4
security/commoncap.c
View File

@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_send);
int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
{
if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}

4
security/dummy.c
View File

@ -675,9 +675,9 @@ static int dummy_netlink_send (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
static int dummy_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb)
static int dummy_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
{
if (!cap_raised (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
if (!cap_raised (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, cap))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}

26
security/selinux/hooks.c
View File

@ -3641,32 +3641,32 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct av_decision avd;
int err;
err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
tsec = current->security;
avd.allowed = 0;
avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
return err;
}
static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
{
if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
int err;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
if (err)
return err;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.u.cap = capability;
return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
}
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,