Files
rea/docs/harmony-analysis.md
Ace c7b0e0dec6 feat(harmony): disclose the unread pkgContextInfo.json declaration (#9096)
* feat(harmony): disclose the unread pkgContextInfo.json declaration

A package that ships pkgContextInfo.json shows the entry in
unclassified_components, yet nothing said its isSO declarations were
skipped: bridge_candidates came only from the libs/<abi>/lib<name>.so
path rule. State that gap in limitations when the entry is inventoried,
so a path-convention hypothesis is not read as a package declaration.

The declaration-parsing half of #4489 needs a decision about who owns
reading inventoried file content; this projection receives identity and
digests only, and the shared inventory carrier guard rejects other
Evidence. No content is parsed here.

* test(harmony): assert the disclosure by its names, not its sentence

docs/testing.md requires asserting structured facts instead of freezing an
explanatory sentence, and says a replaced prose assertion must still pass on a
harmless wording change while failing when the fact is lost. The first version of
this test compared the whole limitation string verbatim, so any rewording of the
disclosure would have failed CI.

The assertions now require exactly one limitation naming pkgContextInfo.json,
carrying bridge_candidates, isSO, and the not-read/not-narrowed fact, and keep the
structural claim that the same package without the declaration file yields
identical bridge candidates and no such limitation.
2026-11-06 14:26:41 +08:00

6.9 KiB

Static HarmonyOS package inventory

REA inventories HarmonyOS application packages through the shared hardened ZIP artifact reader in src/artifacts/, then projects the authenticated inventory into an execution-free application graph. This is the first increment of the HarmonyOS roadmap (#1431): package identification and component inventory only.

Recognized root formats:

  • .hap — installable application module
  • .hsp — runtime shared package
  • .app — distribution App Pack (HAP/HSP children are listed by path). The App Pack classification applies to verified-ZIP-magic root inputs only; a nested ZIP member ending in .app inside another package, such as an IPA, keeps the generic zip classification.

HarmonyOS .har shared libraries are intentionally not classified by suffix: .har also names HTTP Archive JSON, so a Harmony shared archive requires verified ZIP bytes and is deferred with an explicit limitation.

Usage

No external SDK, toolchain, or engine is required. Inventory the package and project the graph; CLI and MCP use the same workflow and return artifact-bound Evidence inline:

rea inspect-artifact /path/to/Example.hap --format json > inspection.json
node --input-type=module -e 'import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; console.log(JSON.stringify({ inventory_evidence: [JSON.parse(readFileSync("inspection.json", "utf8"))] }));' > projection-input.json
rea project-harmony-application-graph projection-input.json --format json

The MCP tool project_harmony_application_graph takes the same inventory_evidence input. The projection reports:

  • exact component paths, artifact IDs, and hashes (manifests, Ark bytecode, resources, native libraries, JavaScript, signing)
  • unclassified_components with the same paths and content identities for authenticated files outside those categories and the App Pack child list
  • a packaging-model hint: Stage is claimed only from an exactly cased module.json entry outside a classified resource path, FA only from config.json outside a classified resource path, otherwise unknown
  • FA resources under assets/<module>/resources/ as well as Stage resources/
  • unavailable component paths with unknown IDs and hashes, including encrypted entries; these make projection coverage partial
  • App Pack child package paths without recursive inventory
  • runtime-family hints (ark, native, javascript) from paths and formats
  • path-based N-API bridge hypotheses between bytecode and libs/<abi> native libraries

An unavailable manifest can still supply a path-based model hint; its content identity remains unknown. Manifest names follow case-sensitive ZIP member names.

File and slice occurrences supply component and child-package paths; directory trees and symlinks retain their identities in the source inventory without being classified as code files. Ark and JavaScript runtime hints summarize the classified bytecode and JavaScript lists; supported source extensions share the same classification rule as their component rows.

unclassified_components preserves files such as pkgContextInfo.json, .pages.info, a HarmonyOS .har shared library, and a non-certificate META-INF entry without interpreting their contents. The .har suffix also names HTTP Archive JSON, so identifying one needs verified ZIP bytes rather than a path rule. Different paths sharing the same bytes remain separate entries. App Pack children of an App Pack root are already reported in app_pack_children, so they are not repeated as unclassified files. A nested .hap or .hsp member of a HAP or HSP root is disclosed in unclassified_components instead, because child-package inventory is not recursive. Unreadable or encrypted content remains in unavailable_components with unknown identity instead.

coverage.status: "complete-within-inventory" describes the authenticated source inventory and bounded bridge projection, not semantic understanding of every file. Unclassified files do not make a complete inventory partial; missing inventory pages, source coverage limits, unavailable content and bridge limits still qualify coverage independently. An empty unclassified list on a partial inventory does not establish that the whole package has no unclassified files.

Every claim is path-presence only. Manifest semantics (module identity, abilities, entry points, permissions, dependencies), Ark bytecode contents and versions, resource resolution, signing verification, and observed native boundaries are out of scope for this increment and stay in the projection's limitations array until a dedicated HarmonyOS provider exists. REA fails closed on packages whose inventory cannot be authenticated.

pkgContextInfo.json is inventoried and listed as an unclassified component but never read, so its isSO declarations do not narrow bridge_candidates. When that entry is present the projection adds a limitation naming the unread declaration, so a path-convention hypothesis is not mistaken for a package declaration.

Verification lane

npm run fixtures:harmony downloads the SHA-256-pinned 1.0.1 HAP release from the MIT-licensed harmony-next-pipeline source repository into ignored _reference/harmony-integration/. The pin records the source revision, release asset ID, size, and digest. The downloaded artifact is not redistributed; bundled component licenses have not been independently audited.

npm run fixtures:harmony
REA_HARMONY_TEST_HAP=_reference/harmony-integration/entry-default-unsigned.hap \
  npm run verify:harmony

The lane exercises the compiled CLI and actual SDK-connected stdio MCP: inspect_artifact authenticity, projection determinism, Stage-model path hints, exact manifest/bytecode/resource component sets, empty native and bridge sets, complete-inventory coverage, and CLI/MCP parity. It checks that this fixture has no META-INF signing entries; that does not establish whether the package is signed.

The release artifact's compiler/SDK versions and reproducible source build have not been independently established. This lane does not complete the pinned toolchain acceptance in #1431 and does not verify Ark decoding or signatures. Set REA_HARMONY_ENTRYPOINT to an installed package's scripts/rea.mjs to run the same checks against that package; the default lane uses the repository build.

Packaging-model and App Pack child presence use inventoried file/slice paths even when encrypted content cannot be authenticated. Unavailable App Pack children retain their path, format, encryption and limitations with null artifact ID and digest; they do not establish decoded package semantics. Missing source nodes outside supplied pages retain the inventory limitation and partial coverage. The signing list includes inventoried META-INF RSA, DSA and EC certificate-block paths alongside the existing suffixes; opaque content does not establish a valid signature or certificate.