diff --git a/doc/protocols.texi b/doc/protocols.texi index e53d6a47a5..5022cbeb4e 100644 --- a/doc/protocols.texi +++ b/doc/protocols.texi @@ -883,14 +883,18 @@ the host name is validated as well.) This is disabled by default since it requires a CA database to be provided by the caller in many cases. -@item listen -Act as a server, listening for an incoming connection. +@item cert_file, cert=@var{filename} +A file containing a certificate to use in the handshake with the peer. +(When operating as server, in listen mode, this is more often required +by the peer, while client certificates only are mandated in certain +setups.) -@item cert=@var{filename} -Certificate file. The file must be in OpenSSL PEM format. +@item key_file, key=@var{filename} +A file containing the private key for the certificate. -@item key=@var{filename} -Private key file. +@item listen=@var{1|0} +If enabled, listen for connections on the provided port, and assume +the server role in the handshake instead of the client role. @end table diff --git a/libavformat/tls.c b/libavformat/tls.c index 6031b266a2..3da9cfac20 100644 --- a/libavformat/tls.c +++ b/libavformat/tls.c @@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ typedef struct { int fd; char *ca_file; int verify; + char *cert_file; + char *key_file; + int listen; } TLSContext; #define OFFSET(x) offsetof(TLSContext, x) @@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ static const AVOption options[] = { {"ca_file", "Certificate Authority database file", OFFSET(ca_file), AV_OPT_TYPE_STRING, .flags = D|E }, {"cafile", "Certificate Authority database file", OFFSET(ca_file), AV_OPT_TYPE_STRING, .flags = D|E }, {"tls_verify", "Verify the peer certificate", OFFSET(verify), AV_OPT_TYPE_INT, { .i64 = 0 }, 0, 1, .flags = D|E }, + {"cert_file", "Certificate file", OFFSET(cert_file), AV_OPT_TYPE_STRING, .flags = D|E }, + {"key_file", "Private key file", OFFSET(key_file), AV_OPT_TYPE_STRING, .flags = D|E }, + {"listen", "Listen for incoming connections", OFFSET(listen), AV_OPT_TYPE_INT, { .i64 = 0 }, 0, 1, .flags = D|E }, { NULL } }; @@ -135,11 +141,7 @@ static int do_tls_poll(URLContext *h, int ret) static void set_options(URLContext *h, const char *uri) { TLSContext *c = h->priv_data; - char buf[1024], key[1024]; - int has_cert, has_key; -#if CONFIG_GNUTLS - int ret; -#endif + char buf[1024]; const char *p = strchr(uri, '?'); if (!p) return; @@ -154,22 +156,11 @@ static void set_options(URLContext *h, const char *uri) c->verify = 1; } - has_cert = av_find_info_tag(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert", p); - has_key = av_find_info_tag(key, sizeof(key), "key", p); -#if CONFIG_GNUTLS - if (has_cert && has_key) { - ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(c->cred, buf, key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); - if (ret < 0) - av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret)); - } else if (has_cert ^ has_key) { - av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cert and key required\n"); - } -#elif CONFIG_OPENSSL - if (has_cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(c->ctx, buf)) - av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file %s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); - if (has_key && !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c->ctx, key, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) - av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file %s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); -#endif + if (!c->cert_file && av_find_info_tag(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert", p)) + c->cert_file = av_strdup(buf); + + if (!c->key_file && av_find_info_tag(buf, sizeof(buf), "key", p)) + c->key_file = av_strdup(buf); } static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) @@ -177,20 +168,22 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) TLSContext *c = h->priv_data; int ret; int port; - char buf[200], host[200], path[1024]; + char buf[200], host[200], opts[50] = ""; int numerichost = 0; struct addrinfo hints = { 0 }, *ai = NULL; const char *proxy_path; int use_proxy; - int server = 0; const char *p = strchr(uri, '?'); - if (p && av_find_info_tag(buf, sizeof(buf), "listen", p)) - server = 1; ff_tls_init(); - av_url_split(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, host, sizeof(host), &port, path, sizeof(path), uri); - ff_url_join(buf, sizeof(buf), "tcp", NULL, host, port, "%s", path); + if(p && av_find_info_tag(buf, sizeof(buf), "listen", p)) + c->listen = 1; + if (c->listen) + snprintf(opts, sizeof(opts), "?listen=1"); + + av_url_split(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, host, sizeof(host), &port, NULL, 0, uri); + ff_url_join(buf, sizeof(buf), "tcp", NULL, host, port, "%s", opts); hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (!getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai)) { @@ -220,8 +213,8 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) c->fd = ffurl_get_file_handle(c->tcp); #if CONFIG_GNUTLS - gnutls_init(&c->session, server ? GNUTLS_SERVER : GNUTLS_CLIENT); - if (!numerichost) + gnutls_init(&c->session, c->listen ? GNUTLS_SERVER : GNUTLS_CLIENT); + if (!c->listen && !numerichost) gnutls_server_name_set(c->session, GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, host, strlen(host)); gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&c->cred); set_options(h, uri); @@ -236,6 +229,19 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) #endif gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(c->cred, c->verify ? GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT : 0); + if (c->cert_file && c->key_file) { + ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(c->cred, + c->cert_file, c->key_file, + GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); + if (ret < 0) { + av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, + "Unable to set cert/key files %s and %s: %s\n", + c->cert_file, c->key_file, gnutls_strerror(ret)); + ret = AVERROR(EIO); + goto fail; + } + } else if (c->cert_file || c->key_file) { + av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cert and key required\n"); gnutls_credentials_set(c->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, c->cred); gnutls_transport_set_ptr(c->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t) (intptr_t) c->fd); @@ -280,7 +286,7 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) } } #elif CONFIG_OPENSSL - c->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(server ? TLSv1_server_method() : TLSv1_client_method()); + c->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(c->listen ? TLSv1_server_method() : TLSv1_client_method()); if (!c->ctx) { av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ret = AVERROR(EIO); @@ -291,6 +297,18 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c->ctx, c->ca_file, NULL)) av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations %s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); } + if (c->cert_file && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(c->ctx, c->cert_file)) { + av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to load cert file %s: %s\n", + c->cert_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + ret = AVERROR(EIO); + goto fail; + } + if (c->key_file && !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c->ctx, c->key_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) { + av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to load key file %s: %s\n", + c->key_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + ret = AVERROR(EIO); + goto fail; + } // Note, this doesn't check that the peer certificate actually matches // the requested hostname. if (c->verify) @@ -302,10 +320,10 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags) goto fail; } SSL_set_fd(c->ssl, c->fd); - if (!server && !numerichost) + if (!c->listen && !numerichost) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(c->ssl, host); while (1) { - ret = server ? SSL_accept(c->ssl) : SSL_connect(c->ssl); + ret = c->listen ? SSL_accept(c->ssl) : SSL_connect(c->ssl); if (ret > 0) break; if (ret == 0) { diff --git a/libavformat/version.h b/libavformat/version.h index a601072138..10b6a36b98 100644 --- a/libavformat/version.h +++ b/libavformat/version.h @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #define LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MAJOR 55 #define LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MINOR 18 -#define LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MICRO 103 +#define LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MICRO 104 #define LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_INT AV_VERSION_INT(LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MAJOR, \ LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MINOR, \