syzkaller/pkg/host/host_linux.go

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// Copyright 2015 syzkaller project authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by Apache 2 LICENSE that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package host
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"runtime"
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"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"github.com/google/syzkaller/pkg/osutil"
"github.com/google/syzkaller/prog"
"github.com/google/syzkaller/sys/linux"
)
func isSupported(c *prog.Syscall, sandbox string) (bool, string) {
if strings.HasPrefix(c.CallName, "syz_") {
return isSupportedSyzkall(sandbox, c)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(c.Name, "socket$") ||
strings.HasPrefix(c.Name, "socketpair$") {
return isSupportedSocket(c)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(c.Name, "openat$") {
return isSupportedOpenAt(c)
}
// There are 3 possible strategies for detecting supported syscalls:
// 1. Executes all syscalls with presumably invalid arguments and check for ENOprog.
// But not all syscalls are safe to execute. For example, pause will hang,
// while setpgrp will push the process into own process group.
// 2. Check presence of /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/syscalls/sys_enter_* files.
// This requires root and CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS. Also it lies for some syscalls.
// For example, on x86_64 it says that sendfile is not present (only sendfile64).
// 3. Check sys_syscallname in /proc/kallsyms.
// Requires CONFIG_KALLSYMS.
// Kallsyms seems to be the most reliable and fast. That's what we use first.
// If kallsyms is not present, we fallback to execution of syscalls.
kallsymsOnce.Do(func() {
kallsyms, _ = ioutil.ReadFile("/proc/kallsyms")
})
if !testFallback && len(kallsyms) != 0 {
return isSupportedKallsyms(c)
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}
return isSupportedTrial(c)
}
func isSupportedKallsyms(c *prog.Syscall) (bool, string) {
name := c.CallName
if newname := kallsymsMap[name]; newname != "" {
name = newname
}
if !bytes.Contains(kallsyms, []byte(" T sys_"+name+"\n")) &&
!bytes.Contains(kallsyms, []byte(" T ksys_"+name+"\n")) &&
!bytes.Contains(kallsyms, []byte(" T __ia32_sys_"+name+"\n")) &&
!bytes.Contains(kallsyms, []byte(" T __x64_sys_"+name+"\n")) {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("sys_%v is not present in /proc/kallsyms", name)
}
return true, ""
}
func isSupportedTrial(c *prog.Syscall) (bool, string) {
switch c.CallName {
// These known to cause hangs.
case "exit", "pause":
return true, ""
}
trialMu.Lock()
defer trialMu.Unlock()
if res, ok := trialSupported[c.NR]; ok {
return res, "ENOSYS"
}
cmd := osutil.Command(os.Args[0])
cmd.Env = []string{fmt.Sprintf("SYZ_TRIAL_TEST=%v", c.NR)}
_, err := osutil.Run(10*time.Second, cmd)
res := err != nil
trialSupported[c.NR] = res
return res, "ENOSYS"
}
func init() {
str := os.Getenv("SYZ_TRIAL_TEST")
if str == "" {
return
}
nr, err := strconv.Atoi(str)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
arg := ^uintptr(0) - 1e4 // something as invalid as possible
_, _, err = syscall.Syscall6(uintptr(nr), arg, arg, arg, arg, arg, arg)
if err == syscall.ENOSYS {
os.Exit(0)
}
os.Exit(1)
}
// Some syscall names diverge in __NR_* consts and kallsyms.
// umount2 is renamed to umount in arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl.
// Where umount is renamed to oldumount is unclear.
var (
kallsyms []byte
kallsymsOnce sync.Once
kallsymsMap = map[string]string{
"umount": "oldumount",
"umount2": "umount",
}
trialMu sync.Mutex
trialSupported = make(map[uint64]bool)
filesystems []byte
filesystemsOnce sync.Once
)
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func isSupportedSyzkall(sandbox string, c *prog.Syscall) (bool, string) {
switch c.CallName {
case "syz_open_dev":
if _, ok := c.Args[0].(*prog.ConstType); ok {
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// This is for syz_open_dev$char/block.
// They are currently commented out, but in case one enables them.
return true, ""
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}
fname, ok := extractStringConst(c.Args[0])
if !ok {
panic("first open arg is not a pointer to string const")
}
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var check func(dev string) bool
check = func(dev string) bool {
if !strings.Contains(dev, "#") {
// Note: don't try to open them all, some can hang (e.g. /dev/snd/pcmC#D#p).
return osutil.IsExist(dev)
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}
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
if check(strings.Replace(dev, "#", strconv.Itoa(i), 1)) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
if !check(fname) {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("file %v does not exist", fname)
}
return onlySandboxNoneOrNamespace(sandbox)
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case "syz_open_procfs":
return true, ""
case "syz_open_pts":
return true, ""
case "syz_fuse_mount":
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/dev/fuse"); err != nil {
return false, err.Error()
}
return onlySandboxNoneOrNamespace(sandbox)
case "syz_fuseblk_mount":
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/dev/fuse"); err != nil {
return false, err.Error()
}
return onlySandboxNoneOrNamespace(sandbox)
sys, executor: extract tcp sequence numbers from /dev/net/tun This commit adds a new pseudo syscall syz_extract_tcp_res, that reads a packet from /dev/net/tun and extracts tcp sequence numbers to be used in subsequent packets. As a result this syzkaller program: mmap(&(0x7f0000000000/0x10000)=nil, (0x10000), 0x3, 0x32, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0) r0 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0) bind$inet(r0, &(0x7f0000001000)={0x2, 0x0, @empty=0x0, [0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0]}, 0x10) listen(r0, 0x5) syz_emit_ethernet(0x36, &(0x7f0000002000)={@local={[0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa], 0x0}, @random="4c6112cc15d8", [], {{0x800, @ipv4={{0x5, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x28, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6, 0x0, @remote={0xac, 0x14, 0x0, 0xbb}, @local={0xac, 0x14, 0x0, 0xaa}, {[]}}, @tcp={{0x1, 0x0, 0x42424242, 0x42424242, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x2, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, {[]}}, {""}}}}}}) syz_extract_tcp_res(&(0x7f0000003000)={<r1=>0x42424242, <r2=>0x42424242}, 0x1, 0x0) syz_emit_ethernet(0x38, &(0x7f0000004000)={@local={[0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa], 0x0}, @remote={[0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb], 0x0}, [], {{0x800, @ipv4={{0x5, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2a, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6, 0x0, @remote={0xac, 0x14, 0x0, 0xbb}, @local={0xac, 0x14, 0x0, 0xaa}, {[]}}, @tcp={{0x1, 0x0, r2, r1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x10, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, {[]}}, {"0c10"}}}}}}) r3 = accept$inet(r0, &(0x7f0000005000)={0x0, 0x0, @multicast1=0x0, [0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0]}, &(0x7f0000006000)=0x10) established a TCP connection: Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:20000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 5477/a.out tcp 2 0 172.20.0.170:20000 172.20.0.187:20001 ESTABLISHED 5477/a.out Similar program for IPv6: mmap(&(0x7f0000000000/0x10000)=nil, (0x10000), 0x3, 0x32, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0) r0 = socket$inet6_tcp(0xa, 0x1, 0x0) bind$inet6(r0, &(0x7f0000000000)={0xa, 0x1, 0x0, @empty={[0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0]}, 0x0}, 0x1c) listen(r0, 0x5) syz_emit_ethernet(0x4a, &(0x7f0000001000)={@local={[0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa], 0x0}, @random="de895db1468d", [], {{0x86dd, @ipv6={0x0, 0x6, "a228af", 0x14, 0x6, 0x0, @remote={0xfe, 0x80, [0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0], 0x0, 0xbb}, @local={0xfe, 0x80, [0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0], 0x0, 0xaa}, {[], @tcp={{0x0, 0x1, 0x42424242, 0x42424242, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x2, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, {[]}}, {""}}}}}}}) syz_extract_tcp_res(&(0x7f0000002000)={<r1=>0x42424242, <r2=>0x42424242}, 0x1, 0x0) syz_emit_ethernet(0x4a, &(0x7f0000003000)={@local={[0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa], 0x0}, @random="de895db1468d", [], {{0x86dd, @ipv6={0x0, 0x6, "a228af", 0x14, 0x6, 0x0, @remote={0xfe, 0x80, [0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0], 0x0, 0xbb}, @local={0xfe, 0x80, [0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0], 0x0, 0xaa}, {[], @tcp={{0x0, 0x1, r2, r1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x10, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, {[]}}, {""}}}}}}}) r3 = accept$inet6(r0, &(0x7f0000004000)={0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @empty={[0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0]}, 0x0}, &(0x7f0000005000)=0x1c) Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name tcp6 0 0 :::20001 :::* LISTEN 5527/a.out tcp6 0 0 fe80::aa:20001 fe80::bb:20000 ESTABLISHED 5527/a.out
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case "syz_emit_ethernet", "syz_extract_tcp_res":
reason := checkNetworkInjection()
return reason == "", reason
case "syz_kvm_setup_cpu":
switch c.Name {
case "syz_kvm_setup_cpu$x86":
if runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || runtime.GOARCH == "386" {
return true, ""
}
case "syz_kvm_setup_cpu$arm64":
if runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" {
return true, ""
}
}
return false, "unsupported arch"
case "syz_init_net_socket":
// Unfortunately this only works with sandbox none at the moment.
// The problem is that setns of a network namespace requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN
// in the target namespace, and we've lost all privs in the init namespace
// during creation of a user namespace.
if ok, reason := onlySandboxNone(sandbox); !ok {
return false, reason
}
return isSupportedSocket(c)
case "syz_genetlink_get_family_id":
fd, err := syscall.Socket(syscall.AF_NETLINK, syscall.SOCK_RAW, syscall.NETLINK_GENERIC)
if fd == -1 {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_GENERIC) failed: %v", err)
}
syscall.Close(fd)
return true, ""
case "syz_mount_image":
if ok, reason := onlySandboxNone(sandbox); !ok {
return ok, reason
}
fstype, ok := extractStringConst(c.Args[0])
if !ok {
panic("syz_mount_image arg is not string")
}
filesystemsOnce.Do(func() {
filesystems, _ = ioutil.ReadFile("/proc/filesystems")
})
if !bytes.Contains(filesystems, []byte("\t"+fstype+"\n")) {
return false, "/proc/filesystems does not contain this fs"
}
return true, ""
case "syz_read_part_table":
return onlySandboxNone(sandbox)
}
panic("unknown syzkall: " + c.Name)
}
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func onlySandboxNone(sandbox string) (bool, string) {
if syscall.Getuid() != 0 || sandbox != "none" {
return false, "only supported under root with sandbox=none"
}
return true, ""
}
func onlySandboxNoneOrNamespace(sandbox string) (bool, string) {
if syscall.Getuid() != 0 || sandbox == "setuid" {
return false, "only supported under root with sandbox=none/namespace"
}
return true, ""
}
func isSupportedSocket(c *prog.Syscall) (bool, string) {
af, ok := c.Args[0].(*prog.ConstType)
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if !ok {
panic("socket family is not const")
}
fd, err := syscall.Socket(int(af.Val), 0, 0)
if fd != -1 {
syscall.Close(fd)
}
if err == syscall.ENOSYS {
return false, "socket syscall returns ENOSYS"
}
if err == syscall.EAFNOSUPPORT {
return false, "socket family is not supported (EAFNOSUPPORT)"
}
proto, ok := c.Args[2].(*prog.ConstType)
if !ok {
return true, ""
}
var typ uint64
if arg, ok := c.Args[1].(*prog.ConstType); ok {
typ = arg.Val
} else if arg, ok := c.Args[1].(*prog.FlagsType); ok {
typ = arg.Vals[0]
} else {
return true, ""
}
fd, err = syscall.Socket(int(af.Val), int(typ), int(proto.Val))
if fd != -1 {
syscall.Close(fd)
return true, ""
}
return false, err.Error()
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}
func isSupportedOpenAt(c *prog.Syscall) (bool, string) {
fname, ok := extractStringConst(c.Args[1])
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if !ok || len(fname) == 0 || fname[0] != '/' {
return true, ""
}
fd, err := syscall.Open(fname, syscall.O_RDONLY, 0)
if fd != -1 {
syscall.Close(fd)
}
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("open(%v) failed: %v", fname, err)
}
return true, ""
}
func extractStringConst(typ prog.Type) (string, bool) {
ptr, ok := typ.(*prog.PtrType)
if !ok {
panic("first open arg is not a pointer to string const")
}
str, ok := ptr.Type.(*prog.BufferType)
if !ok || str.Kind != prog.BufferString || len(str.Values) == 0 {
return "", false
}
v := str.Values[0]
for len(v) != 0 && v[len(v)-1] == 0 {
v = v[:len(v)-1] // string terminating \x00
}
return v, true
}
func init() {
checkFeature[FeatureCoverage] = checkCoverage
checkFeature[FeatureComparisons] = checkComparisons
checkFeature[FeatureSandboxSetuid] = unconditionallyEnabled
checkFeature[FeatureSandboxNamespace] = checkSandboxNamespace
checkFeature[FeatureFaultInjection] = checkFaultInjection
setupFeature[FeatureFaultInjection] = setupFaultInjection
checkFeature[FeatureLeakChecking] = checkLeakChecking
setupFeature[FeatureLeakChecking] = setupLeakChecking
callbFeature[FeatureLeakChecking] = callbackLeakChecking
checkFeature[FeatureNetworkInjection] = checkNetworkInjection
}
func checkCoverage() string {
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if reason := checkDebugFS(); reason != "" {
return reason
}
if !osutil.IsExist("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov") {
return "CONFIG_KCOV is not enabled"
}
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov"); err != nil {
return err.Error()
}
return ""
}
func checkComparisons() string {
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if reason := checkDebugFS(); reason != "" {
return reason
}
// TODO(dvyukov): this should run under target arch.
// E.g. KCOV ioctls were initially not supported on 386 (missing compat_ioctl),
// and a 386 executor won't be able to use them, but an amd64 fuzzer will be.
fd, err := syscall.Open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", syscall.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return "CONFIG_KCOV is not enabled"
}
defer syscall.Close(fd)
// Trigger host target lazy initialization, it will fill linux.KCOV_INIT_TRACE.
// It's all wrong and needs to be refactored.
if _, err := prog.GetTarget(runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err != nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("failed to get target: %v", err)
}
coverSize := uintptr(64 << 10)
_, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(
syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), linux.KCOV_INIT_TRACE, coverSize)
if errno != 0 {
return fmt.Sprintf("ioctl(KCOV_INIT_TRACE) failed: %v", errno)
}
mem, err := syscall.Mmap(fd, 0, int(coverSize*unsafe.Sizeof(uintptr(0))),
syscall.PROT_READ|syscall.PROT_WRITE, syscall.MAP_SHARED)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("KCOV mmap failed: %v", err)
}
defer syscall.Munmap(mem)
_, _, errno = syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_IOCTL,
uintptr(fd), linux.KCOV_ENABLE, linux.KCOV_TRACE_CMP)
if errno != 0 {
if errno == 524 { // ENOTSUPP
return "CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS is not enabled"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("ioctl(KCOV_TRACE_CMP) failed: %v", errno)
}
defer syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), linux.KCOV_DISABLE, 0)
return ""
}
func checkFaultInjection() string {
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/proc/self/make-it-fail"); err != nil {
return "CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION is not enabled"
}
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/proc/thread-self/fail-nth"); err != nil {
return "kernel does not have systematic fault injection support"
}
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if reason := checkDebugFS(); reason != "" {
return reason
}
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/sys/kernel/debug/failslab/ignore-gfp-wait"); err != nil {
return "CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS is not enabled"
}
return ""
}
func setupFaultInjection() error {
if err := osutil.WriteFile("/sys/kernel/debug/failslab/ignore-gfp-wait", []byte("N")); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to write /failslab/ignore-gfp-wait: %v", err)
}
if err := osutil.WriteFile("/sys/kernel/debug/fail_futex/ignore-private", []byte("N")); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to write /fail_futex/ignore-private: %v", err)
}
if err := osutil.WriteFile("/sys/kernel/debug/fail_page_alloc/ignore-gfp-highmem", []byte("N")); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write /fail_page_alloc/ignore-gfp-highmem: %v", err)
}
if err := osutil.WriteFile("/sys/kernel/debug/fail_page_alloc/ignore-gfp-wait", []byte("N")); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write /fail_page_alloc/ignore-gfp-wait: %v", err)
}
if err := osutil.WriteFile("/sys/kernel/debug/fail_page_alloc/min-order", []byte("0")); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write /fail_page_alloc/min-order: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
func checkLeakChecking() string {
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if reason := checkDebugFS(); reason != "" {
return reason
}
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak"); err != nil {
return "CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK is not enabled"
}
return ""
}
func setupLeakChecking() error {
fd, err := syscall.Open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", syscall.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to open /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak: %v", err)
}
defer syscall.Close(fd)
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("scan=off")); err != nil {
// kmemleak returns EBUSY when kmemleak is already turned off.
if err != syscall.EBUSY {
return fmt.Errorf("write(kmemleak, scan=off) failed: %v", err)
}
}
// Flush boot leaks.
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("scan")); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write(kmemleak, scan) failed: %v", err)
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second) // account for MSECS_MIN_AGE
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("scan")); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write(kmemleak, scan) failed: %v", err)
}
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("clear")); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write(kmemleak, clear) failed: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
func callbackLeakChecking() {
start := time.Now()
fd, err := syscall.Open("/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak", syscall.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
defer syscall.Close(fd)
// KMEMLEAK has false positives. To mitigate most of them, it checksums
// potentially leaked objects, and reports them only on the next scan
// iff the checksum does not change. Because of that we do the following
// intricate dance:
// Scan, sleep, scan again. At this point we can get some leaks.
// If there are leaks, we sleep and scan again, this can remove
// false leaks. Then, read kmemleak again. If we get leaks now, then
// hopefully these are true positives during the previous testing cycle.
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("scan")); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
time.Sleep(time.Second)
// Account for MSECS_MIN_AGE
// (1 second less because scanning will take at least a second).
for time.Since(start) < 4*time.Second {
time.Sleep(time.Second)
}
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("scan")); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
buf := make([]byte, 128<<10)
n, err := syscall.Read(fd, buf)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if n != 0 {
time.Sleep(time.Second)
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("scan")); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
n, err := syscall.Read(fd, buf)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
nleaks := 0
for buf = buf[:n]; len(buf) != 0; {
end := bytes.Index(buf[1:], []byte("unreferenced object"))
if end != -1 {
end++
} else {
end = len(buf)
}
report := buf[:end]
buf = buf[end:]
if kmemleakIgnore(report) {
continue
}
// BUG in output should be recognized by manager.
fmt.Printf("BUG: memory leak\n%s\n", report)
nleaks++
}
if nleaks != 0 {
os.Exit(1)
}
}
if _, err := syscall.Write(fd, []byte("clear")); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
func kmemleakIgnore(report []byte) bool {
// kmemleak has a bunch of false positives (at least what looks like
// false positives at first glance). So we are conservative with what we report.
// First, we filter out any allocations that don't come from executor processes.
// Second, we ignore a bunch of functions entirely.
// Ideally, someone should debug/fix all these cases and remove ignores.
if !bytes.Contains(report, []byte(`comm "syz-executor`)) {
return true
}
for _, ignore := range []string{
" copy_process",
" do_execveat_common",
" __ext4_",
" get_empty_filp",
" do_filp_open",
" new_inode",
} {
if bytes.Contains(report, []byte(ignore)) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func checkSandboxNamespace() string {
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/proc/self/ns/user"); err != nil {
return err.Error()
}
return ""
}
func checkNetworkInjection() string {
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/dev/net/tun"); err != nil {
return err.Error()
}
return ""
}
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func checkDebugFS() string {
if err := osutil.IsAccessible("/sys/kernel/debug"); err != nil {
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return "debugfs is not enabled or not mounted"
}
return ""
}