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a4718693a3
The function executes random code. Update #310
139 lines
4.3 KiB
C
139 lines
4.3 KiB
C
// Copyright 2015 syzkaller project authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by Apache 2 LICENSE that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE32 _IOR('c', 1, uint32)
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#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE64 _IOR('c', 1, uint64)
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#define KCOV_ENABLE _IO('c', 100)
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#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
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const unsigned long KCOV_TRACE_PC = 0;
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const unsigned long KCOV_TRACE_CMP = 1;
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static bool detect_kernel_bitness();
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static void os_init(int argc, char** argv, void* data, size_t data_size)
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{
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prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL, 0, 0, 0);
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is_kernel_64_bit = detect_kernel_bitness();
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if (mmap(data, data_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0) != data)
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fail("mmap of data segment failed");
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}
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static __thread cover_t* current_cover;
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static long execute_syscall(const call_t* c, long a[kMaxArgs])
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{
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if (c->call)
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return c->call(a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], a[4], a[5], a[6], a[7], a[8]);
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return syscall(c->sys_nr, a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], a[4], a[5]);
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}
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static void cover_open(cover_t* cov)
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{
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int fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
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if (fd == -1)
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fail("open of /sys/kernel/debug/kcov failed");
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if (dup2(fd, cov->fd) < 0)
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fail("filed to dup2(%d, %d) cover fd", fd, cov->fd);
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close(fd);
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const int kcov_init_trace = is_kernel_64_bit ? KCOV_INIT_TRACE64 : KCOV_INIT_TRACE32;
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if (ioctl(cov->fd, kcov_init_trace, kCoverSize))
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fail("cover init trace write failed");
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size_t mmap_alloc_size = kCoverSize * (is_kernel_64_bit ? 8 : 4);
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cov->data = (char*)mmap(NULL, mmap_alloc_size,
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PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, cov->fd, 0);
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if (cov->data == MAP_FAILED)
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fail("cover mmap failed");
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cov->data_end = cov->data + mmap_alloc_size;
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}
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static void cover_enable(cover_t* cov, bool collect_comps)
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{
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int kcov_mode = collect_comps ? KCOV_TRACE_CMP : KCOV_TRACE_PC;
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// This should be fatal,
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// but in practice ioctl fails with assorted errors (9, 14, 25),
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// so we use exitf.
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if (ioctl(cov->fd, KCOV_ENABLE, kcov_mode))
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exitf("cover enable write trace failed, mode=%d", kcov_mode);
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current_cover = cov;
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}
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static void cover_reset(cover_t* cov)
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{
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if (cov == 0)
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cov = current_cover;
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*(uint64*)cov->data = 0;
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}
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static void cover_collect(cover_t* cov)
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{
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// Note: this assumes little-endian kernel.
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cov->size = *(uint32*)cov->data;
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}
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static bool cover_check(uint32 pc)
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{
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return true;
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}
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static bool cover_check(uint64 pc)
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{
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#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
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// Text/modules range for x86_64.
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return pc >= 0xffffffff80000000ull && pc < 0xffffffffff000000ull;
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#else
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return true;
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#endif
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}
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static bool detect_kernel_bitness()
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{
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if (sizeof(void*) == 8)
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return true;
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// It turns out to be surprisingly hard to understand if the kernel underneath is 64-bits.
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// A common method is to look at uname.machine. But it is produced in some involved ways,
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// and we will need to know about all strings it returns and in the end it can be overriden
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// during build and lie (and there are known precedents of this).
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// So instead we look at size of addresses in /proc/kallsyms.
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bool wide = true;
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int fd = open("/proc/kallsyms", O_RDONLY);
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if (fd != -1) {
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char buf[16];
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if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) == sizeof(buf) &&
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(buf[8] == ' ' || buf[8] == '\t'))
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wide = false;
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close(fd);
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}
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debug("detected %d-bit kernel\n", wide ? 64 : 32);
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return wide;
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}
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// One does not simply exit.
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// _exit can in fact fail.
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// syzkaller did manage to generate a seccomp filter that prohibits exit_group syscall.
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// Previously, we get into infinite recursion via segv_handler in such case
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// and corrupted output_data, which does matter in our case since it is shared
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// with fuzzer process. Loop infinitely instead. Parent will kill us.
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// But one does not simply loop either. Compilers are sure that _exit never returns,
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// so they remove all code after _exit as dead. Call _exit via volatile indirection.
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// And this does not work as well. _exit has own handling of failing exit_group
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// in the form of HLT instruction, it will divert control flow from our loop.
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// So call the syscall directly.
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NORETURN void doexit(int status)
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{
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volatile unsigned i;
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syscall(__NR_exit_group, status);
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for (i = 0;; i++) {
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}
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}
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