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rpcrt4: Add support for signing, verifying, encrypting and decrypting RPC packets.

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This commit is contained in:
Rob Shearman 2006-11-15 01:00:36 +00:00 committed by Alexandre Julliard
parent 8e178b2d4f
commit 51dd6f9fb8
1 changed files with 157 additions and 21 deletions
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178
dlls/rpcrt4/rpc_message.c
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@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(rpc);
(((alignment) - (((value) % (alignment)))) % (alignment))
#define ROUND_UP(value, alignment) (((value) + ((alignment) - 1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
enum secure_packet_direction
{
SECURE_PACKET_SEND,
SECURE_PACKET_RECEIVE
};
static RPC_STATUS I_RpcReAllocateBuffer(PRPC_MESSAGE pMsg);
static DWORD RPCRT4_GetHeaderSize(RpcPktHdr *Header)
@ -76,6 +82,19 @@ static DWORD RPCRT4_GetHeaderSize(RpcPktHdr *Header)
return ret;
}
static int packet_has_body(RpcPktHdr *Header)
{
return (Header->common.ptype == PKT_FAULT) ||
(Header->common.ptype == PKT_REQUEST) ||
(Header->common.ptype == PKT_RESPONSE);
}
static int packet_has_auth_verifier(RpcPktHdr *Header)
{
return !(Header->common.ptype == PKT_BIND_NACK) &&
!(Header->common.ptype == PKT_SHUTDOWN);
}
static VOID RPCRT4_BuildCommonHeader(RpcPktHdr *Header, unsigned char PacketType,
unsigned long DataRepresentation)
{
@ -264,6 +283,80 @@ VOID RPCRT4_FreeHeader(RpcPktHdr *Header)
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, Header);
}
static RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_SecurePacket(RpcConnection *Connection,
enum secure_packet_direction dir,
RpcPktHdr *hdr, unsigned int hdr_size,
unsigned char *stub_data, unsigned int stub_data_size,
RpcAuthVerifier *auth_hdr,
unsigned char *auth_value, unsigned int auth_value_size)
{
SecBufferDesc message;
SecBuffer buffers[4];
SECURITY_STATUS sec_status;
message.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
message.cBuffers = sizeof(buffers)/sizeof(buffers[0]);
message.pBuffers = buffers;
buffers[0].cbBuffer = hdr_size;
buffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA|SECBUFFER_READONLY_WITH_CHECKSUM;
buffers[0].pvBuffer = hdr;
buffers[1].cbBuffer = stub_data_size;
buffers[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA;
buffers[1].pvBuffer = stub_data;
buffers[2].cbBuffer = sizeof(*auth_hdr);
buffers[2].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA|SECBUFFER_READONLY_WITH_CHECKSUM;
buffers[2].pvBuffer = auth_hdr;
buffers[3].cbBuffer = auth_value_size;
buffers[3].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
buffers[3].pvBuffer = auth_value;
if (dir == SECURE_PACKET_SEND)
{
if ((auth_hdr->auth_level == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY) && packet_has_body(hdr))
{
sec_status = EncryptMessage(&Connection->ctx, 0, &message, 0 /* FIXME */);
if (sec_status != SEC_E_OK)
{
ERR("EncryptMessage failed with 0x%08x\n", sec_status);
return RPC_S_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
}
else if (auth_hdr->auth_level != RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_NONE)
{
sec_status = MakeSignature(&Connection->ctx, 0, &message, 0 /* FIXME */);
if (sec_status != SEC_E_OK)
{
ERR("MakeSignature failed with 0x%08x\n", sec_status);
return RPC_S_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
}
}
else if (dir == SECURE_PACKET_RECEIVE)
{
if ((auth_hdr->auth_level == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY) && packet_has_body(hdr))
{
sec_status = DecryptMessage(&Connection->ctx, &message, 0 /* FIXME */, 0);
if (sec_status != SEC_E_OK)
{
ERR("EncryptMessage failed with 0x%08x\n", sec_status);
return RPC_S_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
}
else if (auth_hdr->auth_level != RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_NONE)
{
sec_status = VerifySignature(&Connection->ctx, &message, 0 /* FIXME */, NULL);
if (sec_status != SEC_E_OK)
{
ERR("VerifySignature failed with 0x%08x\n", sec_status);
return RPC_S_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
}
}
return RPC_S_OK;
}
/***********************************************************************
* RPCRT4_SendAuth (internal)
*
@ -277,16 +370,25 @@ static RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_SendAuth(RpcConnection *Connection, RpcPktHdr *Header,
DWORD hdr_size;
LONG count;
unsigned char *pkt;
LONG alen = AuthLength ? (AuthLength + sizeof(RpcAuthVerifier)) : 0;
LONG alen;
RPC_STATUS status;
buffer_pos = Buffer;
/* The packet building functions save the packet header size, so we can use it. */
hdr_size = Header->common.frag_len;
Header->common.auth_len = AuthLength;
if (AuthLength)
Header->common.auth_len = AuthLength;
else if (Connection->AuthInfo && packet_has_auth_verifier(Header))
Header->common.auth_len = 16 /* FIXME */;
else
Header->common.auth_len = 0;
Header->common.flags |= RPC_FLG_FIRST;
Header->common.flags &= ~RPC_FLG_LAST;
alen = RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER_LEN(&Header->common);
while (!(Header->common.flags & RPC_FLG_LAST)) {
unsigned char auth_pad_len = AuthLength ? ROUND_UP_AMOUNT(BufferLength, AUTH_ALIGNMENT) : 0;
unsigned char auth_pad_len = Header->common.auth_len ? ROUND_UP_AMOUNT(BufferLength, AUTH_ALIGNMENT) : 0;
unsigned int pkt_size = BufferLength + hdr_size + alen + auth_pad_len;
/* decide if we need to split the packet into fragments */
@ -312,7 +414,7 @@ static RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_SendAuth(RpcConnection *Connection, RpcPktHdr *Header,
memcpy(pkt + hdr_size, buffer_pos, Header->common.frag_len - hdr_size - auth_pad_len - alen);
/* add the authorization info */
if (Connection->AuthInfo && AuthLength)
if (Connection->AuthInfo && packet_has_auth_verifier(Header))
{
RpcAuthVerifier *auth_hdr = (RpcAuthVerifier *)&pkt[Header->common.frag_len - alen];
@ -323,7 +425,21 @@ static RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_SendAuth(RpcConnection *Connection, RpcPktHdr *Header,
/* a unique number... */
auth_hdr->auth_context_id = (unsigned long)Connection;
memcpy(auth_hdr + 1, Auth, AuthLength);
if (AuthLength)
memcpy(auth_hdr + 1, Auth, AuthLength);
else
{
status = RPCRT4_SecurePacket(Connection, SECURE_PACKET_SEND,
(RpcPktHdr *)pkt, hdr_size,
pkt + hdr_size, Header->common.frag_len - hdr_size - alen,
auth_hdr,
(unsigned char *)(auth_hdr + 1), Header->common.auth_len);
if (status != RPC_S_OK)
{
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pkt);
return status;
}
}
}
write:
@ -350,6 +466,13 @@ static void RPCRT4_AuthNegotiate(RpcConnection *conn, SecBuffer *out)
SECURITY_STATUS r;
SecBufferDesc out_desc;
unsigned char *buffer;
ULONG context_req = ISC_REQ_CONNECTION | ISC_REQ_USE_DCE_STYLE |
ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH | ISC_REQ_DELEGATE;
if (conn->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY)
context_req |= ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY;
else if (conn->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY)
context_req |= ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY;
buffer = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, 0x100);
@ -366,8 +489,7 @@ static void RPCRT4_AuthNegotiate(RpcConnection *conn, SecBuffer *out)
conn->ctx.dwUpper = 0;
r = InitializeSecurityContextA(&conn->AuthInfo->cred, NULL, NULL,
ISC_REQ_CONNECTION | ISC_REQ_USE_DCE_STYLE | ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH |
ISC_REQ_DELEGATE, 0, SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
context_req, 0, SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
NULL, 0, &conn->ctx, &out_desc, &conn->attr, &conn->exp);
TRACE("r = %08x cbBuffer = %ld attr = %08x\n", r, out->cbBuffer, conn->attr);
@ -385,9 +507,16 @@ static RPC_STATUS RPCRT_AuthorizeConnection(RpcConnection* conn,
unsigned char buffer[0x100];
RpcPktHdr *resp_hdr;
RPC_STATUS status;
ULONG context_req = ISC_REQ_CONNECTION | ISC_REQ_USE_DCE_STYLE |
ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH | ISC_REQ_DELEGATE;
TRACE("challenge %s, %d bytes\n", challenge, count);
if (conn->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY)
context_req |= ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY;
else if (conn->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY)
context_req |= ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY;
out.BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
out.cbBuffer = sizeof buffer;
out.pvBuffer = buffer;
@ -405,8 +534,7 @@ static RPC_STATUS RPCRT_AuthorizeConnection(RpcConnection* conn,
inp_desc.ulVersion = 0;
r = InitializeSecurityContextA(&conn->AuthInfo->cred, &conn->ctx, NULL,
ISC_REQ_CONNECTION | ISC_REQ_USE_DCE_STYLE | ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH |
ISC_REQ_DELEGATE, 0, SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
context_req, 0, SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
&inp_desc, 0, &conn->ctx, &out_desc, &conn->attr, &conn->exp);
if (r)
{
@ -436,20 +564,10 @@ RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_Send(RpcConnection *Connection, RpcPktHdr *Header,
RPC_STATUS r;
SecBuffer out;
/* if we've already authenticated, just send the context */
if (Connection->ctx.dwUpper || Connection->ctx.dwLower)
{
unsigned char buffer[0x10];
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof buffer);
buffer[0] = 1; /* version number lsb */
return RPCRT4_SendAuth(Connection, Header, Buffer, BufferLength, buffer, sizeof buffer);
}
if (!Connection->AuthInfo ||
Connection->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_DEFAULT ||
Connection->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_NONE)
Connection->AuthInfo->AuthnLevel == RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_NONE ||
(Connection->ctx.dwUpper || Connection->ctx.dwLower))
{
return RPCRT4_SendAuth(Connection, Header, Buffer, BufferLength, NULL, 0);
}
@ -595,6 +713,12 @@ RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_Receive(RpcConnection *Connection, RpcPktHdr **Header,
}
if (header_auth_len) {
if (header_auth_len < sizeof(RpcAuthVerifier)) {
WARN("bad auth verifier length %d\n", header_auth_len);
status = RPC_S_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
/* FIXME: we should accumulate authentication data for the bind,
* bind_ack, alter_context and alter_context_response if necessary.
* however, the details of how this is done is very sketchy in the
@ -607,6 +731,18 @@ RPC_STATUS RPCRT4_Receive(RpcConnection *Connection, RpcPktHdr **Header,
status = RPC_S_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
/* these packets are handled specially, not by the generic SecurePacket
* function */
if ((common_hdr.ptype != PKT_BIND) &&
(common_hdr.ptype != PKT_BIND_ACK) &&
(common_hdr.ptype != PKT_AUTH3))
status = RPCRT4_SecurePacket(Connection, SECURE_PACKET_RECEIVE,
*Header, hdr_length,
(unsigned char *)pMsg->Buffer + buffer_length, data_length,
(RpcAuthVerifier *)auth_data,
(unsigned char *)auth_data + sizeof(RpcAuthVerifier),
header_auth_len - sizeof(RpcAuthVerifier));
}
buffer_length += data_length;