torproject/torspec
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/torproject/torspec.git synced 2024-12-14 22:18:40 +00:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

tor-spec: Prop#289: RELAY cell padding should be randomised

Browse Source 
Updates tor-spec for 26871
This commit is contained in:
teor 2018-07-20 11:44:29 +10:00 committed by Nick Mathewson
parent 42d93671d4
commit 46bc41bb1b
1 changed files with 18 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

21
tor-spec.txt
View File

@ -482,9 +482,24 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
drop the cell. Since more cell types may be added in the future, ORs
should generally not warn when encountering unrecognized commands.
The cell is padded up to the cell length with padding bytes. Senders
SHOULD set padding bytes to NUL and receivers MUST ignore their
value.
The cell is padded up to the cell length with padding bytes.
Senders set padding bytes depending on the cell's command:
VERSIONS: Payload MUST NOT contain padding bytes.
AUTHORIZE: Payload is unspecified and reserved for future use.
Other variable-length cells:
Payload MAY contain padding bytes at the end of the cell.
Padding bytes SHOULD be set to NUL.
RELAY: Payload MUST be padded to PAYLOAD_LEN with padding bytes.
Padding bytes SHOULD be set to random values.
Other fixed-length cells:
Payload MUST be padded to PAYLOAD_LEN with padding bytes.
Padding bytes SHOULD be set to NUL.
We recommend random padding in RELAY cells, so that cell content is
unpredictable. See proposal 289 for details. For non-RELAY cells, TLS
authenticates cell content, so randomised padding bytes are redundant.
Receivers MUST ignore padding bytes.
PADDING cells are currently used to implement connection keepalive.
If there is no other traffic, ORs and OPs send one another a PADDING