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cleanups based on looking through svn commits
svn:r9491
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@ -270,7 +270,8 @@ of their choices.
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We use Guard nodes (also called "helper nodes" in the literature) to
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prevent certain profiling attacks. Here's the risk: if we choose entry and
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exit nodes at random, and an attacker controls C out of N servers, then the
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exit nodes at random, and an attacker controls C out of N servers
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(ignoring advertised bandwidth), then the
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attacker will control the entry and exit node of any given circuit with
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probability (C/N)^2. But as we make many different circuits over time,
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then the probability that the attacker will see a sample of about (C/N)^2
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@ -298,13 +299,14 @@ of their choices.
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A guard is unusable for a particular circuit if any of the rules for path
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selection in 2.2 are not met. In particular, if the circuit is "fast"
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and the guard is not Fast, or if the circuit is "stable" and the guard is
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not Stable, Tor can't use the guard for that circuit.
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not Stable, or if the guard has already been chosen as the exit node in
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that circuit, Tor can't use it as a guard node for that circuit.
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If the guard is excluded because of its status in the networkstatuses for
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over 30 days, Tor removes it from the list entirely, preserving order.
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If Tor fails to connect to an otherwise usable guard, it retries
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periodically: every hour for six hours, every for hours for 3 days, every
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periodically: every hour for six hours, every 4 hours for 3 days, every
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18 hours for a week, and every 36 hours thereafter. Additionally, Tor
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retries unreachable guards the first time it adds a new guard to the list,
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since it is possible that the old guards were only marked as unreachable
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