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rend-spec: Add a set of test vectors for hs-ntor.
These were generated using a patched Tor with extra logging info. I've used them to validate (and find bugs in) the arti hs-ntor implementation. (See arti!1189.)
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@ -2723,3 +2723,95 @@ Appendix F. Two methods for managing revision counters.
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Similarly, implementations SHOULD NOT let the revision counter
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increase forever without resetting it -- doing so links the service
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across changes in the blinded public key.
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Appendix G. Text vectors
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G.1. Test vectors for hs-ntor / NTOR-WITH-EXTRA-DATA
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Here is a set of test values for the hs-ntor handshake, called
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[NTOR-WITH-EXTRA-DATA] in this document. They were generated by
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instrumenting Tor's code to dump the values for an INTRODUCE/RENDEZVOUS
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handshake, and then by running that code on a Chutney network.
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We assume an onion service with:
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KP_hs_ipd_sid = 34E171E4358E501BFF21ED907E96AC6B
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FEF697C779D040BBAF49ACC30FC5D21F
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KP_hss_ntor = 8E5127A40E83AABF6493E41F142B6EE3
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604B85A3961CD7E38D247239AFF71979
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KS_hss_ntor = A0ED5DBF94EEB2EDB3B514E4CF6ABFF6
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022051CC5F103391F1970A3FCD15296A
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N_hs_subcred = 0085D26A9DEBA252263BF0231AEAC59B
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17CA11BAD8A218238AD6487CBAD68B57
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The client wants to make in INTRODUCE request. It generates
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the following header (everything before the ENCRYPTED portion)
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of its INTRODUCE1 cell:
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H = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000002002034E171E4358E501BFF
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21ED907E96AC6BFEF697C779D040BBAF49ACC30FC5D21F00
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It generates the following plaintext body to encrypt. (This
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is the "decrypted plaintext body" from [PROCESS_INTRO2].
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P = 6BD364C12638DD5C3BE23D76ACA05B04E6CE932C0101000100200DE6130E4FCA
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C4EDDA24E21220CC3EADAE403EF6B7D11C8273AC71908DE565450300067F0000
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0113890214F823C4F8CC085C792E0AEE0283FE00AD7520B37D0320728D5DF39B
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7B7077A0118A900FF4456C382F0041300ACF9C58E51C392795EF870000000000
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0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
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000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
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The client now begins the hs-ntor handshake. It generates
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a curve25519 keypair:
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x = 60B4D6BF5234DCF87A4E9D7487BDF3F4
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A69B6729835E825CA29089CFDDA1E341
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X = BF04348B46D09AED726F1D66C618FDEA
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1DE58E8CB8B89738D7356A0C59111D5D
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Then it calculates:
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ENC_KEY = 9B8917BA3D05F3130DACCE5300C3DC27
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F6D012912F1C733036F822D0ED238706
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MAC_KEY = FC4058DA59D4DF61E7B40985D122F502
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FD59336BC21C30CAF5E7F0D4A2C38FD5
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With these, it encrypts the plaintext body P with ENC_KEY, getting
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an encrypted value C. It computes MAC(MAC_KEY, H | X | C),
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getting a MAC value M. It then assembles the final INTRODUCE1
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body as H | X | C | M:
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000000000000000000000000000000000000000002002034E171E4358E501BFF
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21ED907E96AC6BFEF697C779D040BBAF49ACC30FC5D21F00BF04348B46D09AED
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726F1D66C618FDEA1DE58E8CB8B89738D7356A0C59111D5DADBECCCB38E37830
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4DCC179D3D9E437B452AF5702CED2CCFEC085BC02C4C175FA446525C1B9D5530
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563C362FDFFB802DAB8CD9EBC7A5EE17DA62E37DEEB0EB187FBB48C63298B0E8
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3F391B7566F42ADC97C46BA7588278273A44CE96BC68FFDAE31EF5F0913B9A9C
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7E0F173DBC0BDDCD4ACB4C4600980A7DDD9EAEC6E7F3FA3FC37CD95E5B8BFB3E
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35717012B78B4930569F895CB349A07538E42309C993223AEA77EF8AEA64F25D
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DEE97DA623F1AEC0A47F150002150455845C385E5606E41A9A199E7111D54EF2
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D1A51B7554D8B3692D85AC587FB9E69DF990EFB776D8
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Later the service receives that body in an INTRODUCE2 cell. It
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processes it according to the hs-ntor handshake, and recovers
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the client's plaintext P. To continue the hs-ntor handshake,
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the service chooses a curve25519 keypair:
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y = 68CB5188CA0CD7924250404FAB54EE13
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92D3D2B9C049A2E446513875952F8F55
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Y = 8FBE0DB4D4A9C7FF46701E3E0EE7FD05
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CD28BE4F302460ADDEEC9E93354EE700
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From this and the client's input, it computes:
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AUTH_INPUT_MAC = 4A92E8437B8424D5E5EC279245D5C72B
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25A0327ACF6DAF902079FCB643D8B208
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NTOR_KEY_SEED = 4D0C72FE8AFF35559D95ECC18EB5A368
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83402B28CDFD48C8A530A5A3D7D578DB
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The service sends back Y | AUTH_INPUT_MAC in its RENDEZVOUS1 cell
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body. From these, the client finishes the handshake, validates
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AUTH_INPUT_MAC, and computes the same NTOR_KEY_SEED.
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Now that both parties have the same NTOR_KEY_SEED, they can derive
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the shared key material they will use for their circuit.
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