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178 lines
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178 lines
6.9 KiB
Plaintext
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Glossary
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The Tor Project
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This document aims to specify terms, notations, and phrases related
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to Tor, as used in the Tor specification documents and other documentation.
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This glossary is not a design document; it is only a reference.
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This glossary is a work-in-progress; double-check its definitions before
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citing them authoritatively. ;)
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0. Preliminaries
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
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NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
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RFC 2119.
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1.0 Commonly used Tor configuration terms
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ORPort - Onion Router Port
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DirPort - Directory Port
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2.0 Tor network components
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2.1 Relays, aka OR (onion router)
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[Style guide: prefer the term "Relay"]
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2.1.1 Specific roles
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Exit relay: The final hop in an exit circuit before traffic leaves
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the Tor network to connect to external servers.
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Non-exit relay: Relays that send and receive traffic only to
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other Tor relays and Tor clients.
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Entry relay: The first hop in a Tor circuit. Can be either a guard
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relay or a bridge, depending on the client's configuration.
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Guard relay: A relay that a client uses as its entry for a longer
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period of time. Guard relays are rotated more slowly to prevent
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attacks that can come from being exposed to too many guards.
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Bridge: A relay intentionally not listed in the public Tor
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consensus, with the purpose of circumventing entities (such as
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governments or ISPs) seeking to block clients from using Tor.
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Currently, bridges are used only as entry relays.
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Directory cache: A relay that downloads cached directory information
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from the directory authorities and serves it to clients on demand.
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Any relay will act as a directory cache, if its bandwidth is high enough.
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Rendezvous point: A relay connecting a client to a hidden service.
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Each party builds a three-hop circuit, meeting at the
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rendezvous point.
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2.2 Client, aka OP (onion proxy)
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[Style: the "OP" and "onion proxy" terms are deprecated.]
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2.3 Authorities:
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Directory Authority: Nine total in the Tor network, operated by
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trusted individuals. Directory authorities define and serve the
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consensus document, defining the "state of the network." This document
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contains a "router status" section for every relay currently
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in the network. Directory authorities also serve router descriptors,
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extra info documents, microdescriptors, and the microdescriptor consensus.
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Bridge Authority: One total. Similar in responsibility to directory
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authorities, but for bridges.
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Fallback directory mirror: One of a list of directory caches distributed
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with the Tor software. (When a client first connects to the network, and
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has no directory information, it asks a fallback directory. From then on,
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the client can ask any directory cache that's listed in the directory
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information it has.)
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2.4 Hidden Service:
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A hidden service is a server that will only accept incoming
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connections via the hidden service protocol. Connection
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initiators will not be able to learn the IP address of the hidden
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service, allowing the hidden service to receive incoming connections,
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serve content, etc, while preserving its location anonymity.
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2.5 Circuit:
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An established path through the network, where cryptographic keys
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are negotiated using the ntor protocol or TAP (Tor Authentication
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Protocol (deprecated)) with each hop. Circuits can differ in length
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depending on their purpose. See also Leaky Pipe Topology.
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Origin Circuit -
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Exit Circuit: A circuit which connects clients to destinations
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outside the Tor network. For example, if a client wanted to visit
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duckduckgo.com, this connection would require an exit circuit.
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Internal Circuit: A circuit whose traffic never leaves the Tor
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network. For example, a client could connect to a hidden service via
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an internal circuit.
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2.6 Edge connection:
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2.7 Consensus: The state of the Tor network, published every hour,
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decided by a vote from the network's directory authorities. Clients
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fetch the consensus from directory authorities, fallback
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directories, or directory caches.
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2.8 Descriptor: Each descriptor represents information about one
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relay in the Tor network. The descriptor includes the relay's IP
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address, public keys, and other data. Relays send
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descriptors to directory authorities, who vote and publish a
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summary of them in the network consensus.
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3.0 Tor network protocols
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3.1 Link handshake
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The link handshake establishes the TLS connection over which two
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Tor participants will send Tor cells. This handshake also
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authenticates the participants to each other, possibly using Tor
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cells.
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3.2 Circuit handshake
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Circuit handshakes establish the hop-by-hop onion encryption
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that clients use to tunnel their application traffic. The
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client does a pairwise key establishment handshake with each
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individual relay in the circuit. For every hop except the
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first, these handshakes tunnel through existing hops in the
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circuit. Each cell type in this protocol also has a newer
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version (with a "2" suffix), e.g., CREATE2.
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CREATE cell: First part of a handshake, sent by the initiator.
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CREATED cell: Second part of a handshake, sent by the responder.
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EXTEND cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTEND cell) First part of a
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handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit. The last relay
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in the circuit so far will decrypt this cell and send the
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payload in a CREATED cell to the chosen next hop relay.
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EXTENDED cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTENDED cell) Second part
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of a handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit. The last
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relay in the circuit so far receives the CREATED cell from the
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new last hop relay and encrypts the payload in an EXTENDED cell
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to tunnel back to the client.
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Onion skin: A CREATE/CREATE2 or EXTEND/EXTEND2 payload that
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contains the first part of the TAP or ntor key establishment
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handshake.
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3.3 Hidden Service Protocol
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3.4 Directory Protocol
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4.0 General network definitions
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Leaky Pipe Topology: The ability for the origin of a circuit to address
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relay cells to be addressed to any hop in the path of a circuit. In Tor,
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the destination hop is determined by using the 'recognized' field of relay
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cells.
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Stream: A single application-level connection or request, multiplexed over
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a Tor circuit. A 'Stream' can currently carry the contents of a TCP
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connection, a DNS request, or a Tor directory request.
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Channel: A pairwise connection between two Tor relays, or between a
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client and a relay. Circuits are multiplexed over Channels. All
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channels are currently implemented as TLS connections.
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