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replay r23271, since it got lost in the move

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Roger Dingledine 2010-10-27 10:19:37 +00:00
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getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
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@ -1033,19 +1033,6 @@
by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
</li>
<li>Right now Tor clients are willing to reuse a given circuit for ten
minutes after it's first used. The goal is to avoid loading down the
network with too many circuit extend operations, yet to also avoid having
clients use the same circuit for so long that the exit node can build a
useful pseudonymous profile of them. Alas, ten minutes is probably way
too long, especially if connections from multiple protocols (e.g. IM and
web browsing) are put on the same circuit. If we keep fixed the overall
number of circuit extends that the network needs to do, are there more
efficient and/or safer ways for clients to allocate streams to circuits,
or for clients to build preemptive circuits? Perhaps this research item
needs to start with gathering some traces of what connections typical
clients try to launch, so you have something realistic to try to optimize.
</li>
<li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay