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Fix links that broke due to splitting the spec in its own repo
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ a fuzzer for Tor; mentored by Roger.</dd>
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Improving Tor Path Selection (<a
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href="https://svn.torproject.org/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi/torflow/branches/gsoc2008/">svn</a>)
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and <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/151-path-selection-improvements.txt">proposal
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href="<specblob>proposals/151-path-selection-improvements.txt">proposal
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151</a> as part of Google Summer of Code 2008.</dd>
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<dt>Bram Cohen</dt><dd>Helped design our congestion control mechanisms,
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in Tor's early days.</dd>
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@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
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press, and general support.</dd>
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<dt>Dr. Karsten Loesing, Researcher and Developer</dt>
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<dd>Worked during the 2007 Google Summer of Code on <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/114-distributed-storage.txt">distributing
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href="<specblob>proposals/114-distributed-storage.txt">distributing
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and securing the publishing and fetching of hidden
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service descriptors</a>. Currently the primary
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researcher for our National Science Foundation grant
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@ -192,7 +192,7 @@
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<p>
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If you would like to learn more about our bridge
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design from a technical standpoint, please read the <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/bridges-spec.txt">Tor bridges
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href="<specblob>bridges-spec.txt">Tor bridges
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specification</a>. If you're interested in running an unpublished bridge
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or other non-standard uses, please do read the specification.
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</p>
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@ -137,9 +137,9 @@
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<li>
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Learn about the <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/001-process.txt">Tor
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href="<specblob>proposals/001-process.txt">Tor
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proposal process for changing our design</a>, and look over the <a
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href="<gittree>doc/spec/proposals">existing proposals</a>.
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href="<spectree>proposals">existing proposals</a>.
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</li>
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<li>
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@ -210,25 +210,25 @@
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<li>The <b>specifications</b> aim to give
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developers enough information to build a compatible version of Tor:
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<ul>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/tor-spec.txt">Main Tor specification</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec.txt">Tor
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<li><a href="<specblob>tor-spec.txt">Main Tor specification</a></li>
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<li><a href="<specblob>dir-spec.txt">Tor
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version 3 directory server specification</a> (and older <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec-v1.txt">version 1</a> and <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt">version 2</a> directory
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href="<specblob>dir-spec-v1.txt">version 1</a> and <a
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href="<specblob>dir-spec-v2.txt">version 2</a> directory
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specifications)</li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/control-spec.txt">Tor control protocol
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<li><a href="<specblob>control-spec.txt">Tor control protocol
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specification</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">Tor rendezvous
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<li><a href="<specblob>rend-spec.txt">Tor rendezvous
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specification</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/path-spec.txt">Tor path selection
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<li><a href="<specblob>path-spec.txt">Tor path selection
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specification</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/address-spec.txt">Special hostnames in
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<li><a href="<specblob>address-spec.txt">Special hostnames in
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Tor</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/socks-extensions.txt">Tor's SOCKS support
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<li><a href="<specblob>socks-extensions.txt">Tor's SOCKS support
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and extensions</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/version-spec.txt">How Tor version numbers
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<li><a href="<specblob>version-spec.txt">How Tor version numbers
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work</a></li>
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<li><a href="<gittree>doc/spec/proposals">In-progress drafts of
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<li><a href="<spectree>proposals">In-progress drafts of
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new specifications and proposed changes</a></li>
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</ul></li>
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@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ the same geographic location.
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have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing
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key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a
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"directory signing key". The directory authorities <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>
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href="<specblob>dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>
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of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
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each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
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locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control
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@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ meetings around the world.</li>
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<p>If you want to get more into the guts of Tor itself (C), a more minor problem
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we should address is that current Tors can only listen on a single
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address/port combination at a time. There's
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<a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a
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<a href="<specblob>proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a
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proposal to address this limitation</a> and allow clients to connect
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to any given Tor on multiple addresses and ports, but it needs more
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work.</p>
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@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ meetings around the world.</li>
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Currently, on Debian and Ubuntu, there is a configuration mechanism which
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allows Vidalia to override Tor's ability to start on boot (by sourcing
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<code>/etc/default/tor.vidalia</code> which sets <code>RUN_DAEMON=no</code> at the user's
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request), but full implementation of <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/control-spec.txt">ControlPort</a>
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request), but full implementation of <a href="<specblob>control-spec.txt">ControlPort</a>
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communication is still required.
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</p>
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@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ meetings around the world.</li>
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href="<gitblob>doc/roadmaps/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development
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roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
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and find out what you think needs fixing.
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Some of the <a href="<gittree>doc/spec/proposals">current proposals</a>
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Some of the <a href="<spectree>proposals">current proposals</a>
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might also be short on developers.
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</li>
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@ -1206,7 +1206,7 @@ meetings around the world.</li>
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href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list
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of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
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be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification
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href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification
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for Tor and
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UDP</a> — please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>
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@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ meetings around the world.</li>
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<li>
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Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
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more scanning-resistant. Right now, an adversary can identify <a
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href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
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href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
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just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
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and seeing if they respond. To solve this, bridges could <a
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href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
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@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
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<define-tag wikifaq whitespace=delete>https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ</define-tag>
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<define-tag blog whitespace=delete>https://blog.torproject.org/blog/</define-tag>
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<define-tag tbbrepo whitespace=delete>https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob_plain/HEAD:</define-tag>
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<define-tag specblob whitespace=delete>https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=</define-tag>
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<define-tag spectree whitespace=delete>https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=tree;hb=HEAD;f=</define-tag>
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# Xinclude "locallinks.wmi"
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# Xinclude "langlocallinks.$(LANG).wmi"
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