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explain that the authentication step is what allows the distributed

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trust property
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Roger Dingledine 2012-02-06 22:33:40 +00:00
parent 0422a92e88
commit 8d180ff77e
1 changed files with 7 additions and 3 deletions
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docs/en/faq.wml
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@ -1550,7 +1550,8 @@ the same geographic location.
<b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption
key with each relay in the circuit, so only the exit relay can read
key with each relay in the circuit; these extra layers of encryption
mean that only the exit relay can read
the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends,
so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
won't work.
@ -1559,11 +1560,14 @@ the same geographic location.
<p>
<b>Authentication</b>:
Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a
href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way
the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.
Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
Because the Tor client chooses the path, it can make sure to get
Tor's "distributed trust" property: no single relay in the path can
know about both the client and what the client is doing.
</p>
<p>
@ -1576,7 +1580,7 @@ the same geographic location.
of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control
a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2011 there were 8
a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2012 there are 8
directory authorities), he can't trick the Tor client into using
other Tor relays.
</p>