make the faq work better on website mirrors too

docs/en/faq.wml

@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ executive
     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a
-    href="https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning">Be
+    href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be
     careful and be smart.</a>
     </p>
 
@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>
 You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
 Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
 out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a
-href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en">man page</a>,
+href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,
 and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
 doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
 HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed
 
     <p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the
     signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a
-    href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en">
+    href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">
     checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional
     verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as
     the download.</p>
@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@ href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed
       <pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>
       (This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other
       developers' key IDs can be found on
-      <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en">this
+      <a href="<page docs/signing-keys>">this
       page</a>.)</li>
       <li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:
       <pre>gpg --verify &lt;NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE&gt;.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>
@@ -1794,7 +1794,7 @@ Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
     </pre>
     <p>
     If you've installed <a
-    href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions.html.en#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,
+    href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,
     you'll need to add one more line:
     </p>
     <pre>
@@ -2845,7 +2845,7 @@ users
     for most flaggings are documented on the <a
     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays">bad
     relays wiki</a>. Please <a
-    href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en">contact us</a> so
+    href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> so
     we can sort out the issue.</p>
 
     <hr>
@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ most users, we think it's a smart move.
     <p><a href="https://exonerator.torproject.org/">
     Exonerator</a> is a web service that can check if an IP address was a
     relay at a given time. We can also <a
-    href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en">provide a signed
+    href="<page about/contact>">provide a signed
     letter</a> if needed.</p>
 
     <hr>
@@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ diversity,
     hidden service?</a></h3>
  
     <p>
-    See the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en">
+    See the <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">
     official hidden service configuration instructions</a>.
     </p>
 
@@ -3838,7 +3838,7 @@ diversity,
     </p>
     <p>
     That's where the <a
-    href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor Browser
+    href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser
     Bundle</a> comes in. We produce a web browser that is preconfigured to
     help you control the risks to your privacy and anonymity while browsing
     the Internet. Not only are the above technologies disabled to prevent
@@ -4123,7 +4123,7 @@ interactive streams while still allowing good throughput for bulk streams.
 But since we want to do a lot of work on quality-of-service and better
 queuing approaches first, you shouldn't expect this change anytime soon
 (if ever). However if you are keen, there are a couple of
-<a href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Research">
+<a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">
 research ideas</a> that may involve changing the cell size.
     </p>
 
@@ -4158,7 +4158,7 @@ government firewalls to access the Tor network.
     </p>
     <p>
 We've made quite a bit of progress on this problem lately. You can read more
-details on the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en">
+details on the <a href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">
 pluggable transports page</a>. You may also be interested in
 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwMr8Xl7JMQ">Roger and Jake's talk at
 28C3</a>, or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZg1nqs793M">Runa's
@@ -4224,10 +4224,10 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.
     minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely
     dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor
     users (assuming you did not <a
-    href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning">identify
+    href="<page download/download>#warning">identify
     yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough
     information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a
-    href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution">encrypted
+    href="<page about/overview>#thesolution">encrypted
     three-hop circuit</a> design.
     </p>