vxcontrol/pentagi
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi.git synced 2026-07-20 23:57:11 -04:00
Code Issues 45 Packages Projects Releases 9 Wiki Activity

[GH-ISSUE #316] [phantomcreds] Exposed secrets detected in this repository #105

New Issue
Closed
opened 2026-06-06 22:09:09 -04:00 by yindo · 1 comment
yindo commented 2026-06-06 22:09:09 -04:00
Owner
Copy Link
Copy Source

Originally created by @tg12 on GitHub (May 21, 2026).
Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/issues/316

Credential-handling risk report for vxcontrol/pentagi

phantomcreds detected repo-level code or deployment patterns that warrant maintainer review.

Metric Value
Scan date 2026-05-21
Composite score 0.350
Findings 1
Issue-worthy findings 1
Discovery sources secret-path-deepseek-env
Exposed secret indicators [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode

Detected finding types: exposed_secret

Secret-bearing credential material appears committed in current repository files

  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: confirmed
  • Summary: Current repository files appear to contain committed API keys or webhook-style credential material. 9 redacted secret indicators were found in fetched repository files. Evidence is redacted in the report output.

Evidence:

  • README.md:2447 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable)]`
  • docker-compose.yml:132 - [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]
  • docker-compose.yml:227 - [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]
  • .vscode/launch.json:14 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable",]
  • .vscode/launch.json:134 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable",]
  • .vscode/launch.json:155 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable",]
  • backend/cmd/installer/files/links/docker-compose-langfuse.yml:40 - [REDACTED:postgresql://${LANGFUSE_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@langfuse-postgres:5432/${LANGFUSE_POSTGRES_DB:-langfuse}]
  • backend/cmd/installer/files/links/docker-compose.yml:132 - [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]
  • backend/cmd/installer/files/links/docker-compose.yml:227 - [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]

LLM Fix Guide

Recommended remediation order:

  1. Revoke or rotate the exposed credential(s): [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode.
  2. Remove the committed secret material from the current default branch and replace it with environment-variable or secret-manager loading.
  3. If the secret existed in prior commits, rewrite history or invalidate the old credential so historical clones are harmless.
  4. Add secret-bearing files to .gitignore and provide a safe template file such as .env.example instead of live credentials.

Suggested prompt for an LLM coding assistant:

Remove the exposed credential material from this repository without breaking runtime configuration.
Replace committed secrets with environment-variable loading or secret-manager integration.
Add or update ignore rules so secret-bearing files are not recommitted.
Preserve existing behavior, but migrate any checked-in .env, private-key, or service-account material to safe templates.
Assume the scanner evidence came from current files on the default branch, not from a full git-history scan.
Show the exact files changed and include a short post-fix verification checklist.

This report is based on current files fetched from the repository's default branch at scan time.
It does not by itself prove that older commits are clean or compromised.

This scan is evidence-first and probabilistic. It is not an accusation of malicious intent.
If any finding is incorrect or outdated, please reply with corrected context and exact file references.

Automated by phantomcreds.
Project repo · Created by James Sawyer
at JS Labs.

Originally created by @tg12 on GitHub (May 21, 2026). Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/issues/316 <!-- phantomcreds:issue --> <!-- phantomcreds:issue:secrets --> <!-- phantomcreds:scan:2026-05-21 --> ## Credential-handling risk report for `vxcontrol/pentagi` phantomcreds detected repo-level code or deployment patterns that warrant maintainer review. | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Scan date | 2026-05-21 | | Composite score | **0.350** | | Findings | 1 | | Issue-worthy findings | 1 | | Discovery sources | secret-path-deepseek-env | | Exposed secret indicators | [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode | Detected finding types: `exposed_secret` ### Secret-bearing credential material appears committed in current repository files - Severity: `high` - Confidence: `confirmed` - Summary: Current repository files appear to contain committed API keys or webhook-style credential material. 9 redacted secret indicators were found in fetched repository files. Evidence is redacted in the report output. Evidence: - `README.md:2447 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable`)]` - `docker-compose.yml:132 - [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]` - `docker-compose.yml:227 - [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]` - `.vscode/launch.json:14 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable",]` - `.vscode/launch.json:134 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable",]` - `.vscode/launch.json:155 - [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode=disable",]` - `backend/cmd/installer/files/links/docker-compose-langfuse.yml:40 - [REDACTED:postgresql://${LANGFUSE_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@langfuse-postgres:5432/${LANGFUSE_POSTGRES_DB:-langfuse}]` - `backend/cmd/installer/files/links/docker-compose.yml:132 - [REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]` - `backend/cmd/installer/files/links/docker-compose.yml:227 - [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode=disable]` ### LLM Fix Guide Recommended remediation order: 1. Revoke or rotate the exposed credential(s): `[REDACTED:postgres://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgres://postgres:[REDACTED:[REDACTED]]@localhost:5432/pentagidb?sslmode, [REDACTED:postgresql://${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_USER:[REDACTED:-postg...res}]@pgvector:5432/${PENTAGI_POSTGRES_DB:-pentagidb}?sslmode`. 2. Remove the committed secret material from the current default branch and replace it with environment-variable or secret-manager loading. 3. If the secret existed in prior commits, rewrite history or invalidate the old credential so historical clones are harmless. 4. Add secret-bearing files to `.gitignore` and provide a safe template file such as `.env.example` instead of live credentials. Suggested prompt for an LLM coding assistant: ```text Remove the exposed credential material from this repository without breaking runtime configuration. Replace committed secrets with environment-variable loading or secret-manager integration. Add or update ignore rules so secret-bearing files are not recommitted. Preserve existing behavior, but migrate any checked-in .env, private-key, or service-account material to safe templates. Assume the scanner evidence came from current files on the default branch, not from a full git-history scan. Show the exact files changed and include a short post-fix verification checklist. ``` This report is based on current files fetched from the repository's default branch at scan time. It does not by itself prove that older commits are clean or compromised. --- This scan is evidence-first and probabilistic. It is not an accusation of malicious intent. If any finding is incorrect or outdated, please reply with corrected context and exact file references. Automated by [phantomcreds](https://github.com/tg12/phantomcreds). [Project repo](https://github.com/tg12/phantomcreds) · Created by [James Sawyer](https://github.com/tg12) at [JS Labs](https://labs.jamessawyer.co.uk/).
yindo closed this issue 2026-06-06 22:09:10 -04:00
yindo commented 2026-06-06 22:09:10 -04:00
Author
Owner
Copy Link
Copy Source

@asdek commented on GitHub (May 27, 2026):

hey @tg12

file .env.example doesn't contains any secrets for production environment.

<!-- gh-comment-id:4558339085 --> @asdek commented on GitHub (May 27, 2026): hey @tg12 file .env.example doesn't contains any secrets for production environment.
Sign in to join this conversation.
No Branch/Tag Specified
Branches Tags
Labels
Clear labels
bug
enhancement
help wanted
pull-request
Mirrored from GitHub Pull Request
 question
No Label
Milestone
No items
No Milestone
Projects
Clear projects
No project
Assignees
Clear assignees
yindo
No Assignees
1 Participants
Notifications
Due Date
No due date set.
Dependencies

No dependencies set.

Reference: vxcontrol/pentagi#105
Delete Branch "%!s()"

Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?